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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

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Accessions  No.  .££&:£ &.Y    Shelf  No. .. 


INTRODUCTION 


STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


BY 


J.  H.  W.  STUCKENBERG,   D.D, 


Ndn  gorft 


A.    C.    ARMSTRONG    AND    SON 

61  EAST  10th  STREET,  NEAR  BROADWAY 


"EDs 


COPYRIGHT,  1888, 
BY  A.  C.  ARMSTRONG  &  SON. 


PRESSWORK  BY  JOHN  WlLSON  AND  SON, 
UNIVERSITY  PRESS. 


PREFACE. 


THE  title  indicates  the  specific  aim  of  this  volume. 
It  is  not  an  encyclopaedia;  nor  is  it  intended  as  an 
introduction  to  any  particular  philosophical  system,  or 
to  the  history  of  the  various  systems,  but  to  the  study 
of  philosophy  itself.  The  book  was  not  written  for 
philosophers,  but  for  students  and  others  who  desire  to 
prepare  themselves  fpr  philosophic  pursuits.  While 
especially  adapted  to  beginners  in  philosophy,  maturer 
students  will  find  it  helpful  as  a  review.  It  may  serve 
to  concentrate  and  crystallize  the  thoughts  which  have 
been  confused  and  bewildered  by  the  perplexing  prob- 
lems of  philosophy,  and  by  the  antagonistic  views  in 
the  different  systems,  and  thus  may  prepare  the  thinker 
for  a  new  and  more  vigorous  start  in  philosophic  re- 
search. The  urgent  need  of  such  a  work  is  the  apology 
for  its  existence,  —  a  need  evident  to  all  who  under- 
stand the  inherent  difficulties  of  philosophy,  the  con- 
flicting notions  respecting  its  nature,  aim,  divisions,  and 
method,  and  the  numerous  mistakes  of  students,  and 
their  failure  to  secure  the  best  results  from  philosophic 

inquiries. 

iii 


IV  PREFACE. 

The  specific  aim  has  not  merely  determined  the  gen- 
eral character  of  the  volume,  but  also  its  particular 
parts,  so  as  to  limit  the  contents  strictly  to  the  scope 
of  an  introductory  work.  No  labor  has  been  spared  to 
present,  in  the  clearest  manner,  such  thoughts  as  are 
regarded  most  essential  for  the  beginner.  The  reader 
who  knows  the  difference  between  floundering  in  a 
subject,  and  thinking  through  it,  is  in  no  danger  of 
mistaking  obscurity  as  synonymous  with  philosophical 
profundity.  But  even  an  elementary  work  in  philos- 
ophy is  obliged  to  discuss  subjects  which  require  pro- 
found study,  and  furnish  food  for  the  deepest  thought. 
Particularly  is  this  the  case  with  those  great  problems 
which  have  enlisted  the  best  energies  of  thinkers  ever 
since  the  birth  of  philosophy.  The  student  who  has 
the  acumen  and  thoroughness  which  adapt  him  to  phil- 
osophical investigations  will  appreciate  the  importance 
of  grappling  early  with  themes  which  most  severely 
test  his  intellectual  powers.  While  intent  on  securing 
all  possible  help  to  put  him  into  the  right  attitude  to 
philosophy,  he  will  value  all  aids  only  as  means  for 
becoming  independent  of  foreign  help.  Philosophy  is 
not  taught,  but  thought;  and  even  an  introductory 
work  presupposes  that  the  student  will  do  more  for 
himself  than  others  can  do  for  him.  Particularly  in 
philosophy  is  it  true,  that  what  one  gets  depends  on 
what  he  brings. 

The  best  introduction  to  philosophy  is  not  so  much 
an  accumulation  of  materials  of  thought,  as  the  develop- 


PREFACE.  V 

ment  and  proper  direction  of  the  energy  of  thought- 
While  the  following  chapters  aim  to  give  a  clear  state- 
ment of  problems,  and  hints  for  their  solution,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  their  full  discussion  must  be  left  to  philosophy 
itself.  Where  mere  statements  are  all  that  the  philoso- 
pher requires,  the  beginner  may  need  the  processes 
themselves  which  lead  to  the  results  attained  by  ma- 
ture thinkers ;  and  here  such  processes  are  frequently 
given,  so  that,  by  means  of  the  genetic  method,  the 
student  may  learn  that  only  by  thinking  through  a 
thought  can  it  be  appropriated.  At  the  end  of  each 
chapter,  hints  are  found  under  the  head  of  Reflections, 
intended  partly  as  a  review,  but  mainly  as  suggestions 
for  independent  inquiry  and  for  mental  discipline. 

Aside  from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  the  character 
of  the  volume  has  been  determined  by  the  author's  own 
experience  of  the  difficulties  of  philosophical  studies, 
and  by  extensive  observations,  in  America  and  Ger- 
many, of  the  perplexities  and  mistakes  of  students  of 
philosophy.  Particularly  have  these  observations  been 
valuable  in  Berlin,  where  students  congregate  from  all 
parts  of  the  world.  A  careful  consideration  of  the  need 
of  beginners  has  led  to  the  treatment  of  certain  subjects 
with  greater  fulness  than  required  in  ordinary  philo- 
sophical works  ;  while  other  topics  have  been  only  men- 
tioned or  briefly  discussed,  their  full  consideration  being 
left  to  a  period  of  greater  maturity.  A  clear  view  of 
philosophy  itself  and  its  divisions,  a  definite  statement 
of  the  problems  involved,  and  specific  directions  for 


Vi  PREFACE. 

thorough  and  successful  study,  have  been  the  constant 
aim.  While  the  views  of  philosophers  in  past  ages  may 
be  learned  from  their  books,  or  from  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy, the  student  generally  finds  it  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to  form  a  comprehensive  view  of  present  tendencies 
in  philosophic  thought,  —  tendencies  which  are  the  more 
important  because  he  is  continually,  though  perhaps 
unconsciously,  subject  to  their  influence.  Frequent 
reference  is  made  to  the  present  status  of  philosophy, 
in  order  that  the  student  may  learn  what  special  de- 
mands the  age  makes  on  the  philosophic  thinker,  and 
against  what  dangers  he  must  guard.  Wisdom  does  not 
lose  itself  in  random  thinking,  but  it  selects  timely  and 
useful  subjects,  which  the  historic  development  justi- 
fies and  the  age  makes  urgent,  and  which  are  capable 
of  richest  development  and  most  fruitful  application. 

Much  valuable  help  has  been  derived  from  the  numer- 
ous volumes  consulted ;  but  as  none  of  them  has  exactly 
the  same  aim  as  this  volume,  they  could  not  determine 
the  general  plan  and  particular  method  of  the  book. 
It  is  hoped  that  the  student  will  find  in  the  wprk  that 
independence  respecting  prevalent  systems  which  the 
book  itself  is  intended  to  promote.  So  far  as  justice 
required,  special  mention  has  been  made  of  the  authors 
used.  The  student  will  be  grateful  for  the  views  of  emi- 
nent philosophers  on  the  most  important  problems ;  and 
he  who  makes  reading  subordinate  to  thinking  will  not 
regret  the  opportunities  for  reflection  furnished  by  the 
interruptions  occasioned  by  footnotes.  The  longer 


PREFACE.  yii 

notes  are  thrown  into  the  Appendix,  and  to  these  the 
numbers  in  the  text  refer. 

In  discussing  the  relation  of  philosophy  to  science, 
it  would  have  been  easy  to  treat  the  subject  wholly 
from  the  philosophical  standpoint.  But  this  relation 
has  become  so  important,  that  both  sides  should  be 
heard;  and  for  this  reason  the  views  of  scientists,  as 
well  as  those  of  philosophers,  are  presented:  hence 
numerous  references  are  made,  both  in  the  text  and  in 
the  Appendix,  to  leaders  in  science. 

In  addition  to  the  works  referred  to  in  the  text,  a 
list  of  books  is  given  at  the  end  of  the  first  chapters,  on 
the  subjects  therein  discussed.  This  list  may  be  valu- 
able as  an  introduction  to  the  literature  on  philosophy, 
particularly  to  the  philosophical  journals.  Besides  a 
knowledge  of  current  philosophical  tendencies,  these 
journals  furnish  valuable  aid  to  the  student  for  the 
selection  of  works  on  the  general  subject,  and  on  the 
various  departments  of  philosophy. 

J.  H.  W.  STUCKENBERG. 

BERLIN,  Dec.  21, 1887. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

INTRODUCTION 1 

I.    DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 11 

II.    RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION 57 

III.  PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL  SCIENCE 93 

IV.  PHILOSOPHY  AND  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY    ,    .    .    .  129 
V.    DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 159 

VI.    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  (NOETICS) 175 

VII.    METAPHYSICS 242 

VIII.    ^ESTHETICS 268 

IX.    ETHICS 310 

X.    THE  SPIRIT  AND  THE   METHOD   IN  THE  STUDY  OF 

PHILOSOPHY 345 

APPENDIX 399 

INDEX .                                                                                    ,  421 


INTRODUCTION. 


IF  philosophy  is  the  object  of  onr  search,  the  ques- 
tion respecting  the  means  for  its  attainment  is  funda- 
mental. But  not  less  important  is  an  inquiry  into  the 
state  of  the  person  who  is  to  engage  in  this  search,  and 
to  use  these  means.  The  apprehension  of  the  subject, 
and  the  application  of  the  means,  depend  on  the  stu- 
dent's intellectual  grasp  and  energy,  his  previous  train- 
ing and  mental  possessions.  Since  these  vary  so  greatly, 
their  peculiarities  in  each  individual  case  cannot  be 
taken  into  account  here :  only  what  must  be  required 
of  all  can  be  indicated.  Although  we  are  obliged  to 
leave  the  matter  mainly  to  himself,  the  greatest  emphasis 
must  be  placed  on  the  state  of  the  beginner  in  the  study 
of  philosophy.  Thrown  upon  his  own  resources  more 
than  in  any  other  pursuit,  a  fault  in  himself  or  in  his 
attitude  toward  philosophy  may  prove  fatal  to  success. 

Not  only  must  philosophy  in  the  abstract,  and  what 
the  student  is  in  himself,  be  considered.  The  develop- 
ment attained  by  philosophy  and  the  general  condition 
of  thought,  particularly  in  his  immediate  surroundings, 
are  also  important  factors  in  determining  his  course. 
Even  mature  philosophers  cannot  ignore  the  current 
tendencies  of  their  age ;  still  less  can  this  be  done 
by  beginners.  The  earnest  student  of  philosophy,  an 
inquirer  into  deepest  thought,  is  supposed  to  be  exempt 


2  INTRODUCTION. 

from  ordinary  errors  and  prejudices  respecting  the 
nature  and  value  of  his  pursuit.  The  severe  labor  re- 
quired of  the  philosophic  thinker  is  evidence  that  the 
best  truth  may  lie  farthest  below  the  surface,  and  cannot 
be  received  as  a  direct  impression  through  the  senses,  or 
as  an  inspiration.  Other  views  calculated  to  embarrass 
him  may,  however,  be  worthy  of  serious  attention,— 
views  infecting  the  air  we  breathe,  arid  unconsciously 
becoming  a  part  of  our  very  being  and  intellectual  life. 
f  In  every  age  opposite  tendencies  prevail,  animated  by 
;  different  spirits,  pursuing  methods  which  are  in  conflict, 
\and  terminating  in  results  which  cannot  be  harmonized. 
Frequently  these  antagonistic  movements  are  extremes 
which  beget  and  develop  one  another.  When  the  error 
in  an  extreme  is  discovered,  the  mind  is  apt  to  reject 
even  the  truth  with  which  it  is  associated,  and  to  adopt 
one-sidedly  the  truth  which  was  ignored  or  denied ;  but 
truth  out  of  right  relations,  or  developed  in  undue  pro- 
portion to  other  truths,  is  itself  an  error.  It  requires 
rare  breadth,  depth,  and  impartiality,  to  discern,  appro- 
priate, and  properly  relate  all  that  is  true  in  a  system, 
while  rejecting  all  that  is  erroneous. 

Amid  the  numerous  currents  of  our  agitated  age,  there 
are  two  fundamental  tendencies  which  are  radically 
antagonistic.  On  the  one  hand,  we  discover  the  maxim 
which  confines  thought  to  external  objects,  as  the  only 
source  of  valid  and  valuable  knowledge.  Observation 
and  experiment  are  pronounced  the  only  means  of  com- 
municating with  the  real,  and  the  mind  is  solely  esteemed 
as  the  agent  which  unites  the  materials  thus  gathered, 
and  which  draws  from  them  such  laws  as  give  the  intel- 
lect a  comprehensive  view  of  the  facts,  and  enable  it  in 
some  measure  to  foretell  coming  natural  events.  Nature 
being  regarded  as  the  chief  object  of  investigation, 


en 


INTRODUCTION.  3 


empiricism,  aided  by  mathematics,  domineers  thought. 
The  mind  is  treated  as  the  passive  tool  of  the  sense, 
subject  to  its  laws,  run  in  its  grooves,  and  limited  by 
its  authority.  The  human  interests  receiving  supreme 
attention  are  those  most  closely  connected  with  nature, 
and  with  the  animal  creation  at  large.  As  the  facts  of 
the  natural  world  are  made  the  germs  of  science,  so  the 
facts  of  human  history  become  the  seeds  of  ethics, 
sociology,  and  politics.  A  deep  distrust  of  rnind  is  fre- 
quently revealed  by  minds  controlled  by  this  tendency, 
and  vigorous  efforts  are  made  to  suppress  aspiration  be- 
yond the  limits  of  natural  law.  Much  formerly  regarded 
as  real,  or  at  least  as  a  mental  representation  of  reality, 
is  now  mercilessly  assigned  to  poetry  and  fiction,  while 
the  sense  is  endowed  with  an  intuitive  knowledge  of 
things  as  they  are.  To  thought  preferring  the  limits 
of  its  own  law  to  those  of  empirical  realism,  the  region 
of  mythology  is  generously  donated.  Cherished  ideals 
are  treated  as  pleasant  and  perhaps  harmless  illusions ; 
faith  is  regarded  as  effete  ;  ajid  theology  and  meta- 
physics are  interpreted  as  aberrations  of  mind  on  its 
way  to  positivism,  the  Ultima  Thule  of  reliable  thought. 
This  tendency  is  not,  however,  confined  to  positivists. 
Sacrificing  depth  to  breadth,  it  is  a  widely  diffused  spirit 
with  various  manifestations,  agreeing  in  its  negations 
rather  than  in  its  positions.  Thus  experience  may  be 
lauded  as  the  sole  guide,  and  yet  the  results  obtained 
may  differ  greatly.  The  theoretic  rejection  of  faith  does 
not  prevent  assumptions  which  reveal  astounding  credu- 
lity. Theology  can  be  rejected  as  worthless,  and  then, 
to  meet  the  cravings  of  the  mind,  something  termed 
natural  religion  can  be  invented,  or  a  cultus  of  reason, 
genius,  or  humanity  can  be  instituted.  If  a  practical  rest 
can  be  found  in  a  theoretical  void,  agnosticism  may  be 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

pronounced  final.  Facts  may  be  regarded  as  most 
valuable  in  their  naked,  unconnected  reality,  while  a 
system  of  them  is  viewed  as  suspicious  because  too 
mental.  Above  all  else,  that  is  esteemed  as  having 
worth  which  can  be  weighed  and  measured,  and  ex- 
pressed in  mathematical  formulas. 

Numerous  evidences  of  this  spirit  are  found  in  life 
and  literature.  Socialism  boldly  proclaims  that  science 
has  abolished  the  spiritual  world  and  the  ideals,  and  that 
consequently  the  most  illiterate,  by  placing  himself  on 
the  conclusions  of  science,  will  be  consistent  with  it  if 
he  limits  his  desires  and  pursuits  to  the  immediate  inter- 
ests of  this  life.  Selfishness  and  passion  have  much  to 
do  with  determining  these  interests.  Unless  some  altru- 
istic notions  can  be  communicated  to  him,  he  is  freed 
from  the  dominion  of  all  authority  outside  of  himself, 
that  of  blind  force  or  the  penal  laws  of  society  alone 
excepted.  With  the  dominion  of  empiricism,  new 
methods  of  education  are  also  to  be  introduced.  Men- 
tal science  is  treated  a^. vague  and  unreliable,  because 
it  does  not  submit  to  tape-lines  and  scales.  Even  history 
is  depreciated,  because  it  does  not  square  itself  to  the 
rules  of  mathematics.  Humanity  has  so  meandering 
a  course,  that  it  can  be  studied  to  best  advantage  in  the 
severer  scientific  regularity  of  brutes.  The  classics  are 
objectionable,  because  by  promoting  ideals  they  disturb 
the  mind's  possession  of  the  reals. 

Not  indeed  all  who  cherish  this  spirit  go  to  these 
extremes ;  but  one  need  only  be  familiar  with  the  press 
of  the  day,  to  learn  that  potent  factors  in  society  tend 
to  destroy  the  ethical  and  spiritual  basis,  to  interpret 
what  is  termed  mental  by  the  mechanical,  to  deprive  the 
soul  of  confidence  in  its  peculiarities  and  deepest  inter- 
ests, and  to  involve  it  in  that  pessimism  which  has 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

become  so  marked  a  feature  of  the  most  sensitive  and 
most  cultured  among  those  controlled  by  this  spirit. 

So  general  and  so  dominant  is  this  spirit,  that  all  who 
eagerly  enter  the  domain  of  science,  to  become  masters 
of  its  principles,  are  likely  to  come  under  its  influence. 
In  proportion  to  the  zeal  with  which  an  object  is  pur- 
sued, does  it  abstract  the  attention  from  other  objects. 
Not  in  enthusiasm  for  a  specialty  is  there  danger  for  the 
mind,  but  in  affirmations  respecting  the  reality  or  char- 
acter of  the  territory  lying  outside  of  that  specialty, 
and  not  even  entered  by  the  intellect.  It  is  a  common 
human  failing  to  make  the  knowledge  obtained  in  one 
sphere  of  thought  the  light  to  illumine  the  darkness  of 
every  other  sphere.  Not  unfrequently  has  nature  been 
interpreted  by  the  knowledge  obtained  of  mind;  and, 
in  our  day,  the  reverse  is  common. 

The  correctness  of  the  claims  made  by  this  spirit  will 
be  considered  later ;  here  we  want  only  to  contrast  it 
with  another  tendency.  In  science  itself  there  are 
numerous  illustrations  that  the  best  scientists  are  not 
exclusive.  Not  a  few  of  them  admit  that  science  is 
neither  the  measure  of  reality  nor  the  limit  of  the  intel- 
lect. Tyndall,  Huxley,  Haeckel,  Helmholtz,  Du  Bois- 
Reymond,  and  many  others,  prove  by  their  works  that 
science  is  but  the  basis  for  thought  in  its  progress  to 
broader  generalizations  and  higher  flights.  There  are 
even  scientists  who  compensate  for  the  absence  of  fancy 
in  their  themes,  by  liberally  supplying  it  themselves. 

But  it  is  outside  of  the  domain  of  science  that  a  spirit, 
the  opposite  of  that  described,  is  most  manifest.  All 
religion  proves  that  the  mind  is  unwilling  to  be  confined 
to  the  dogmatism  of  empiricism.  But  also  in  other 
departments  thought  rebels  against  the  prescribed  limits, 
strives  to  free  itself  from  the  trammels  of  gross  objects, 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

revels  in  poetry  and  fiction,  and  thus  proves  that  it 
wants  to  supplement  the  known  realities  of  nature  with 
creations  of  its  own,  in  order  that  it  may  obtain  satis- 
faction. The  age  which  seeks  to  curb  thought  has  not 
a  few  who  hail  even  Emerson's  poetry  as  philosophy, 
failing  to  discriminate  between  the  rational  and  imagin- 
ative elements  in  his  works.  Plato  has  been  subject  to 
the  same  treatment  in  all  ages.  And  it  looks  as  if  in 
realistic  America  an  era  of  Hegelistic  idealism  were 
about  to  be  inaugurated, — an  idealism  farthest  removed 
from  the  dominion  of  facts,  and  blending  the  subtlest 
fiction  with  the  profoundest  reason.  Look  where  we 
will  in  the  most  practical  and  most  scientific  lands, 
thought  proves  by  a  fact,  by  its  own  energy,  that  it 
cannot  be  buried  under  a  mass  of  sensations. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  prove  to  the  student  of  phi- 
losophy, that  there  are  aspirations  which  a  cramped 
knowledge  cannot  satisfy.  Nor  is  it  worth  while  further 
to  pursue  this  spirit  in  its  efforts  to  move  in  a  sphere 
which  transcends  the  phenomena  of  nature.  One  need 
but  understand  himself,  in  order  to  know  that  the  real 
of  the  senses  is  not  the  limit  of  the  real  of  reason. 
Never  has  the  intellect  been  limited  to  the  former,  ex- 
cept by  a  theory  not  fully  understood  by  its  advocates. 

Looking  at  these  opposite  tendencies,  both  equally 
marked  in  our  day,  what  is  their  lesson  ?  What  posi- 
tion respecting  them  shall  we  take?  Empiricism  is 
liable  to  err  in  limiting  thought  to  sensations,  while 
speculation  is  in  danger  of  ignoring  the  data  of  the 
senses.  The  one  treats  as  final  what  is  but  a  beginning ; 
the  other  treats  as  the  beginning  what  still  requires  a 
solid  basis.  The  mind  cannot  be  content  with  the  facts 
of  nature  bound  together  in  a  rigid  system  of  laws, 
while  all  reality  beyond  the  visible  and  the  tactual  is 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  7 

denied.  Nor  can  we  build  solid  structures  on  creations 
of  the  fancy.  The  mind  conscious  of  itself  demands 
a  certainty  that  is  absolute,  and  at  the  same  time  the  pur- 
suit of  thought  to  its  utmost  limits.  This  means  the  union 
of  what  is  good  and  reliable  in  both  tendencies,  without 
the  adoption  of  their  extremes.  It  means  actualism  and 
realism,  whether  found  in  the  highest  or  lowest  domains 
of  thought.  The  intellect  can  only  be  true  to  itself 
while  moving  in  a  freedom  whose  sole  law  is  the  neces- 
sity of  reason. 

The  above  result  justifies  the  demand  for  philosophy. 
Numerous  other  reflections  lead  to  philosophy  and  illus- 
trate its  scope. 

1.  The  concrete  is  endless.    The  mind  cannot  remem- 
ber all  individual  objects;   if  it  did,  they  would  only 
prove  a  useless  burden.     But  every  step  it  takes  from 
the    concrete   toward   the    abstract,    from   percepts   to 
concepts,    and   from    concepts   to  principles,  decreases 
the  number  but  increases  the  comprehensiveness  of  the 
objects  before  the  mind.      There   is   a   strong   innate 
tendency  to  unite  under  as  few  heads  as  possible  all 
the  objects  of  knowledge.    However  far  separated  at  the 
start,  as  they  increase  in  depth,  the  thoughts  converge 
and  tend  to  union  in  the  ultimate  principles. 

2.  Besides  this  tendency  to   seek   the   fundamental 
thought  which  lies  in  many  or  all  other  thoughts,  the 
mind  also  wants  to  find  the  various  relations  of  concepts. 
It  seeks  so  to  unite  fragmentary  thoughts  as  to  form 
a  system.    Not  content  with  the  spontaneous  association 
of  thoughts,  it  aims  to  discover  their  hidden  relations,  so 
that  it  may  construct  an  intellectual  cosmos  in  which 
nothing  is  isolated. 

3.  Numerous  objects  appear  before  consciousness,  and 
then  vanish  to  return  no  more.     In  this  way  a  fleeting 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

world  is  presented,  and  because  continually  vanishing 
it  fails  to  satisfy.  Does  the  mind  exist  merely  for  the 
sake  of  these  ever-changing  impressions,  or  has  it  a  value 
of  its  own  ?  It  is  hard  to  believe  that  the  universe  has 
no  other  meaning  than  to  furnish  passing  phenomena. 
As  the  same  underlying  consciousness  abides  amid  the 
changes  of  its  objects,  so  the  mind  seeks  the  eternal 
substance  behind  the  vanishing  forms.  It  inquires  into 
the  ultimate  real ;  asks  whether  its  nature  changes,  or 
whether  in  what  we  term  phenomena  there  is  seen  only 
the  effect  of  changing  the  relations  of  the  real.  Can  we 
conceive  of  the  substance  as  unchangeable,  and  yet  as 
the  source  of  all  changes  ? 

4.  Our  opinions  vary.     We  make  mistakes,  and  cor- 
rect them.     Much  once  held  as  established  beyond  all 
question  is  now  pronounced  false.     Its  experiences  may 
lead  the  mind  to  question  its  ability  to  discover  the 
truth.    The  differences  of  opinion,  the  conflicts  between 
systems,  and  the  numerous  disputes  on  the  most  signifi- 
cant and  most  trivial  subjects,  shake  its  confidence  in 
the  ordinary  thinking.    As  the  intellect  becomes  critical, 
it  distinguishes  between  subjective  views  (opinions)  of 
truth,  and  the  truth  itself.     Are  there  criteria  which 
furnish  an  absolute  test  of  systems  and  an  invariable 
standard  of  truth  ? 

5.  The  greatest  interests  are  attacked.     The  exist- 
ence of  spirit  is  questioned;  the  freedom  and  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  are  denied ;  reason  is  eliminated  from 
the  universe,  and  blind  force  is  thought  to  banish  design  ; 
God  being  dethroned,  atoms  are  made  omnipotent.     Is 
there  still  a  reliable  basis  for  religion  ?     Or  is  faith  an 
empty  vision,  and  hope  a  dream  ?    What  are  the  objects 
of  supreme  worth  ? 

6.  Much  that  appears  I  condemn,  and  much  that  I 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

think  desirable  does  not  exist.  How  to  destroy  the  one 
and  promote  the  other,  thus  becomes  an  important 
problem.  In  one  domain  of  values,  taste  rules;  in 
another,  conscience.  What  is  their  authority?  How 
can  they  be  satisfied  ? 

7.  As  soon  as  the  intellect  penetrates  beyond  the 
surface  of  ordinary  thought,  numerous  perplexing  prob- 
lems appear.  The  effort  to  solve  them  leads  deeper  and 
deeper,  and  reveals  a  world  formerly  hid.  Far  away 
from  the  phenomenal,  the  mind  is  thrown  wholly  on  its 
own  resources,  and  depends  on  the  penetrative  energy 
of  its  thoughts.  How  can  it  discover  the  laws  of  reason 
and  move  safely  in  the  realm  of  pure  thinking? 

These  hints  give  an  idea  of  some  of  the  ways  which 
lead  to  philosophic  thought,  and  also  indicate  the  sphere 
in  which  the  discussions  of  this  book  move.  The  logi- 
cal arrangement  of  the  chapters  is  seen  at  a  glance. 
First  the  Nature  of  philosophy  is  considered ;  then  its 
Relation  to  adjacent  subjects ;  its  general  Divisions  are 
then  given,  and  these  are  followed  by  an  explanation  of 
each  division ;  and  last  of  all  the  Spirit  and  Method  in 
the  study  of  philosophy  are  discussed. 


INTRODUCTION  TO   THE  STUDY   OF 
PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER   I. 

DEFINITION    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

INTELLECT  is  energy,  great  equally  in  discovering  as 
in  solving  problems.  The  leading  systems  of  thought 
have  revealed  difficulties  before  unseen,  and  exposed 
fallacies  in  reasoning  before  supposed  to  be  perfect. 
The  works  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  of  Hume,  Kant,  and 
Hegel,  teem  with  problems ;  and  some  supposed  solu- 
tions given  by  them  are  found  to  contain  greater  prob- 
lems than  they  themselves  knew.  Difficulties  multiply 
as  we  go  deeper  ;  and  whoever  discovers  a  new  unsolved 
question  proves  that  he  has  thought  more  correctly  or 
more  profoundly  than  his  predecessors.  The  discovery 
of  such  problems,  where  the  ordinary  thinking  sees 
none,  is  the  first  step  toward  philosophical  thought; 
and  the  determination  of  their  exact  nature  is  a  condu 
tion  for  all  successful  attempts  at  solution.  The  diffi- 
culty which  arrests  thought  tests  the  mind's  quality, 
and  tends  to  develop  its  capacity.  £  Resistance  makes 
the  intellect  conscious  of  itself,  arid  arouses  its  greatest 
energy.  The  supposed  limits  of  the  understanding, 
for  instance,  provoke  to  almost  superhuman  efforts  to 
transcend  them.  jUnless  the  tension  is  too  great,  it  will 

11 


12      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

develop  the  utmost  strength.  The  spontaneous  flow  of 
thought  which  we  do  not  master,  and  are  scarcely  con- 
scious of,  may  become  so  habitual  as  to  unfit  the  mind 
for  riveted  attention  to  profound  themes,  and  for  the 
control  of  its  own  processes ;  while  problems  requir- 
ing penetrative  thought,  and  long,  absorbing  investiga- 
tion, are  of  inestimable  value  for  intellectual  discipline, 
even  if  their  study  ends  in  no  solutions.  Only  with 
severe  labor  can  we  rise  from  a  life  lost  amid  sensations, 
to  a  steady  contemplation  of  concepts.  These  are  at 
first  taken  for  what  they  seem  to  be,  just  like  the  im- 
pressions through  the  senses ;  only  after  severe  training 
to  the  task  can  the  mind  fathom  their  meaning,  discover 
their  problems,  discern  their  relations,  and  learn  what 
they  imply,  but  do  not  explicitly  state.  This  life  in 
the  concepts,  if  deep  and  consistent,  moves  among  the 
problems  which  have  enlisted  the  best  energies  of  the  first 
thinkers  for  thousands  of  years,  and  have  given  birth 
to  philosophy. 

All  who  use  this  term  intelligently  recognize  it  as 
designating  a  sphere  which  lies  far  beyond  the  range 
of  ordinary  thinking,  though  numerous  avenues  lead 
from  the  one  to  the  other.  The  profoundest  efforts  to 
solve  the  mysteries  of  thought  and  being  have  usually 
been  regarded  as  characteristic  of  philosophers.  The 
first  and  final  causes,  and  the  great  concepts  lying 
between  them,  are  the  realm  of  philosophy ;  but  such 
statements  are  too  general  to  convey  any  tangible 
meaning. 

It  is  a  popular  conviction,  that  the  object  of  philo- 
sophical contemplation  lies  beyond  ordinary  scholarship, 
as  well  as  beyond  the  search  of  the  masses ;  and  hence 
but  few  in  any  age,  even  when  scholarship  was  not 
unusual,  have  been  honored  with  the  illustrious  name 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  13 

of  philosophers.  But  the  reverence  accorded  to 'them 
has  been  based  on  vague  notions  of  the  excellence  of 
their  pursuit,  rather  than  on  a  clear  conception  of  its 
exact  nature.  The  recognition  that  depth  characterizes 
philosophy  has  not  served  to  dispel  the  mysteries  con- 
nected with  the  term.  The  popular  mind  associates 
with  it  wisdom  and  reason,  —  peculiar  endowments  and 
a  peculiar  sphere  of  inquiry ;  but  however  eminent 
and  solitary  the  position  thus  assigned  to  philosophy, 
its  real  character  has  been  but  little  understood  by  the 
popular  mind.  All  this  becomes  self-evident  so  soon 
as  we  appreciate  the  truth,  that  we  understand  only 
what  we  intellectually  elaborate  or  work  out  for  our- 
selves. 

The  use  of  the  term  on  the  part  of  scholars  is  scarcely 
less  vague  than  in  the  popular  mind.  The  proof  is 
found  in  works  of  scientists  and  philosophers,  and  in 
general  literature.  The  thoughtful  reader  is  conse- 
quently constrained  to  ask,  What  constitutes  philoso- 
phy? An  inquiry  into  the  mysteries  of  being?  The 
objects  which  philosophers  contemplate  ?  The  method 
of  inquiry  ?  The  results  attained  by  the  investigation  ? 
Whoever  seriously  reflects  on  the  word  will  apprehend 
the  difficulty  of  determining  its  exact  sense.  With  the 
prevailing  vagueness  in  its  use,  what  wonder  if  those 
beginning  the  study  of  philosophy  are  puzzled  by  the 
nature,  aim,  relations,  and  limits  of  the  subject? 

In  many  problems  an  exhaustive  study  is  the  condi- 
tion of  clear  conception ;  still  it  is  evident  that  at  the 
very  outset  the  exact  place  of  a  discipline  in  the  whole 
system  of  knowledge  should  be  determined  in  order  to 
insure  its  successful  investigation.  Perhaps  even  this 
can  be  done  only  after  long  inquiry ;  in  that  case  no 
effort  should  be  spared  in  the  beginning  to  determine 


14     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  subject  proximately  and  as  clearly  as  possible.  The 
limitation  given  a  subject  by  the  definition  is  essential 
to  concentration  and  perspicuity  of  thought.  We  must 
find  a  subject,  must  separate  it  from  its  attachments,  and 
possess  it  intellectually,  before  we  can  apply  to  it  predi- 
cates or  use  it  effectively.  The  rational  and  successful 
pursuit  of  a  study,  therefore,  necessarily  depends  largely 
on  a  clear  conception  of  its  nature.  Only  when  an 
object  is  in  some  measure  known,  can  the  way  to  it  be 
found  ;  only  then  can  it  be  recognized  when  discovered ; 
only  then  can  its  importance  be  appreciated,  and  direc- 
tions for  its  pursuit  be  valuable.  With  no  definite  end 
in  view,  the  most  diligent  study  is  in  danger  of  losing 
itself  in  distractions,  in  fruitless  search  ings,  and  idle 
wanderings. 

Definitions  are  a  mental  necessity.  In  every  defini- 
tion, two  things  are  to  be  distinguished ;  namely,  an 
object  defined,  and  the  mind  giving  the  definition. 
When  two  persons  define  the  same  word  differently, 
the  reason  is  found  in  the  knowledge,  the  needs,  the 
preferences,  the  prejudices,  and  perhaps  the  whims,  of 
the  persons.  An  object  may  be  viewed  in  two  lights. 
We  can  ask  what  it  is  in  itself,  or  we  can  content  our- 
selves with  the  impression  it  makes  on  our  minds  or 
what  it  is  to  us.  In  the  latter  case  we  consider  only 
what  the  object  seems  to  be,  or  how  it  strikes  us.  We 
do  not  go  beyond  this  to  inquire  whether  our  impres- 
sion is  correct,  but  we  take  it  as  final.  Superficial  as 
this  is,  it  is  the  common  way  of  viewing  objects.  An 
inquisitive  energy  is  required  to  lead  the  mind  from  the 
naive  to  the  critical  standpoint,  which  demands  an 
investigation  of  the  impression  itself  in  order  to  deter- 
mine its  truth  or  falsity.  So  long  as  uncriticised  impres- 
sions or  mere  opinions  are  taken  for  real  knowledge,  we 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  15 

must  expect  definitions  to  be  personal  and  arbitrary, 
with  a  flavor  of  the  defining  subject  rather  than  the 
characteristics  of  the  object  defined. 

A  sharp  distinction  between  the  mind  as  subject  and 
the  object  before  it,  and  a  discernment  of  the  difference 
between  what  seems  to  be  and  what  is,  are  the  best  evi- 
dences that  the  mind  has  passed  from  its  spontaneous 
to  the  critical  and  philosophical  stage.  By  abstracting 
(separating)  the  object  from  the  subject,  and  by  concen- 
trating the  attention  on  it,  the  mind  seeks  the  (not  a) 
definition.  It  is  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  intellect, 
when  it  begins  to  make  objective  truth  the  standard 
of  subjective  value. 

We  must  not  imagine  that  definitions  alone  change 
while  the  objects  remain  the  same.  A  word  may  be 
variously  defined  ;  but  then  the  same  word  stands  for 
as  many  different  objects  as  there  are  definitions.  'Both 
Hegel  and  J.  S.  Mill  wrote  on  logic,  but  they  did  not 
discuss  the  same  subject.  We  speak  of  the  philosophy 
of  Plato  and  of  Comte,  but  the  latter  rejected  from  phil- 
osophical inquiry  what  in  Plato's  system  is  the  essence. 
And,  as  the  same  word  may  stand  for  different  things, 
so  different  words  may  stand  for  the  same  object. 
There  is  thus  much  that  is  accidental  and  arbitrary  in 
the  use  of  words ;  and  where  clearness  and  exactness 
are  sought,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  to  come  to  an 
agreement  on  the  sense  in  which  words  are  to  be  taken.  ) 

Aside  from  these  general  considerations,  there  is  spe- 
cial need  of  determining  the  meaning  of  philosophy. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  find  another  word  of  the  same 
prominence  which  has  been  subject  to  as  many  changes 
and  to  such  a  variety  of  definitions.  At  different  times  it 
has  been  made  to  include  all  that  is  possible  and  real  on 
earth,  in  heaven,  and  in  imagination.  It  is  no  wonder, 


16      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

therefore,  that  teachers  of  philosophy  and  authors  of 
philosophical  works  find  it  extremely  difficult  to  define 
the  term,  and  be  consistent  in  its  use.  This  is  espe- 
cially true  of  the  historians  of  philosophy,  who  are 
perplexed  to  know  what  to  admit  and  what  to  exclude 
of  the  materials  regarded  in  the  various  ages  as  philo- 
sophical. While  some  standards  limit  these  to  rational 
speculation,  others  embrace  science  and  a  large  part  of 
general  literature.  When  we  consider  the  heterogeneity 
of  objects  designated  by  the  term  at  present,  we  must 
first  define  "  system  of  philosophy,"  when  used,  if  it  is 
to  convey  any  definite  meaning.  Indeed,  in  the  same 
university,  philosophical  systems  may  be  taught  which 
really  exclude  each  other. 

It  is  evident  that  this  indefiniteness  must  interfere 
both  with  the  study  and  the  progress  of  philosophy. 
The  stream  flowing  through  history  for  thousands  of 
years  has  at  last  separated  into  so  many  rivulets  that 
it  is  in  danger  of  losing  itself  in  the  sand.  Philoso- 
phers, therefore,  recognize  the  necessity  of  coming  to 
an  understanding  on  the  use  of  the  term,  so  that  they 
may  concentrate  their  efforts,  and  also  understand  one 
another.  Consequently,  in  philosophical  journals  and 
books,  the  definition  of  philosophy  is  one  of  the  subjects 
most  frequently  discussed.  So  long  as  those  regarded 
as  philosophers  cannot  agree  as  to  the  object  which 
engrosses  their  attention,  it  is  not  surprising  that  phi- 
losophy itself  is  regarded  with  suspicion,  and  treated 
by  many  as  unworthy  of  serious  inquiry.  Not  a  few 
earnest  thinkers  are  inquiring  whether  philosophy  stands 
for  any  thing  definite  and  valuable ;  whether  it  is  pos- 
sible as  a  distinct  department  of  thought.  If  it  is  an 
independent  subject  worthy  of  profound  consideration, 
why  do  not  philosophers  limit  the  word  and  their  inves- 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  17 

tigations  to  that  subject?  Some  have  become  suspi- 
cious that  under  cover  of  that  attractive  name  men 
have  sought  for  something  which  is  unattainable.  May 
it  not  be  that  the  progress  of  knowledge  shows  that 
philosophers  have  been  dreaming,  and  that,  being  awake 
now,  they  are  searching  in  vain  for  the  reality  in  their 
dreams  ?  Some  are  ready  to  put  philosophy  on  a  level 
with  astrology  and  alchemy;  they  accordingly  assign 
its  place  to  the  past  wanderings  of  the  human  mind 
in  its  progress  toward  knowledge. 

This  confusion  discourages  the  beginner,  and  makes 
the  study  difficult.  The  vague  use  of  the  term  also 
encourages  looseness  in  thinking,  and  deceives  the  stu- 
dent into  the  belief  that  he  has  attained  something  real 
and  precious,  when  he  has  nothing  but  a  word  that  is 
almost  meaningless,  and  includes  the  most  heterogene- 
ous materials.  Of  the  many  who  study  what  is  called 
philosophy,  not  a  few  at  the  end  of  their  collegiate 
course  cannot  define  the  word.  It  may  even  happen 
that  those  who  have  studied  the  elements  of  psychology 
or  logic  imagine  that  they  have  mastered  philosophy ! 

We  might  yield  to  the  temptation  either  to  drop  the 
term  altogether,  or  to  leave  it  in  its  present  indefinite- 
ness,  with  no  particular  object  and  no  peculiar  sphere, 
were  it  not  for  the  treasures  of  the  past  which  it  holds, 
and  for  the  conviction  that  it  stands  for  something  too 
precious  to  lose.  Subjects  are  often  difficult  in  propor- 
tion to  their  intrinsic  value,  and  the  terms  used  vaguely 
to  designate  them  may  only  indicate  the  eagerness  of 
the  mind  to  grasp  the  subjects  themselves.  There  is 
no  other  word  to  take  the  place  of  "  philosophy  ;  "  but 
the  concept  for  which  it  stands  is  so  difficult,  because 
it  lies  beyond  the  usual  objects  of  contemplation,  and 
this  naturally  contributes  to  the  present  confusion. 


18      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

But  no  one  who  forms  and  appreciates  the  concept  will 
begrudge  the  labor  it  costs.  The  student  with  patient 
thoroughness  in  the  beginning  may  discover  a  light 
which  shall  illumine  his  course  till  the  end. 

PRINCIPLES   WHICH   DETERMINE   THE    DEFINITION. 

In  a  definition  we  aim  at  a  full  and  clear  apprehen- 
sion of  an  object.  This  is  only  possible  by  so  limiting 
that  object  as  to  be  readily  distinguishable  from  others, 
especially  from  those  most  closely  related.  Brevity 
being  essential  to  clearness  in  definitions,  we  cannot 
give  a  full  description  of  an  object  by  defining  it ;  the 
characteristic  marks  by  which  it  can  at  once  be  recog- 
nized will  meet  all  requirements.  In  order  that  an 
object  may  be  known,  its  own  peculiarities,  as  well  as 
its  relation  to  other  objects,  must  be  indicated.  The 
most  essential  elements  are  the  determination  of  the 
class  or  genus  to  which  the  object  belongs,  and  its 
peculiarities  in  that  genus  (the  genus  proximum  and 
the  differentia  specified). 

Where  a  subject  is  complicated,  it  is  more  easy  to 
determine  what  the  general  requirements  of* a  defini- 
tion are  than  to  fix  the  principles  according  to  which  it 
is  to  be  found.  With  all  the  learned  and  laborious 
efforts  to  define  philosophy,  these  principles  have  not 
been  sufficiently  considered.  We  cannot  expect  agree- 
ment respecting  the  definition,  unless  it  is  understood 
with  what  conditions  it  must  comply.  Our  first  inquiry 
must  therefore  be :  What  rules  should  be  followed  in 
defining  philosophy  ? 

Owing  to  the  variety  of  objects  at  one  time  or 
another  included  under  this  name,  there  may  be  a 
strong  temptation  to  let  preference  or  prejudice  or  a 
mere  whim  decide  to  which  the  term  shall  be  applied. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


19 


Every  arbitrary,  merely  subjective  definition,  must, 
however,  be  rejected.  Whatever  its  authority  to  the 
mind  giving  it,  objective  value  it  cannot  claim.  We 
are  not  seeking  any  one's  opinion,  but  philosophy  itself, 
—  an  aim  according  to  which  the  reader  is  expected  to 
accept  or  reject  all  presented  in  this  chapter. 

For  the  same  reason  we  cannot  let  any  existing  sys- 
tem determine  the  sense  of  the  word,  unless  the  system 
itself  has  been  proved  the  true  philosophy.  It  is  com- 
mon to  adopt  a  system  taught  at  a  university,  and  then 
make  it  the  test  of  other  systems.  Those  pursuing 
this  method  should  remember  that  there  is  a  difference 
between  philosophy  and  philosophical  systems.  Every 
system  is  apt  to  have  some  peculiar  views  respecting 
philosophy  ;  and  it  is  to  be  regretted  if  the  beginner 
accepts  these,  and  lets  them  determine  the  whole  course 
of  his  inquiries,  instead  of  waiting  until  the  mind  can 
compare  and  critically  test  the  various  systems,  and  can 
either  form  its  own  or  adopt  one  rationally.  The  philo- 
sophic mind  can  wait. 

Not  a  few  define  the  term  according  to  what  they 
think  philosophy  can  and  ought  to  accomplish,  thus  lim- 
iting it  to  what  they  regard  as  most  important  or  within 
the  reach  of  the  mind.  This,  however,  makes  the  sub- 
jective state  the  principle  of  the  definition,  while  the 
historic  use  of  the  term  is  ignored.  If  this  rule  is 
adopted,  there  may  be  as  many  definitions  as  defmers. 
Besides,  it  has  by  no  means  been  determined  what  the 
limits  of  the  knowable  are ;  this,  in  fact,  is  one  of  the 
most  important  problems  of  philosophy,  and  it  would 
be  unreasonable  to  close  the  investigation  by  making 
any  one's  opinion  on  the  subject  the  last  appeal. 

Useful  as  the  etymology  may  be  in  determining  the 
original  sense  of  a  word,  it  does  not  necessarily  indicate 


20      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

its  meaning  afterwards.  Words  are  but  symbols  of 
thought,  and  their  meaning  is  liable  to  change  with  the 
concepts  for  which  they  stand.  It  sometimes  happens 
that  in  the  course  of  time  the  sense  of  a  word  changes 
to  the  very  opposite  of  the  original.  The  development 
of  a  subject  is  also  a  development  of  the  corresponding 
term,  which  grows  with  it  in  definiteness  and  richness. 
Yet  the  etymology  may  be  useful,  the  original  meaning 
of  a  word  being  in  many  cases  like  the  seed  which 
determines  the  future  growth.  As  all  development  is 
according  to  law,  each  stage  of  progress  depending  on 
the  preceding  growth,  the  etymology  is  important  in 
giving  the  root  of  the  meaning,  the  concept  of  those 
who  first  used  the  term,  and  the  nature  of  the  subject 
then  designated  by  it.  While,  therefore,  we  do  not 
expect  the  etymology  to  give  the  use  of  the  term  "  phi- 
losophy "  in  the  different  ages  and  the  various  systems, 
it  will,  nevertheless,  be  valuable  in  determining  impor- 
tant elements  in  the  historic  use  of  the  word. 

The  history  of  the  term  is  far  more  important  than 
its  etymology.  It  gives  the  notions  attached  to  the 
word  by  the  leading  philosophers  and  in  the  prominent 
systems.  Even  if  the  historical  use  has  varied  greatly, 
there  is  in  all  probability  something  common,  some 
leading  thought  which  underlies  the  various  senses,  at 
least  in  the  principal  systems.  If  this  common  element 
can  be  found,  it  will  give  the  central  thought  of  philos- 
ophy in  all  ages,  or  that  which  makes  an  historical  sys- 
tem philosophical.  Those  who  ignore  this  historical  use 
of  the  term  must  regard  the  standard  histories  of  phi- 
losophy misnomers,  and  must  sever  the  word  arbitrarily 
from  its  past  associations.  The  history  of  philosophy  is 
a  summary  of  the  thinking  of  all  philosophers,  even 
the  greatest  of  whom  constitutes  only  a  small  part  of  the 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  21 

whole  course  of  philosophical  development.  If,  then, 
we  prefer  the  whole  to  its  parts,  we  must  place  the  his- 
toric use  of  the  term  higher  than  the  conception  of  any 
philosopher,  unless  that  conception  is  either  a  legitimate 
product  of  the  historical  development,  or  else  proves 
that  development  to  be  fundamentally  wrong. 

Useful  as  the  historical  development  is  in  determining 
the  sense  of  the  term,  it  has  unfortunately  terminated 
in  no  generally  accepted  definition.  We  cannot  there- 
fore appeal  to  the  present  use  of  the  word  to  determine 
its  sense,  nor  is  any  system  so  prominent  as  to  make  any 
particular  meaning  generally  prevalent.  Still  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  age,  especially  of  its  best  thinkers, 
must  be  taken  into  account. 

A  careful  study  of  the  subject  will  show  that  the  con- 
fusion is  largely  verbal.  (jPhilosophy  really  has  a  sphere 
of  its  own,  clearly  defined,  and  very  important ;  and  no 
other  subject  can  either  take  its  place  or  make  it  un- 
necessary. Its  separate  existence  and  continued  study 
are  thereby  justified.  It  will  be  found  that  there  is  a 
sense  which  gives  the  essence  of  the  etymology,  as  well 
as  of  the  historic  use  of  the  term ;  which  contains  what 
is  common  to  the  great  systems ;  which  marks  an  impor- 
tant and  distinct  department  of  thought;  and  which 
also  gives  the  idea  on  which  the  present  intelligent  use 
of  the  word  is  based. 

We  shall  now,  under  the  guidance  of  these  principles, 
proceed  to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  term. 

ETYMOLOGY  AND   HISTORY   OF   THE  WORD. 

The  etymology  *  primarily  indicates  a  certain  spirit 
and  tendency,  namely  the  love  of  wisdom,  and  the  striv- 
ing to  become  wise.  So  long  as  wisdom  was  a  pursuit 

and  o-oc/ua. 


22     INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  not  an  attainment,  its  exact  nature  could  not  be 
determined.  The  sphere  of  inquiry  and  the  goal 
reached  were  to  each  seeker  the  measure  for  his  appre- 
hension of  the  desired  object.  Thus  wisdom  as  the 
chief  excellence  of  man  might  be  differently  appre- 
hended according  to  the  views,  preferences,  and  results 
of  the  inquirers.  It  might  be  viewed  as  the  summit  of 
speculation  in  any  particular  department,  or  as  the  cul- 
mination of  all  theoretical  inquiry  ;  or  it  could  be  taken 
as  the  practical  guide  of  life  or  as  skill  for  attaining  par- 
ticular ends,  —  a  skill  in  which  the  highest  theory  and 
best  practice  are  united.  It  was  not  unusual  to  ascribe 
wisdom  to  persons  who  excelled  in  an  art  or  learning. 
Pythagoras  is  said  to  have  been  the  first  who  employed 
"  philosophy  "  to  designate  a  particular  subject ;  and  it  is 
claimed,  that  he  called  himself  a  philosopher  rather  than 
wise,*  because  he  thought  God  alone  wise,  while  man  is 
merely  a  friend  of  wisdom,  and  strives  to  attain  it.f 
This  sentiment,  however,  corresponds  most  fully  with 
the  spirit  of  Socrates,  and  many  think  it  should  be  at- 
tributed to  him  rather  than  to  Pythagoras.  Plato  also 
repeatedly  states  that  wisdom  belongs  only  to  God, 
but  that  it  becomes  man  to  be  a  friend  or  lover  of 
wisdom. 

In  the  historical  use  of  the  word,  we  behold  a  reflec- 
tion of  the  various  views  of  philosophy  itself  in  the 
course  of  its  development.  We  must,  however,  distin- 
guish between  the  popular  and  the  technical  use  of  the 
term.  In  the  former,  some  phase  of  philosophy  is  usually 

*  4uA6o-o<£os  rather  than  0-0^6?. 

t  On  the  use  of  the  term  among  the  Greeks,  I  have  found  of  special 
value  "  Philosophic,"  by  R.  Haym,  in  Ersch  und  Gruber's  Encyklopaedie ; 
Paulsen,  "  Ueber  das  Verhaltniss  der  Philosophic  zur  Wissenschaft,"  in 
Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  wissenschaftliche  Philosophic,  1877,  first  number; 
and  Ueberweg's  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  Einleitung. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  23 

seized,  or  a  general  characteristic  designated ;  but  it  is 
of  little  service  in  determining  the  technical  sense. 

While  originally  the  word  indicated  merely  a  mental 
attitude  toward  wisdom,  and  the  striving  to  which  that 
led,  it  was  soon  used  also  to  designate  the  result  of  this 
striving.*  For  a  long  time,  however,  the  word  was  used 
vaguely.  Thus  Herodotus  employs  it  to  designate  the 
desire  for  learning,  while  Thucydides  uses  it  in  the  sense 
of  striving  after  intellectual  culture.  Among  others, 
sophists  and  rhetoricians  were  called  philosophers,  and 
the  contents  of  their  instruction  were  designated  phi- 
losophy. Isocrates,  for  instance,  uses  the  term  for  rheto- 
ric. Even  in  the  Socratic  school  the  sense  of  the  word 
was  by  no  means  fixed.  Plato  employs  it  for  study,  for 
learning,  for  love  of  learning;  but  the  knowledge  to 
which  he  especially  applies  it  is  that  sought  for  its  own 
sake  and  not  for  practical  application.  Thus  he  speaks 
of  himself  as  a  philosopher,  in  distinction  from  the 
sophist,  who  makes  a  trade  of  imparting  instruction, 
and  from  the  politician,  who  seeks  knowledge  for  practi- 
cal ends.  Like  Plato,  his  pupil  Aristotle  also  uses  the 
word  in  various  senses. 

Besides  this  general  use  of  the  term,  we,  however, 
find  that  Plato  and  Aristotle  also  employ  it  in  a  techni- 
cal sense.  Thus  Plato,  as  already  intimated,  uses  it  to 
designate  the  purely  theoretical  activity  of  the  mind, 
aside  from  any  practical  application  of  the  results 
attained.  While  the  artist  seeks  skill,  and  the  rhetori- 
cian and  politician  eloquence,  in  order  to  influence 
popular  assemblies,  the  philosopher  seeks  truth,  simply 

*  The  word  ivropia  has  been  subject  to  a  simliar  development  as 
<f>ao<ro<£i'a.  Both  originally  designated  merely  a  subjective  state  or  atti- 
tude, and  afterwards  the  results  attained,  namely  histories  and  philoso- 
phies. The  same  is  true  of  many  other  terms. 


24      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

because  it  is  the  truth.  The  philosopher  also  differs 
from  the  historian,  who  merely  describes  events.  Plato 
wants  to  get  behind  phenomena,  and  seeks  to  attain  an 
intellectual  apprehension  of  existence  ;  and  he  holds  that 
"  a  philosopher  is  one  who  sees  the  essence  of  things, 
the  true  things,  the  ideas."  *  Not  satisfied  with  the  tran- 
sient and  the  particular,  Plato  sought  the  eternal  and 
the  universal ;  instead  of  what  seems  to  be,  he  aimed  to 
get  at  reality  itself.  From  the  world  of  sense  he  with- 
drew to  the  world  of  ideas,  the  archetypes  of  all  exist- 
ence, the  contemplation  of  which  he  regarded  as  the  true 
philosophy.  The  term,  however,  is  not  confined  to  this 
contemplation  or  to  any  mental  attitude,  but  is  also 
applied  to  the  knowledge  or  system  which  is  the  result. 
But  as  a  system  philosophy  was  not  distinguished  from 
mathematics  and  physics ;  and  in  one  instance  Plato 
speaks  of  geometry  as  included  in  philosophy. 

The  verb  "  to  philosophize  "  is  used  by  Aristotle  in 
the  sense  of  inquiring  or  searching  after  knowledge 
or  truth,  and  he  pronounces  philosophy  the  science  of 
truth.  It  is  thus  a  general  term  for  learning,  especially 
for  deeper  knowledge.  Like  his  teacher,  Aristotle  did 
not  separate  science  from  philosophy. f  He,  however, 
makes  a  distinction  in  favor  of  what  he  calls  the  "  first 
philosophy,"  afterwards  designated  metaphysics.  But 
in  philosophy  he  also  includes  physics,  mathematics, 
ethics,  and  politics.  In  its  widest  sense  Aristotle,  in 

*  Paulsen. 

t  4>iAo(roe£c'a  is  at  times  used  by  him  as  synonymous  with  ero^ua,  and 
also  with  ejrio-TrjiuiTf.  Paulsen  says  of  Aristotle's  use  of  the  term,  "  No 
knowledge  whatever  is  excluded.  Aristotle  thinks  he  philosophizes 
when  he  investigates  the  natural  history  of  animals  or  household 
economy,  as  well  as  when  he  contemplates  the  nature  of  things  in  gen- 
eral, or  the  essence  of  knowledge.  He,  however,  manifests  a  tendency 
to  limit  the  term  to  a  narrower  sphere  :  he  wants  philosophy  to  con- 
sider being  in  general,  not  any  particular  part  of  it." 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  26 

fact,  embraces  within  it  all  the  knowledge  which  he 
himself  systematized.  But  in  a  more  specific  sense  it 
is  the  science  of  the  first  principles,  and  of  the  causes 
of  reality.  Haym  says  that  according  to  the  Aristo- 
telian conception,  "  the  science  of  the  philosopher  is  the 
science  of  being,  so  far  as  it  is  being, — being  in  gen- 
eral, not  in  particular."  It  thus  comprehends  all  that 
pertains  to  being,  such  as  its  matter,  its  form,  its  effi- 
cient and  its  final  cause.  Philosophy  is  thus  found 
to  consist  in  the  ultimate  explanation  of  all  existence. 
He  also  employs  the  term  to  designate  particular  sys- 
tems, for  instance  that  of  Thales. 

The  character  of  the  Greek  mind,  the  state  of  learn- 
ing, and  the  wanderings  necessary  in  the  search  for 
what  above  all  other  things  entitles  one  to  be  desig- 
nated wise,  explain  the  variety  of  senses  in  which  the 
word  was  used.  The  various  meanings  were  so  many 
hypotheses  respecting  its  real  nature,  which  were  des- 
tined to  be  confirmed  or  rejected  by  later  investigations. 
The  term  "  philosophy  "  more  than  any  other  expressed 
the  deepest  desire  and  highest  aspiration  of  the  Greek 
mind.  Wisdom  was  prized  more  than  aught  besides, 
and  philosophy  was  intended  to  embody  the  eagerness 
and  the  striving  of  the  mind  for  its  attainment.  All 
the  varied  results  thus  attained  were  also  designated 
philosophy,  a  fact  which  accounts  for  the  comprehen- 
sion under  this  term  of  all  that  was  supposed  to  make 
men  wise.  But  distinctions  were  made  in  these  attain- 
ments, some  being  regarded  more  excellent  than  others. 
What  philosophers  of  one  age  established,  those  of  the 
next  generation  tried  to  surpass ;  thus  age  after  age 
they  strove  to  get  nearer  the  goal  of  all  thinking. 
The  highest  attainments  in  any  period  were  naturally 
regarded  as  wisdom  in  the  truest  sense,  and  their  pos- 


26      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

sessor  was  emphatically  the  philosopher.  It  is  evident 
that  a  real  desire  for  wisdom  could  not  rest  content 
with  inferior  knowledge  ;  it  was  a  restless  impulse  to 
attain  the  most  exalted.  This  enables  us  to  understand 
why,  with  all  its  varied  applications,  the  term  "  philoso- 
phy," in  its  most  specific  sense,  should  designate  the 
ultimate  object  of  all  search,  namely  the  first  princi- 
ples. The  only  explanations  with  which  eager  inquiry 
could  stop  are  those  which  need  none  themselves,  or 
for  which  none  can  be  found.  While  all  that  lay  be- 
tween the  beginning  and  these  final  explanations  might 
be  viewed  as  part  of  philosophy,  it  was  nevertheless 
but  means  to  an  end,  its  value  consisting  in  that  it 
aided  the  mind  in  the  discovery  of  the  last  thought. 
As  wisdom  culminated  in  the  first  principles,  they  were 
called  philosophy  par  excellence.  Thus  both  Plato's 
ideas  or  archetypes,  and  Aristotle's  "  first  philosophy," 
regard  as  the  essence  of  philosophy  those  principles 
which  are  explanatory  of  all  things,  but  which  them- 
selves require  no  explanation. 

What  the  Greeks  meant  by  philosophy,  in  its  techni- 
cal sense,  may  be  inferred  from  the  systems  usually 
designated  by  that  name.  In  their  methods  and  results 
they  vary  greatly  ;  they,  however,  have  this  in  common : 
they  aim  to  get  beyond  phenomena  to  their  source  and 
final  interpretation.  The  first  Greek  philosophers  were 
intent  on  finding  the  primitive  substance,  or  the  ele- 
ments from  which  the  universe  was  compounded,  or  out 
of  which  the  present  order  is  developed.  The  inquiries 
of  the  Ionian  philosophers  were  cosmological.  Thales 
regards  water  as  the  source  of  all  existence.  Anaxi- 
mander  postulates  an  eternal,  self-moving,  indefinite 
something,*  as  lying  at  the  basis  of  the  universe.  Anax- 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  27 

imenes  makes  air  the  primitive  substance,  while  Hera- 
clitus  holds  that  fire  is  the  original  element.  They  all 
viewed  matter  as  the  source  and  the  sufficient  explana- 
tion of  the  cosmos,  and  hence  they  merely  sought  its 
primitive  form. 

Pythagoras  and  his  disciples  made  a  specialty  of  math- 
ematics, and  viewed  number  as  the  principle  of  all  exist- 
ence. In  the  Eleatic  school  *  the  notion  of  being  was 
the  absorbing  theme,  —  being  as  one  and  eternal  (God 
and  the  universe  are  one),  and  its  distinction  from  that 
which  merely  appears  and  is  not  real  (the  distinction 
between  the  real  and  the  phenomenal  world).  The 
inquiries  of  this  school  were  therefore  metaphysical,  and 
its  principal  subjects  were  :  being  and  nothing  ;  the  real 
and  the  apparent ;  the  one  and  the  many ;  that  which 
is,  and  what  seems  to  become  and  then  vanishes  again, 
or  the  eternal  and  the  transient;  the  stationary  and 
motion. 

Some  of  the  later  Greek  philosophers  who  inquired 
into  the  origin  of  nature  recognized  the  existence  of 
gods,  while  others  ignored  them.  Empedocles  believed 
in  their  existence :  nevertheless  he  explained  nature  by 
making  earth,  water,  air,  and  fire  the  first  things,  with 
love  and  hatred  as  their  ruling  principles.  Anaxagoras 
held  that  originally  there  was  a  mixture  of  the  primitive 
elements,  a  chaos,  from  which  the  divine  spirit  con- 
structed the  universe.  Leucippus  and  Democritus  estab- 
lished the  atomic  theory,  and  were  pure  materialists. 

In  all  these  cases,  philosophy  meant  an  inquiry  into 
the  real  nature  and  the  cause  of  things;  but  it  also 
included  the  result  of  this  inquiry,  or  the  explanation 
found.  Philosophers  were  those  who  sought  to  under- 
stand the  essence,  the  principles,  the  cause  of  existence, 

*  Xenophanes,  Parmenides,  Zeno,  Melissus. 


28      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

or  the  first  substance  from  which  every  thing  else  sprang. 
Wisdom  thus  meant  for  them  the  ultimate  thoughts 
obtained  by  inquiring  into  the  nature  and  origin  of  the 
universe. 

However  interesting  and  absorbing  these  problems, 
they  could  not  permanently  limit  the  inquiries  of  the 
mind.  The  failure  or  despair  of  a  solution,  as  well  as 
the  importance  of  other  questions,  served  to  direct 
attention  to  a  different  class  of  objects.  Problems  them- 
selves are  evolved  in  the  process  of  intellectual  develop- 
ment ;  and  an  age  may  be  better  characterized  by  the 
questions  which  occupy  the  attention  of  its  best  thinkers, 
than  by  the  solutions  given.  Philosophy  began  with 
nature,  but  it  could  not  be  confined  to  nature.  As  if 
exhausted  by  its  fruitless  attempts  to  unravel  the  mys- 
teries of  what  was  outside  of  itself,  the  mind  now 
directed  its  attention  to  itself.  The  sophists  gave 
prominence  to  the  hitherto  neglected  subjective  ele- 
ment. In  spite  of  their  later  degeneracy,  which  justly 
subjected  them  to  severe  criticism,  they  had  an  impor- 
tant share  in  the  development  of  Greek  philosophy, 
and  mediated  the  way  from  the  naturalistic  to  the 
Socratic  school.  Instead  of  permitting  nature  to  absorb 
the  attention,  they  concentrated  their  thoughts  on  man, 
and  made  him  the  measure  of  all  things.  This  doctrine, 
which  is  certainly  true,  so  far  as  it  makes  the  laws  of 
our  being  the  condition  and  measure  of  all  our  concep- 
tions, was  perverted  to  mean  that  truth  itself  is  merely 
a  matter  of  opinion ;  and  even  if  something  more  than 
this,  it  was  held  that  the  truth  cannot  be  discovered. 
Hence,  instead  of  eternal  principles,  subjective  prefer- 
ences were  made  the  rule  of  life.  Knowledge  and  skill 
were  esteemed  simply  because  useful  in  discussion,  or 
for  the  attainment  of  personal  ends ;  and  dialectic  was 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  29 

valued  as  an  instrument  for  selfish  interests,  without 
regard  to  truth  and  right.  So  far  as  the  later  sophists 
had  any  claim  to  philosophy,  it  was  permeated  with 
sceptical,  eclectic,  and  utilitarian  elements. 

The  appearance  of  Socrates  makes  an  epoch  in  phi- 
losophy. He  opposed  the  conceit,  together  with  the 
superficial  and  sceptical  tendencies,  of  the  sophists,  and 
directed  attention  from  mere  observation  and  opinion 
to  careful  definitions  and  correct  thinking.  He  esteemed 
a  knowledge  of  self  as  the  essence  of  wisdom ;  self- 
knowledge  was  consequently  the  aim  of  his  instruction. 
While  the  sophists  claimed  to  possess  wisdom,  he  mod- 
estly professed  to  be  still  a  seeker.  In  the  whole  his- 
tory of  philosophy,  Socrates  is  the  best  embodiment  of 
the  etymological  sense  of  the  term.  He  thought,  if 
any  thing  could  entitle  him  to  claim  wisdom,  it  was  the 
knowledge  of  his  ignorance.  Regarding  virtue  as  the 
highest  good,  he  made  truth  its  basis  and  correct^ 
knowledge  its  source.  Virtue  had,  indeed,  been  dis- 
cussed by  Pythagoras,  Democritus,  the  sophists,  and 
others ;  but  Socrates  made  the  moral  element  the  essence 
of  philosophy,  and  is  properly  regarded  as  the  founder 
of  philosophical  ethics. 

If,  now,  in  connection  with  this  hasty  glance  at  the 
early  systems  of  philosophy,  we  inquire  into  the  tech- 
nical use  of  the  term  among  the  Greeks,  what  do  we 
find  respecting  its  meaning?  Although  the  inquiries 
of  the  early  philosophers  were  confined  to  nature,  they 
were  not  those  pursued  by  the  physicists  of  our  day. 
They  were  allied  to  what  the  Germans  call  Natur- 
philo sophie,  being  purely  speculative  and  really  a  part 
of  metaphysics.  The  speculations  of  the  Eleatics,  as 
we  have  seen,  were  also  metaphysical.  The  essence 
of  Plato's  philosophy  and  the  "first  philosophy"  of 


30     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Aristotle  belong  to  the  same  category.  There  can, 
therefore,  be  no  question  that  among  the  Greeks  meta- 
physics has  peculiar  claims  to  the  title  philosophy.  In 
it,  as  a  rule,  philosophical  inquiry  culminated.  We 
should,  however,  have  to  ignore  not  only  the  sophists, 
but  also  Socrates  and  Plato  and  Aristotle,  if  we  did  not 
include  in  philosophy  dialectics  (logic)  and  ethics. 
In  a  still  more  general  sense,  as  already  intimated, 
mathematics  and  other  subjects  were  also  included, 
especially  by  Aristotle. 

In  Aristotle  the  development  of  Greek  philosophy 
and  of  the  term  itself  culminated.  However  vaguely 
the  word  was  used  at  times,  in  its  technical  sense  it 
designated  the  aim  to  discover  the  final  explanation  of 
things.  It  indeed  included  many  reflections  which  do 
not  bear  directly  on  this  aim ;  but  they  were  generally 
such  as  were  supposed  to  aid  in  understanding  the  real 
nature  of  things. 

Among  the  successors  of  Aristotle,  namely  the  Peri- 
patetics, Stoics,  Epicureans,  and  Sceptics,  philosophy 
lost  the  high  standard  it  had  attained;  and  the  term 
was  again  used  indefinitely,  frequently  designating  a 
certain  mental  tendency  rather  than  a  special  study. 
Its  use  for  particular  systems,  however,  continued. 
But  it  was  also  applied  to  any  study  regarded  as  spe- 
cially important  and  as  leading  to  wisdom.*  Strabo 
puts  Homer  among  philosophers,  and  regards  geography 
as  a  part  of  philosophy.  Josephus  speaks  of  three  phi- 
losophies of  the  Jews,  meaning  Pharisaism,  Sadducee- 
ism,  and  Essenism.  The  Church  fathers  applied  the 
term  to  Christian  doctrine,  and  in  the  early  Christian 
Church  theologians  were  called  philosophers.  In  the 

*  Cicero,  De  Or.,  says,  "  Gram's  rerum  optimawni  cognitio  atque  in  iis 
exercitatio  philosophia  nominata  est." 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  31 

Middle  Ages  the  term  was  employed  very  much  as 
among  the  Greeks,  except  that,  in  distinction  from  the- 
ology as  the  science  of  God  and  divine  things,  it  was 
used  to  designate  worldly  wisdom.* 

In  modern  times  the  word  has  not  only  been  taken 
in  previous  senses,  but  new  ones  have  also  been  added. 
From  the  time  of  Bacon  and  Descartes  it  has  frequently 
been  employed  to  designate  inquiries  into  the  causes  of 
things,  as  well  as  for  systematized  knowledge  in  general. 
Until  recently  a  clear  distinction  between  philosophy 
and  the  experimental  sciences  was  not  made.  Indeed, 
the  Middle  Ages  handed  the  term  down  to  modern 
times  in  that  general  sense  in  which  Aristotle  some- 
times uses  it.f 

In  England,  philosophy  and  science  have  been  used 
interchangeably,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  this  tra- 
ditional use  still  prevails.  Bacon  regards  the  results  of 
the  experimental  method  as  philosophy.  Newton  called 
his  great  work,  Philosophic^  Naturalis  Principia  Mathe- 
matica,  and  his  scientific  investigations  are  usually 
spoken  of  as  his  philosophy.  With  Locke,  philosophy 
and  science  are  synonymous.  At  the  close  of  his  work 
on  Human  Understanding,  he  calls  physics,  which  is 
"the  knowledge  of  things  as  they  are  in  their  own 
proper  beings,  their  constitutions,  properties,  and  opera- 
tions," natural  philosophy.  It  is,  in  his  sense,  much 
more  metaphysical  than  like  modern  physics ;  still  he 
regards  it  as  the  first  part  of  science,  of  which  the 
second  is  ethics,  the  third  logic.  In  the  "  Epistle  to 

*  Sapient ia  scecularis  or  mundana. 

t  In  Descartes'  Principia  Philosophic  are  found,  among  other  things, 
mechanics,  astronomy,  physics,  and  chemistry.  In  1729  Bourguet  pub- 
lished his  Lett,  res  Philosophiqnes  sur  la  Formation  de  Sels  et  Christeaux. 
In  the  middle  of  the  same  century  appeared  the  celebrated  work  of 
Linnaeus,  entitled  Philosophia  Botanica. 


32     INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Reader,"  he  pronounces  philosophy  "nothing  but  the 
true  knowledge  of  things."  The  philosophical  societies 
of  England,  the  Philosophical  Transactions,  and  the  Phil- 
osophical Magazine,  are  chiefly  devoted  to  scientific 
investigations. 

In  England  and  America,  philosophy  is  often  taken 
in  a  more  comprehensive  sense  than  science,  but  fre- 
quently they  are  also  made  synonymous.  Thus  natural 
philosophy  is  either  the  same  as  natural  science,  or  one 
of  its  branches.  English  writers  in  particular  are  in 
the  habit  of  using  " philosophy"  and  "philosophical" 
very  loosely.  Nor  can  an  improvement  be  expected, 
so  long  as  the  terms  "  philosophy  "  and  "  science  "  are 
not  more  carefully  distinguished.1  * 

In  England  there  is  now,  however,  a  tendency  to 
make  a  clearer  distinction  in  the  application  of  the 
terms.  Scientists  attack  philosophy,  and  speak  dis- 
paragingly of  its  study,  thus  proving  that,  even  if  they 
do  not  know  exactly  what  it  uieans,  it  is  not  science. 
Present  discussions  excite  the  hope  that  the  two  will 
eventually  be  recognized  as  occupying  entirely  distinct 
spheres.  But  among  English  writers  who  recognize  the 
peculiarity  of  philosophy,  there  is  no  agreement  as  to 
its  proper  sphere.  Not  unfrequently  what  has  from  the 
first  been  regarded  as  its  peculiar  province  is  excluded. 
From  the  time  of  Bacon,  English  thought  has  been  pre- 
dominantly practical,  and  this  has  determined  the  char- 
acter of  its  significant  conquests.  Instead  of  inquiring 
into  first  principles,  it  has  cherished  an  aversion  to  specu- 
lation, and  a  horror  of  metaphysics.  There  is  not  in  all 
England  a  journal  devoted  exclusively  to  (speculative) 
philosophy.  When,  in  1876,  "Mind,  A  Quarterly  Re- 
view of  Psychology  and  Philosophy,"  was  begun,  the 

*  See  Appendix. 


DEFINITION   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  33 

editor  said,  "That  no  such  journal  should  hitherto  have 
existed,  is  hardly  surprising.  Long  as  English  inquiry 
has  been  turned  on  the  things  of  mind,  it  has,  till 
quite  lately,  been  distinguished  from  the  philosophical 
thought  of  other  countries  by  what  may  be  called  its 
unprofessional  character.  Except  in  Scotland  (and 
even  there  Hume  was  not  a  professor),  few  British 
thinkers  have  been  public  teachers  with  philosophy  for 
the  business  of  their  lives.  Bacon,  Hobbes,  Locke, 
Berkeley,  Hume,  Hartley,  the  Mills,  did  their  philosoph- 
ical work  at  the  beginning  or  at  the  end  or  in  the 
pauses  of  lives  otherwise  active,  and  addressed  for 
the  most  part  the  common  intelligence  of  their  time.  It 
may  not  have  been  ill  for  their  fame  ;  but  their  work 
itself  is  not  what  it  otherwise  might  have  been,  and 
their  manner  of  thinking  has  affected  the  whole  charac- 
ter and  standing  of  philosophical  inquiry  in  England. 
If  their  work  had  been  academic,  it  would  probably 
have  been  much  more  sustained,  —  better  carried  out 
when  it  did  not  lack  comprehension,  more  comprehen- 
sive when  it  was  well  and  carefully  begun.  The  in- 
formality of  their  thought  lias  undoubtedly  prevented 
philosophy  from  obtaining  the  scientific  consideration 
which  it  holds  elsewhere."  Paulsen,  in  the  article 
already  quoted,  referring  to  English  philosophy,  says, 
"Philosophy  or  science  aims  at  a  knowledge  of  the 
laws  of  the  real.  Beyond  this  there  are  no  objects  for 
scientific  knowledge.  There  may  be  objects  for  faith, 
but  that  is  the  concern  of  the  Church.  Metaphysical 
or  critical  investigations  like  Hume's  are  received  coldly, 
and  viewed  with  suspicion." 

The  practical  character  of  the  English  mind,  with  its 
tendency  to  observation  and  experiment,  has  given  par- 
ticular prominence  to  psychology ;  and  it  has  been 


34     INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

common  to  regard  "  mental  science  "  as  the  whole  of 
philosophy.  In  the  few  sentences  devoted  to  the  article 
"  Philosophy,"  in  the  eighth  edition  of  the  Encyclopae- 
dia Britannica  (1859),  this  occurs:  "Philosophy  may 
be  defined  as  the  science  of  first  principles  ;  and  the  term 
is  now  limited  almost  exclusively  to  the  mental  sci- 
ences." An  effort  is,  however,  now  made  in  England  to 
exclude  psychology  from  philosophy,  and  to  introduce 
more  speculative  elements  into  the  latter.  German 
philosophers,  especially  Kant  and  Hegel,  have  gained 
considerable  influence ;  but  this,  instead  of  fixing  the 
sense  of  the  term  "philosophy,"  has  added  new  mean- 
ings to  the  word,  and  increased  its  indefiniteness.  One 
who  studies  its  present  use  in  English  literature  almost 
despairs  of  attaching  to  the  term  any  definite  meaning ; 
it  is  applied  to  subjects  so  heterogeneous,  that  it  indi- 
cates nothing  in  particular.  Sometimes  philosophy  is 
spoken  of  as  a  mere  habit  of  mind.  Thus  one  writer  * 
limits  the  term  to  a  mental  tendency,  and  regards  phi- 
losophy useful  as  a  kind  of  literary  training,  "concerned 
with  moods  of  mind  rather  than  with  objective  truth," 
and  declares  "  that  it  is  as  much  beside  the  mark  to 
wrangle  over  the  truth  of  a  philosophy,  as  over  the  truth 
of  Paradise  Lost."  This  view  would  consign  the  deep- 
est thinking  of  the  ages  to  the  realm  of  fiction.  Phi- 
losophy, indeed,  implies  a  certain  habit  of  mind :  it  is 
not,  however,  that  habit,  but  its  product,  —  the  result 
of  the  sincerest  love  and  profoundest  search  for  truth. 
Others  make  it  synonymous  with  metaphysics,  or  regard 
it  as  a  theory  of  knowledge.  The  editor  of  "  Mind  "  f  pro- 
nounces metaphysics  the  same  as  "  general  philosophy." 
In  another  place  \  he  says  that  philosophy  "  is  theory 
of  knowledge  "  (as  that  which  is  known),  but  declares 

*  Mind,  vol.  iii.  240.  t  i.  5.  f  viii.  16. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  35 

metaphysics  "the  most  widely  accepted  synonyme  for 
any  thing  that  can  be  called  philosophy."  In  replying 
to  the  writer  quoted  above,  he,  however,  regards  phi- 
losophy as  a  "rational  interpretation  of  the  universe 
in  relation  to  man,"  and  says,  "  In  philosophy  we  are 
going  to  consider  what  may  be  said  more  or  less  deter- 
minately  concerning  the  whole  frame  of  things  and 
man's  relation  thereto."  In  the  same  journal  *  we  read 
"that  the  term  'philosophy'  may  fairly  be  applied  to 
what  is  primarily  a  doctrine  of  the  criteria  of  knowl- 
edge, without  reference  to  any  ontological  conclusions 
which  such  a  doctrine  may  be  held  to  establish."  This 
variety  in  the  definition  is  a  fair  index  of  the  prevalent 
confusion  of  thought  on  the  subject. 

Not  only  does  one  look  in  vain  for  unanimity  in  the 
use  of  the  term  in  England ;  but  other  interests  so  en- 
gross the  attention,  that,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
eminent  thinkers,  there  seems  to  be  no  serious  effort 
to  come  to  an  agreement.  The  influence  of  English 
thought  in  America  has  promoted  a  similar  state  of 
things  in  this  land.  Instead  of  agreement  as  to  its 
application,  the  narrowest  as  well  as  broadest  use  of  the 
term  prevails,  the  definition,  of  course,  depending  largely 
on  the  system  adopted.  Much  more  attention  is  paid  to 
philosophy  in  Scotland  than  in  England ;  but  there,  too, 
the  term  lacks  definiteness.  Indeed,  among  the  multi- 
tude of  current  definitions,  it  might  be  difficult  to  find 
one  which  in  each  of  these  three  countries  has  not  some 
advocates. 

For  more  than  a  century  Germany  has  taken  the 
lead  in  philosophy.  At  the  very  beginning  of  its  pre- 
eminence, the  foundation  was  laid  for  distinguishing  it 
from  empirical  inquiries.  Kant  held  that  philosophy 

*  vii.  533. 


36      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

starts  with  reason,  natural  science  with  experience. 
The  domain  of  philosophy  is  therefore  the  rational,  that 
of  natural  science  the  empirical.*  His  immediate  fol- 
lowers completed  the  work  of  separation  begun  by  him. 
They  aimed  to  construct  a  purely  speculative  system  of 
a  priori  knowledge,  and  this  they  termed  philosophy. 
Since  Kant  it  has,  therefore,  become  common  to  dis- 
tinguish sharply  between  speculative  or  philosophical, 
and  empirical  systems.  In  the  division  of  the  faculties 
in  German  universities,  the  traditional  use  of  "  philo- 
sophical "  is,  however,  still  retained.  The  "  Philosoph- 
ical Faculty "  includes  all  learned  branches  outside  of 
theology,  law,  and  medicine. 

Since  Hegel's  philosophy  lost  its  supremacy  (about 
1840),  no  other  system  has  gained  such  general  influ- 
ence as  to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  term.  Much 
attention  has  been  devoted  to  the  history  of  philosophy, 
as  well  as  to  psychology,  logic,  eesthetics,  and  ethics ; 
but  metaphysic  has  been  viewed  with  suspicion.  It  is 
a  general  conviction,  that  philosophy  needs  reconstruc- 
tion, and  that  the  first  requirement  is  a  new  and  immov- 
able basis.  But  the  tendencies  indicate  that  the  age  is 
critical,  sceptical,  and  destructive,  rather  than  favorable 
to  the  construction  of  new  systems. 

We  have  inherited  the  ruins  of  the  philosophical  sys- 
tems of  former  ages.  Among  them  are  fragments  of 
inestimable  value  ;  but  they  cannot  be  used  as  they  are 
for  the  construction  of  new  systems.  Those  who  stum- 
ble over  these  ruins,  in  search  of  a  satisfactory  definition 
of  philosophy,  are  apt  to  be  bewildered  and  lost  in  the 
confusion  ;  and  yet,  until  that  definition  is  found,  they 
have  no  criterion  to  judge  which  of  the  fragments  are 

*  It  seems  that  Kant  was  also  the  first  on  the  Continent  who  separated 
mathematics,  as  well  as  psychology  aud  physics,  from  philosophy. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  37 

genuine  and  fit  for  use  in  the  new  structure.  This  phil- 
osophical chaos  is  a  characteristic  of  the  age  and  of  all 
lands.  It  is  generally  supposed,  at  least  in  Germany, 
that  if  the  last  dominant  schools  fairly  represent  its  true 
character,  philosophy  is  not  worthy  of  the  best  efforts 
of  serious  minds.  But  while  those  who  strive  to  re- 
construct philosophy  may  have  learned  much  from  these 
schools,  they  are  not  so  unphilosophical  as  to  identify 
any  existing  system  with  the  ideal  or  with  philosophy 
itself. 

In  the  various  lands  in  which  considerable  attention 
is  paid  to  philosophy  (besides  Germany,  Great  Britain, 
and  America,  the  principal  ones  are  France,  Italy, 
Switzerland,  Austria,  Belgium,  Holland,  and  Scandi- 
navia), the  question  is  seriously  asked,  whether  it  desig- 
nates a  peculiar  object,  or  sphere  of  thought.  Some 
regard  its  sphere  the  same  as  that  of  the  natural  sciences, 
but  hold  that  its  method  is  peculiar,  doing  speculatively 
what  they  do  empirically.  But  if  science  does  its  work 
successfully,  what  demand  is  there  for  performing  the 
same  by  another  method  ?  Others  assign  to  it  the  mind 
as  its  special  sphere,  making  it  mental  science  ("  G-eistes- 
wissenschaft "),  so  that,  as  nature  is  the  sphere  of  natural 
science,  philosophy  is  essentially  psychology.  This,  how- 
ever, is  too  narrow,  excluding  much  that  has  always 
been  regarded  as  belonging  to  it.  Quite  recently  there 
has  been  a  disposition  to  make  it  synonymous  with  the 
theory  of  knowledge  ;  but  there  already  existed  systems 
of  philosophy  before  this  theory  became  a  special  object 
of  study,  and  it  cannot  be  made  to  absorb  the  whole 
subject.  Not  a  few  regard  philosophy  as  the  synonyme 
of  metaphysics,  while  others  view  it  as  giving  the  laws 
of  the  sciences,  or  as  drawing  the  conclusions  from  them 
so  as  to  constitute  the  unity  of  all  knowledge. 


88     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

While  the  popular  use  of  the  term  is  altogether  too 
loose  and  general,  some  of  the  definitions  given  are 
too  partial,  taking  a  particular  element  of  philosophy 
and  regarding  it  as  the  whole,  instead  of  seizing  the 
essence  and  making  it  the  nucleus  around  which  all 
that  belongs  to  the  subject  may  be  gathered.  If  any 
historic  element  of  philosophy  is  to  be  excluded,  a  suf- 
ficient reason  for  doing  so  must  be  given.  There  may 
be  much  in  the  historical  development  which  was 
merely  temporal  or  accidental,  and  which  can  without 
serious  loss  be  now  ignored.  The  sand  carried  along 
by  the  current  is  not  the  stream.  But  if  now  we  must 
abandon  the  elements  which  from  the  very  beginning 
constituted  what  was  called  philosophy,  then  with  its 
sense  let  us  also  abandon  the  word. 

THE  MEANING   OF   THE  TERM. 

It  has  become  evident*that  neither  the  etymology  nor 
the  history  of  the  term,  nor  the  development  of  phi- 
losophy itself,  nor  its  present  status,  can  give  us  the 
true  sense  of  the  word.  Yet  they  must  all  be  taken 
into  account.  If  the  essence  of  all  can  be  found,  it 
will  make  philosophy,  with  all  its  variety,  a  unit,  so 
that  its  past,  present,  and  future  must  constitute  an 
organism  which  always  changes  and  yet  is  ever  the 
same.  It  is  the  same  tree,  whose  bark,  leaves,  and  fruit 
differ  with  the  seasons.  Sometimes  it  grows  vigorously ; 
at  others  it  produces  only  wild  wood,  which  must  be 
lopped  off  in  order  to  insure  health  and  future  growth. 
It  may  be  subject  to  many  vicissitudes  without  losing 
its  essential  character.  Those,  however,  who  take  from 
it  a  twig,  and  plant  that  so  as  to  secure  a  new  growth, 
may  have  something  valuable ;  but  they  have  not  the 
tree  itself.  Those  who,  on  the  other  hand,  root  out  the 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


39 


tree  in  order  to  plant  another  in  its  place,  sever  their 
connection  with  the  past,  have  not  the  same  tree,  and 
only  mislead  by  calling  the  new  organism  by  the  old 
name.  Trimming  may  be  necessary ;  but  if  the  future 
is  to  grow  from  the  past,  the  tree  itself  must  be  spared. 
Its  fruit  may  have  become  unpalatable,  so  that  it  is  time 
to  change  its  products  ;  every  limb  may  have  to  be  cut 
off  in  order  to  graft  on  new  scions ;  but  they  must  be 
ingrafted  on  the  tree  itself,  if  the  fruit  is  still  to  be  its 
product. 

The  development  of  philosophy  in  the  individual 
mind  is  similar  to  the  process  in  history ;  and  whoever 
interprets  aright  his  own  philosophizing  will  obtain  the 
clearest  knowledge  of  philosophy  itself.  In  the  genetic 
method  of  defining  a  term,  we  do  what  we  want  to 
know.  Philosophy  thus  becomes  a  matter  of  experi- 
ence. 

Consciousness  precedes  self-consciousness ;  percepts 
precede  concepts ;  individual  concepts  precede  systems  ; 
and  for  systems  we  seek  the  final  thought  which  is  -the 
bond  of  union  for  all  systems,  concepts,  and  percepts,  — 
a  thought  that  is  the  seed  from  which  all  our  thoughts 
are  developed.  In  its  earliest  processes  the  mind  sim- 
ply lets  itself  go,  its  operations  being  determined  mainly 
by  objects  of  sense  and  by  spontaneous  reflection. 
This  naive  stage  may  be  called  historical  or  psycho- 
logical, but  no  one  thinks  of  calling  it  philosophical. 
The  mere  observation  of  phenomena  cannot  produce 
philosophy,  even  in  its  shallowest  sense.  Those  remain- 
ing on  this  standpoint  never  give  an  account  to  them- 
selves of  their  own  operations  and  of  the  contents 
of  their  minds,  but  accept  the  opinions  of  others  as 
thoughtlessly  as  the  impressions  through  their  senses. 
When,  however,  the  mind  is  checked  in  this  course,  and 


40     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

aroused  to  reflect  on  itself,  it  is  impelled  to  seek  an 
explanation  of  what  is  given  spontaneously.  The  mind 
become  conscious  of  itself  is  not  merely  receptive,  but 
also  penetrative.  It  wants  to  know,  but  it  soon  learns 
that  it  only  truly  knows  what  it  interprets.  The  very 
energy  of  the  mind,  when  once  aroused,  leads  to  in- 
quiries into  the  causes  of  phenomena.  Much  that 
transpires  is  calculated  to  excite  its  curiosity  ;  it  begins 
to  wonder,  which  Plato  pronounces  the  beginning  of 
philosophy.  In  its  efforts  to  explain  mysteries,  the 
mind  finds  former  views,  which  were  naively  adopted, 
incorrect ;  and  with  increasing  efforts  at  explanation  it 
also  finds  the  problems  deepening  and  the  difficulties 
growing.  Wonder  increases,  and  doubt  becomes  its 
constant  companion.  Doubt  is  developed  by  the  dis- 
covery that  opinions  have  been  held  without  sufficient 
reason,  and  even  contrary  to  reason ;  and  repeated  fail- 
ures may  lead  to  questioning  the  possibility  of  solving 
the  riddles  of  mind  and  nature.  But  wonder  and  doubt, 
unless  the  scepticism  becomes  absolute  and  induces  de- 
spair, are  mighty  impulses  to  seek  an  explanation  of  what 
is  obscure.  They  create  and  intensify  an  eagerness  for 
deeper  knowledge,  and  the  love  of  wisdom  becomes  the 
inspiration  of  the  most  searching  inquiries.  This  is 
the  spirit  which  is  characteristic  of  all  philosophy,  and 
is  the  essential  element  in  the  etymology  of  the  word. 

There  is  in  this  impulse  a  peculiarity  which  was  par- 
ticularly emphasized  by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  It  has  its 
birth  directly  in  the  energy  and  necessity  of  the  mind 
itself;  the  impulse  is  wholly  innate,  a  purely  mental  or 
intellectual  affection.  The  reason  for  philosophizing  is 
different  from  the  impulse  leading  to  studies  undertaken 
for  a  livelihood  or  ambitious  ends.  In  a  peculiar  sense, 
therefore,  philosophy  is  free  and  human ;  in  it  the 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


41 


intellect  most  fully  expresses  its  own  nature,  and  follows 
its  own  laws.  Because  so  free,  not  a  servant  to  attain 
other  ends,  it  has  been  called  the  "  divinest  and  worthi- 
est "  of  all  studies.  The  fact  that  the  impulse  of  the 
mind  itself  is  its  creative  energy,  of  course  does  not 
imply  that  philosophy  is  not  in  the  highest  and  best 
sense  useful ;  but  its  use,  aside  from  meeting  the  intel- 
lectual needs,  is  secondary,  and  wholly  conditioned  by 
what  it  does  for  the  mind  and  makes  that  mind. 

Impelled  by  wonder  and  doubt,  the  mind  in  its 
search  for  the  solution  of  problems  is  a  law  unto  itself. 
Behind  the  psychologic  process  and  the  transitory  char- 
acter of  phenomena,  it  wants  to  discover  the  reason,  the 
underlying  thought,  the  eternal  principles.  When 
doubt  has  brought  thought  to  the  stage  of  the  sophists, 
where  all  is  uncertain,  the  mind,  with  Socrates,  inquires 
for  the  permanent,  and,  with  Plato,  seeks  the  archetypes 
and  ideas.  The  laws  of  reason  being  the  standard  of 
judgment,  mere  external  authority  loses  its  binding 
character.  Opinions,  traditions,  mythologies,  and  all 
dogmas  are  subjected  to  the  rational  test.  These,  no 
mind  conscious  of  itself  can  adopt  uncritically ;  its  aim 
is  purely  and  solely  the  truth,  and  it  cannot  rest  short 
of  the  highest  truth,  which  is  the  most  complete 
embodiment  of  wisdom.  It  is  therefore  evident,  that, 
whilst  it  may  use  the  descriptive  and  historical,  the 
reason  cannot  view  them  as  final ;  they  may  give  what 
transpires,  but  cannot  furnish  its  ultimate  explanation. 
They  do  not  constitute  philosophy,  though  they  may 
furnish  materials  for  philosophizing.  Poetry  and  the 
arts  are  also  excluded  from  philosophy;  they  do  not 
explain  what  is,  but  are  themselves  subjects  for  expla- 
nation ;  they  increase,  instead  of  satisfying,  intellectual 
wonder  and  doubt.  Nor  is  philomathy  philosophy :  it 


42      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

may  be  mere  breadth,  while  the  latter  always  demands 
depth ;  it  may  be  mere  learning,  while  the  latter  is 
always  the  explanation  of  learning  itself;  it  may  be 
the  product  of  a  mind  predominantly  receptive,  while 
in  philosophy  the  energy  of  the  mind  is  the  essential 
thing. 

It  is  not  strange  that  in  history  the  philosophical 
impulse  first  attempted  an  explanation  of  nature.  The 
same  is  true  in  the  genesis  of  knowledge  in  the  indi- 
vidual mind.  The  natural  phenomena  are  most  striking, 
and  first  arrested  attention.  But  the  mental  facts  could 
not  be  permanently  ignored,  and  in  the  course  of  time 
both  nature  and  the  mind  were  subjected  to  philosophi- 
cal inquiry.  The  ultimate  principle  or  principles  of  nat- 
ural and  mental  phenomena  and  being,  therefore,  early 
formed  the  object  of  philosophy. 

In  history,  as  well  as  in  the  genesis  of  philosophic 
thought  in  the  individual  mind,  the  usual  objects  of 
attention  and  interest  are  the  ones  which  demand  an 
explanation.  Thought  need  not  go  out  of  its  usual 
path  to  discover  mysteries ;  it  cannot  go  anywhere  with- 
out finding  them.  The  early  philosophers,  besides 
nature  and  the  mind,  found  religious  faith  existing  —  a 
belief  in  gods.  This  faith  had  to  be  explained.  And 
by  the  time  Greek  thought  reached  its  climax,  there 
were  three  objects  of  supreme  importance,  namely 
nature  (cosmology),  man  (psychology),  and  God  (theol- 
ogy). The  investigation  of  these  was  an  inquiry  into 
being  itself,  —  the  effort  to  discover  its  essence  and 
interpretation.  We  have  already  seen  how  to  these 
objects  of  inquiry  the  dialectical  and  ethical  elements 
were  added. 

In  its  efforts  to  explain  what  is,  the  mind  always 
depends  on  existing  knowledge,  at  least  for  its  starting 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  43 

point.  The  way  to  the  explanation  may  be  but  little 
prepared.  The  first  work  in  that  case  is  of  an  element- 
ary character,  largely  a  groping  in  the  dark,  method  and 
means  still  obscure,  and  imagination,  as  well  as  reason, 
active  in  the  process  of  discovery.  Originally  the  prog- 
ress toward  the  wisdom  sought  required  an  examina- 
tion of  many  things  which  the  philosopher  now  finds 
explained,  just  as  the  geologist  or  ethnologist  may  at 
first  be  obliged  to  perform  the  work  afterwards  done 
for  him  by  the  miner  and  the  traveller.  In  seeking  the 
final  explanation,  philosophy  took  up  one  department 
of  knowledge  after  another  as  it  needed  them,  but  each 
belonging  to  it  only  as  means  to  an  end.  When  suffi- 
ciently developed  to  become  independent,  they  no  longer 
needed  the  fostering  care  received  in  the  past ;  and  it 
was  against  the  interest  of  the  mother,  as  well  as  of 
the  son,  to  keep  the  man  in  childish  subjection.  This 
explains  the  fact  that  at  one  time  philosophical  investi- 
gations may  include  more  subjects  than  at  another.  A 
subject  may  also  at  one  time  be  thought  to  lie  within 
the  domain  of  philosophy,  and  afterwards  be  found  to 
belong  to  another  department,  when  it  is  dropped. 

We  can  thus  be  true  to  the  Greek  notion  of  philoso- 
phy without  including  the  same  disciplines  as  Aristotle. 
Although  philosophical  inquiry  began  with  nature,  we 
do  not  include  physics.  Mathematics  has  long  been 
independent. 

But  after  eliminating  the  natural  sciences,  what  sphere 
remains  for  philosophy?  The  fundamental  and  ulti- 
mate problems.  These  have  in  all  ages  been  assigned  to 
it,  though  their  nature  has  at  various  times  been  differ- 
ently apprehended.  Whether  it  started  with  the  inter- 
ests uppermost  at  the  time,  or  with  concepts  which 
engrossed  the  attention  of  preceding  thinkers,  the  final 


44      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

aim  has  always  been  the  solution  of  the  problems 
regarded  as  ultimate.  Many  other  themes  have  been 
discussed  in  the  name  of  philosophy ;  but  that  was 
merely  incidental,  or  because  they  were  supposed  to 
lie  on  the  way  to  the  last  solution.  They  can,  how- 
ever, be  consigned  to  other  departments,  or  dropped 
without  serious  loss.  But  those  problems  which  per- 
tain to  the  last  things  cannot  be  dropped  without  the 
destruction  of  philosophy  itself;  they,  as  every  one 
who  reflects  on  what  is  known  as  philosophical  litera- 
ture must  admit,  constitute  its  very  essence.  These 
problems  are  the  centre  from  which  the  whole  circum- 
ference of  philosophical  speculation  is  drawn.  Their 
solution  has  always  been  regarded  as  the  highest  intel- 
lectual wisdom ;  hence  that  solution  is  the  most  eager 
and  the  last  aim  of  the  love  of  wisdom.  That  this  is 
a  correct  view  of  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  phi- 
losophy, is  proved  by  its  entire  history,  and  by  the  fun- 
damental thoughts  of  its  great  systems.  The  elements 
of  the  universe,  sought  by  Thales  and  his  successors ; 
the  principles  of  being,  discussed  by  the  Eleatics ;  the 
atoms  of  Democritus ;  the  efforts  of  the  sophists  to 
solve  the  final  problems  in  mental  phenomena;  the 
search  of  Socrates  for  the  eternal  reason  underlying 
thought  and  morals ;  the  ideas  of  Plato ;  the  "  first  phi- 
losophy "  of  Aristotle ;  the  nominalistic  and  realistic 
controversies  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  the  speculations 
of  the  school-men  respecting  God  and  the  universe  ;  the 
innate  ideas  of  Descartes ;  the  theory  of  knowledge 
given  by  Locke ;  the  monads  of  Leibnitz,  and  his  pre- 
established  harmony ;  the  substance  of  Spinoza ;  the 
absolute  scepticism  of  Hume  respecting  the  final  prob- 
lems ;  the  Kritik  of  Pure  Reasons,  by  Kant ;  the  Ego 
of  Fichte,  the  subject-object  of  Schelling,  and  the 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  45 

panlogism  of  Hegel ;  common-sense  or  intuitionalism,  as 
the  ultimate  appeal,  of  the  Scotch  school ;  the  rejection 
of  theology  and  metaphysics  by  Comte,  and  the  claim 
that  the  results  of  the  positive  sciences  are  the  ultimate 
of  the  intellect ;  Schopenhauer's  will  as  force,  Spencer's 
unknowable,  and  Hartmann's  unconscious ;  the  conflicts 
between  idealism  and  realism  in  Germany;  and  the 
various  efforts  in  different  lands  to  determine  the  limits 
of  thought,  and  to  get  a  safe  method  to  reach  these 
limits;  the  prevalent  doubts  respecting  the  solvability 
of  the  ultimate  problems,  and  the  consequent  suspicion  of 
philosophical  solutions,  —  all  furnish  indubitable  proof 
that  the  final  problems  have  been  the  peculiar  domain 
of  philosophy  from  its  origin  till  the  present. 

Having  now  found  the  sphere  of  philosophy,  it 
remains  to  be  seen  how  it  deals  with  its  problems. 
Mythology  and  theology  largely  move  in  the  same 
sphere ;  and  frequently  mythological  and  religious  views 
are  mixed  with  philosophical  elements.  But  mythology 
is  the  work  of  a  creative  fancy,  and  religion  is  the  out- 
growth of  faith ;  while  philosophy  is  purely  the  product 
of  reason.  Hence  the  test  applied  to  a  philosophical 
system  is  always  rational,  history  and  external  authority 
having  no  weight  in  its  final  decisions.  While  the  history 
of  thought  shows  what  has  been  held  as  truth,  philosophy 
seeks  to  discover  the  truth  itself.  Reason  as  the  instru- 
ment and  creator  is  also  the  sole  test  of  philosophy. 

In  summing  up  all  that  has  been  said,  we  find  that  from 
the  first  the  most  general  characteristic  of  philosophy 
is,  that  it  is  a  rational  inquiry  into  ultimate  principles.* 

*  As  the  student  is  an  inquirer,  and  cannot  be  prepared  to  give  the 
content  of  the  final  system,  it  is  of  especial  advantage  to  apprehend 
distinctly  the  aim  of  all  his  inquiries.  Only  when  he  has  found  the 
ultimate  principles  (in  idealism,  materialism,  or  something  else),  will 
philosophy  cease  to  be  for  him  an  inquiry. 


46     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  inquiry  must  not,  however,  be  viewed  as  merely 
a  mental  act,  but  as  the  product  of  the  inquiring  mind. 
In  this  sense  the  word  is  frequently  used  in  literature, 
as  in  Hume's  "Enquiry  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing." Every  product  of  such  rational  investiga- 
tion is  philosophical.  All  the  philosophies  of  the  past 
may  be  brought  under  this  definition.  Not  one  of 
them  can  be  pronounced  the  philosophy :  they  are  but 
attempts  to  construct  it.  Hence  we  treat  them  as  ten- 
tative, as  essays  and  inquiries.  This  is  no  disparage- 
ment of  those  systems :  they  are  simply  on  a  level  with 
all  other  systems  produced  by  the  human  mind. 

While  the  definition  just  given  applies  to  all  real 
systems  of  philosophy,  it  does  not  give  the  ideal ;  and 
yet  this  is  what  we  want  when  a  subject  is  defined. 
We  must,  therefore,  go  beyond  this  definition,  in  order 
to  learn  what  that  idea  is  which  philosophy,  as  an 
inquiry,  seeks  to  realize.  Looking  solely  at  the  idea  of 
philosophy,  not  at  the  actual  attainments,  we  define  it 
as  follows :  — 

Philosophy  is  the  rational  system  of  fundamental  prin- 
ciples. 

By  Principles  we  here  understand  more  than  is  usually 
designated  grounds,  or  reasons,  or  causes ;  they  include 
all  required  to  explain  a  subject.  They  involve  the 
nature,  the  grounds,  and  the  design  of  objects.  As  the 
word  "  principle "  is  frequently  used  for  other  than 
the  last  explanation,  it  is  qualified  in  the  definition  by 
fundamental,  to  indicate  that  it  is  the  last  or  ultimate 
principles  that  are  sought.  When  we  speak  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  science,  we  mean  those  first  truths  which  inter- 
pret science  itself,  constitute  it  what  it  is,  and  thus  give 
its  essence.  He  who  knows  these  principles  has  the 
characteristic  marks  of  all  that  is  scientific,  that  which 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  47 

is  peculiar  to  all  the  details  of  science,  and  yet  is  not 
these  details.  The  ultimate  principles  are  those  whic 
lie  behind  all  others,  and  yet  are  involved  in  all  of  them  ; 
they  are  the  solutions  from  which  all  other  solutions 
spring,  as  plants  from  seeds.  Philosophy  wants  to  dis- 
cover the  last  thought  respecting  what  is,  whence  it  is, 
why  it  is ;  or  it  seeks  to  learn  the  essence,  the  origin, 
and  the  purpose  of  (real  and  ideal)  being.  It  aims 
to  find  the  idea  of  that  which  is.  Instead  of  merely 
inquiring  into  the  immediate  causes  of  phenomena,  it 
wants  to  penetrate  to  the  reason  which  manifests  itself 
in  the  universe.  It  therefore  seeks  that  principiant 
truth  which  is  the  solution  of  all  problems.  The  words 
theism,  atheism,  pantheism,  materialism,  idealism,  real- 
ism, and  numerous  other  terms  which  give  the  charac- 
teristic marks  of  systems,  all  contain  the  idea  of  a 
principle  which  is  viewed  as  the  ultimate  of  thought. 
Philosophy  is,  accordingly,  the  highest  possible  demand 
of  the  human  mind,  and  marks  the  utmost  limit  of  intel- 
lectual aspiration  ;  it  is  reason  objectified. 

In  philosophy  we  want  System,  not  merely  isolated 
thoughts.  If  one  principle,  ultimate  and  all-embracing, 
can  be  found,  then  the  system  may  be  deduced  from 
that ;  but  if  this  is  not  possible,  the  different  principles 
found  must  be  put  into  proper  relations,  and  the  infer- 
ences drawn  from  them  must  also  be  systematized. 
With  our  imperfections  and  limitations,  we  may  be 
unable  to  form  one  system  of  fundamental  principles, 
a  system  containing  the  ultimate  of  all  thought ;  in  that 
case  we  must  be  content  with  a  number  of  systems, 
each  controlled  by  a  principle  to  us  ultimate. 

The  system  must  be  Rational ;  that  is,  it  must  be  the 
product  of  reason,  and  in  all  its  parts  meet  the  require- 
ments of  reason.2  As  an  impulse  to  truth,  reason  is  also 


48      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PIIILOSOPUY. 

the  norm  for  its  search,  and  the  standard  of  its  attain- 
ment. The  word  "rational,"  therefore,  indicates  the 
sphere  and  character  of  all  philosophical  investigation. 
The  inquiry  may  start  with  experience  or  history ;  but 
if  limited  to  these,  it  cannot  produce  philosophy.  There 
may  be  other  systems  with  principles  professedly  ulti- 
mate ;  but  their  basis  is  not  the  sole  authority  of  reason. 
Irrational  elements  may  also  be  attached  to  philosophical 
systems ;  but  they  are  to  philosophy  itself  what  dross  is 
to  the  gold  to  which  it  adheres. 

As  already  intimated,  our  definition  gives  the  ideal 
of  philosophy,  indicating  its  aim,  not  an  actual  attain- 
ment. In  this  there  is  nothing  peculiar,  but  a  charac- 
teristic of  all  definitions.  They  want  to  give  the  idea 
of  the  subject  itself,  without  regard  to  the  degree  of 
realization  attained,  unless  they  profess  to  be  merely 
descriptive.  This  is  not  only  true  of  theology,  philol- 
ogy, history,  and  the  like,  but  also  of  every  one  of  the 
natural  sciences.  Physics,  chemistry,  geology,  biology, 
are  ideals,  compared  with  which  the  real  works,  individ- 
ually and  collectively,  are  very  defective.  The  ideal 
science  of  nature  has  not  yet  found  its  way  into  books. 
There  are  many  attempts  at  science,  but  they  are  only 
attempts.  The  same  is  true  of  philosophy.  It  repre- 
sents the  end  sought,  and  the  actual  systems  are  but 
efforts  to  attain  that  end.  If,  instead  of  the  true  idea 
of  philosophy  itself,  we  want  simply  to  indicate  what 
has  been  already  attained,  we  shall  have  to  go  back  to 
the  previous  definition,  and  say  that  every  system  is 
a  rational  inquiry  into  ultimate  principles. 

As  a  rational  system  of  ultimate  principles,  philosophy 
has  a  clearly  defined  sphere  which  distinguishes  it  from 
all  other  departments  of  thought.  It  is  neither  descrip- 
tive, nor  historical,  nor  experimental;  its  province  is 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  49 

not  the  imaginative,  nor  the  emotional,  nor  the  artistic. 
It  does  not  come  under  the  special  sciences,  each  of 
which  is  limited  to  a  class  of  objects  with  whose  expla- 
nation it  is  satisfied ;  nor  is  it  a  science  of  the  sciences, 
since  it  aims  to  explain  more  than  can  ever  be  made 
a  direct  object  of  science  as  now  technically  used. 

Looked  at  in  every  light,  the  definition  meets  all  the 
requirements  of  the  case.  The  principles  sought  are 
the  highest  wisdom ;  hence  the  definition  harmonizes 
with  the  etymology.  It  is  also  justified  by  the  history 
of  the  specific  use  of  the  term,  and  by  the  history  of 
philosophy  itself.  Every  great  system  aims  at  these 
principles.  Trendelenburg,  in  fact,  divides  all  the  sys- 
tems according  to  their  first  principles ;  namely,  those 
which  start  with  matter,  with  mind,  or  with  a  union 
of  both.  This  gives  materialism,  idealism,  and  pan- 
theism. It  would  be  difficult  to  get  all  the  systems 
under  this  classification ;  nevertheless,  it  is  true  that 
the  character  of  a  system  is  determined  by  its  ultimate 
principles.  In  many  instances  these  were  thought  to 
have  been  found,  as  in  the  case  of  the  early  Greek 
philosophers  and  Plato,  and  also  Spinoza,  Leibnitz, 
Berkeley,  Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel,  Schopenhauer,  and 
Hartmann ;  while  other  systems  were  rather  an  inquiry 
into  the  possibility  of  discovering  these  principles,  as 
those  of  Locke,  Hume,  and  Kant,  which  are  essentially 
a  theory  of  knowledge.  But  in  all  systems  the  ulti- 
mate principles  were  the  object  of  inquiry. 

While  the  definition  gives  the  aim  (namely,  the  fun- 
damental principles)  within  the  sphere  (the  rational)  of 
philosophical  inquiry,  it  is  not  intended  to  intimate 
that  the  principles  sought  are  the  only  contents  of  phil- 
osophical systems.  These  may  also  include  whatever 
is  connected  with  the  discovery  of  the  principles,  and 


50      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

likewise  the  rational  inferences  drawn  from  them.  A 
developed  system  of  these  principles  embraces  at  least 
the  general  ideas  of  all  objects  they  comprehend.  As 
the  search  for  the  ultimate  concepts  implies  a  journey 
over  the  road  leading  to  them,  so  when  discovered  and 
systematized  they  may  be  applied  to  the  explanation 
of  whatever  they  include.  Philosophy  is  thus  both 
inductive  and  deductive ;  and  both  in  its  search  and 
application,  its  sphere  is  limited  solely  by  reason.  Phi- 
losophies are  consequently  not  mere  skeletons  of  these 
principles.  Indeed,  philosophy  is  the  most  comprehen- 
sive of  disciplines,  including  principiantly  all  that  is 
real  and  ideal.  Its  principles  are  the  apex  of  a  great 
pyramid ;  but  in  passing  toward  the  base,  there  is  a 
constant  increase  of  space  and  content. 

In  spite  of  the  present  confusion  in  the  definition  of 
philosophy,  it  will  be  found  that  the  one  given  harmo- 
nizes with  the  intelligent  specific  use  of  the  word  now, 
containing  the  essence  of  what  is  sought  but,  perhaps, 
not  clearly  expressed.  By  common  consent,  philosophy 
aims  at  the  highest  and  most  universal  truth,  which 
can  be  nothing  short  of  the  ultimate  principles.  This 
is  implied  by  those  even  who  pronounce  philosophy 
itself  impossible,  for  they  regard  these  principles  unat- 
tainable. 

That  our  definition  largely  agrees  with  the  common 
consciousness  as  to  the  specific  sense  of  the  word,  is 
evident  from  the  application  of  the  term  to  various 
other  subjects.  Thus  we  speak  of  the  philosophy  of 
law,  of  language,  of  religion,  of  history,  and  the  like. 
What  is  meant  by  philosophy  when  thus  applied? 
Simply  the  principles  involved  in  these  subjects,  and 
explanatory  of  them.  Thus  the  philosophy  of  religion 
contains  the  principles  which  underlie  religion,  and 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  51 

explain  its  existence  and  character.  If  now,  when 
applied  to  other  subjects,  philosophy  is  an  inquiry  into 
the  principles  involved  in  them,  then  taken  by  itself, 
or  absolutely,  it  must  be  an  investigation  of  principles, 
not  indeed  of  any  particular  subject,  but  of  all  subjects, 
—  it  must  be  an  investigation  into  the  absolute  or  final 
principles ;  and  at  its  completion,  it  must  be  a  system 
of  those  principles. 

Although  the  definition  meets  all  the  requirements, 
the  beginner  will  probably  have  difficulty  in  clearly 
apprehending  the  subject.  This  arises  partly  from  un- 
familiarity  with  it,  partly  from  its  inherent  difficulties. 
It  will,  however,  become  clearer,  the  more  he  reflects 
on  the  aim  to  attain  the  final  explanation,  and  the  far- 
ther he  progresses  towards  this  goal.  Such  is  the  depth 
of  philosophy,  that  those  who  never  attempt  to  follow 
thought  to  its  limits  can  form  no  conception  of  its  real 
character.  But  whoever  rationally  inquires  into  the 
essence,  the  origin,  and  the  purpose  of  all  things,  phi- 
losophizes; and,  as  intimated,  in  the  processes  of  his 
own  mind  he  will  find  the  best  interpretation  of  the 
aim  and  the  sphere  of  philosophy. 

Every  subject,  unless  purely  rational,  may  be  viewed 
empirically,  or  historically,  or  rationally.  We  may 
learn  what  a  language  is ;  we  can  trace  its  history ;  we 
can  investigate  its  principles.  Instead  of  limiting  our 
researches  to  facts,  we  can  also  inquire  into  what  must 
or  ought  to  be ;  we  can  investigate  particular  phe- 
nomena, and  search  for  their  laws ;  but  we  can  also  seek 
what  is  universal.  In  all  such  cases  it  is  easy  to  recog- 
nize the  function  of  philosophy.  In  contrast  with  the 
phenomenal,  it  seeks  the  substance ;  instead  of  the  em- 
pirical, it  seeks  the  rational ;  in  contrast  with  the  acci- 
dental, it  seeks  the  necessary ;  in  distinction  from  the 


52     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

particular,  it  seeks  the  universal ;  instead  of  the  de- 
scriptive, the  historical,  and  mere  classifications,  it 
seeks  the  principiant ;  instead  of  the  world  of  sense, 
it  seeks  the  idea,  or  the  last  thought ;  and,  in  distinc- 
tion from  the  derivative,  it  seeks  what  is  primitive,  or 
the  first  principles. 

Many  of  the  current  definitions  agree  essentially  with 
that  given ;  while  there  are  others  which  are  included 
under  it,  as  designating  some  part  but  not  the  whole  of 
philosophy.  Ulrici  says,  "To  philosophize  is  to  seek 
principles."  Ueberweg  (History  of  Philosophy,  Intro- 
duction) states  that  in  the  various  systems,  philosophy 
is  viewed  as  a  science,  and  that,  as  a  rule,  it  is  distin- 
guished from  the  other  sciences  in  that  its  sphere  is  not 
limited  like  theirs.  It  does  not,  however,  include,  to 
their  full  extent,  the  sum  of  all  the  spheres  of  knowl- 
edge ;  but  it  seeks  the  essence,  the  laws,  and  the  con- 
nection of  all  that  is  real.  He  gives  this  definition: 
"  Philosophy  is  the  science  of  principles."  This  might 
be  adopted  without  hesitation,  were  it  not  that  "science  " 
is  used  almost  as  vaguely  as  the  term  it  is  intended  to 
define.  "  Principle  "  is  also  used  in  various  senses.  In 
order  to  avoid  ambiguity,  I  have  used  "system"  and 
"  fundamental "  or  "  ultimate  "  principles.  In  his  Logik 
(Introduction),  Ueberweg  defines  philosophy  "as  the 
science  of  the  universe,  not  according  to  its  details, 
but  according  to  the  principles  which  condition  all  par- 
ticulars;  or,  as  the  science  of  the  principles  of  what 
is  knowable  by  means  of  the  special  sciences."  In 
another  place  *  he  states  that  the  various  philosophical 
systems  are  indeed  not  science,  but  that  the  aim  of 

*  In  Fichte's  Zeitschrift  fur  Philosophie  und  philosophische  Kritik, 
1863.  "  Ueber  den  Beyriff  der  Philosophie."  A  valuable  discussion  of 
the  subject. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  53 

philosophy  has  all  along  been  to  become  "  science  in  the 
strictest  and  highest  sense."  As  science  it  is  distin- 
guished from  art  and  practice.  It  is  theoretical ;  even 
what  is  called  practical  philosophy  is  only  a  theory  of 
practice. 

Whatever  the  differences  in  the  definitions  given, 
they,  as  a  rule,  make  the  universal  and  the  ultimate 
the  aim  of  philosophy.  Trendelenburg  regarded  it  as 
aiming  at  the  idea  of  the  total  and  universal,  which  lies 
at  the  basis  of  the  parts  and  of  all  that  is  particular,  in 
distinction  from  the  empirical  sciences,  which  contem- 
plate the  individual  as  separated  from  the  totality. 
Lotze  held  that  it  is  the  aim  of  philosophy  to  bring 
into  unity  and  connection  the  scattered  thoughts,  to 
follow  them  to  their  first  presuppositions,  and  also  to 
their  last  consequences,  and  thus  to  secure  a  consistent 
idea  of  the  universe.  It  aims  especially  to  subject  to 
new  investigation  those  thoughts  which,  in  life  and  in 
the  sciences,  are  the  principles  by  which  other  thoughts 
are  judged,  in  order  to  determine  their  validity  and 
limits.  He  therefore  viewed  philosophy  as  fundamental, 
examining  the  principles  on  which  all  the  sciences  rest, 
and  as  going  backward  and  forward  to  the  utmost  limits 
of  thought.*  Harms  (Abhandlunyen  zur  systematischen 
Philosophie)  also  regards  it  as  fundamental,  being  that 
general  science  which  investigates  and  explains  the 
nature  and  the  connection  of  the  sciences.  "Since 
philosophy  is  the  science  of  the  fundamental  principles 
of  knowledge,  which  include  logical,  ontological,  ethi- 
cal, and  physical  conceptions,  it  has  a  large  sphere  ;  and, 
by  means  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  knowledge, 
it  is  connected  with  all  the  sciences."  Wirth  defines 
philosophy  as  "  a  striving  after  the  principiant  knowl- 

*  Grundziiye  der  Logik  und  Encyclopaedic  der  Philosophic.    86. 


54     INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

edge  of  all  being,  which  knowledge  must  not,  however, 
be  based  on  assumptions."  He  held  that  there  is  a  law 
of  thought  which  impels  the  mind  to  seek  the  unity 
in  the  variety  of  knowledge.*  Joseph  Beckf  says: 
"  Philosophy  is  the  rational  knowledge  of  the  truth  of 
the  facts  of  human  consciousness ;  or  the  science  of  the 
nature,  the  last  principles,  and  the  highest  ends  (design) 
of  things."  Its  aim  is  truth;  its  objects  are  man,  the 
world,  and  God.  Its  mission  is  to  follow  phenomena 
to  their  ultimate  grounds,  in  order  to  comprehend  their 
nature  and  connection,  so  that  their  relation  as  parts  to 
the  whole  may  be  understood.  Stockl  (Lehrbuch  der 
Philosophic),  an  author  whose  works  are  used  in  Cath- 
olic schools,  defines  philosophy  as  "the  general,  specu- 
lative, rational  science ;  or,  as  the  science  of  the  last 
and  highest  grounds  of  being,  so  far  as  they  can  be 
known  and  proved  by  mere  reason."  Frohschammer, 
professor  of  philosophy  at  Munich,  regards  truth,  not 
as  found  in  history  or  experience,  but  ideal,  perfect 
truth,  as  the  aim  of  philosophy.  It  seeks  the  ultimate 
reason  of  being  and  of  thought,  and  of  the  ideal;  it 
wants  to  explain  the  essence,  and  give  the  reason,  of  all 
real  and  ideal  being.  SchmidJ  says,  "Philosophy  is 
a  rational  science  of  reality:  namely,  of  the  nature, 
reason,  and  design  of  things,  as  well  as  of  the  means 
for  the  accomplishment  of  the  design."  According  to 
Paulsen,  "He  is  a  philosopher  whose  inquiries  are 


*  Fichte's  Zeitschrift,  of  which  he  was  one  of  the  editors,  1863.  186. 
The  original  is  :  — 

"  Es  gibt  also  ein  im  Wesen  des  Denkens,  seiner  nothwendigen  Form 
gegriindetes,  rnithin  apriorisches  und  allgemeingiiltiges  Denkgesetz  der 
Totalitat  oder  des  Ganzen,  welches  also  lautet :  strebe  alle  deine  Er- 
kenntuisse  zur  Einheit  der  Totalitat  zu  verkniipfen." 

t  Encyclopaedie  der  theoretischen  Philosophic,  a  hook  for  gymnasia. 

t  Philosophische  Monatshefte,  iii.  388. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  55 

guided  by  the  aim  to  attain  the  ultimate  unity  of  all 
knowledge ;  while  he  who  stops  with  isolated  facts  as 
the  final  truth  is  an  empiric." 

LITERATURE. 

The  references  made  in  the  chapter  will  serve  as  a 
general  guide  to  the  literature  on  the  subject.  For  the 
views  of  philosophy  in  the  different  systems,  the  various 
histories  can  be  consulted,  particularly  that  of  Ueber- 
weg,  translated  by  Professor  G.  S.  Morris.  The  most 
scholarly  discussion  of  Greek  philosophy  is  by  Professor 
E.  Zeller,  Die  Philosophic  der  Griechen.  Some  of  the 
best  discussions  of  the  definition  of  philosophy  are  to 
be  found  in  philosophical  journals,  which  must  also  be 
consulted  if  the  student  desires  a  survey  of  present  tend- 
encies in  philosophy.  In  the  following  list  of  journals 
the  number  of  volumes  in  1886  is  indicated.  The  Jour- 
nal of  Speculative  Philosophy,  vol.  20.  Williams  T. 
Harris :  New  York.  —  Mind :  A  Quarterly  Review  of 
Psychology  and  Philosophy,  vol.  11.  George  Groom 
Robertson  :  London.  —  Revue  Philosophique  de  la  France 
et  de  VEtranger,  vol.  11.  Th.  Ribot :  Paris.  —  La  Critique 
Philosophique.  Nouvelle  serie,  vol.  2.  M.  Renouvier: 
Paris.  —  Revista  de  Filosofia  Scientifica,  vol.  5.  Enrico 
Morselli:  Milan.  —  La  Filosofia  delle  Scuole  Italiane, 
vol.  33.  T.  Mamiani:  Rome.  —  Philosophische  Monats- 
hefte,  vol.  23.  C.  Schaarschmidt :  Heidelberg.  —  Zeit- 
schrift  fur  Philosophic  und  philosophische  Kritik.  Neue 
Folge,  vol.  87.  Founded  by  J.  H.  Fichte  and  H.  Ulrici. 
A.  Krohn  and  R.  Falckenberg:  Halle. —  Vierteljahrs- 
schrift  fur  wissenschaftliche  Philosophie,  vol.  10.  R. 
Avenarius :  Leipzig.  —  Philosophische  Studien,  vol.  4. 
W.  Wundt :  Leipzig.  —  Zeitschrift  fur  exacte  Philosophic* 
im  Sinne  des  neuern  philosophischen  Realismus,  vol.  14. 


56      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

T.  Allihn  and  O.  Fliigel :  Langensalza.  —  In  the  first 
volumes  of  Mind,  a  series  of  valuable  articles  on  phil- 
osophy in  England,  Scotland,  Ireland,  France,  Italy, 
Sweden,  America,  and  Germany,  appeared,  written  by 
prominent  philosophical  thinkers  in  these  countries. 
In  a  book  entitled  Minleitung  in  die  Philosophie  vom 
Standpunkte  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  by  Professor 
L.  Struempell,  1886,  the  definition  and  leading  problems 
of  philosophy  are  discussed.  The  volume  aims  to 
introduce  the  student  into  the  historical  systems  of 
philosophy. 

REFLECTIONS. 

The  significance  of  Definitions.  Difference  between 
Definition  and  Description.  Vague  use  of  "  Philoso- 
phy." Reasons  for  this  vagueness.  Popular  and  tech- 
nical sense.  Principles  determining  the  Definition. 
Etymology,  history,  and  present  use  of  the  term.  How 
used  in  leading  systems.  Distinction  between  Philoso- 
phy and  Systems  of  Philosophy.  Is  the  gulf  between 
the  ideal  and  real  Philosophy  peculiar  to  it  ?  Difficul- 
ties in  the  Definition.  Define  Philosophy.  Its  Aim. 
Its  Objects.  Its  Sphere.  Relation  to  Empiricism, 
to  the  Practical,  to  History,  to  Art.  Philosophy  as  a 
mental  habit,  and  as  a  product  of  this  habit.  Indicate 
the  agreement  of  the  Definition  with  the  Etymology, 
the  History,  and  present  Use  of  the  term. 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.       57 


CHAPTER  II. 

RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO   RELIGION.' 

THE  nature  and  sphere  of  philosophy  will  be  better 
apprehended  by  determining  its  relation  to  subjects 
with  which  its  connection  is  most  intimate.  Its  distinc- 
tion from  history,  poetry,  and  art,  is  too  marked  to 
require  discussion ;  but  its  relation  to  religion,  natural 
science,  and  psychology,  is  worthy  of  special  consider- 
ation. While  a  subject  is  outlined  by  the  definition,  it 
is  brought  into  bold  relief  by  comparison  with  adjacent 
parts.  Distinctness  means  distinction  from  what  is  most 
similar. 

When  only  their  striking  peculiarities  are  viewed, 
philosophy  and  religion  are  as  distinct  as  two  peaks; 
but  by  going  deeper,  numerous  points  of  contact  are  dis- 
covered. They  are,  in  fact,  two  circles  which  intersect. 
Different  in  spirit  and  method,  their  objects  are  largely 
the  same.  Both  consider  the  origin,  nature,  relation, 
and  tendency  of  objects;  but  they  view  them  in  differ- 
ent lights,  and  each  has  a  peculiar  aim  in  their  contem- 
plation. Their  intimate  relation  accounts  for  their 
mutual  influence,  and  the  frequent  efforts  to  control  .or 
absorb  each  other.  Their  harmony  respecting  the  cause 
and  design  of  the  universe  has  always  been  signalized 
by  vigorous  co-operation ;  but  in  disagreement  their  very 
intimacy  makes  the  conflict  between  them  one  of  life 
and  death. 


58      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  objects >  held  _ in  common  by  philosophy  and  rel^ 
gion  are  viewed  from  the  standpoints  of  Jgjjh  and  reason. 
Co-operation  is  consequently  possible  only  in  the  union 
of  these  two:  namely,  in  a  believing  reason,  or  its 
synonyme,  a  rational  faith.  This  implies  that  both 
coalesce  so  far  as  their  objects  are  the  same.  If  reason 
and  faith  ignore  each  other,  it  must  be  at  the  sacrifice 
of  their  perfection.  But  even  in  their  union  the  pecu- 
liarities of  each  must  also  be  distinguished.  Whatever 
the  beginning  of  the  religious  impulse,  it  reaches  its 
climax  in  faith,  while  philosophy  always  culminates  in 
pure  reason.  Psychologically  religion  is  much  broader 
than  philosophy,  enlisting  the  whole  spirit  and  affecting 
intellect,  heart,  and  will ;  philosophy,  on  the  other  haiyi, 
whatever  object  it  contemplates,  is  always  purely  intel- 
lectual, subjecting  even  the  heart  and  will  to  theoretical 
treatment.  While  religion,  therefore,  so  apprehends  its 
objects  with  the  spirit  as  fully  to  possess  them  and  to 
be  possessed  by  them,  philosophy  speculates,  it  beholds 
them  intellectually;  if  it  loses  itself  in  them,  as  the 
mystics  did,  it  ceases  to  be  philosophy.  Philosophy  is 
always  conscious  of  itself,  keeps  subject  and  object 
apart,  and  is  cold ;  religion  is  feeling  as  well  as  intel- 
lect, hence  is  capable  of  great  enthusiasm.  The  state- 
ment which  dates  from  the  Middle  Ages,  that  philosophy 
seeks  the  truth,  theology  finds  it,  and  religion  possesses 
it,  at  least  indicates  the  relation  to  the  truth  claimed  by 
each.  In  their  origin  they  differ  widely ;  religion,  being 
more  naive  and  more  intuitive,  is  much  earlier  than  phi- 
losophy, which  requires  more  maturity  of  intellect  for 
its  origin.  The  objects  of  religion  are  usually  given 
historically,  in  sacred  books  or  tradition,  while  philoso- 
phy is  required  to  search  for  its  objects  by  a  long  and 
laborious  process  of  thought. 


RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY   TO   RELIGION.       59 

But  they  differ  somewhat  respecting  their  objects,  as 
well  as  respecting  their  standpoints  arid  methods.  So 
much  of  belief  lies  outside  of  its  sphere,  that  religion 
is  far  from  including  the  whole  domain  of  faith.  But 
even  the  range  of  religious  faith  may  be  much  larger 
than  that  of  demonstration,  and  thus  include  many 
objects  which  philosophy  still  seeks.  The  historical  ele- 
ment being  a  potent  factor,  religion  may  receive  from 
it  objects  which  reason  alone  could  never  have  dis- 
covered. The  impulse  of  the  heart  may  also  present  to 
religious  faith  objects  beyond  the  sphere  of  demonstra- 
tion. On  the  other  hand,  philosophy  also  deals  with 
subjects  foreign  to  religion.  Being  thrown  wholly  on 
itself  for  its  method  of  research,  philosophy  must  estab- 
lish its  authority;  reason  must  justify  itself  to  itself, 
and  thought  must  prove  thought.  Consequently  phi- 
losophy  deals  largely  with  the  processes  of  thought, 
testing  them  so  as  to  discover  their  validity,  their  laws, 
and  their  limits.  Why  we  think  as  we  think ;  why  we 
reach  certain  conclusions,  and  form  certain  systems ;  why 
we  accept  certain  inferences  as  true,  and  reject  others 
as  false ;  these  are  problems  of  primary  significance  for 
philosophy,  while  religion  only  considers  them  so  far  as 
it  becomes  philosophic.  Like  all  other  subjects,  religion 
looks  to  philosophy  to  settle  for  it  problems  purely 
rational.  While  religion  is  a  relation  of  submission  and 
obedience  to  a  will,  person,  or  power,  recognized  as 
supreme,  philosophy  is  a  purely  theoretical  (contempla- 
tive, rational)  relation  to  the  same,  and  to  all  that  per- 
tains to  principles  and  being. 

When  the  relation  of  the  two  is  here  considered,  it  is 
of  course  intended  to  discuss  them  only  so  far  as  the 
circles  intersect.  Their  agreement  and  conflict  concern 
us  most,  and  these  pertain  entirely  to  objects  and  inter- 


60      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

ests  held  in  common.  Religion  is  here  taken  in  its  most 
general  sense.  Neither  a  particular  system  of  theology, 
nor  the  faith  of  a  particular  church,  is  taken  into  account. 
Theologies  are  a  product  of  development,  and  change 
with  their  growth.  Even  when  they  are  subject  to 
great  changes,  religion  itself,  at  least  its  essence,  may 
not  be  affected  thereby.  If,  however,  the  dogmas  lying 
at  the  basis  of  religion  are  overthrown,  then  the  super- 
structure must  also  fall.  Usually  theology  is  a  union 
of  religious  and  philosophical  elements,  faith  striving 
to  become  rational,  and  reason  seeking  to  become  faith. 
It  is  consequently  in  the  domain  of  theology  that  the 
fiercest  conflicts  between  faith  and  reason  occur.  The 
battle  ranges  around  the  dogmas  of  theology,  they  being 
the  border-land  where  philosophy  and  religion  meet  and 
claim  equal  right  to  possession. 

Lying  wholly  within  reason,  philosophy  cannot  tran- 
scend this  limit  and  still  remain  true  to  itself.  Its 
agreement  and  conflict  with  religion  and  theology  there- 
fore pertain  to  these  so  far  only  as  they  lie  within  the 
domain  of  reason.  Religion  and  theology  are,  conse- 
quently, directly  related  to  philosophy  only  in  their 
natural  or  rational  elements.  Speculative  or  rational 
theology  is,  in  fact,  a  part  of  philosophy. 

Recognizing  the  rational  element  in  religion  as  its 
sole  point  of  contact  with  philosophy,  Kant  entitled  his 
book  on  theology,  "  Religion  within  the  Limits  of  Pure 
Reason."  3  He  did  not,  however,  mean  to  indicate  that 
there  are  no  objects  beyond  these  limits,  and  that  faith 
in  them  is  not  valid.  Kant  repeatedly  affirms  that 
there  may  be  many  things  of  which  our  limited  reason 
has  no  knowledge.  This  every  profound  philosopher 
admits;  and  this  admission  is  the  basis  of  hope  that, 
with  all  their  differences,  and  even  conflicts,  philosophy 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO   RELIGION.       61 

and  religion  can  exist  together.  It  is  the  narrow,  shal- 
low, and  exclusive  tendencies,  on  both  sides,  which 
destroy  the  hope  of  final  agreement.  The  usual  limita- 
tions of  our  thoughts,  together  with  the  tendency  of 
the  mind  to  take  one  object,  hold  it  before  conscious- 
ness to  the  exclusion  of  others,  and  to  develop  it  by 
itself,  and  therefore  one-sidedly,  is  not  only  a  great 
barrier  to  final  harmony,  but  prevents  the  very  recogni- 
tion of  the  differences,  and  the  appreciation  of  the  need 
of  agreement.  All  discussion  is  simply  beating  the  air, 
so  long  as  there  is  a  lack  of  depth  and  comprehensive- 
ness, and  of  that  modesty  which  is  a  requirement 
equally  of  religion  and  philosophy.  The  two  need 
each  other  as  complements.  A  religion_that  ignores 
philosophy  is  in  constant  danger  of  superstition  and 
fanaticism ;  while  an  exclusive  philosophy  attempts  to 
compress  the  whole  of  life  into  logical  formulas,  at 
which  the  heart  rebels.  For  the  healthy  development 
of  both,  it  is  essential  that  their  spheres  be  exactly 
defined,  that  each  be  kept  strictly  in  its  sphere,  and 
that  each  recognize  the  just  claims  of  the  other. 

While  there  is  much  in  the  emotions  and  the  life  of 
religion  which  transcends  the  power  of  exact  philo- 
sophical expression,  they  are  not  wholly  beyond  the 
influence  of  reason.  If,  for  instance,  it  could  be  demon- 
strated that  the  objects  of  faith  are  products  of  the 
fancy,  mere  creations  of  the  brain,  as  Feuerbach  held, 
all  worship  would  necessarily  cease.  The  very  points 
which  philosophy  and  religion  have  in  common  are  the 
ones  on  which  the  latter  depends;  namely,  the  ques- 
tions respecting  ultimate  principles. 

The  origin  of  religion  cannot  be  determined  by  specu- 
lation. Recent  ethnographical  studies  have  led  to  vari- 
ous theories,  and  it  may  also  be  impossible  to  determine 


62      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  matter  historically,  the  given  data  being  insufficient. 
Whether  the  first  religious  impressions  were  the  result 
of  a  direct  revelation,  or  came  from  dreams,  the  sight  of 
a  corpse,  or,  as  Max  Miiller  says,  "from  an  incipient 
perception  of  the  infinite  pressing  upon  us  through  the 
great  phenomena  of  nature,  and  not  from  sentiments 
of  surprise  or  fear  called  forth  by  such  finite  things 
as  shells  or  bones ; "  whether  fetichism,  polytheism, 
or  monotheism  came  first ;  whether  there  were  not  in 
reality  different  occasions  for  religion  in  different  places, 
and  different  emotions  as  its  basis  in  different  persons, 
may  never  be  absolutely  settled  by  history.  The  phe- 
nomena bearing  on  this  subject  are  so  various,  often 
so  uncertain  and  contradictory,  that  there  is  abundant 
room  for  different  theories.  But,  whatever  its  origin 
may  have  been,  the  philosophical  value  of  religion  can- 
not be  determined  thereby.  If  the  lowest  fetichism 
was  its  source,  that  is  no  more  against  it,  than  the 
fact  that  all  knowledge  began  in  the  crudest  way  is  an 
argument  against  science  and  philosophy. 

There  is  dispute  even  as  to  whether  there  are  or  have 
been  peoples  wholly  devoid  of  religion.  In  some  cases 
the  question  was  answered  affirmatively,  when  after- 
wards it  was  discovered  to  be  a  mistake,  founded  on 
ignorance  of  the  language  and  customs  of  the  peoples.* 
For  philosophy  this  question  is  not  essential.  If  a  peo- 
ple were  found  with  no  notion  of  general  principles,  it 
would  argue  nothing  against  their  validity.  What  pre- 
vails in  a  higher  stage  of  development,  not  in  a  lower 
one,  may  only  prove  the  superiority  of  the  former. 

*  Thus  far  there  is  no  satisfactory  evidence  that  any  people  exists,  or 
has  existed,  wholly  devoid  of  religion.  It  is  often  extremely  difficult 
for  travellers  to  learn  the  religious  views  of  savage  peoples,  and  many 
of  their  statements  have  to  be  taken  with  caution. 


RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.        63 

Religion  is  established  as  a  fact,  and  is  so  deeply  rooted 
in  human  nature,  and  so  much  a  need  of  man,  that  we 
may  be  sure  it  is  here  to  remain.  It  is  incredible  that 
from  the  earliest  records  till  the  present  time  religion 
existed,  and  yet  is  nothing  but  the  "  baseless  fabric  of 
a  vision."  While  errors  may  be  attached  to  it,  religion 
itself  must  have  a  true  basis  in  the  human  heart.  It 
may  need  purification ;  it  cannot  be  exterminated.  So 
far  as  philosophy  can  draw  religion  within  its  circle,  it 
must  consider  the  subject  as  one  of  the  deepest  and 
worthiest  problems  of  humanity,  demanding  explana- 
tion. If  originally  a  revelation,  then  the  origin  of 
religion  is  of  course  removed  beyond  the  domain  of  phi- 
losophy. But  whatever  supernatural  elements  it  may 
possess,  it  must  also  be  natural,  and  subject  to  evo- 
lution, and  therefore  an  object  of  philosophical  inquiry. 

Religion,  indicating  the  personal  relation  of  man  to 
God,  implies  that  the  spirit  is  both  receptive  and  active, 
so  that  it  both  receives  and  gives.  Instead  of  putting 
its  seat  in  the  intellectual,  emotional,  or  volitional  ele- 
ment, religion  lies  behind  the  various  faculties  of  the 
mind,  and  gives  coloring  and  direction  to  all  of  them. 
Its  seat  is  in  the  person  or  spirit,  and  indicates  the 
character  of  the  heart  in  the  scriptural  sense,  namely  as 
the  centre  of  human  nature  and  the  source  of  all  human 
manifestations.  Religion  is  a  spiritual  energy  in  thought 
and  feeling  and  volition,  so  that  it  has  concepts,  inspi- 
rations, and  acts.  The  intellectual  elements,  and  the 
conduct  springing  therefrom,  are  naturally  more  com- 
pletely within  the  comprehension  of  philosophy  than  the 
emotions.  Yet  these  emotions  are  too  essential  an 
element  of  religion  to  be  ignored  in  the  philosophy  of 
religion. 

Nothing  is  more  absurd  than  to  claim  that  all  views 


64     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

based  on  religious  feeling  are  reliable.  In  this  way 
the  most  contradictory  opinions  and  wildest  fanaticism 
might  be  established.  Philosophy  boasts  that  its  logic 
is  heartless,  and  therefore  not  subject  to  influence  by 
feeling.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  reason  can  neither 
give  light  to  the  emotions  nor  learn  lessons  from  them. 
The  religious  feelings  are  as  truly  facts  as  those  we 
become  aware  of  by  means  of  the  external  senses,  and 
they  reveal  the  human  heart  and  our  real  nature  with 
at  least  as  much  perfection  as  external  phenomena 
reveal  the  nature  of  the  substances  which  produce 
them.  We  are  undoubtedly  more  fully  conscious  of 
self  than  we  can  be  of  any  thing  external.  That  our 
emotions  are  a  real,  and  apparently  the  most  immedi- 
ate, revelation  of  self,  is  a  fact  of  deepest  significance, 
whose  importance  is  not  decreased  because  it  is  so  gen- 
erally ignored  in  our  day.  The  philosopher  Jacobi  may 
have  gone  too  far  in  identifying  reason  so  largely  with 
the  higher  emotions,  and  thus  making  it  a  kind  of 
intuitive  faculty  for  the  objects  of  religion  ;  but  he  was 
evidently  right  in  emphasizing  the  value  of  the  emo- 
tions beside  the  reflections  of  philosophy.  To  say  with 
a  sneer,  "  It  is  nothing  but  feeling,"  and  thus  dismiss 
summarily  what  concerns  humanity  most,  is  an  insult 
to  human  nature.  There  may  be  in  emotion  a  depth  of 
reality  which  philosophy  can  neither  fathom  nor  formu- 
late. The  religious  feeling  demands  explanation ;  and 
reason  confronted  by  it  cannot  but  ask,  What  is  its 
meaning  ?  What  its  source  ?  What  does  it  reveal 
respecting  man?  What  elements  of  truth  does  it 
embody?  How  is  it  to  be  intellectually  apprehended? 
To  what  inferences  does  it  lead?  If  religion  is  a  senti- 
ment, so  is  irreligion ;  and  the  question  still  remains, 
Which  sentiment  rests  on  the  truth?  It  is  no  wonder 


RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.       65 

that  the  deep  mysticism  of  the  middle  ages  —  of  Master 
Eckhart,  Tauler,  Nicholas  of  Basle,  Suso,  and  others  — 
arrested  the  attention  of  philosophers,  and  led  to  the 
inquiry,  "  What  must  that  nature  be  which  is  capable 
of  such  things  ?  "  The  theosophy  of  Jacob  Boehme  may 
be  false,  nevertheless  its  very  possibility  demands  expla- 
nation. Only  when  things  are  exalted,  and  personality 
is  depreciated,  can  this  be  questioned.  All  the  great 
teachers  of  religion  and  their  doctrines,  Jesus  and  his 
gospel  included,  present  problems  to  the  philosopher: 
if  philosophy  cannot  explain  them,  it  must  give  the 
reasons  for  its  inability;  if  it  could  explain  them  as 
natural  phenomena,  this  very  explanation  would  give 
new  revelations  of  nature,  and  wholly  change  our 
views  of  its  character. 

We  must  recognize  as  proper  the  effort  of  philoso- 
phy, particularly  the  Hegelian,  to  resolve  emotion  into 
thought.  The  intellect  is  only  true  to  itself  when 
its  energy  seeks  to  think  what  the  heart  feels.  Yet  not 
strength  but  weakness  of  intellect  ignores  the  limits  of 
thought,  and  frivolously  rejects  as  frivolous  what  the 
logical  scales  cannot  balance.  A  healthy  reason  trans- 
forms the  emotional  into  the  rational  when  possible, 
and  expresses  feelings  in  concepts ;  but  whatever  does 
not  submit  to  this  transformation,  it  seeks  to  explain 
as  emotion.  Philosophy  may  not  be  able  to  put  the 
substance  of  impulse  and  aspiration  and  longing  into 
rational  equivalents,  and  yet  may  find  in  them  an 
important  revelation  of  the  nature  of  the  seed  from 
which  they  grow  and  of  the  soil  on  which  they  flourish. 
A  system  of  human  nature  which  destroys  its  mental 
life,  the  emotions  included,  for  the  sake  of  gaining  pure 
abstractions,  is  as  valuable  as  a  botany  and  an  anatomy 
which  exist  for  the  destruction  instead  of  the  interpre- 


66      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

tation  of  organisms.  Life,  spirit,  freedom,  God,  may 
contain  more  than  can  be  limited  philosophically,  the 
concrete  necessarily  being  richer  than  our  abstract  for- 
mulas. Our  highest  intellectual  generalization  is  poorer 
than  reality,  and  we  may  put  an  abstraction  or  an  un- 
related absolute  for  what  is  the  real  source  of  the  uni- 
verse. We  know  that  there  is  personality,  but  we  may 
not  be  able  to  find  a  single  principle  deep  and  broad 
enough  to  comprehend  personality.  Perhaps  in  feeling, 
a  reality,  a  personality  supplements  the  manifestation 
of  itself  in  thought.  Even  reason  cannot  free  itself 
wholly  from  the  impulse  of  the  emotions,  and  feeling 
may  become  a  mental  guide  when  thought  is  bewildered. 

No  one  questions  the  perfect  harmony  of  truth  with 
itself:  we  are  convinced  of  the  existence  of  that  har- 
mony, even  if  we  fail  to  discover  it.  This  is  a  postu- 
late on  which  all  reasoning  is  based.  But  if  there  is 
harmony  in  truth,  then  the  establishment  of  one  truth 
means  in  some  measure  the  establishment  and  support 
of  all  other  tmth ;  and  the  advocacy  of  error  means 
hostility  to  all  truth.  Truths  in  science,  philosophy, 
religion,  and  history,  are  not  destructive,  but  promotive 
of  each  other ;  and  if  there  is  antagonism,  it  is  either 
imaginary,  or  else  between  truth  and  error.  Therefore 
truth  in  one  department  always  welcomes  as  an  ally 
truth  in  another,  so  soon  as  it  is  recognized.  And  truth 
alone  can  recognize  truth. 

The  harmony  claimed  for  the  truth,  we  also  claim  for 
reason.  All  logic,  all  the  processes  of  thinking,  rest  on 
this  as  a  fact.  It  is  a  primary  law  of  reasoning,  that 
two  conflicting  concepts  cannot  both  be  true.  I  may 
hold  as  rational,  views  which  are  in  reality  destructive 
of  each  other ;  but  this  is  only  possible  by  mistaking  as 
rational  what  is  not  rational.  Progress  from  error  to 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.       67 

truth  is  simply  the  elimination  of  the  irrational  (which 
was  held  as  rational),  and  the  apprehension  of  the 
rational.  There  may  be  much  error  in  what  we  re- 
gard as  rational :  there  can  be  none  in  what  is  rational. 
As  we  distinguish  between  what  is  subjectively  held 
as  truth,  and  objective  truth,  so  we  must  distinguish 
between  what  is  subjectively  regarded  as  rational,  and 
what  is  really  or  objectively  rational.  All  true  thought 
tends  to  make  the  subjective  the  same  as  the  objective : 
to  have  the  truth,  not  merely  to  think  we  have  it. 

These  are  axioms  of  thought  to  him  who  has  not 
merely  moved  in  the  forms,  but  has  also  grasped  the 
principles,  of  logic.  Strange  that  those  who  accept 
these  axioms  do  not  take  the  next  step  which  they 
really  involve.  If  I  can  trust  my  intellectual  nature 
or  reason  when  properly  understood,  why  not  the  rest 
of  my  nature  properly  interpreted  ?  The  emotions,  so 
far  as  a  correct  expression  of  the  true  self,  cannot  be 
in  conflict  with  each  other  or  with  the  truth.  If  the 
true  self  is  reliable  when  it  expresses  itself  intellect- 
ually, why  not  when  it  expresses  itself  emotionally? 
There  are  false  emotions,  just  as  there  is  false  reason- 
ing ;  but  this  is  no  more  an  argument  for  rejecting  all 
emotions  than  for  rejecting  all  reasoning.  We  want  to 
eliminate  the  false  ones  in  order  to  get  those  which 
really  express  our  true  being.  We  may  not  always 
interpret  correctly  the  truth  deposited  in  our  feelings,  I 
but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  there  is  much  there 
which  cannot  be  revealed  in  any  other  way.  And  reli- 
gious faith,  as  an  expression  of  the  true  self,  as  a  real 
and  legitimate  demand  of  our  nature,  has  as  reliable  a 
basis  as  that  reason  which  is  an  expression  of  the  same 
nature.  True  reason  and  true  faith-eait  no  more  con- 
flict than  a  true  thought  and  a  true  emotion. 


GS^JNTKODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

^-i  i  .  — -^^ 

We  might  go  still  farther,  and  show  that  there  can 
be  no  conflict  between  the  real  interests  of  our  nature. 
The  conflicts  which  occur  are  only  between  supposed 
interests.  What  my  nature  truly  demands,  it  has  a 
right  to  demand ;  indeed,  it  is  a  necessity,  and  my 
nature  must  demand  it.  Unless  there  is  that  which 
my  very  constitution  must  demand,  all  ethics  is  over- 
thrown, and  all  reasoning  based  on  the  final  harmony 
of  thought  and  being  rests  on  a  false  postulate. 

These  thoughts  are  fundamental  for  the  investigation 
of  the  rational  basis  of  religion.  It  is  an  unjustifiable 
one-sidedness  to  regard  our  nature  as  the  ultimate 
appeal  intellectually,  and  then  to  reject  the  same  appeal 
when  made  with  respect  to  the  emotions.  It  is  indeed 
very  difficult  to  get  at  the  intellectual  factor  in  our 
emotional  nature,  and  to  draw  the  correct  inferences, 
particularly  at  a  time  when  it  is  fashionable  to  regard 
the  mind  as  valuable  in  proportion  as  it  studies  things 
and  not  itself.  The  time  may,  however,  not  be  distant 
when  the  truth  revealed  in  and  through  ourselves  shall 
be  prized  as  highly,  at  least,  as  that  which  comes  to  us 
from  a  foreign  source. 

The  thoughtful  mind  will  not  mistake  the  fool's 
sneer  at  the  most  serious  subjects,  for  an  expression 
of  wisdom.  The  student  who  is  tainted  with  that 
frivolous  tendency  which  regards  the  moral  and  reli- 
gious problems  as  not  worthy  of  his  best  efforts,  lacks 
the  spirit  which  produced  the  greatest  systems,  and 
animated  men  like  Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle,  Kant, 
Fichte,  Hegel,  and  Lotze.4 

Were  philosophy  and  religion  perfect,  they  of  course 
could  not  conflict.  But  both  err,  hence  the  strife  ;  both 
are  liable  to  claim  infallibility,  hence  the  dogmatism. 
Each  is  apt  to  throw  the  entire  blame  on  the  other, 


RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO   RELIGION.       69 

instead  of  revising  its  own  status  to  discover  whether 
it  may  not  itself  be  at  fault.  Sometimes  the  hostility 
leads  to  a  war  intent  on  extermination ;  at  others,  the 
grounds  of  the  conflict  are  only  apparent.  The  first 
thing  required,  therefore,  is  that  they  understand  each 
other  perfectly,  so  as  to  learn  whether  really  antago- 
nistic. Thus  certain  forms  of  philosophical  scepticism 
are  not  unfavorable  to  religion ;  the  proof  that  a  sphere 
lies  beyond  the  region  of  demonstration  does  not  imply 
that  it  is  beyond  the  domain  of  valid  faith.  There  may 
be  good  reasons  for  believing  in  the  existence  of  God, 
though  we  know  that  no  argument  can  leap  from  the 
finite  to  the  infinite.5  In  his  Kritik  of  Pure  Reason, 
Kant  examines  thoroughly  all  supposed  proofs  of  the 
Divine  existence,  and  claims  to  have  overthrown  them ; 
yet  he  was  too  great  a  philosopher  to  think  he  had 
proved  that  there  is  no  God,  or  to  imagine  such  a 
proof  possible  even.  True  to  his  convictions  of  the 
limit  of  human  knowledge,  he  declared,  "It  is  indeed 
necessary  to  be  convinced  of  the  existence  of  God,  but 
it  is  not  equally  necessary  to  demonstrate  it."  In  fact, 
he  went  so  far  as  to  declare  that  he  was  obliged  to 
destroy  knowledge  in  order  that  he  might  find  room 
for  faith.  He  held  that  God,  freedom,  and  immortality 
are  undemonstrable,  and  yet  established  beyond  ques- 
tion, by  what  he  termed  the  practical,  in  distinction 
from  the  speculative,  reason.  In  the  ultimate  regions 
of  thought,  Kant  was  obliged  to  resort  to  postulates ; 
but  he  chose  such  as  the  necessities  of  the  case  seemed 
to  require.  When,  in  dealing  with  the  final  problems 
in  religion,  philosophy  passes  from  demonstration  to 
postulates,  it  naturally  resorts  to  such  as  have  potency 
to  account  for  what  is  and  transpires,  —  feelings,  ethics, 
and  -religion  included.  Surely  reason  is  not  reprehen- 


70      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

sible  if  it  makes  the  First  Cause  rich  enough  to  account 
for  all  things,  instead  of  an  abstraction  which  has  no 
reality  itself,  and  cannot  be  the  source  of  any  other 
reality.  And  is  the  reason  to  be  blamed  if,  in  the  First 
Cause,  it  seeks  something  rational,  in  order  that  reason 
may  at  least  account  for  its  own  existence  ? 

Forms  of  agnosticism  are  possible  which  are  not  hos- 
tile to  religion.  All  depends  on  the  sense  and  signifi- 
cance attributed  to  knowledge  and  faith.  All  Christians 
are  agnostics  if  knowledge  is  limited  to  objects  of  sense 
and  to  mathematical  demonstrations.  Agnosticism  is 
only  destructive  of  religion  when  it  claims  that  nothing 
but  absolute  knowledge,  in  the  scientific  sense,  is  worthy 
of  assent,  or  when  it  denies  the  possibility  of  a  valid 
basis  for  faith.  Not  the  proofs  but  the  implications  of 
agnosticism  endanger  religion. 

In  grappling  with  the  momentous  problems  of  reli- 
gion, the  serious  thinker  maybecome  involved  in  per- 
plexities which  ordinary  minds  cannot  appreciate ;  and 
his  faith  may  be  affected  just  because  his  love  of  truth 
is  so  deep  as  to  induce  him  to  attempt  its  pursuit  to  the 
ultimate  sources  and  final  consequences.  If  such  plod- 
ders appreciate  their  ignorance,  and  hold  in  abeyance 
their  decision  on  the  problems  of  the  ages,  nothing  can 
be  gained  for  religion  if,  in  its  name,  they  are  subjected 
to  flippant  attacks  by  such  as  answer  the  profoundest 
questions  without  even  an  effort  at  thought. 

With  the  ages  the  problems  have  deepened,  and  the 
attempts  to  solve  them  have  only  made  the  difficulties 
of  the  solution  the  more  apparent.  Hume's  despair  of 
knowledge  is  shared  by  many  who  are  not  his  disciples. 
One  need  but  appreciate  the  difficulties'  of  every  theory 
of  knowledge,  and  the  agnosticism,  scepticism,  together 
with  the  despair  of  the  age  and  its  consequent  pessi- 


RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.        71 

mism,  in  order  to  learn  that  it  is  most  irrational  and 
irreligious  to  attack  men  on  account  of  the  results  of 
honest  and  deep  thought,  whatever  those  results  may 
be.  The  convincing  power  of  the  fury  of  passion  has 
vanished.  It  must  be  frankly  admitted  by  the  religious 
that  the  philosopher  and  scientist  may  be  perfectly 
honest  in  their  researches,  and  because  of  that  very 
honesty,  and  freedom  from  bias,  may  find  their  early 
faith  beset  with  difficulties.  Under  such  circumstances, 
if  their  view  conflicts  with  the  prevalent  religious  dog- 
mas, they  cannot  but  be  repelled  by  theological  abuse, 
while  they  respect  every  honest  defence  of  religion. 
Philosophy,  as  well  as  religion,  has  its  martyrs. 

The  philosopher  must  be  free  from  all  bias  respecting 
religious  dogmas.  So  far  as  he  is  purely  philosophical, 
he  must  treat  them  as  unfeelingly  as  he  would  a  ques- 
tion in  logic.  He  can  do  this  with  the  full  consciousness 
that  there  is  much  in  religion  which  he  cannot  grasp  in 
this  way,  just  as  he  is  convinced  that  there  are  many 
things  which  the  chain  of  his  logic  cannot  measure. 
He  begins  his  philosophical  investigations  solely  as  an 
inquirer  after  truth  so  far  as  this  is  an  object  of  rational 
inquiry.  If  any  thing  else  than  philosophy  determines 
the  truth  for  him,  he  can  dispense  with  the  aid  of  phi- 
losophy, and  should  not  profess  to  conduct  his  researches 
under  its  guidance.  Slow  and  cautious  in  accepting 
statements,  the  philosopher  is  equally  slow  and  cautious 
in  rejecting  them.  The  names  and  catch-words  of  par- 
ties have  no  significance  for  him,  except  so  far  as  they 
embody  truth.  For  the  beginner  in  philosophy,  this 
attitude  of  perfect  freedom  from  prejudice  is  extremely 
difficult,  but  of  the  utmost  importance.  He  must  learn 
to  estimate  aright  both  the  unthinking  faith,  and  the 
idiotic  sneer  at  religion,  fashionable  in  some  quarters. 


72      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Nor  must  he  be  frightened  by  the  terms  "  pantheism  " 
and  "materialism."  They  are  to  him,  like  religion, 
subjects  for  deep  study.  The  most  devout  mystics  had 
pantheistic  elements,  and  the  Apostle  Paul  uses  expres- 
sions which  border  on  pantheism :  as  when  he  says  of 
God,  "For  in  him  we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our 
being ;  "  "  For  of  him,  and  through  him,  and  to  him,  are 
all  things."  Who  will  draw  the  exact  line  between 
theism  and  pantheism  ?  Indeed,  it  may  be  that  much  in 
a  philosophical  pantheism  only  expresses  intellectually 
what  is  implied  in  the  devout  religious  feeling,  when 
the  soul  loses  itself  in  God.  Even  materialism  has  be- 
come largely  a  bugbear.  Although  frequently  claiming 
to  be  scientific,  it  is  not,  and,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
cannot  be.  Science  never  deals  with  the  ultimate  prob- 
lems, unless  it  becomes  philosophy.  To  the  scientist, 
materialism  can  never  be  any  thing  but  a  postulate  or 
a  working  hypothesis.  Atoms  and  matter  are  symbols 
to  him,  as  those  of  algebra  and  chemistry ;  and  as  such 
they  are  useful,  without  leading  to  atomism  or  material- 
ism as  an  interpretation  of  the  universe.  In  its  sphere, 
science  is  absolute ;  out  of  its  sphere,  it  ceases  to  be 
science.  Thus  science  as  science  cannot  recognize  God, 
unless  it  abandons  the  sphere  of  observation  and  its 
laws.  The  terms  "  theism  "  and  "  atheism  "  have  no 
relevancy  for  science,  simply  because  it  limits  itself  to 
objects  which  are  affected  neither  by  the  one  nor  the 
other,  just  as  it  is  not  affected  by  poetry,  history,  or 
aesthetics.  The  questions  which  the  scientist  asks  of 
nature  have  nothing  to  do  directly  with  his  religion, 
and  this  should  not  have  the  slightest  effect  on  his 
search  for  the  answers.  The  only  atheistic  influences 
which  science  can  exert  spring  from  the  habit  induced 
by  the  constant  study  of  subjects  in  which  God  is  not 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.       73 

considered,  and  in  the  use  of  methods  which  can  never 
lead  to  Him,  —  a  habit  which  may  deaden  the  religious 
sensibilities.  Jacobi  once  said,  "  It  is  to  the  interest  of 
science,  that  there  should  be  no  God."  He  uses  "sci- 
ence "  in  a  wider  sense  than  the  strictly  technical  one  ; 
but,  if  we  put  "empirical"  before  the  term,  we  must 
say  that  neither  in  its  aims,  nor  in  its  methods,  nor  in 
its  results,  is  pure  science  concerned  with  the  existence 
or  non-existence  of  God.  The  fact  is,  that  the  supposed 
influence  of  science  on  religion  is,  as  a  rule,  simply  the  in- 
fluence of  philosophical  speculations,  for  which  the  defi- 
niteness  and  exactness  of  science  are  claimed,  though 
without  the  least  title  to  that  claim.  Although  usually 
termed  scientific,  materialism,  dealing  with  the  ultimate 
problems,  belongs  to  the  domain  of  philosophy.  It  is 
a  word  whose  sense  is  apt  to  vanish  in  proportion  as 
the  effort  to  fathom  its  meanin-g  is  deep.  Whoever  is 
haunted  by  materialism  can  get  no  better  advice  than 
to  make  clear  to  his  mind  what  he  means  by  it,  and  by 
the  term  "  matter,"  whose  atoms  are  imagined  to  be  the 
seed  of  the  universe.  The  vulgar  materialism  of  the 
day  cannot  bear  the  light  of  intellect.  Expressions 
which  seem  to  involve  the  crassest  materialism  may  be 
harmless.  Professor  Huxley,  in  "  Lay  Sermons,"  has  an 
address  on  "  The  Physical  Basis  of  Life,"  in  which  he 
uses  expressions,  which,  taken  by  themselves,  might 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  their  author  must  be  a  ma- 
terialist. Yet  he  holds  that  we  are  totally  ignorant  of 
what  matter  is,  and  consequently  he  is  not  a  materialist 
in  the  ordinary  sense.  The  same  is  true  of  Herbert 
Spencer ;  he  claims  to  be  neither  a  spiritualist  nor  a 
materialist,  because  he  thinks  we  can  attach  no  intel- 
ligent meaning  to  these  terms.  The  suspicion  with 
which  metaphysic  is  generally  regarded  has  made 


74      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

scholars  cautious  in  drawing  inferences  respecting  the 
nature  of  things,  and  especially  of  the  substance  which 
lies  behind  all  phenomena  and  is  the  ultimate  source 
of  all. 

In  one  aim  philosophy  and  religion  perfectly  agree : 
both  want  the  truth  respecting  the  origin  and  tendency 
of  things,  and  respecting  our  relation  to  this  truth.  Phi- 
losophy, however,  seeks  this  truth  theoretically,  while 
religion  also  wants  it  for  the  heart  and  life.  If  now  the 
one  can  help  the  other  in  this  aim,  its  aid  should  be  wel- 
comed exactly  in  proportion  as  it  overthrows  prejudice 
and  false  notions,  and  leads  to  pure  truth.  This  is 
omnipotent,  and  nothing  will  be  able  to  check  its  con- 
quering march.  Nothing  else  is  eternal ;  and  only  he 
who  resolutely  attaches  himself  to  the  truth  can  hope 
to  do  work  which  will  abide.  In  this  conviction  the 
philosopher  and  believer  can  unite  in  their  labors,  each 
in  his  sphere  doing  his  utmost  to  discover  and  promote 
the  truth,  and  cheerfully  co-operating  with  the  other  to 
attain  this  end.  The  best  friend  of  the  honest  thinker 
is  the  man  who  destroys  his  dearest  errors,  and  substi- 
tutes for  them  despised  truth. 

Since  religion  involves  the  deepest  interests  of  man, 
the  defence  of  its  fundamental  dogmas,  with  intense 
feeling,  can  easily  be  understood.  This  very  fact  is  of 
significance  to  the  philosopher.  Why  is  the  spirit  so 
deeply  attached  to  religion?  If  not  a  demand  of  man's 
nature,  how  can  we  explain  the  fact  that  religion  is 
adhered  to  so  persistently,  and  defended  so  passion- 
ately ?  The  inquiry  into  its  psychological  basis  reveals 
in  religion  elements  so  thoroughly  human,  that  he  who 
would  banish  it  from  the  world  must  first  rob  humanity 
of  its  heart.  Not  only  is  religion  older  than  philosophy, 
but  it  has  also  at  all  times  exerted  a  deeper  and  wider 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.        T6 

influence.*  Those  who  appreciate  it  as  a  necessity  of 
human  nature,  do  not  fear  that  its  right  to  existence 
will  ever  be  successfully  questioned,  and  are  the  last  to 
shield  it  from  the  severest  tests.  They  cannot  share  the 
fears  of  those  who  imagine  that  the  development  of 
science  and  philosophy  may  weaken  the  religious  sen- 
timent. Such  fears  are  apt  to  prevail  most  in  times 
when  the  agony  of  doubt  is  experienced,  and  in  minds 
where  faith  and  criticism  are  in  antagonism,  and  whose 
confidence  in  religion  has  been  shaken.  They  therefore 
have  a  subjective  rather  than  an  objective  basis.  Jacobi, 
who  declared  that  with  his  head  he  was  a  heathen,  but 
with  his  heart  a  Christian,  feared  that  philosophy  tended 
to  Spinozism,  and  that  with  its  progress  its  deleterious 
influence  on  religion  would  increase.  But  such  fears 
can  only  be  justified  if  philosophy  perverts  the  truth,  or 
else  if  religion  is  not  true  and  does  not  meet  the  real 
needs  of  man.  With  a  true  philosophy,  genuine  religion 
must  also  advance.  "  Every  fresh  advance  of  certain 
knowledge  apparently  sweeps  off  a  portion  of  (so-called) 
religious  belief,  but  only  to  leave  the  true  religious  ele- 
ment more  and  more  pure ;  and  in  proportion  to  its 
purity  will  be  its  influence  for  good,  and  for  good 

only."t 

Whatever  is  really  valuable  must  retain  or  even  in- 
crease its  value  after  the  most  thorough  investigation. 
If,  after  such  investigation,  its  value  vanishes,  it  is  con- 
clusive proof  that  it  is  a  delusion  which  ought  to  be 

*  Herbart,  Einleituny  in  die  PhilosopJiie,  2d  ed.  213,  says  that  religion 
"  is  much  older  than  philosophy,  and  strikes  its  roots  much  deeper  in 
the  human  soul."  He  doubts  whether  religion  loses  from  the  -fact  that 
it  is  a  matter  of  faith  instead  of  demonstration.  This  faith  he  regards 
as  a  complement  of  our  knowledge,  a  complement  which  theoretically 
is  a  necessity. 

t  W.  B.  Carpenter:  Contemporary  Review,  vol.  xxvii. 


76      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

banished  as  soon  as  possible.  A  faith  that  fears 
scrutiny  is  a  very  weak  faith  as  far  as  its  contents,  or 
else  as  far  as  its  confidence  in  the  power  of  truth,  is 
concerned. 

To  reject  the  claims  of  philosophy,  respecting  its  right 
to  investigate  religion,  may  spring  from  three  motives : 
either  because  religion  is  not  thought  worthy  of  philo- 
sophical attention  ;  or  because  it  does  not  need  attention 
from  philosophy;  or  because  it  is  supposed  that  phi- 
losophy can  determine  nothing  respecting  religion.  The 
first  has  already  been  disposed  of  as  totally  ignoring 
the  significance  of  religion,  and  the  important  part  it 
has  played  in  human  history.  The  second  is  based  on 
a  false  view  of  philosophy,  and  of  the  rights  of  reason, 
and  also  ignores  the  fact  that,  whether  religion  wants 
it  or  not,  philosophy  will  examine  its  claims.  The  third 
assumes  what  can  be  determined  only  by  philosophy 
itself;  and,  while  philosophy  may  not  solve  the  deepest 
problems  of  religion,  it  will  at  least  reveal  their  true 
character,  and  expose  the  fallacies  of  false  solutions,  thus 
performing  an  important  work  for  religion.  Philosophy 
does  not  solve  the  problems  involved  in  moral  and 
physical  evil ;  but  while  it  cannot  construct  a  satisfac- 
tory theodicy,  it  may  do  much  to  show  that  atheism 
meets  with  just  as  many  difficulties  as  the  religious  view, 
or  with  still  more.  And  if  some  philosophical  systems 
have  been  used  against  the  very  existence  of  religion, 
the  latest  which  is  of  special  significance,  that  of  Lotze, 
has  much  which  is  in  harmony  with  religion  in  general, 
and  with  Christianity  in  particular.  He  declares  that 
faith  in  a  personal  God  is  not  in  conflict  with  any  of  the 
metaphysical  convictions  he  is  obliged  to  maintain,  and 
rejects  the  supposition  that  the  spiritual  may  have  had 
its  origin  in  the  material,  or  that  anthropomorphism 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.       77 

necessarily  vitiates  the  religious  notions.*  If  for  noth- 
ing else,  religion  should  hail  with  joy  a  true  philosophy 
as  a  corrective  of  the  false  prevalent  systems. 

Among  the  cardinal  points  in  determining  the  rela- 
tion of  philosophy  to  religion  are  the  following :  Is 
one  supreme  and  the  other  subordinate?  Or  are  they 
co-ordinate?  Or  are  they  partly  co-ordinate,  partly 
different  in  rank?  A  complete  answer  would  settle 
their  relation,  and  avoid  many  difficulties  common  in 
their  disputes.  Conflicts  often  arise  because  religion 
and  philosophy  attempt  to  encroach  on  each  other. 

If  religion  arrogantly  claims  dominion  over  thought, 
its  tendency  is  to  make  philosophy  in  the  true  sense 
impossible.  Degraded  to  a  tool  of  theology,  it  ceases 
to  be  philosophy.  Nor  can  it  be  expected  to  develop 
freely,  so  long  as  it  is  limited  to  a  sphere  in  which  there 
is  no  possibility  of  a  conflict  with  theology.  This  was 
its  position  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Philosophy  was  viewed 
as  the  servant  of  religion,  whose  dogmas  were  regarded 
as  absolute,  and  therefore  a  norm  for  the  philosopher. 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  especially  the  latter,  were  used  to 
form  and  prove  the  systems  of  theology.  As  soon  as 
philosophy  came  in  conflict  with  the  dogmas  of  the 
Church,  as  in  the  case  of  Abelard  and  others,  the  de- 
mand was  made  unconditionally  that  it  should  be  aban- 
doned or  modified.  Those*  to  whom  the  works  had  to 
be  submitted  were  usually  not  the  persons  best  able 
to  appreciate  their  contents.  To  save  themselves  from 
the  anathema  of  the  Pope,  some  of  the  philosophers,  or 
rather  philosophic  theologians,  invented  the  doctrine 

*  Grundzuge  der  ReliyionsphilosopJrie,  99.  He  pronounces  foolish  the 
notion  that  the  highest  principle  of  the  world  is  an  unconscious,  blind 
•substance,  whose  conception  is  for  us  perfectly  dark  and  impenetrable. 
Thus  his  views  antagonize  the  pantheistic  systems,  which  strike  their 
roots  in  Spinoza,  a.s  well  as  the  systems  of  Schopenhaiier  and  Hartmann. 


78      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  what  is  true  in  philosophy,  may  be  false  in  theology, 
and  vice  versa.  It  is  self-evident  that  a  philosophy 
which  starts  with  the  presuppositions  of  a  Church,  and 
moves  along  the  line  marked  out  for  it  by  that  Church, 
can  have  authority  only  for  him  who  occupies  the  same 
ecclesiastical  standpoint ;  and  it  has  authority  for  him 
merely  because  it  has  no  authority  of  its  own,  but  only 
that  of  the  Church.  A  system  that  fetters  the  reason 
cannot  be  rational. 

In  the  Roman-Catholic  Church  this  servile  position 
is  still  assigned  to  philosophy.  Where  the  Church  or  a 
council  or  the  Pope  is  pronounced  infallible,  the  final 
appeal  will  always  be  to  this  infallibility ;  and  the  su- 
premacy of  reason,  as  well  as  the  freedom  of  philoso- 
phy, is  out  of  the  question.  A  prominent  teacher  in 
that  Church  says  that  there  are  truths  which  belong 
both  to  theology  and  philosophy,  but  that  the  former 
always  treats  them  as  truths  of  revelation,  while  the 
latter  regards  them  as  truths  of  reason.  He  adds,  "  In 
rank  philosophy  is  not  co-ordinate  with  theology,  but 
subordinate.  For  theology  has,  on  the  one  hand,  a  much 
higher  source  of  knowledge  than  philosophy,  namely  rev- 
elation ;  and  on  the  other,  it  has  a  higher  and  more 
extensive  sphere  of  truth  than  philosophy,  because  it  has 
the  Christian  mysteries,  which  philosophy  of  itself  can- 
not attain."  *  This  view  is  evidently  the  only  one  which 
can  consistently  be  held  in  that  Church.  The  author 
claims  that  philosophy  is  actually  exalted,  instead  of 
being  degraded,  by  this  position.  "Philosophy  stands 
to  theology  in  a  certain  relation  of  servitude,  and  that 
in  a  twofold  way.  First,  it  gives  to  theology  a  scien- 
tific basis,  because  it  contains  logic  and  methodology ; 

*  Lehrbuch  der  Philosophic,  by  Dr.  A.  Stockl,  professor  in  Eichstadt, 
4th  ed.,  1876,  vol.  i.  14.  The  Italics  are  in  the  original. 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.        79 

and,  second,  it  furnishes  those  speculative  results  on 
whose  basis  theology,  so  far  as  it  is  possible  for  the 
human  mind,  attains  a  speculative  knowledge  of  the 
Christian  mysteries.  This  is  the  sense  and  significance 
of  the  well-known  device  :  Philosophia  est  ancilla  theo- 
logice.  From  this  it  is  seen,  that,  in  accepting  such  a 
position  of  servitude  in  its  relation  to  theology,  the 
dignity  of  philosophy  is  riot  lessened;  for  it  surely  is 
no  degradation  of  philosophy  if,  in  the  way  indicated, 
it  can  be  and  is  used  for  the  purposes  of  a  higher 
science."  On  such  soil  a  pure  philosophy  cannot  flour- 
ish ;  and  it  is  not  surprising,  that  of  recent  philosophers 
not  one  of  eminence  has  come  from  the  Catholic  Church. 
It  goes  back  to  Thomas  Aquinas,  not  forward. 

If  such  views  are  still  possible  in  Germany,  we  can- 
not be  surprised  if  in  the  countries  of  Southern  Europe 
philosophy  is  held  in  bondage.  Barzellotti,*  in  speak- 
ing of  Gioberti  and  Rosmini,  says  of  the  latter,  "He 
never  allows  the  freedom  of  his  thought  to  go  the  length 
of  admitting  that  any  thing  can  be  true  to  a  philoso- 
pher which  is  incompatible  with  religious  faith.  That 
is  to  say,  Rosmini  regards  the  agreement  of  the  latter 
with  the  results  of  philosophical  investigation  as  a  post- 
ulate. Gioberti,  in  his  earlier  works,  goes  even  farther 
than  this.  Not  only  does  he  identify  philosophy  and 
religion,  but  he  recognizes  in  the  spirit  a  faculty  sui 
generis,  superior  to  reason,  and  having  the  supernatural 
for  its  object.  Viewing  the  doctrine  of  Rosmini  and 
Gioberti  mainly  from  this  point  of  view,  Cousin,  there- 
fore, had  ground  for  asserting  that  Italian  thought  was 
still  in  the  '  bonds  of  theology.' " 

Only  a  Church  which  regards  its  dogmas  as  absolute 
and  final  can  degrade  philosophy  to  a  mere  tool,  and 

*  Philosophy  iu  Italy,  Mind,  1878. 


80      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

rob  reason  and  conscience  of  their  rights.  That  philos- 
ophy in  any  worthy  sense  is  thus  destroyed,  must  be 
evident  to  all  who  understand  its  character.  If  dogmas 
are  absolutely  true,  all  possible  antagonism  cannot  affect 
them,  and  all  thorough  inquiry  can  only  serve  to  make 
their  truth  more  evident.  That  mind  must  be  strangely 
constituted  which  holds  that  a  force  is  so  great  as  to 
overcome  all  resistance,  and  yet  claims  that  no  one  is 
permitted  to  tost  that  force  or  attempt  resistance. 
When  both  the  dogmas  and  the  infallibility  of  the 
authority  establishing  them  are  questioned,  as  in  our 
day,  such  claims  create  the  suspicion  that  the  Church 
lacks  confidence  in  its  own  teachings. 

But  even  in  the  Protestant  Church  philosophy  has 
not  always  enjoyed  that  freedom  which  enabled  it  fully 
to  express  and  develop  its  principles.  Wolff,  Kant, 
Fichte,  and  others  had  their  liberties  restrained,  or  were 
subjected  to  persecution.*  Heusde,  a  recent  Dutch 
professor,  said  of  his  countrymen,  "  In  philosophizing 
we  ask  for  simplicity,  good  sound  sense,  and  especially 
good  principles,  that  should  in  no  wise  disagree  with 
those  of  our  religious'faith."  Let  any  one  in  America 
or  Great  Britain  attempt  to  develop  a  philosophical  sys- 
tem in  conflict  with  the  prevailing  faith,  and  he  will 
soon  discover  that  there  is  a  marked  difference  between 
nominal  and  real  freedom  of  thought.  In  these  lands 
the  law  may  not  interfere  with  freedom  of  expression ; 
but  there  are  other  than  legal  restraints.  There  is  a 
constant  growth  of  toleration ;  but  there  are  many  who 
still  have  to  learn  that  the  wounds  made  by  philosophy 


*  "Wolff  was  banished  from  Halle,  but  was  restored  by  Frederick  II.  ; 
Kant  received  a  reprimand  from  the  Cultusminister  for  publishing  a 
certain  article  on  religion  ;  and  Fichte,  being  charged  with  atheism  in 
Jena,  lost  his  professorship,  and  lied  to  Berlin. 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO   RELIGION.        81 

and  science  can  only  be  healed  by  the  same,  while 
abuse  and  passion  only  turn  them  into  festering  sores.* 
Sometimes  the  question  of  toleration  becomes  in  the 
highest  degree  difficult.  Can  a  state  permit  teachers  in 
its  institutions,  appointed  and  supported  by  itself,  to 
advocate  views  which  tend  to  undermine  the  very 
principles  on  which  it  is  founded?  Its  first  law  is  self- 
protection.  Communism  will  probably  teach  the  states 
which  have  not  already  learned  the  lesson,  that  a  sharp 
line  must  be  drawn  between  liberty  and  licentiousness. 
In  an  institution  established  by  a  religious  denomina- 
tion, for  religious  purposes,  it  cannot  be  expected  that 
instruction  subversive  of  this  end  should  be  tolerated. 
No  honest  philosopher  would  accept  or  retain  a  position 
in  which  the  perfect  freedom  necessary  for  a  full  devel- 
opment and  free  expression  of  his  views  cannot  be 
maintained.  This  does  not  imply  that  a  teacher  must 
express  all  he  imagines  or  believes,  no  matter  with  what 
consequences  it  may  be  fraught.  The  wise  man  is 
reserved  in  the  utterance  of  mere  opinions  on  weighty 
subjects,  —  opinions  which  may  be  false  and  injurious, 
and  which  he  himself  may  have  occasion  to  change 
afterwards.  Freedom  is  not  temerity ;  arid  philosophy 
is  not  contempt  of  authority,  though  it  recognizes  no 
authority  as  not  subject  to  its  tests. 

If  religion  has  repeatedly  attempted  to  make  philoso- 
phy subordinate,  the  latter  has  frequently  tried  to  over- 
throw religion,  or,  at  least,  to  transform  it  into  harmony 
with  itself.  The  Kantian  rationalism,  the  use  made  of 
Hegel's  dialectics,  and  Hartmann's  pessimism,  are  ex- 
amples. Theologians  have  repeatedly  tried  to  harmonize 

*  Julius  Muller  says  in  one  of  his  sermons,  "Wounds  which  have 
been  inflicted  oil  humanity  by  knowledge,  can  be  healed  only  by 
knowledge." 


82      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

their  doctrines  with  the  prevalent  school  of  philosophy, 
often  with  indifferent  results.  Sometimes,  when  the 
harmony  was  supposed  to  be  complete,  the  philosophical 
system  itself  changed,  and  then  no  one  cared  for  the 
reconciliation.  Theologians  may  be  obliged  to  pass 
through  many  transformations  in  order  to  keep  in  har- 
mony with  the  rapidly  changing  philosophies.*  There 
can  hardly  be  a  more  absurd  proposition  than  to  claim 
that  religion  must  adapt  itself  to  the  current  philosophy. 
Even  the  disciples  themselves  are  not  always  agreed  as 
to  the  religion  most  in  harmony  with  their  philosoph- 
ical system.  In  the  school  of  Kant,  and  still  more  in 
that  of  Hegel,  the  followers  have  disputed  fiercely  about 
the  religious  attitude  of  their  philosophy ;  and  even  on 
the  doctrines  of  God  and  immortality  conflicting  views 
were  held.  Some  philosophers  modified  their  own  sys- 
tems (as  Reinhold  and  Schelling),  so  that  at  different 
periods  of  their  lives  different  religious  doctrines  would 
have  found  most  favor.  And  what  a  time  theologians 
would  have  in  our  age  to  determine  which  philosophical 
system  shall  fix  their  dogmas  !  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume, 
Comte,  Spencer,  Kant,  Hegel,  Schopenhauer,  Lotze,  and 
perhaps  a  score  besides,  would  have  to  be  taken  into 
account.  Religion  has  been  subject  to  many  changes, 
but  it  has  been  stability  itself  compared  with  the  evo- 
lutions and  transformations  of  philosophical  systems. 
The  failure  to  harmonize  the  two  has  repeatedly  led 

*  Karl  Daub,  formerly  theological  professor  at  Heidelberg,  is  an  inter- 
esting illustration.  He  began  his  career  as  a  Kantian,  and  his  first 
works  are  written  from  that  standpoint.  Then,  after  being  under 
Fichte's  influence  for  a  while,  he  adopted  Schelling's  system,  and  wrote 
a  number  of  dogmatic  works  in  the  spirit  of  that  philosophy.  Finally 
he  became  a  disciple  of  Hegel,  and  his  latest  works  bear  the  impress  of 
that  philosopher.  His  change  of  views  cannot  be  attributed  to  lack 
of  character.  He  was  thoroughly  sincere,  as  well  as  scholarly  and 
speculative. 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.        83 

to  efforts  to  separate  religion  from  philosophy.*  That 
this  is  impracticable,  is  frequently  proved  by  its  very 
advocates.  One  might  as  well  attempt  to  keep  the  two 
elements  apart  in  his  own  mind.  A  philosophical  sys- 
tem may  influence  the  mind  very  deeply,  yet  uncon- 
sciously. 

Conflicts  are  inevitable.  When  they  do  arise,  which 
is  the  final  appeal?  The  fact  that  a  religion  claims  to 
be  absolute  has  no  significance  for  the  philosopher.  The 
Catholic,  the  Protestant,  the  Jew,  the  Mohammedan, 
the  Buddhist,  all  claim  to  possess  the  truth ;  but  who 
shall  decide  between  them  ?  In  order  to  be  the  crite- 
rion, a  faith  must  first  legitimate  itself ;  it  must  prove 
its  authority  before  its  claims  can  be  recognized  by  phi- 
losophy. The  appeal  to  revelation  or  inspiration  may  be 
made  by  any  religion :  the  very  thing  to  be  established 
is  the  genuineness  of  the  claimed  authority.  A  faith, 
in  order  to  gain  the  approval  of  reason,  must  be  rational. 
This  implies  that  reason  is  the  ultimate  appeal  in  case 
of  conflict.  Properly  understood,  there  can  be  no  ob- 
jection to  this  on  the  part  of  faith.  As  the  appeal  to 
reason  as  the  final  authority,  even  in  religious  faith,  is 
often  perverted,  it  is  worth  while  to  determine  exactly 
what  is  meant  by  such  an  appeal. 

The  claim  that  faith  must  be  rational  does  not  mean 
that  all  the  objects  of  belief  can  be  comprehended  by 
reason.  If  this  were  the  sense,  faith  might  as  well  be 
abandoned  at  once.  Reason  neither  comprehends  itself 
absolutely,  nor  the  soul,  nor  the  world,  nor  God.  So 
far  as  it  understands  its  limits,  it  has  the  best  grounds 

*  Schleiermacher  attempted  this  at  the  beginning  of  the  century. 
Kitsehl  of  Gottingen  advocates  the  total  exclusion  of  metaphysics 
from  theology.  He  already  has  numerous  followers,  and  his  school  is 
growing. 


84      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

for  modesty.  The  deeper  thought  of  the  age  tends  to 
despair  rather  than  to  arrogance.  Much  may  be  true 
whose  full  meaning  we  cannot  fathom. 

Nor  does  it  mean  that  faith  is  only  to  accept  what 
reason  or  the  understanding  demonstrates.  If  this  were 
done,  faith  would  be  superseded  by  knowledge.  This  is 
the  tendency  of  positivism  and  allied  systems,  though 
they  themselves,  in  the  name  of  knowledge,  usually  start 
with  some  supposition  which  itself  needs  proof,  so  that 
their  positive  knowledge  itself  rests  on  faith.  Such 
tendencies,  narrow,  unconscious  of  their  real  character, 
often  conceited  as  well  as  exclusive,  are  opposed  by  a 
philosophy  which  is  broad  as  well  as  deep.  A  rational 
faith  means  the  continuance  of  faith  as  faith,  arid  not 
the  foolish  attempt  to  transform  its  emotional  elements 
into  mathematical  formulas.  Faith  may  contain  much 
which  reason  cannot  discover  or  demonstrate  and  com- 
prehend, and  yet  be  perfectly  rational.  It  must  not,  how- 
ever, contain  any  thing  in  itself  contradictory ;  and  one 
of  the  most  important  functions  of  philosophy  in  relation 
to  theology  is  the  test  of  the  consistency  of  theological 
dogmas  and  systems.  Not  only  does  the  reason  claim 
that  doctrines  must  be  consistent  with  themselves,  but 
also  that  they  must  not  be  in  conflict  with  the  estab- 
lished laws  of  mind.  When  evidence  is  produced  in 
favor  of  facts  or  doctrines,  it  must  be  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  of  evidence.  So  far  as  its  objects  are  subject 
to  demonstration,  faith  has  only  that  logic  whose  appli- 
cation is  universal.  The  logic  of  faith,  unless  the  ex- 
pression is  figurative,  is  exactly  the  same  as  that  which 
proves  the  revolution  of  the  earth  around  the  sun.  The 
data,  indeed,  differ  greatly,  but  not  the  reasoning  founded 
on  them. 

So  far  as  the  doctrines  of  faith  are  comprehensible  by 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO   RELIGION.        85 

reason,  they  must  be  rational.  But  we  go  a  step  far- 
ther, and  claim  that  faith,  whether  its  doctrines  are  com- 
prehensible or  not,  must  itself  be  rational ;  that  is,  there 
must  be  sufficient  ground  for  the  faith.  The  fact  that 
a  doctrine  is  not  self-contradictory  is  no  evidence  of  its 
truth.  The  ontological  proof  has  lost  its  force,  because 
it  is  seen  that  a  consistent  idea  of  the  Divine  Being  is 
no  proof  that  God  really  exists.  Whether  it  is  held 
that  faith  is  based  on  revelation,  or  on  history,  or  on 
the  study  of  nature,  or  on  the*  impulses,  demands,  and 
experiences  of  man,  or  on  all  these  combined,  it  can 
only  substantiate  its  claims  by  showing  that  its  grounds 
are  rational.  The  objects  of  the  claimed  revelation  may 
transcend  the  limits  of  our  minds  ;  but  if  I  am  to  believe 
in  them,  I  must  have  reasonable  grounds  for  the  belief, 
otherwise  I  might  as  well  accept  mythology,  or  make 
some  other  arbitrary  choice.  For  historic  facts  we 
justly  demand  historic  evidence.  Philosophy,  in  spite 
of  the  attempt  of  Hegelians,  cannot  determine  a  priori, 
or  according  to  any  valid  process,  what  the  historical 
development  must  have  been,  and  what  may  have  oc- 
curred at  a  particular  time.  But  reason  has  criteria 
according  to  which  historical  events,  whether  sacred 
or  profane,  must  be  tested.  Faith  in  events  which 
stand  this  test  is  rational,  while  unbelief  would  be  irra- 
tional. It  is  certainly  not  rational  to  determine  by 
philosophy  what  belongs  exclusively  to  history.  A  phi- 
losophy which  decides  a  priori  that  providence,  prophecy, 
and  miracle  are  impossible,  disposes  of  these  subjects 
summarily,  wholly  regardless  of  the  testimony  of  his- 
tory. All  in  history  which  comes  under  these  heads  is 
interpreted  as  mythology,  or  fiction,  or  deception,  or 
mistake.  There  is  much  construction  of  history  where 
there  should  be  simply  interpretation.  We  must  judge 


86      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

experience  by  experience,  not  by  any  supposed  philoso- 
phy of  experience  which  ignores  experience  itself;  so 
history  must  be  judged  by  history,  according  to  the 
laws  of  historic  criticism.6 

In  affirming  that  reason  is  the  last  appeal,  we  mean 
that  reason  is  fundamental ;  it  determines  the  laws  of 
probability  and  certainty.  It  must  not,  however,  be 
expected  that  reason  can  reconcile  all  principles,  or 
explain  all  mysteries.  If  the  accomplishment  of  this  is 
to  be  the  rule,  then  the  religion  that  is  rational  must 
be  barren,  and  will  hardly  rise  above  the  level  of  rigid 
morality.  Philosophy  cannot  fully  explain  even  its 
own  principles,  or  completely  harmonize  them ;  and  it 
is  too  much  to  expect  of  it  an  explanation  of  all  that 
pertains  to  religion.  Principles  which  are  true  may 
form  a  union  at  a  point  which  lies  beyond  the  reach  of 
our  intellects.  Even  Hume,  with  his  empirical  basis, 
his  clearness  and  acumen  and  scepticism,  could  not 
limit  his  mind  to  what  he  could  explain  and  demon- 
strate. At  the  close  of  his  Treatise  he  says,  "There 
are  two  principles  which  I  cannot  render  consistent, 
nor  is  it  in  my  power  to  renounce  either  of  them ;  viz., 
that  all  our  distinct  perceptions  are  distinct  existences, 
and  that  the  mind  never  perceives  any  real  connection 
among  distinct  existences."  If  these  problems  baffle  the 
power  of  the  mind,  is  it  any  wonder  that  the  deepest 
may  have  much  for  faith  and  little  for  intellectual  sight? 

The  specific  rules  of  reason  as  applicable  to  faith  may 
be  thus  summarized :  — 

1.  The  fact  that  a  notion  is  perfectly  consistent  with 
itself  is  no  evidence  that  there  is  a  corresponding  reality. 

2.  No  reality  can  correspond  with  a  notion  that  is 
self-contradictory.     A  cannot  at  the  same  time  be  B 
and  not-B. 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY   TO  EELIGION.        87 

3.  No  doubt  many  objects  exist  of  which  reason  has 
no  conception,  and  which  it  cannot  comprehend.     The 
power  of  reason  is  not  the  measure  of  existence. 

4.  Faith  in  such  objects  must  be  based  011  sufficient 
evidence  ;  that  is,  it  must  be  rational. 

To  reject  rules  as  evident  as  these,  is  simply  to  deter- 
mine that  faith  shall  be  unreasonable ;  that  it  shall  rest 
on  grounds  which  the  mind  itself  finds  inadequate. 
One  need  but  understand  what  this  means,  in  order  to 
see  that  it  is  in  reality  faith  against  faith;  that  it  is 
an  effort  to  force  the  mind  to  assent  to  what  it  cannot 
accept.  Rejecting  this  negation  of  its  own  laws  as 
impossible,  nothing  remains  but  genuine  rationalism, 
as  indicated  in  the  rules  given.  But  it  is  not  what  has 
commonly  been  called  rationalism.  Heretofore  this 
name  has  usually  been  applied  to  the  efforts  to  bring 
all  the  objects  of  faith  within  the  comprehension  of 
reason,  or  to  admit  as  valid  only  those  which  reason 
itself  could  discover  and  demonstrate.  This  rational- 
ism was  itself  most  irrational,  because  it  ignored  both 
the  reasonable  claims  of  the  heart  and  the  limits  of 
reason.  It  viewed  as  rational  only  what  was  within 
the  grasp  of  reason,  which  reason  was  often  used  in  a 
low  and  narrow,  not  in  an  ideal,  sense ;  but  it  forgot 
that  there  may  be  rational  grounds  in  history  and  ex- 
perience for  a  faith  which  is  not  limited  by  the  powers 
of  the  reason  to  comprehend.  The  rationalism  which 
the  above  rules  establish  simply  claims  that  there  should 
be  a  reason  for  the  faith  in  us,  and  that  we  should  prove 
all  things,  and  hold  fast  that  which  is  good.  It  is  a 
rationalism  which  religion  demands  as  much  as  philoso- 
phy; which,  in  fact,  faith  demands  if  it  is  to  be  faith. 
It  admits  that  objects  of  faith  may  be  above  reason,  but 
insists  that  they  cannot  be  against  reason ;  it  admits 


88     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  reason  may  no  more  be  able  to  discover  them  than 
it  can  historic  events,  but  claims  that  faith  in  them 
must  be  reasonable.  Whatever  the  ground  of  faith  may 
be,  whether  in  history,  Scripture,  nature,  the  heart,  or 
the  will,  it  must  have  a  rational  basis. 

If  faith  has  at  times  sinned  against  reason  by 
ignoring  the  rational  claims,  philosophy  has  also  sinned 
against  faith  by  ignoring  its  character  and  rights.  But 
the  sins  of  faith  against  reason  are  against  faith  itself; 
and  when  philosophy  sins  against  faith,  it  also  does  vio- 
lence to  its  own  nature.  A  philosophy  which  eagerly 
interprets  the  phenomena  of  the  external  world,  but 
ignores  those  which  are  inner,  which  reveal  man  him- 
self and  concern  him  most,  may  ignore  religion,  but  it 
is  not  worthy  of  the  name  "  philosophy/' 7 

It  may  be  claimed  that  sin  has  so  weakened  reason, 
that  it  cannot  test  the  truth  ;  but  this  objection  cuts 
off  the  very  limb  on  which  the  objector  himself  must 
stand.  If  it  is  valid,  how  can  we  know  whether  we 
have  the  truth  ?  How  can  we  determine  what  to  be- 
lieve? The  power  of  faith  must  also  have  been  per- 
verted by  sin.  The  argument  which  robs  man  of  the 
ability  to  test  the  truth,  also  robs  him  of  the  possibility 
of  attaining  a  reliable  faith.  The  man  who  wants  an 
ethical  and  spiritual  basis  of  faith  must,  of  course,  him- 
self be  moral  and  religious. 

A  few  more  hints  may  be  of  service  to  the  student. 
By  its  attacks,  philosophy  may  help  to  make  religion 
conscious  of  itself.  The  fact  that  certain  views  have 
been  held  for  ages,  does  not  establish  their  truth.  But 
neither  does  it  prove  them  false.  Neither  antiquity  nor 
novelty  decides  any  thing  in  philosophy.  An  object 
may  be  real,  and  yet  our  grounds  for  believing  in  it 
may  be  irrational.  A  man,  after  discovering  that  he 


RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  RELIGION.       89 

has  believed  without  sufficient  reasons,  may  abandon 
his  faith ;  but  the  fact  that  his  faith  was  not  well  estab- 
lished is  no  proof  that  the  objects  in  which  he  believed 
do  not  exist.  Our  belief  and  unbelief  do  not  affect  the 
truth  itself.  The  earth  moved,  though  the  whole  world 
denied  it.  It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  the 
objects  of  faith  and  the  psychological  basis  of  faith.  If 
faith  is  not  valid  without  sufficient  grounds,  neither 
should  it  be  rejected  without  sufficient  reasons.  "A 
logical  apparatus  that  is  to  overturn  the  deepest  of 
human  beliefs,  must  have  an  extremely  firm  basis,  and 
must  have  these  parts  so  firmly  articulated  that  there 
is  no  dislocating  them."  * 

The  conflict  between  reason  and  faith  has  probably 
not  yet  reached  its  climax.  Much  as  we  may  desire 
peace,  the  mind  cannot  rest  until  it  has  fought  the 
battle  to  the  end.  No  truce  is  possible  until  the  com- 
batants have  learned  thoroughly  to  understand  each 
other,  and  have  become  willing  to  give  each  other  their 
dues.  He  who  enters  the  conflict  must  be  prepared 
for  severe  trials  if  he  wants  to  make  thorough  work. 
Whatever  else  may  be  destroyed,  the  truth  cannot  be 
finally  overthrown.  If  he  has  this  confidence  coupled 
with  modesty,  deep  sincerity,  and  a  religious  love  for 
truth,  the  student  may  safely  enter  the  battle,  assured 
that  truth  will  at  last  hold  the  field. 

Confidence  in  the  truth,  and  the  resolute  purpose  to 
seek  it,  and  it  only,  may  unite  in  the  closest  bonds 
philosophy  and  religion.  Both  are  free,  but  both  are 
bound  by  the  truth.  Co-ordination,  union,  and  freedom 
claimed  by  each  for  the  other,  as  well  as  for  itself,  are 
the  conditions  of  success.  The  progress  made  in  our 

*  Herbert  Spencer  uses  these  words  with  reference  to  Hume:  Psy- 
chology, 2d  ed.,  ii.  350. 


90     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

age  is  a  guaranty  to  the  scholar  that  he  shall  enjoy 
greater  freedom  in  his  inquiries  than  former  ages 
granted.  That  may,  of  course,  be  claimed  as  liberty, 
which  is  really  an  abuse ;  but  if  true  freedom  is  op- 
posed, progress  cannot  be  permanently  checked.  The 
triumphs  of  intellect  may  be  somewhat  more  slow,  but 
they  will  eventually  overthrow  the  last  remains  of 
bigotry.  Helmholtz  attributes  the  superior  success  of 
German  investigators,  in  some  departments  of  science, 
to  the  fact  that  they  are  "more  fearless  than  others 
of  the  consequences  of  the  entire  and  perfect  truth. 
Both  in  England  and  France  we  find  excellent  inves- 
tigators, who  are  capable  of  working  with  thorough 
energy  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  scientific  methods ; 
hitherto,  however,  they  have  always  had  to  bend  to 
social  or  ecclesiastical  prejudices,  and  could  only  openly 
express  their  convictions  at  the  expense  of  their  social 
influence  and  their  usefulness.  Germany  has  advanced 
with  bolder  step :  she  has  had  the  full  confidence,  which 
has  never  been  shaken,  that  truth  fully  known  brings 
with  it  its  own  remedy  for  the  danger  and  disadvantage 
that  may  here  and  there  attend  a  limited  recognition 
of  what  is  true.  A  labor-loving,  frugal,  and  moral 
people  may  exercise  such  boldness,  may  stand  face  to 
face  with  truth;  it  has  nothing  to  fear  though  hasty 
or  partial  theories  be  advocated,  even  if  some  appear  to 
trench  upon  the  foundations  of  morality  and  society."  * 
Whatever  else  may  be  feared,  we  cannot  abandon 
our  confidence  in  the  beneficence  of  truth.  The  whole 
truth  will  fit  the  heart  as  well  as  the  head,  and  will  be 
promotive  of  pure  religion  as  well  as  of  sound  philoso- 
phy. "From  science,  modestly  pursued,  with  a  due 

*  Aim  and  Progress  of  Physical  Science,  in  his  Popular  Scientific 
Lectures. 


RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO   RELIGION.        91 

consciousness  of  the  extreme  fmitude  of  our  intellectual 
powers,  there  can  arise  only  nobler  and  wider  notions 
of  the  purpose  of  creation.  Our  philosophy  will  be  an 
affirmative  one,  not  the  false  and  negative  dogmas  of 
August  Comte,  which  have  usurped  the  name  and  mis- 
represented the  tendencies  of  a  true  positive  philosophy. 
True  science  will  not  deny  the  existence  of  things 
because  they  cannot  be  weighed  and  measured.  It 
will  rather  lead  us  to  believe  that  the  wonders  and 
subtleties  of  possible  existence  surpass  all  that  our 
mental  powers  allow  us  clearly  to  perceive."  * 

LITERATURE. 

The  subject  of  this  chapter  is  frequently  discussed  in 
philosophical  and  dogmatic  works,  but  not  always  with 
impartiality.  Often  it  is  too  evident  that  there  is  more 
concern  about  the  claims  of  some  system,  than  to  give 
an  objective  view  of  the  relation  of  philosophy  and 
religion.  Deism  in  England,  and  rationalism  in  Ger- 
many, necessarily  led  to  a  discussion  of  the  subject. 
Under  the  influence  of  Lessing,  Kant,  and  Hegel,  special 
attention  was  devoted  to  the  relation.  The  works  on 
natural  or  rational  theology  all  bear  on  the  subject. 
In  works  on  the  philosophy  of  religion  (Kant,  Fries, 
Schelling,  Hegel,  Caird,  Pfleiderer,  Lotze),  an  effort  is 
usually  made  to  determine  what  religious  elements  are 
demanded  by,  or  consistent  with,  certain  philosophies. 
On  the  Continent  the  recent  efforts  to  harmonize  reli- 
gion are  mostly  based  on  the  works  of  Kant,  Herbart 
fDrobisch:  Religionsphilosophie ;  Fliigel :  Die  spekula- 
tive  Tlieologie  der  GregenwartJ),  Hegel  (Biedermann: 
Philosophic  und  Christenthum,  also  Dogmatik ;  Lipsius : 
two  books  on  the  same  subjects  as  Biedermann's),  and 

*  Jevons,  768. 


92     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Lotze.  Ritschl's  effort  to  exclude  metaphysics  from 
theology  has  led  to  discussions,  mostly  among  theolo- 
gians, which  have  produced  an  extensive  literature. 
(Ritschl:  Theoloyie  und  Metaphysik ;  Herrmann:  Die 
Metaphysik  in  der  Theologie ;  Kaftan :  Das  Wesen  der 
Religion).  It  has  also  been  attempted  to  construct 
religions  on  the  basis  of  positivism,  evolutionism,  and 
pessimism  (Hartmann).  The  religious  questions  com- 
mon to  philosophy  and  religion  may  be  concentrated 
under  theism,  and  the  doctrine  of  the  soul  or  immortality ; 
the  former  including,  besides  the  existence  and  attri- 
butes of  God,  such  themes  as  creation,  design,  providence, 
miracles,  revelation  (Flint,  Ladd,  Pressense"s  Origins). 
On  the  relation  of  faith  and  knowledge  (Glauben  und 
Wissen),  there  are  numerous  works  in  German,  and  the 
subject  is  also  frequently  discussed  in  philosophical 
journals. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Religion  a  personal  relation  to  God.  What  basis  and 
objects  has  it  in  common  with  Philosophy  ?  Difference 
between  Philosophy  and  Religion.  Between  Religion 
and  Theology.  Reason  and  Faith.  Rational  Faith. 
Historical  Rationalism  and  Deism.  Reason  and  Com- 
mon Sense.  Philosophy  and  Mysticism.  Arguments 
for  the  existence  of  God.  Views  of  Anselm,  Descartes, 
Kant.  Significance  of  the  emotional  and  volitional 
elements  in  Religion.  Philosophical  and  historical  crit- 
icism (Tubingen  School).  Limits  of  thought  and  of 
being.  Religion  and  Materialism,  Pantheism,  Positiv- 
ism, Agnosticism.  Science  and  Religion.  Basis  for 
Religion  in  human  nature.  Moral  argument  for  Reli- 
gion. Does  the  psychological  basis  of  Religion  furnish 
an  argument  in  favor  of  the  objects  of  Religion  ?  What 
is  meant  by  the  self-evidencing  power  of  truth  ? 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL  SCIENCE.  93 


CHAPTER  III. 

PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL  SCIENCE. 

PHILOSOPHY  and  science,  the  two  departments  in 
which  modern  intellect  has  attained  its  greatest  achieve- 
ments, are  both  coldly  intellectual,  and,  in  theory  at 
least,  rigorous  in  method  and  absolute  in  the  finality 
of  their  results.  The  advocates  of  each  usually  claim 
independence  in  their  respective  sphere,  and  contend 
for  the  supremacy  in  the  domain  of  thought.  It  is  but 
natural  that  with  so  great  similarity  they  should  often 
be  confounded,  and  that  with  so  much  to  distinguish 
them  their  hostility  during  rivalry  and  encroachments 
should  become  intense.  But  while  at  times  they  severely 
repel,  they  at  others  attract  each  other,  and  tend  to 
coalesce.  That  they  interlace,  or  even  amalgamate,  is 
evident  from  expressions  like  "scientific  philosophy," 
and  "  philosophy  of  science.''  * 

"Under  these  circumstances  it  is-peculiarly  difficult  to 
determine  their  exact  places  and  relations ;  but  it  is  as 
important  as  difficult,  particularly  since  they  are  the 
departments  in  which  the  severest  efforts  of  intellect 
culminate. 

*  In  the  beginning  of  this  century,  it  was  common  in  Germany  to 
regard  philosophy  as  science  (WissenschafC);  the  same  is  still  the  case, 
but  it  meets  with  more  opposition.  A  distinction  is  now  made  between 
philosophy  which  is  scientific,  and  that  which  is  not,  as  is  evident  from 
the  Quarterly  for  Scientific  Philosophy  (wisKerwhaflliche  Philosophic), 
and  also  from  the  Italian  journal  Kevista  dc  Filosofia  Scienlifica. 


94     INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  student  who  watches  the  development  of  thought 
in  the  growth  of  language,  will  observe  that  "-philos- 
ophy "  and  "science"  are  not  so  commonly  as  formerly 
employed  as  synonymes.  As  a  branch  in  its  growth 
may  separate  into  two  with  different  directions,  so  it  has 
been  with  intellect  in  developing  philosophy  and  science 
together  and  afterwards  separating  them  into  distinct 
tendencies.  While  both  terms  are  at  times  still  used  for 
the  same  spheres,  we  shall  see  that  the  process  of  dis- 
crimination and  analysis  is  rapidly  assigning  to  each  a 
peculiar  class  of  objects,  and  a  peculiar  aim.  The  term 
"  natural  science  "  of  course  implies  that  there  is  other 
science  also ;  and  for  the  present,  for  the  sake  of  defi- 
niteness,  we  shall  distinguish  between  philosophy  and 
natural  science,  but  with  the  conviction  that  the  time 
is  not  distant  when  philosophy  and  science  itself  shall 
be  generally  admitted  to  have  distinct  spheres. 

If  a  word  with  different  senses  is  used,  it  will  be  found 
that  its  leading  or  most  apparent  sense  absorbs,  as  it 
were,  the  others,  and  is  ordinarily  the  only  one  present 
to  the  mind.  When  used  with  a  meaning  different  from 
the  leading  one,  it  requires  special  discrimination  to 
discern  it;  so  that  we  frequently  get  a  meaning  of  a 
word,  but  not  the  one  intended.  (When  a  technical  term 
is  popularized,  some  prominent  shade  of  meaning  is  gen- 
erally seized,  and  applied  to  many  objects  to  which  it  is 
not  technically  applicable.  J"  Science  M  and  "  philosophy  " 
are  thus  employed  and  made  vague.  But  this  law  is  also 
promotive  of  serious  error,  which  can  only  be  overcome 
by  carefully  observing  the  exact  sense  of  a  word  in  its 
connections.  To  such  use,  or  rather  abuse,  the  word 
"  natural "  is  subject.  In  theology  it  has  actually  come 
to  mean  unnatural  (sinful,  the  opposite  of  man's  origi- 
nal, true  nature).  In  science  it  is  at  times  used  in  dis- 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.  95 

tinction  from  the  supernatural,  in  which  case  it  includes 
the  mental  in  man.  When  this  is  done,  the  mental  is 
apt  to  be  assimilated  to  what  is  most  prominent  in 
nature,  namely  the  material  and  mechanical.  But  we 
also  use  " natural"  in  distinction  from  "mental,"  in 
which  case  man's  peculiarities  are  most  emphasized. 

When  natural  science  is  here  contrasted  with  phi- 
losophy, we  use  "natural"  as  distinct  both  from  the 
mental  and  the  supernatural.  Natural  science  thus  in- 
cludes the  whole  domain  of  nature,  but  not  psychology. 
C There  are  two  leading  meanings  in  the  term  "  science  " 
which  have  led  to  confusion  even  in  its  technical  use. 
Thus  it  is  employed  on  the  one  hand  to  designate  sim- 
ply certainty  in  systematized  knowledge,  whether  that 
knowledge  be  formal  or  material ;  *  and,  on  the  other,  it 
designates  systematized  material  knowledge  that  is  cer- 
tain. )  Thus,  when  the  mere  element  of  certainty  is  con- 
sidered, there  are  two  departments  of  thought  which 
have  the  strongest  claim  to  the  term  "  science,"  namely 
mathematics  and  formal  logic.  They  are  both  specula- 
tive, mathematics  being  based  on  space  and  numbers, 
logic  on  indisputable  axioms,  and  both  being  developed 
according  to  inexorable  laws  of  mind,  independent  of 
observation  and  experiment  in  the  ordinary  sense.  That 
this  formal  knowledge  is  the  most  certain  of  all,  is  evi- 
dent from  the  fact  that  mathematics  and  logic  are  not 
liable  to  the  errors  possible  in  observation  and  experi- 
ment; besides,  all  material  knowledge,  natural  science 
in  eluded,  depends  on  formal  knowledge  for  its  construc- 
tion, so  that,  even  if  its  materials  are  absolutely  certain, 
material  knowledge  can  at  best  but  attain  the  absolute- 
ness of  the  formal  laws  by  which  it  is  constructed. 

*  Material  in  the  sense  of  containing  objects  as  well  as  forms  of 
knowledge. 


96      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

If  certainty,  then,  were  the  sole  point  of  considera- 
tion, we  should  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  the  specu- 
lative departments  of  mathematics  and  formal  logic 
pre-eminently  science.  But  when  we  come  to  material 
knowledge  we  find  that  the  conditions  for  the  strict 
application  of  these  formal  systems  are  given  only  in 
nature,  so  that  in  the  domain  of  material  knowledge  the 
term  "science  "  is  strictly  applicable  only  to  nature,  (if 
we  distinguish  between  formal  and  material  science, 
there  can  be  no  danger  of  confusion,  since  in  that  ease 
the  former  will  include  mathematics  and  logic,  while  the 
latter  will  be  limited  to  natural  science.  So  promi- 
|  nent,  however,  has  natural  science  become,  that  it  is 
generally  meant  now  when  the  term  "  science  "  is  used ; 
and  to  avoid  confusion  it  would  be  well  to  confine  the 
term  to  that  department.  J 

Even  among  scholars  the  term  is  employed  in  various 
senses.  When  used  technically,  they  are  apt  to  attach 
to  it  what  is  only  incidentally  associated,  and  has  no 
claim  to  its  exactness  and  severity,  while  when  employed 
popularly  they  designate  by  it  systematized  knowledge 
of  any  kind.  Thus  heraldry  is  called  "  the  science  of 
conventional  distinctions  impressed  on  shields,  banners, 
and  other  military  accoutrements."  History,  jurispru- 
dence, music,  politics,  theology,  aesthetics,  ethics,  logic, 
mathematics,  chemistry,  and  many  other  subjects,  have 
been  called  sciences.  Now,  a  glance  shows  that  neither 
in  their  objects,  nor  foundation,  nor  method,  nor  degree 
of  exactness  and  reliability,  is  there  any  agreement 
between  these  heterogeneous  subjects.  No  wonder, 
then,  that  scholars  are  not  agreed  as  to  the  meaning  of 
the  term.* 

*  Different  writers,  having  different  conceptions  of  what  constitutes 
a  science,  have  assigned  different  dates  to  the  birth  of  geology  and  other 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.          97 

When  we  speak  of  natural  science,  we  are  apt  to 
think  chiefly  of  a  certain  method  and  its  results ;  but 
we  also  imply  a  particular  class  of  objects.  The  phe- 
nomena of  nature  are  peculiar  in  that  they  cannot 
merely  be  observed  like  other  facts  before  the  mind,  but 
they  can  also  be  tested  so  as  to  yield  exact  and  definite 
results  not  dependent  on  subjective  states.  The  mind, 
if  viewed  as  a  part  of  nature,  cannot  be  subjected  to 
the  same  tests  throughout.  Even  biology  presents 
greater  obstacles  than  physics.  The  character  of  its 
experiments,  and  the  method  of  drawing  and  testing  its 
inferences,  give  natural  science  a  peculiar  severity  and 
exactness.  The  physicist  subjects  objects  to  various 
modifications  in  order  to  discover  the  effect  of  different 
relations.  Something  is  added  or  subtracted,  or  differ- 
ently placed,  in  order  to  discover  new  properties  or 
facts.  Professor  Tait  says,  "The  essence  of  experi- 
ment is  to  modify  the  circumstances  of  a  physical  phe- 
nomenon so  as  to  increase  its  value  as  a  test."  The 
perfect  uniformity,  the  absolute  exactness,  and  the  cer- 
tainty attainable  in  these  experiments,  make  them 
peculiar ;  and  the  laws  to  which  they  are  subject  deter- 
mine what  is  technically  called  the  scientific  method. 

Not  more  severe  is  natural  science  in  its  experiments 
than  in  observing  and  recording  phenomena,  whether 
occurring  naturally  or  the  result  of  experiment.  The 
same  experiments  can  be  repeated  at  will  and  by  any 
number  of  scientists,  thus  insuring  greatest  accuracy. 
But ^bservation  and  experiment  furnish  only  the  mate-  / 
rials  of  science,  not  science  itself.  )  All  the  processes 

sciences.  ^Professor  Huxley  defines  science  as  "  organized  common 
sense  :  "  and  Mr.   Spencer,  as  "  partially  unified  knowledge."    Science 
has  also  l>een  defined  as  systematized  knowledge,  rationalized  knowl-     \_ 
edge,  verified  knowledge,  classified  knowledge,  etc.  —  H.  M.  STANLEY,      | 
Mind,  1884,  2<>6. 


98     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

founded  on  them  are  mathematically  exact.  Whatever 
suppositions  may  be  tentatively  adopted,  science  itself 
is  limited  to  demonstrations ;  so  that  in  the  strict  sense, 
and  according  to  its  true  idea,  natural  science  is  abso- 
lute. For  this  reason  the  term  "  science  "  is  so  often 
assumed  to  help  along  mere  hypotheses  and  assumptions 
which  have  no  claim  either  to  exactness  or  finality. 
We  must  distinguish  between  the  claims  of  science  and 
the  claims  of  scientists. 

Strict  scientists  are  only  consistent  when  they  refuse 
the  application  of  the  term  "  science  "  to  objects  which 
will  not  submit  to  the  tests  of  their  method.  If  their 
conditions  are  correct,  music,  theology,  history,  politics, 
and  similar  subjects  are  not  sciences.  This  of  course 
does  not  imply  that  they  are  neither  valuable  nor  relia- 
ble, but  only  that  they  do  not  comply  with  the  condi- 
tions necessary  to  constitute  science  in  its  technical 
i  sense.  When  we  speak  of  a  man  of  science,  we  do  not 
mean  a  theologian,  metaphysician,  historian,  mathemati- 
cian, or  logician,  but  one  who  devotes  himself  to  natural 
science.  Such  expressions  as  "  student  of  science,  scien- 
tific study,  scientific  discovery,  scientific  progress,"  and 
many  similar  ones,  are  generally  used  in  the  sense  indi- 
cated. From  the  more  general  meaning  of  systematized 
knowledge,  the  term  has  thus  come  to  be  appropriated 
for  knowledge  of  a  certain  kind,  obtained  in  a  particu- 
lar way,  subject  to  definite  tests,  and  absolutely  exact 
and  reliable  ;  and  nothing  will  be  lost  by  limiting  the 
word  to  what  is,  in  the  strictest  and  most  technical 
sense,  scientific.  In  doing  this,  science  will  not  only 
be  different  from  philosophy,  but  will  also  have  a  pecul- 
iar sphere,  distinct  in  method  and  limitation,  and  clearly 
separated  from  all  other  departments  of  learning. 
\  (Natural  science  seeks  to  discover  the  causes  of  physi- 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE. 


99 


cal  events,  and  attempts  to  construct  a  system  of  the 
laws  of  nature.  "  To  find  the  law  by  which  they  are 
regulated,  is  to  understand  phenomena.  For  law  is 
nothing  more  than  the  general  conception  in  which  a 
series  of  similarly  recurring  natural  processes  may  be 
embraced/'  *  ^ 

The  declaration  that  natural  science  aims  to  discover 
the  laws  of  nature,  is  essentially  the  same  as  affirming 
that  it  seeks  the  forces  of  nature.  The  laws  are  simply 
statements  of  how  the  forces  work,  giving  the  formula 
of  the  operations  of  natural  causes.f  "Force"  and 
"  cause "  are,  however,  words  which  seem  to  furnish 
explanations  of  phenomena  which  they  in  reality  do 
not  give.  In  using  them,  (the  mind  should  determine 
whether  they  interpret  facts  otherwise  than  by  the  sub- 
stitution of  another  fact.  Do  we  know  what  a  force  is, 
or  how  a  cause  works  to  produce  an  effect  ?  We  are  apt 
to  imagine  that  we  have  explained  how  a  thing  is  done, 
when  we  have  only  shown  that  it  is  done.  It  is  a  deep 
inquiry  to  determine  whether  with  what  we  call  force 
we  ever  get  farther  than  from  one  fact  to  another.  In 
its  last  analysis  a  law  gives  only  a  method  of  procedure, 
or  a  general  fact  which  embraces  all  facts  of  the  same 
kind.  )The  law  of  gravitation  is  itself  a  fact  which 
includes  many  others;  but  neither  Newton  nor  any 

*  Helmholtz,  Popular  Lectures  on  Scientific  Subjects  (Appleton),  370. 
P.  393  he  says  "  that  what  physical  science  strives  after  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  laws;  in  other  words,  the  knowledge  how  at  different  times, 
under  the  same  conditions,  the  same  results  are  brought  about."  Pro- 
fessor Tait  states :  "  The  object  of  all  pure  physical  science  is  to  en- 
deavor to  grasp  more  and  more  perfectly  the  nature  and  laws  of  the 
external  world."  —  Recent  Advances  in  Physical  Science,  347. 

t  "  Our  desire  to  comprehend  natural  phenomena,  in  other  words,  to 
ascertain  their  laws,  thus  takes  another  form  of  expression,  —  that  is,  we 
have  to  seek  out  the  forces  which  are  the  causes  of  the  phenomena."  — 
HELMHOLTZ,  372. 


100     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

other  human  mind  conceived  the  explanation  of  the  law 
itself. 

Its  aim  to  reduce  phenomena  to  laws  attaches  natural 
science  closely  to  the  facts  it  attempts  to  formulate. 
"  Nothing  can  be  learned  as  to  the  physical  world,  save 
by  observation  and  experiment,  or  by  mathematical 
deductions  from  data  so  obtained."  *  These  deductions 
of  course  include  all  the  direct  logical  inferences  from 
the  facts,  and  it  is  in  these  that  scientists  most  of  all 
reveal  their  intellectual  power.  It  would  be  trivial  to 
state  that  science  demands  the  severest  mental  efforts, 
were  it  not  that  in  some  quarters  the  view  prevails  that 
science  is  the  product  of  mechanical  routine,  as  much 
within  the  power  of  the  shallowest  as  of  the  profoundest 
minds.  Then,  pretenders  so  often  obtain  popularity  by 
palming  off  their  thoughtless  empiricism  as  science,  that 
beginners  are  liable  to  forget  that  mere  observers  and 
experimenters  are  to  the  scientist  what  the  hod-carrier 
is  to  the  mason.  All  phenomena  are  valuable  in  pro- 
portion as  they  are  elaborated  and  mastered  by  thought. 
Newton's  great  discovery  required  few  facts,  but  enor- 
mous intellectual  effort.  Profound  scientists  recognize 
the  need  of  emphasizing  the  mental  vigor  essential  in 
scientific  pursuits,  for  the  reason  that  so  many  imagine 
that  science  requires  nothing  but  a  registering  and  classi- 
fying of  facts.  }  It  is  forgotten  that  the  facts  observed 
in  nature  can  only  be  connected  and  related  by  the 
mind,  and  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  mental  products 
from  the  given  data.  "  Isolated  facts  and  experiments 
have  in  themselves  no  value,  however  great  their  num- 
ber may  be.  They  only  become  valuable  in  a  theoret- 
ical or  practical  point  of  view  when  they  make  us 
acquainted  with  the  law  of  a  series  of  uniformly  recur- 

*  Tait,  342. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        101 

ring  phenomena,  or,  it  may  be,  only  give  a  negative 
result  showing  an  incompleteness  in  our  knowledge  of 
such  a  law,  till  then  held  to  be  perfect."  *  Science,  in 
dealing  with  facts  for  its  highest  purposes,  is  as  purely 
intellectual  as  is  philosophy  in  relating  and  developing 
concepts. 

(jNot  mere  observers,  but  the  thinkers,  have  made  this 
"  the  century  of  natural  science."  The  victories  ascribed 
to  the  laboratory  are  really  the  triumphs  of  reason  in 
the  laboratory.  It  might  be  misleading  to  speak  of  a 
philosophic  element  in  the  profound  scientists  from  New- 
ton till  the  present ;  and  yet  it  would  express  their  con- 
stant tendency  to  pass  from  the  concrete  to  the  abstract, 
and  from  facts  to  laws,  principles,  and  system.)  The 
materials  with  which  science  deals  being  more  apparent 
than  its  method,  the  sense  has  been  honored  with  the 
functions  of  the  reason,  and  it  has  been  overlooked  that 
the  progress  in  physical  studies  has  been  due  to  a  scien- 
tific empiricism,  mastered  by  a  scientific  rationalism.!  ) 
However  unpopular  speculation  maybe  among  empirics, 
it  can  be  healthy  as  well  as  sickly,  and  is  too  deep  an 
impulse  of  the  mind  to  be  ignored  by  real  scientists. 
But  the  difference  between  science  and  philosophy  is, 
that  in  the  former  the  speculation  is  limited  by  facts 
and  their  laws,  while  in  philosophy  the  concepts  and  the 
mental  laws  are  the  limit.  Whoever  has  passed  from 
the  facts  of  science  to  science  itself  will  agree  with 
Whewell  $  in  emphasizing  the  need  of  facts  and  reason, 
the  "observation  of  things  without,  and  an  inward  effort 

*  Helmholtz,  369. 

t  The  indications  given  by  the  senses,  unless  interpreted  by  reason, 
are  utterly  unmeaning.  But  when  reason  and  the  senses  work  harmo- 
niously together,  they  open  to  us  an  absolutely  illimitable  prospect  of 
mysteries  to  be  explored."  —  TAIT,  342. 

I  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,  Introduction. 


102      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  thought."  He  adds,  "The  impressions  of  sense, 
unconnected  by  some  rational  and  speculative  principle, 
can  only  end  in  a  practical  acquaintance  with  individual 
objects ;  the  operations  of  the  rational  faculties,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  allowed  to  go  on  without  a  constant 
reference  to  external  things,  can  lead  only  to  empty 
abstraction  and  barren  ingenuity.  Real  speculative 
knowledge  demands  the  combination  of  the  two  ingre- 
dients, —  right  reason,  and  facts  to  reason  upon.  It  has 
been  wrell  said,  that  true  knowledge  is  the  interpretation 
of  nature:  and  thus  it  requires  both  the  interpreting 
mind,  and  nature  for  its  object ;  both  the  document,  and 
the  ability  to  read  it." 

(Nature  does  not  write  or  impress  its  facts  and  laws 
upon  a  passive  mind,  and  it  is  no  such  immediateness 
of  scientific  knowledge  which  distinguishes  it  from  the 
philosophic.  )  Science  is  not  the  product  of  sensation- 
alism, though  the  denial  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
anywhere  else  than  in  regions  accessible  to  the  senses 
has  led  to  the  more  exclusive  study  of  the  phenomenal 
world.  The  merit  of  turning  thought  from  scholastic 
subtleties  to  empirical  investigations  belongs  largely  to 
Bacon  ;  but  those  who  regard  his  emphasis  on  the  obser- 
vation of  facts,  as  giving  the  essence  of  the  modern 
scientific  spirit  and  tendency,  have  failed  to  appreciate 
the  intellectual  energy  in  science.  Bacon's  great  ser- 
vice to  science  consists  rather  in  the  general  direction 
he  gave  to  thought,  than  in  the  introduction  of  a  com- 
plete method  of  scientific  processes.  He  did  much  to 
banish  useless  inquiries,  and  to  substitute  for  them 
researches  which  promise  fruitful  and  certain  results ; 
but  it  was  an  impulse  to  a  certain  course  of  inquiry, 
rather  than  a  full  indication  of  the  route  to  be 
taken.8 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.         103 

I  In  discussing  the  relation  of  philosophy  to  science,  we 
must  distinguish  the  true  scientist  from  mere  empirics. 

While  the  aim  and  method  of  the  latter  put  all  recon- 
ciliation with  philosophy  out  of  the  question,  because 
they  depreciate  thought  and  exalt  the  sense  to  the  throne 
of  reason,  the  philosopher  has  much  in  common  with  the 
former,  and  can  easily  come  to  an  agreement  with  him 
respecting  many  essential  points  in  science  and  philoso- 
phy. The  purely  intellectual  element  in  his  pursuit 
brings  the  scientist  into  sympathy  with  the  philosopher, 
while  the  philosopher  unhesitatingly  admits  all  that  the 
scientist  can  justly  claim  for  his  method  and  its  results ; 
and  if  both  the  philosopher  and  scientist  are  deep  and 
broad,  there  can  be  little  danger  of  conflict.  A 

Although  the  advance  of  science  is  due  to  the  intel- 
lectual use  of  the  facts,  it  is  still  the  explanation  of  the 
facts  that  is  sought;  and  scientists  are  usually  suspi- 
cious of  conclusions  wholly  beyond  their  reach.  The 
facts  are  held  to  be  the  test  of  all  speculations  respect- 
ing nature.  If  scientists  admit,  that,  in  any  department 
of  thought,  there  may  be  knowledge  of  objects  which 
cannot  be  subjected  to  the  test  of  facts,  they  deny  that 
it  is  scientific.  ( In  natural  science,  therefore,  thought 
is  limited,  being  tethered  to  the  facts.  Besides  observa- 
tion, experiment,  and  mathematics,  it  is  found  that  spec- 
ulation, hypotheses,  and  theories  are  indispensable;  but 
they  must  be  based  on  facts  and  tested  by  them,  and 
their  sole  value  consists  in  their  ability  to  explain  the 
facts.  In  the  strict  sense,  the  work  of  natural  science 
is  completed  when  the  laws  of  nature  have  been  dis- 
covered and  systematized ;  inferences  and  generaliza- 
tions transcending  the  test  laid  down  by  science  cannot 
be  regarded  as  lying  within  its  domain,  however  reliable 
in  themselves. 


104     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

\Our  liability  to  error  induces  us  to  seek  in  sense  and 
reason  a  corrective  of  each  other,  and  to  regard  the  truth 
as  resulting  from  the  harmonious  action  of  both.  Only 
an  unthinking  sensationalism  can  claim  that  the  last 
appeal  should  be  made  to  the  immediateness  of  our  per- 
/  ceptions.  Science  has  clearly  demonstrated  that  our 
sense-impressions  need  correction  by  the  judgment.  I 
see  light,  and  hear  sound ;  but  no  number  of  impressions 
can  convince  me  that,  aside  from  eye  and  ear,  light  and 
sound  exist  in  nature.  I  touch  a  piece  of  iron  and  a 
cloth  in  the  same  room,  and  find  the  one  colder  than  the 
other ;  and  yet  I  know  that  both  have  the  same  tempera- 
ture, my  sensations  being  determined  by  the  power  of 
objects  to  conduct  heat.J  Thus  our  intellect  is  the  ulti- 
mate appeal,  not  the  sense.  As  in  its  inferences,  so  also 
in  its  observations  and  experiments,  natural  science 
makes  the  reason  supreme.  The  difference  between 
ordinary  and  scientific  observation  and  experiment  is 
simply  this, — that  the  latter  use  the  sense  and  its  ob- 
jects according  to  rational  principles,  while  the  former 
do  not.  Instead  of  the  usual  assumption,  therefore, 
that  sense  and  reason  are  to  each  other  a  corrective,  we 
shall  be  nearer  the  truth  in  saying  that  reason  uses  the 
data  of  sense  as  aids  in  drawing  legitimate  conclusions. 
And  natural  science  must  be  viewed  as  the  rational  in- 
terpretation of  nature,  based  on  a  rational  use  of  the 
facts,  and  subjected  to  the  rational  test  by  facts.9 

So  far  there  will  probably  be  no  dispute  between  the 
philosopher  and  the  scientist.  Whoever  objects  to  the 
expressions  "rational  use"  and  "rational  test,"  and  to 
the  supremacy  of  reason  and  the  subordination  of  sense 
implied,  need  but  substitute  the  word  "irrational,"  to 
see  the  absurdity  of  his  position.  By  eliminating  the 
rational,  he  cuts  off  all  dispute,  for  there  is  no  basis  left 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.         105 

on  which  the  disputants  can  stand.  The  only  contro- 
versy possible  between  the  philosopher  and  scientist 
would  be  respecting  the  sense  of  the  word  "  rational," 
—  a  dispute  which  cannot  be  settled  by  science  with  its 
appeal  to  the  test  of  facts  (where  is  the  standard  reason 
given  as  a  fact  ?),  but  only  by  philosophy. 

;  No  one  questions  the  reliability  of  the  results  obtained 
by  means  of  the  scientific  method.  Formerly  philos- 
ophers, indeed,  proposed  to  substitute  speculation  for 
this  method ;  that  is  now,  however,  universally  admitted 
to  be  wrong.  But  a  conflict  begins  so  soon  as  the  ques- 
tion is  proposed,  whether  the  laws  of  nature  established 
by  science  are  the  limits  of  knowledge.  This  is  the 
same  as  the  inquiry,  whether  there  is  other  than  scien- 
tific knowledge.  It  seems  almost  absurd  to  ask  the 
question  ;  but  some  so  exalt  science  that  they  not  only 
refuse  to  join  Du  Bois-Reymond  and  others  in  inscrib- 
ing lynorabimus  on  their  banner,  but  every  other  attain- 
ment so  dwindles  in  comparison  with  science,  that  they 
call  it  knowledge  only  by  courtesy.  A  scholar  eminent 
in  one  department  may  get  into  a  narrow  rut,  and  be 
unable  to  see  over  its  edges  any  thing  worthy  of  notice. 
Compared  with  the  omnipotence  of  science,  one  may 
hear  philology,  literature,  history,  and  logic,  to  say 
nothing  of  metaphysics,  theology,  aesthetics,  and  ethics, 
spoken  of  with  a  degree  of  contempt.  J 

The  cause  of  science  will  not  be  retarded,  but  pro- 
moted, by  distinguishing  between  those  who  have  really 
caught  its  spirit,  and  such  as  are  scientists  only  in  name. 
If  the  latter  speak  disparagingly  of  other  pursuits  in 
order  to  magnify  their  own  importance,  they  can  work 
mischief  only  if  regarded  as  speaking  in  the  name  of 
science.  /The  question,  whether  there  is  any  thing  be- 
yond the  limits  of  strict  science,  is  answered  by  scien- 


106      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

lists  themselves  in  their  efforts  to  get  beyond.  The 
limits  of  science  aj^Tevidently  not  the  limit  of  thought, 
and  the  mind  cannot  rest  when  it  has  reached  them.  J 
Scientific  men  construct  cosmologies,  and  frequently 
adopt  materialistic  or  idealistic  theories  of  the  universe, 
which  are  wholly  extra-scientific.  It  may  even  happen, 
that  speculation  is  zealously  denounced  in  the  interest 
of  exact  science,  but  this  only  serves  to  increase  the 
astonishment  at  finding  so  many  winged  speculations  in 
works  of  scientists.  (The  imagination  plays  a  much 
more  prominent  part  in  constructing  theories  termed 
scientific  than  is  generally  supposed.  Herbartheld  that 
imagination  is  essential  to  all  discoveries,  and  that  there 
is  as  much  of  it  in  original  thought  in  science  as  in 
poetry.  "  It  is  very  doubtful,"  he  says,  "  whether  New- 
ton or  Shakspeare  possessed  the  greater  imagination." 
Surely  our  age  need  riot  abuse  Kepler  for  his  fancies, 
nor  pity  Newton  if  he  believed  in  alchemy.*  \  The  reli- 
ability of  what  the  mind  imagines  possible  is  to  be  deter- 
mined by  direct  questions  to  nature,  to  be  answered  by 
means  of  tentative  experiment.  The  mere  mental 
combinations  and  theories  of  scientists  must  of  course 
be  subjected,  as  far  as  possible,  to  scientific,  tests  ;  but 
their  very  existence,  to  say  nothing  of  their  abundance 
and  utility,  proves  that  the  mind  cannot  be  compressed 
within  the  limits  of  exact  science.10 

(The  confidence  with  which  we  speak  of  natural  sci- 
ence is  justified  so  long  as  we  remember  that  it  confines 
itself  to  phenomena,  and  that  its  observations  are  neces- 
sarily limited.  We  enter  the  domain  of  mystery  as  soon 
as  we  inquire  into  the  essence  of  things,  the  nature  of 
forces  and  causes,  and  the  totality  of  natural  phenom- 
ena. )Both  the  progress  of  science  and  the  division 

*  Jevoiis,  505. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        107 


of  labor  have  increased  the  difficulty  of  generalizations 
comprehending  the  total  results  of  scientific  inquiry.11 
While  specialization,  so  marked  a  feature  of  our  age, 
greatly  promotes  the  advance  of  the  separate  sciences, 
it  also  has  serious  disadvantages.  The  rigid  specialist 
cannot  get  a  comprehensive  view  of  science  even,  still 
less  of  knowledge  in  general ;  he  is  also  in  danger  of 
becoming  unjust  to  other  branches,  and  of  losing  appre- 
ciation for  every  thing  but  his  specialty.  The  undue 
exaltation  of  one  department  of  thought  destroys  the 
unity  of  knowledge,  and  the  organism  of  all  the  sci- 
ences. He  who  is  supreme  in  a  specialty  may  go  far 
astray  when  he  makes  it  the  standard  of  all  intellectual 
achievements,  the  criterion  of  all  truth,  the  basis  of  all 
generalizations,  and  the  law  for  the  interpretation  of 
the  universe.  Mere  specialization,  in  exact  proportion 
to  its  perfection,  makes  knowledge  fragmentary.  For 
systematic  mental  development,  and  for  a  complete  and 
comprehensive  view  of  things,  the  mind  must  go  beyond 
these  specializations.  This  is  a  demand  of  the  special- 
lies  themselves.  Sometimes  the  limits  of  their  spheres 
are  in  dispute  ;  who  can  settle  it  without  rising  above 
the  limitations  of  each  ?  Divisions  are  matters  of  men- 
tal convenience,  and  analysis  is  but  a  preparation  for 
synthesis.  (But  how  can  we  form  a  correct  synthesis  of 
all  the  sciences  and  their  results  ?  In  going  beyond  his 
specialty,  the  specialist  ceases  to  be  a  specialist ;  and  it 
is  no  disparagement  to  his  eminence  in  a  particular 
sphere  to  say  that  the  exclusive  training  for  and  in  his 
specialty  has  probably  unfitted  him  for  the  totally  dif- 
ferent problems  which  lie  beyond.  These  problems  are, 
in  many  cases,  the  deepest,  and  involve  the  highest 
interests.  Shall  they  be  ignored?  Shall  they  be  left 
to  the  fancy?  Or  shall  man  be  specially  prepared  to 


J 


108      INTRODUCTION    TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

\  grapple  with  them  ?     The  mind  demands  their  solution, 
or,  at  least,  the  most  earnest  effort,  with  the  best  means, 

/      to  solve  them.     If  natural  science  could  do  the  work, 
/    no  one  would  hesitate  to  consign  to  it  these  problems ; 

/  but,  lying  far  beyond  the  test  of  physical  facts,  science 
cannot  even  attempt  to  solve  them  without  becoming 
philosophy.  1 

The  unity  of  nature  is  an  axiom  of  science,  and  the 
basis  of  all  induction.  But  is  this  axiom  given  by 
isolated  facts,  or  by  the  special  sciences  ?  No  one  ques- 
tions that  there  must  be  unity  in  the  final  results  of  all 
the  sciences ;  but  can  a  specialty  teach  us  any  thing 
respecting  the  results  of  all  investigation  ?  There  are 
principles  which  are  common  to  all  thought,  which  de- 
termine the  character  of  all  valid  research,  are  the  cri- 
teria of  all  truth,  and  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  the  sciences ; 
now  it  is  self-evident  that  what  is  common  to  all  the 
sciences,  and  constitutes  the  essence  of  science  itself, 
cannot  be  a  specialty  of  any  particular  science.  If  any 
one  claimed  it  as  a  monopoly,  the  others  would  imme- 
diately rebel.  No  natural  science  regards  itself  called 
upon  to  make  these  principles  a  specialty ;  each  one,  as 
a  rule,  simply  takes  them  for  granted,  and  works  on 
them.  Such,  for  instance,  are  the  principles  of  knowl- 
edge. Every  science  rests  on  these,  and  all  its  investi- 
gations and  constructions  must  be  determined  by  them; 
yet  it  might  never  get  to  nature  itself  if  it  had  first  to 
answer  the  numerous  questions  pertaining  to  the  theory 
of  knowledge.  All  that  can  be  expected  of  a  specialist 
is  that  he  master  these  principles ;  and  the  failure  to  do 
so  is  often  fraught  with  serious  consequences  in  scien- 
tific investigations.12  /All  inferences  should  be  logical ; 
!  Jbut  the  specialist  cannot  be  expected  to  prepare  a  logic 
on  the  basis  of  his  specialty,  and  then  make  that  logic 


PHILOSOPHY  AND   NATURAL   SCIENCE.        109 

the  basis  of  reasoning  in  the  specialty.  Then  there  are 
axioms,  as  in  mathematics,  which  are  taken  for  granted, 
and  yet  the  question  of  their  validity  involves  the  per- 
plexing problems  connected  with  the  nature  of  what 
are  called  necessary  truths,  j  So,  too,  there  are  such 
notions  as  space,  time,  motion,  change,  substance  and 
accidence,  being,  cause,  and  many  others,  which  are 
commonly  used  as  if  perfectly  clear,  and  yet  they  are 
full  of  mystery.*  They  may,  indeed,  be  so  habitually 
taken  for  granted  that  they  hardly  seem  to  involve 
unsolved  problems,  and  habit  may  lead  one  to  regard 
his  assumptions  as  demonstrations.  But  the  critical 
mind,  which  does  not  run  in  a  narrow  groove,  and  is 
not  enslaved  by  dogmatism,  sees  that  they  involve  the 
deepest  problems  of  the  human  intellect;  and  it  also 
knows  that  every  solution  opens  new  fields  of  inquiry. 
With  all  the  brilliant  discoveries  of  science,  the  sphere 
of  mystery  has  been  enlarged  and  darkened.  The 
problems  which  arise  out  of  the  depths  of  science  and 
cannot  be  solved  by  it  are  philosophical,  and  must  be 
answered,  if  at  all,  by  philosophy. 

The  study  of  the  principles,  organism,  and  final  con- 
sequences of  science,  has  led  scientists  themselves  to 
connect  philosophical  speculations  with  their  specialties. 
In  Descartes  and  Leibnitz,  philosophy  and  science  were 
intimately  connected.  Kant  passed  from  mathematics 
and  physics  to  metaphysics  and  ethics.  Lotze  and 
Harms  went  from  medical  studies  to  philosophy.  Hart- 

*  How  are  we  to  think  matter  ?  Is  it  the  unchangeable  basis  of  phe- 
nomena, or  is  it  also  changeable  ?  If  it  is  itself  changeable,  is  there  any 
thing  in  the  universe  that  is  not  subject  to  change  ?  If  matter  is  re- 
garded as  an  unchangeable  substance,  how  can  we  account  for  the  man- 
ifold phenomena  of  the  world  ?  To  dismiss  these  subjects  as  irrelevant, 
means  that  the  mind's  inquiries  must  be  checked  whenever  they  go 
below  the  surface. 


110      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

mann  claims  to  base  his  speculations  on  the  results  of 
natural  science,  according  to  the  most  approved  scien- 
tific method.  Professor  Wundt  declares  it  was  the 
natural  sciences  which,  "  almost  without  my  knowledge 
and  desire,  led  me  toward  philosophy  ; "  and  also  states 
that  now  the  sciences  which  lately  seemed  farthest 
removed  from  philosophy  have  not  been  least  affected 
by  it.*  Helinholtz  and  others  on  the  Continent  adopt 
fundamental  principles  of  Kant's  philosophy.  In  Eng- 
land, Locke,  as  developed  by  Hume  and  Mill,  is  the 
leading  authority  among  scientists.  These  philosophers, 
not  the  sciences,  are  the  source  of  the  prevailing  sensa- 
tionalism and  empiricism.  In  the  doctrine  of  causation  ; 
in  the  hesitation  to  regard  the  uniformity  of  nature  as 
established  beyond  question ;  in  the  substitution  of 
heredity,  association,  and  experience,  for  the  necessity 
of  reason  ;  in  the  suspicion  with  which  thought,  rising 
above  the  impressions  through  the  senses,  is  viewed, 
we  see  the  philosophy  of  Hume.  The  argument  some- 
times met  with,  that  a  miracle  is  possible  because  the 
uniformity  of  nature  is  no  necessity  of  reason,  is  simply 
using  Hume  against  Hume.  And  the  view  of  Darwin 
and  the  Darwinians,  that  the  power  to  form  abstractions 
does  not  distinguish  man  from  animals,  is  nothing  but 
Berkeley's  argument  against  abstract  ideas,  adopted  and 
made  current  by  Hume.  Indeed,  scientists  usually  place 
themselves  on  some  philosophical  basis,  on  which  they 
construct  their  theories ;  and  the  conflicts  among  sci- 
entists are  usually  philosophical,  not  scientific.  Just 

*  "  Nicht  am  wenigsten  sind  aber  diejenigen  Wissensehaften  von  der 
Philosophic  beriihrt  worden,  die  ihr  vor  nic-lit  langer  Zeit  vielleicht  am 
fernsten  gestanden,  diejenigen,  die  mich  selhst  —  ich  darf  wolil  sagen 
fast  ohne  niein  Wis^en  und  "Wollen  — der  Philosophic  entgegengefiihrt 
haben,  die  Naturwisseiischaj'ten."  —  Atifgabe  der  Philosophie  in  der  Geyen- 
wart,  5. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        Ill 

because  it  is  so  absolute,  and  always  appeals  to  facts,  and 
to  demonstrations  based  directly  on  them,  science  cannot 
be  disputed.  It  does  not  dispute,  it  demonstrates. 

We  are  consequently  justified  in  affirming  that  sci- 
ence, in  proportion  as  it  is  deep,  will  recognize  the 
necessity  of  philosophy.  The  isolated  thoughts  or  laws 
furnished  by  the  experimental  sciences,  instead  of  sat- 
isfying the  mind,  impel  it  to  form  a  union  of  the 
fragments,  and  to  draw  from  them  the  ultimate  conse- 
quences. It  asks,  What  is  the  result  of  all  the  sciences? 
Into  what  ocean  do  they  pour  their  contents  ?  Starting 
with  the  given  data  and  their  laws,  what  may  be  in- 
ferred respecting  the  first  and  final  causes?  In  these 
queries  are  condensed  some  of  the  most  important  prob- 
lems which  experimental  science  suggests,  but  which 
lie  beyond  its  sphere,  and  in  the  domain  of  philosophy. 
The  mind  continually  strives  to  trace  relations,  to  bring 
remote  objects  together,  and  to  unite  the  separated. 
In  this  it  is  controlled  by  an  impulse  which  may  be 
rudely  checked,  but  which  cannot  be  satisfied  until 
that  ultimate  unity  is  discovered  whose  existence  is  a 
postulate  of  reason.13 

Much  of  the  opposition  of  scientists  to  philosophy  is 
due  to  the  spirit  of  positivism,  which  hinds  experience, 
but  fails  to  see  that  the  laws  drawn  therefrom  involve 
abstractions  whose  processes  are  subjected  to  philosophi- 
cal, not  scientific  tests.  Comte  would  ruthlessly  banish 
thought  from  the  highest  regions,  and  confine  it  to  phe- 
nomena. His  system  denies  the  rights  of  the  mind 
itself.  Its  author  and  some  of  his  disciples  (especially 
Littre*)  imagined  that  their  positivism  was  allied  to  the 
Kantian  criticism  ;  but  it  is  evident  that  they  totally 
failed  to  catch  the  spirit  of  the  critical  philosophy, 
particularly  of  its  earnest  efforts  to  reach  the  limits  of 


112      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

thought,  and  to  conserve  the  basis  of  morality.  Posi- 
tivism is  not  merely  unhistorical,  but  also  uncritical. 
Without  taking  the  trouble  to  examine  thoroughly  the 
mental  powers,  it  determines  arbitrarily  the  limits  of 
thought ;  and  in  this  essential  element  its  method 
of  procedure  is  the  very  opposite  of  the  critical  philoso- 
phy. Positivism  is  dogmatism  exalted  to  absolutism.14 
Positivism  is  not,  however,  the  only  source  of  antag- 
onism between  science  and  philosophy.  Various  philo- 
sophical systems  have  been  seriously  at  fault,  and  have 
aroused  opposition.  In  Germany  the  schism  occurred 
during  the  first  decades  of  this  century,  when  the  influ- 
ence of  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  determined  the 
prevalent  character  of  philosophic  thought.  The  spec- 
ulative tendencies  were  carried  to  such  an  extreme  that 
experiment  was  regarded  beneath  the  dignity  of  philos- 
ophers and  scientists,  who  were  expected  to  unravel  all 
mysteries  a  priori,  and  to  spin  the  laws  of  nature,  as 
well  as  of  mind,  out  of  their  own  brains.  For  "phi- 
losophy "  Fichte  attempted  to  substitute  the  term  Wis- 
senschaftslehre  (the  doctrine  of  science),  which  was 
intended  to  give  the  laws  of  science.  In  the  work  with 
this  title  he  claims  that  the  volume  takes  no  account 
of  experience,  and  that  its  doctrines  would  be  true  even 
if  there  were  no  experience.  The  same  tone  was 
adopted  by  Schelling  and  Hegel.  While  experience 
was  spoken  of  disparagingly,  speculation  was  made 
supreme  and  regarded  as  containing  all  the  treasures  of 
wisdom.  But  during  the  a  priori  frenzy  (1790-1840)  * 

*  A  description  of  the  beginning  of  this  frenzy  is  given  in  my  Life 
of  Immanuel  Kant,  chap.  11. 

1  am  well  aware  that  ajl  of  Hegel's  disciples  are  not  prepared  to 
admit  that  their  master  went  to  the  extreme  in  speculation.  There  are 
many  points  which  are  left  obscure  by  Hegel  himself,  and  the  fierce 
disputes  in  his  school  have  only  served  to  add  to  the  confusion.  Some 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL  SCIENCE.        113 

the  natural  sciences  made  rapid  progress,  and  completely 
emancipated  themselves  from  the  influence  of  specula- 
tive philosophy.  A  great  re-action  came.  The  specu- 
lative systems  had  prevailed  in  State  and  Church  and 
literature ;  but  before  the  middle  of  the  present  century 
a  different  spirit  became  dominant.  The  a  priori  expla- 
nations of  nature  were  laughed  at ;  the  speculations  of 
philosophers  were  viewed  as  air-castles ;  and  science, 
based  on  the  most  pains-taking  collection  of  facts  and 
the  severest  induction,  became  supreme.  It  seemed  as 
if  an  impassable  gulf  had  been  fixed  between  experi- 
mental science  and  philosophy.  With  their  extrava- 
gance the  really  solid  and  grand  achievements  of  the 
speculative  systems  were  also  rejected.  Science  became 
haughty  and  exclusive.  Experimentalists  looked  with 
as  much  contempt  on  speculators  as  these  had  expressed 
for  the  former ;  and  shallow  empirics  revealed  their  wis- 
dom by  an  ignorant  sneer  at  profound  philosophers. 
Science  claimed  the  entire  domain  of  the  real,  while  the 
realm  of  visions  was  assigned  to  philosophy.  This 
development  since  Kant's  Kritik  appeared  enables  us 
to  understand  why  in  Germany  philosophy  and  natural 
science  are  more  sharply  distinguished  than  in  other 
lands.  NaturpJiilosophie  is  not  used  like  "  natural  phi- 
losophy "  in  England  and  America  to  designate  physics, 
but  speculations  respecting  nature ;  hence  it  belongs  to 
philosophy,  not  to  science. 

Respecting  the    beginning    of    that    conflict  which 

of  his  disciples  claim  that  on  the  value  of  experiment,  on  the  relation 
of  experience  to  reason,  on  the  significance  of  the  particular  or  indi- 
vidual and  the  general,  and  of  the  concrete  and  the  abstract,  Hegel 
had  been  misunderstood.  This  may  be  true  :  but  in  that  case  both  the 
disciples  and  the  master  are  to  blame  for  contradictory  statements,  and 
for  the  use  of  terms  which  seem  to  teach  one  thing  when  they  mean 
something  different. 


114      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

drove  philosophy  and  science  into  hostile  camps,  it  will 
be  interesting  to  hear  so  eminent  a  scientist  as  Helm- 
holtz.*  "  Certainly,  at  the  end  of  last  century,  when 
the  Kantian  philosophy  reigned  supreme,  such  a  schism 
had  never  been  proclaimed ;  on  the  contrary,  Kant's 
philosophy  rested  on  exactly  the  same  general  ground 
as  the  physical  sciences,  as  is  evident  from  his  own 
scientific  works,  especially  from  his  Cosmogony."  Of 
Hegel's  efforts  to  construct  natural  philosophy  a  priori, 
he  says,  "  His  system  of  nature  seemed,  at  least  to  nat- 
ural philosophers,  absolutely  crazy.  Of  all  the  distin- 
guished scientific  men  who  were  his  contemporaries,  not 
one  was  found  to  stand  up  for  his  ideas.  Accordingly, 
Hegel  himself,  convinced  of  the  importance  of  winning 
for  his  philosophy  in  the  field  of  physical  science  that 
recognition  which  had  been  so  freely  accorded  to  it 
elsewhere,  launched  out,  with  unusual  vehemence  and 
acrimony,  against  the  natural  philosophers,  and  espe- 
cially against  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  as  the  first  and  greatest 
representative  of  physical  investigation.  The  philoso- 
phers accused  the  scientific  men  of  narrowness ;  the  sci- 
entific men  retorted  that  the  philosophers  were  crazy. 
And  so  it  came  about  that  men  of  science  began  to  lay 
some  stress  on  the  banishment  of  all  philosophic  influ- 
ences from  their  work  ;  while  some  of  them,  including 
men  of  the  greatest  acuteness,  went  so  far  as  to  con- 
demn philosophy  altogether,  not  merely  as  useless,  but 
as  mischievous  dreaming.  Thus,  it  must  be  confessed, 
not  only  were  the  illegitimate  pretensions  of  the  Hege- 
lian system  to  subordinate  to  itself  all  other  studies 
rejected,  but  no  regard  was  paid  to  the  rightful  claims 
of  philosophy,  that  is,  the  criticism  of  the  sources  of 
cognition,  and  the  definition  of  the  functions  of  the 
intellect." 1&  «  7_8. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        115 

This  feud  has  by  no  means  been  confined  to  Ger- 
many, though  it  was  most  bitter  there.  The  various 
phases  of  the  conflict  need  not  be  considered  here ;  but 
the  schism  itself  must  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to 
understand  the  relation  now  existing  between  scientists 
and  philosophers.  It  is  not  a  conflict  between  philos- 
ophy and  science,  which  would  imply  that  they  are 
incompatible  and  that  the  one  or  the  other  must  there- 
fore be  destroyed ;  but  between  historic  systems,  which' 
are  imperfect  and  liable  to  change.  There  is  scarcely  a 
doubt  that  in  the  controversy  philosophers  have  been 
the  greatest  gainers,  perhaps  because  they  were  most  to 
blame  originally  and  had  most  to  learn.  Not  only  have 
they  abandoned  their  a  priori  constructions  respecting 
natural  phenomena,  but  many  of  them  have  also  become 
earnest  students  of  science,  so  as  to  connect  their  phil- 
osophical speculations  as  intimately  as  possible  with  the 
results  of  exact  research.  Naturally  they  attend  rather 
to  laws  and  principles  than  to  the  details  of  science, 
though  these  have  also  received  much  attention.  To 
remove  the  charge  of  vagueness  and  uncertainty,  they 
have  attempted  to  give  philosophy  as  much  of  the  sci- 
entific basis  and  method  as  is  consistent  with  its  charac- 
acter  and  aims.  If  a  philosopher  now  placed  himself  on 
the  Naturphilosophie  of  Schelling  or  Hegel,  he  would  in 
his  own  fraternity  be  laughed  at  for  his  pains.  The 
conflict  has  made  philosophy  more  modest,  more  criti- 
cal, more  solid,  and  consequently  more  reliable. 

There  are  also  scientists  who  have  been  gainers  from 
the  conflict.  The  masters  in  science  recognize  their 
limitations,  admit  the  significance  of  the  theoretical 
element,  encourage  the  study  of  the  cognitive  faculties 
and  of  logic,  while  carefully  excluding  metaphysics  from 
science.  The  cry,  "Return  to  Kant,"  came  largely 


116      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

from  scientists,  who  felt  the  need  of  supplementing 
science  with  a  critical  philosophy.  Such  a  prejudice 
has,  however,  been  excited  against  philosophy,  that 
many  students  of  science  have  ignored  even  the  study 
of  logic ;  and  their  works  also  prove  that  they  do  not 
distinguish  clearly  between  sensation,  experience,  and 
reason. 

Herbart's  words,  uttered  at  the  beginning  of  this  cen- 
tury, sound  like  a  prophecy :  "  It  cannot  be  otherwise 
than  that  the  neglect  of  philosophy  should  result  in  a 
frivolous  or  perverted  treatment  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of  all  the  sciences."  So  common  has  this 
treatment  become  in  certain  quarters,  that  earnest  voices 
are  heard  among  scientists,  to  say  nothing  of  philoso- 
phers and  others,  favoring  more  thorough  discipline  in 
philosophical  studies.  Even  the  materialist,  Dr.  Louis 
Biichner,  holds  that  the  riddles  of  life,  if  to  be  solved 
at  all,  require  philosophy.  He  declares  that  no  special 
science  can  give  this  solution;  the  only  hope  is  in  the 
results  of  all,  developed  according  to  logical  principles.* 
Professor  Haeckel  f  also  complains  of  "  the  lack  of  phil- 
osophical culture,  which  characterizes  most  of  the  physi- 
cists of  the  day."  He  claims  that  many  of  the  errors 
of  scientists  are  due  to  their  neglect  of  philosophy,  and 
to  that  "  crude  empiricism  "  which  they  laud  as  "  exact 
science."  "The  numerous  errors  of  the  speculative 
natural  philosophers  in  the  first  third  of  this  century 
have  brought  all  philosophy  into  such  disrepute  among 
exact  scientists,  that  they  cherish  the  strange  illusion 
that  they  can  construct  the  edifice  of  natural  science 
from  facts  without  a  philosophical  connection  of  the  same ; 
from  mere  observation  without  understanding.  Only  by 

*  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  1871,  No.  283. 
f  Naturliche  Schopfungsyeschichte, 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        117 

means  of  the  most  thorough  permeation  of  philosophy 
and  empiricism  can  the  indestructible  edifice  of  true 
monistic  science  arise."  While  Helmholtz  throws  the 
weight  of  his  influence  in  favor  of  the  study  of  the  cog- 
nitive and  logical  elements  of  philosophy,  his  colleague, 
Du  Bois-Reymond,  does  not  hesitate  to  make  the  charge, 
that  among  scientists  there  is  a  lamentable  lack  of  phil- 
osophical training  and  dialectic  acumen.  In  his  "  Seven 
Riddles  of  the  World,"  he  said  that  the  manner  in  which 
his  address  on  "  The  Limits  of  Natural  Science  "  had 
been  received  proves  that  "the  national  philosophic 
culture,  of  which  we  are  accustomed  to  boast,  does  not 
appear  in  a  favorable  light."  So  completely  "  has  philoso- 
phy been  shoved  aside,  that  even  where  natural  science 
itself  has  in  many  points  reached  the  stage  of  philoso- 
phizing, there  often  appears  a  great  lack  of  preliminary 
conceptions,  and  ignorance  of  what  has  really  been 
accomplished."  It  seems  strange  that  scientists  should 
have  found  it  necessary  to  defend  logical  studies  and 
deep  thinking  in  science,  but  that  has  been  the  case. 
Opposing  the  empirics,  who  want  to  make  science  super- 
ficial, Liebig  said,  "  In  natural  science  all  investigation  is 
deductive  or  a  priori  ;  experiment  is  only  for  use  by  the 
process  of  thought,  just  as  arithmetical  calculation ; 
thought  must  precede  it  in  all  cases  if  it  is  to  have  any 
significance.  An  empirical  investigation  of  nature,  in 
the  usual  sense,  does  not  exist."  *  Fechner  recognizes 
the  need  of  metaphysics ;  and  declares  that  while  the 
scientist  stops  with  the  atoms,  these  by  no  means  satisfy 
the  mind,  which  strives  to  go  beyond  them.  After  a 
war  between  natural  science  and  philosophy,  we  now 
see  them  "  gradually  coming  to  themselves  and  making 
peace  with  each  other,  which  promises  to  be  the  more 

*  Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vol.  xi.,  quoted  by  Barutscheck. 


118      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

lasting,  since  the  very  problems  which  claim  the  atten- 
tion of  modern  science  are  of  such  a  character  that  their 
solution  is  possible  only  on  condition  of  co-operation 
between  natural  science  and  philosophy."  * 

The  antagonism  between  philosophy  and  science  is 
evidently  drawing  to  a  close.  Both  parties  have  erred ; 
their  approach  now  is  on  the  basis  of  truth,  of  mutual 
need,  and  mutual  help.  Professor  Huxley  holds  that 
"  the  reconciliation  of  physics  and  metaphysics  lies  in 
the  acknowledgment  of  faults  upon  both  sides ;  in  the 
confession  by  physics  that  all  the  phenomena  of  nature 
are,  in  their  ultimate  analysis,  known  to  us  as  facts  of 
consciousness ;  in  the  admission  by  metaphysics,  that 
the  facts  of  consciousness  are  practically  interpretable 
only  by  the  methods  and  formulae  of  physics ;  and, 
finally,  in  the  observance  by  both  metaphysical  and 
physical  thinkers  of  Descartes'  maxim,  —  assent  to  no 
proposition  the  matter  of  which  is  not  so  clear  and 
distinct  that  it  cannot  be  doubted."  f  In  his  Logik, 
Ueberweg  says  that  "the  so-called  empirical  sciences 
would  have  to  abandon  their  scientific  character,  if  they 
wanted  to  reject  all  thoughts  transcending  direct  expe- 
rience." J  In  1873,  the  Academy  of  Sciences  in  Berlin 
admitted  to  membership  two  philosophers,  Professors 
Zeller  and  Harms.  The  address  of  welcome  contained 
these  sentences:  "If  the  signs  of  the  times  do  not 

*  Die  Grundprincipien  der  Schettingschen  Natur philosophic,  by  Dr.  R. 
Koeber.  See  also  Wundt's  Einfluss  der  Philosophic  auf  die  Naturwissen- 
schaften,  and  Aufgabe  der  Philosophie  in  der  Gegenwart. 

t  Lay  Sermons,  Descartes  'Discourse  on  Method.  The  only  difficulty 
is  in  the  third  condition.  If  all  the  phenomena  of  nature  are,  "  in  their 
ultimate  analysis,  known  to  us  as  facts  of  consciousness,"  how  can  the 
facts  of  consciousness  be  practically  interpretable  by  the  methods  and 
formulae  of  physics  ?  This  makes  consciousness  interpretable  by 
consciousness. 

J  At  the  close. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        119 

deceive,  the  reconciliation  of  philosophy  and  the  natural 
sciences  is  gradually  approaching.  .  .  .  The  most  impor- 
tant discoveries  in  natural  science  shed  their  light  over 
connected  phenomena  of  extensive  spheres,  and  they 
of  themselves  impel  to  seek  a  comprehension  of  the  uni- 
versal. Ingenious  representatives  of  the  natural  sciences 
approach  philosophy,  and  admit  that  the  mission  and 
method  of  both  are  not  irreconcilably  hostile.  What- 
ever is  gained  permanently  by  philosophy  in  historical 
and  scientific  tendencies,  will  revive  the  consciousness 
that  all  the  sciences  are  one." 

f  Objections  to  philosophy  are  still  common ;  they  are  \ 
not,  however,  directed  so  much  against  philosophy  per 
se,  as  against  certain  historic  systems  and  methods.  To  L-»/ 
lay  their  faults  to  the  charge  of  philosophy  itself,  is  as 
rational  as  to  blame  science  for  the  methods  of  mere 
empirics.  Certain  philosophical  systems  have  been  vis- 
ionary; but  we  are  advocating  sober,  critical  philoso- 
phy, not  wild  speculation.  ]  The  charge  that  philosophy 
is  not  exact,  may  mean  that  .its  objects  cannot  be 
weighed  and  measured.  But  this  is  the  fault,  if  fault 
at  all,  of  the  objects,  not  of  philosophy.  Does  any  one 
blame  science  for  determining  only  proximately  the  dis- 
tance of  a  fixed  star,  or,  perhaps,  resorting  to  guesses 
on  the  subject?  Ideas  cannot  be  put  into  scales,  or 
determined  by  inches ;  there  are  no  pints  or  pounds  for 
truth  and  morality.  But  this  is  no  argument  against 
either  philosophy  or  the  existence  and  value  of  its 
objects.*  These  may  be  real,  though  not  tangible  ;  and 
because  so  purely  intellectual,  it  is  difficult  to  define 

*  "The  study  of  logical  and  mathematical  forms  has  convinced  me 
that  even  space  itself  is  no  requisite  condition  of  conceivable  existence. 
Every  thing,  we  are  told  by  materialists,  must  be  here  or  there,  nearer 
or  farther,  before  or  after.  I  deny  this,  and  point  to  logical  relations  as 
my  proof."  —  JEVONS,  768. 


120      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

them,  and  communicate  the  conception  of  them  to  other 
minds. 

/  The  objection  that  philosophical  systems  have  often 
changed  is  no  argument  against  philosophy  itself.  The 
charge  that  it  has  accomplished  nothing  is  based  on 
ignorance  of  its  own  progress,  and  of  its  great  service 
in  developing  science,  and  promoting  all  departments 
of  intellect.  \  Philosophy  is  fundamental ;  and  its  value 
is  not  diminished  because  the  foundation  itself  was  hid 
from  most  men,  while  the  superstructure  it  bore  was 
evident  to  all. 

(  Many  of  the  objections  to  philosophy  may  as  cogently 
be  urged  against  science.  That,  too,  has  problems  of 
long  standing,  which  are  apparently  no  nearer  solution 
than  when  first  proposed.  Can  it  explain  the  origin  of 
life,  or  sensation,  or  consciousness,  or  the  connection 
of  mind  and  body?  Can  it  in  sound,  say  in  music, 
sharply  separate  the  physical,  the  physiological,  arid  the 
psychical  elements  ?  \  But  questions  like  these  are  end- 
less ;  and  if  they  iJo  not  arise,  it  may  be  because  in 
science  men  so  often  operate  with  symbols  which  are 
taken  for  explanations,  but  in  reality  explain  nothing. 
Science,  like  philosophy,  the  deeper  it  goes,  the  more 
fully  it  realizes  that  it  exposes  problems  rather  than 
solves  them.  It  should  also  be  remembered  that  sci- 
ence itself  thrusts  upon  philosophy  the  deepest  prob- 
lems ;  and  if  these  are  unsolvable,  it  proves  that  science 
itself  must  remain  a  torso. 

The  definiteness  and  exactness  of  science  also  have 
their  limitations.  Has  it  been  determined  where  plants 
end,  and  animals  begin?  Has  the  limit  of  species,  or 
even  their  exact  nature,  been  fixed  ?  Is  there  any  thing 
definite  respecting  the  use  of  such  important  terms 
as  atoms,  matter,  force?  What  is  the  bond  of  union 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        121 

between  chemistry  and  physics  ?  What  is  ether  ?  What 
are  the  connecting  links  between  gravity,  light,  heat, 
and  electricity?  *  But  it  is  useless  to  multiply  instances. 

r  Surely  it  is  no  argument  against  natural  science,  that 

its  deepest  problems  have  thus  far  remained  unsolved ; 

but  this  makes  it  the  more  unaccountable  that  such  an 

objection  should  seriously  be  urged  against  philosophy .) 

The  lack  of  agreement  among  philosophers  has  been 

v  used  against  philosophy ;  but  how  is  it  with  scientists? 
Within  the  last  decades  the  most  bitter  controversies 
have  been  those  of  the  latter.  "  Physical  science  itself, 
as  it  becomes  general,  grows  to  be  contested.  .  .  .  The 
larger  conceptions  and  principles  of  physical  inquiry 
are  so  notoriously  under  dispute  at  the  present  day, 
that  it  is  almost  trivial  to  mention  the  fact."  16  Science 
invites  to  deep  research  just  because  so  much  remains 
to  be  done.  "  We  have  but  to  open  a  scientific  book, 
and  read  a  page  or  two,  and  we  shall  come  to  some 
recorded  phenomenon  of  which  no  explanation  can  yet 
be  given."  f  Is  it  surprising,  then,  that  philosophy  has 
unsolved  problems  ?  The  same  author  says,  "  It  ought 
to  be  added,  that,  wonderful  as  is  the  extent  of  physi- 
cal phenomena  open  to  our  investigation,  intellectual 
phenomena  are  yet  vastly  more  extensive." 

Absolute  as  science  is  in  its  proper  sphere,  it  is,  as 

*  Wundt  (Aufgabe)  says  that,  within  the  memory  of  the  present  gen- 
eration, gravity,  light,  heat,  and  electricity  were  each  subjected  to  a 
special  method  of  explanation,  and  each  in  reality  required  a  particular 
theory  of  matter.  Accordingly  in  different  departments  of  science 
different  theories  of  matter  prevailed  ! 

t  Jevons,  754.  Du  Bois-Reymond  gives  the  following  as  the  seven 
riddles  of  science,  some  of  which  he  regards  as  beyond  all  hope  of 
solution:  1.  The  nature  of  matter  and  force.  2.  The  origin  of  motion. 
3.  The  origin  of  life.  4.  The  apparent  design  in  nature.  5.  The  origin 
of  sensation.  6.  The  origin  of  rational  thought  and  of  language,  which 
is  intimately  connected  with  it.  7.  The  freedom  of  the  will. 


122      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

we  have  seen,  severely  limited  to  that  sphere  ;  and  the 
masters  in  science  continually  warn  against  transcend- 
ing these  limits,  and  treating  philosophy  as  if  lying 
within  the  domain  of  science.  The  two  departments 
do  not  conflict.  Instead  of  dictating  them,  philosophy 
accepts  and  uses  the  facts  and  laws  scientifically  estab- 
lished, making  them  factors  in  its  inferences.  Neither 
does  science  encroach  on  philosophy;  but  gratefully 
accepting  its  fundamental  principles,  science  rejoices 
if  it  takes  up  for  solution  the  weightiest  problems.  All 
the  sciences  press  toward  a  unity  attainable  only  with 
the  help  of  philosophy.  To  check  philosophy  proper 
is  to  check  thought  itself. 

If  in  its  search  for  ultimate  principles  philosophy 
takes  up,  for  criticism,  thoughts  with  which  scientists 
continually  operate  without  making  them  subjects  of 
special  reflection,  that  is  no  interference.  Philosophers 
who  habitually  deal  with  mental  phenomena  and  ab- 
stract terms  are,  in  all  probability,  best  prepared  to 
investigate  them.  Some  of  these  terms  have  already 
been  indicated;  as,  substance,  cause,  being,  time, 
space,  motion,  matter,  force.  Philosophers  may  render 
important  service  by  elucidating  the  concepts  for  which 
they  are  supposed  to  stand ;  they  can  at  least  deter- 
mine whether  the  concept  is  consistent  with  itself,  or 
contains  contradictions.  Thinkers  recognize  the  obscu- 
rity of  these  terms,  though  ordinary  investigators  are 
apt  to  imagine  that  they  have  a  definite  knowledge 
of  the  concepts,  or  the  reality  which  they  represent. 
Investigators,  as  they  go  deeper  and  become  conscious 
of  the  fact  that  they  use  symbols  for  reality,  learn 
modesty.  Balfour  Stewart  says,  "  It  thus  appears  that 
we  know  little  or  nothing  about  the  shape  or  size  of 
molecules,  or  about  the  forces  which  actuate  them; 


PHILOSOPHY  AND   NATURAL   SCIENCE.        128 

and,  moreover,  the  very  largest  masses  of  the  universe 
share  with  the  very  smallest  this  property  of  being 
beyond  the  direct  scrutiny  of  the  human  senses,  —  the 
one  set  because  they  are  so  far  away,  and  the  other 
because  they  are  so  small."  *  Therefore  we  are  obliged 
either  to  dismiss  these  subjects,  or  else  to  resort  to 
speculation.  Since  the  deepest  inquiries  of  science 
always  impel  to  theoretical  investigations,  all  that  it 
can  ask  is  that  philosophy  base  its  speculations  on 
reliable  data,  and  conduct  them  according  to  the  most 
rigid  logic. 

Healthy  speculation,  or  the  thorough  elaboration  of 
concepts  and  their  consequences,  is  essential  to  science. 
The  scientific  method  is  possible  only  because  there  are 
concepts  and  principles  on  which  it  rests,  which  them- 
selves are  not  within  the  limits  or  under  the  necessity 
of  (empirical)  scientific  demonstration.  And  the  scien- 
tist does  not  hesitate  to  use  notions  which  he  cannot 
test  scientifically.  What  use  could  he  make  of  atoms 
and  the  theories  founded  on  them,  if  he  were  limited 
to  his  senses  and  the  test  of  facts  ?  An  atom  may 
be  thought,  but  it  cannot  be  perceived.  "  The  limits 
placed  upon  our  senses,  with  respect  to  space  and  time, 
equally  preclude  the  possibility  of  our  ever  becoming 
directly  acquainted  with  these  exceedingly  minute 
bodies,  which  are,  nevertheless,  the  raw  materials  of 
which  the  whole  universe  is  built."  f  Another  eminent 
scientist  says,  "  An  atom  in  itself  can  no  more  become 
an  object  of  our  investigation  than  a  differential."  f 

*  The  Conservation  of  Energy  (Appleton),  6. 

t  Balfour  Stewart,  9. 

t  J.  R.  Mayer.  See  Correlation  and  Conservation  of  Forces,  by  W. 
R.  Grove  (Appleton),  347.  Tait  says  that  the  question  of  atoms  is  one 
whose  "  solution  seems  to  recede  from  our  grasp  as  fast,  at  least,  as  we 
attempt  to  approach  it,"  284. 


124     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  most  various  properties  have  been  attributed  to 
them,  and  even  their  materiality  has  been  questioned. 
Yet,  in  spite  of  this,  there  are  those  who,  in  the  name 
of  science,  make  atomism  the  explanation  of  mental  as 
well  as  of  natural  phenomena.  Philosophers  do  not 
question  the  right  to  use  the  notions  of  atoms  and 
matter,  but  they  insist  that  these  are  only  symbols 
for  an  unknown  something.  So  physicists  speak  of 
force  as  the  cause  of  phenomena.  Faraday  says,  "  What 
I  mean  by  the  word  '  force,'  is  the  cause  of  a  physical 
action ;  the  source  or  sources  of  all  possible  changes 
amongst  the  particles  or  materials  of  the  universe." 
Mayer  says,  "  Force  is  something  which  is  expended  in 
producing  motion;  and  this  something  which  is  ex- 
pended is  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  cause  equivalent 
to  the  effect,  namely,  to  the  motion  produced."  *  Tait 
denies  that  force  is  a  thing  at  all.  "  It  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  a  thing,  any  more  than  the  bank  rate  of 
interest  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  sum  of  money.  .  .  . 
Force  is  the  rate  at  which  an  agent  does  work  per  unit  of 
length"  f  Force,  then,  is  cause,  something,  rate,  —  all 
concepts  that  involve  philosophical  inquiries.  Hume 
was  any  thing  but  a  scientist,  yet  his  contribution  to 
thought  consists  chiefly  in  his  discussion  of  causation. 
And  many  scientists  take  their  notion  of  cause  from 
Hume's  philosophy. 

Thus  one  need  but  take  the  concepts  which  all 
scientists  must  use,  in  order  to  see  the  absurdity  of 
attempting  to  banish  philosophy.  Science  and  philos- 
ophy have  many  notions  in  common,  which  can  never 
be  the  direct  product  of  experience,  and  can  be  tested 
only  by  critical  thinking.  All  that  lies  behind  bare 
and  isolated  phenomena  is  a  mental  product.  No 

*  Grove,  379,  335.  f  357,  358. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        125 

observation  can  discover  substance,  cause,  or  power; 
and  those  who  admit  nothing  but  observation  and  its 
direct  results  must,  like  Hume,  deny  their  existence 
in  the  external  world.  They  are  concepts,  not  per- 
cepts. If  philosophy  is  rejected  because  it  deals  with 
such  concepts,  then  science  must  also  be  rejected,  for 
its  fundamental  notions  are  of  exactly  the  same  charac- 
ter. If  philosophy  does  not  speculate,  then  scientists 
must  do  it.  And  it  is  remarkable  how  philosophers 
and  scientists  may  come  to  the  same  conclusions,  in- 
dependently of  each  other,  and  often  by  different 
methods.* 

The  more  fully  the  relation  of  philosophy  and  sci- 
ence is  considered,  the  deeper  the  conviction  becomes 
that  they  require  each  other.  Both  are  necessary  for 
an  intelligent  consideration  of  the  world-problem,  and 
for  all  rational  attempts  to  solve  it ;  both  are  parts  of 
the  same  great  system  of  knowledge.  We  may  reject, 
as  too  indefinite,  the  definition  of  Herbert  Spencer: 
"  Philosophy  is  completely  unified  knowledge ; "  f  never- 
theless, there  is  truth  in  it,  since  no  knowledge,  no 
science,  can  be  completed  or  unified  without  philosophy. 

Besides  the  notions  held  in  common  by  philosophy 
and  science,  there  are  many  in  which  scientists  are 
interested,  which  nevertheless  belong  chiefly  or  wholly 
to  philosophy.  Among  these  are  the  problems  of 

*  Schopenhauer  reduces  all  force  to  will,  not  only  the  force  in  man, 
but  also  in  nature.  A.  R.  Wallace  (Contributions  to  the  Theory  of  Natu- 
ral Selection)  holds  a  similar  view.  He  says  it  seems  probable  that  all 
force  is  will-force.  Matter,  he  holds,  is  force,  and  nothing  but  force. 
Matter  in  the  popular  sense  does  not  exist,  and  cannot  be  philosophi- 
cally conceived.  Ziillner  has  placed  the  views  of  Schopenhauer  and 
"Wallace  in  parallel  columns,  thus  making  their  similarity  the  more 
apparent. 

t  First  Principles,  539.  If  knowledge  is  unified  in  its  ultimate  prin 
ciples,  it  becomes  philosophy. 


if 


126      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

monism,  dualism,  pluralism,  materialism,  idealism,  pan- 
theism, theism,  the  nature  of  freedom,  the  immortality 
of  the  soul.  Many  other  questions  must  remain  unan- 
swered, or  be  left  to  philosophers,  or  to  them  and 
scientists  conjointly.  Science  and  philosophy  must 
co-operate.  Each  must  find  an  inspiration,  a  correc- 
tive, a  help,  and,  in  a  measure,  a  limitation,  in  the 
other.  ( Antagonism  means  the  destruction  of  self  in 
proportion  as  the  antagonist  is  destroyed. ")  Their  free 
and  harmonious  co-operation,  while  each  remains  per- 
fectly independent,  is  the  only  ground  of  hope  for  the 
best  results  both  in  science  and  philosophy. 

It  is  surely  a  strange  phenomenon,  that  the  mind  can 
so  lose  itself  in  the  contemplation  of  the  objects  of 
nature  as  to  forget  itself,  its  processes,  and  its  own 
laws,  which  alone  make  a  knowledge  of  nature  possi- 
ble. Is  it  not  a  species  of  infatuation  or  frenzy  ?  Not 
a  few  seem  even  to  forget  that  natural  science  has  sig- 
nificance only  for  the  mind,  not  for  nature,  the  object 
of  investigation.  Unless  some  human  interest  is  to  be 
promoted,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  bugs  should 
be  so  diligently  studied  and  classified.  It  can  hardly 
be  claimed  that  any  blessing  is  to  accrue  to  them,  or 
that  nature  is  thereby  to  be  exalted.  But  if  some 
interest  of  humanity  is  to  be  subserved,  and  if  all 
study  of  inferior  objects  is  somehow  to  promote  the 
welfare  of  the  highest  of  all,  why  not  then  regard  also 
the  study  of  humanity,  of  mind  itself,  as  of  the  utmost 
importance,  and  all  other  knowledge  as  valuable  in 
proportion  as  it  furthers  a  knowledge  of  self,  and  is 
promotive  of  human  interests? 

There  are  already  evidences  of  a  decided  re-action 
against  the  tendency  which  would  make  the  mind  a 
mere  tool  to  work  with  in  the  quarries  of  nature,  —  a 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  NATURAL   SCIENCE.        127 

tool  which  can  neither  understand  itself  nor  the  purpose 
of  its  work.  Enough  has  been  said  to  show  that  it  is 
not  the.  real  scientists  who  are  guilty  of  thus  inestimably 
degrading  the  mind.  The  re-action  is  simply  the  rebel- 
lion of  the  intellect  against  the  attempted  degradation ; 
and  the  leaders  in  science  are  also  leaders  in  the  re- 
action. Unfortunate  would  it  be  for  human  progress,  if 
the  systematic  ignoring  of  what  concerns  humanity  most 
on  the  part  of  empirics,  should  lead  to  a  depreciation  of 
real  science.  Nature  need  not  be  less  studied ;  but  the 
mind,  too,  has  claims,  and  will  see  to  it  that  they  are 
not  ignored.  "  Unmistakably  the  centre  of  gravity  in 
scientific  inquiries  is  gradually  being  shifted.  The  nat- 
ural sciences  have  passed  their  most  flourishing  period, 
the  mental  sciences  are  approaching  theirs."  *  How  far 
the  prophecy  of  the  eminent  thinker  who  gives  expres- 
sion to  this  thought  shall  be  fulfilled,  must  be  left  to  the 
future.  But  we  cannot  suppress  the  wish  that  there 
may  be  before  us  not  less  of  natural  science,  but  more 
philosophy,  and  more  general  attention  to  mental  phe- 
nomena. A  healthy  intellectual  period  cannot  bury  or 
hide  the  mind  under  its  possessions,  but  will  appreciate 
those  possessions  as  the  wealth  of  the  mind ;  and  all 
attainments  will  be  esteemed  in  proportion  to  their  real 
dignity  and  to  their  relation  to  the  highest  interests. 
Unless  indications  deceive,  the  progress  of  thought 
among  the  Greeks  will  be  repeated  in  our  day,  namely, 
from  matter  to  mind,  and  from  nature  to  humanity. 

*  Wundt,  Loyik,  II.  516,  517:  "  Doch  unverkennbar  verschiebt  sich  all- 
inahlich  der  Schwerpunkt  der  wissenschaftlichen  Forschungen.  Die 
Naturwissenschaften  haben  ihre  Bliithe  hinter  sich,  die  Geistes wissen- 
schaften  gehen  ihr  entgegen.  Die  Einflusse  des  Naturalismus  auf  die 
letzteren,  die  noch  iiberall  in  geschichtsphilosophischen  Systeraen,  in 
sociologischen  und  naturrechtlichen  Theorien  zu  spiiren  sind,  werden 
damit  von  selbst  verschwindeu. 


128     INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

May  we  not  also  expect,  that,  as  Aristotle  followed 
Plato,  so  now  rigid,  rational  philosophizing,  uniting  in- 
duction and  deduction,  will  follow  an  unbridled  specu- 
lation in  philosophy  ? 

REFLECTIONS. 

Various  senses  in  which  "  Science  "  is  used.  Its  true 
sense.  Scientific  method.  Limits  of  Science.  Rela- 
tion of  Hypotheses  and  Theories  to  Science.  Relation 
of  Philosophy  to  Science.  Hostility  between  them. 
Historic  reasons  for  the  antagonism.  Tendencies  to- 
ward Philosophy  in  Science.  Philosophical  elements 
in  scientific  works.  "  Law  "  as  used  in  Natural  Science. 
Does  it  refer  to  force?  Does  it  explain  the  cause  of 
phenomena?  Can  Science  get  behind  phenomena? 
Does  it  determine  quality,  or  only  quantity  ?  What  is 
meant  by  "  natural "  ?  Empiricism  and  the  work  of  Sci- 
ence. Relation  of  Philosophy  to  the  basis  of  Science. 
What  problems  does  Science  give  Philosophy  ?  Science 
and  the  limits  of  knowledge.  The  scientific  method,  and 
mental  and  historical  phenomena.  Objections  to  Phi- 
losophy applicable  to  Science.  Co-operation  of  Philoso- 
phy and  Science.  Condition  for  this  co-operation. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY.  129 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PHILOSOPHY  AND  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

PSYCHOLOGY,  the  doctrine  of  the  soul,  treats  of  the 
mental  activities,  seeking  to  analyze  and  interpret  them, 
so  as  to  discover  their  laws*  and  to  give  a  complete  sys- 
tem of  the  operations  of  the  mind.  A  general  view  of 
cognition  may  be  obtained  by  regarding  the  mind  as 
subject,  and  all  its  knowledge  as  object.  If,  now,  we 
take  up  for  consideration  the  mind  as  the  subject  to 
which  all  knowledge  is  object,  we  can  ask,  What  is  that 
mind?  and  what  does  it  do?  The  first  question  per- 
tains to  essence,  namely,  the  substance  or  nature  of  the 
mind,  and  belongs  to  metaphysics.  The  second,  pertain- 
ing to  the  mind's  activities,  gives  the  sphere  of  psy- 
chology. When  we  turn  from  the  subject  to  the  object, 
we  find  that  the  latter  includes  all  that  comes  before 
the  mind ;  it  therefore  includes  the  whole  domain  of 
knowledge. 

In  psychology  the  mind,  as  activity,  is  both  subject 
and  object.  It  reflects  on  itself,  takes  up  for  investiga- 
tion its  own  operations,  and  seeks  to  understand  its 
method  of  dealing  with  the  various  objects  engaging  its 
attention.  When  we  demand  of  the  mind  that  it  make 
itself  the  object  of  inquiry,  it  at  first  seems  to  be  equal 
to  asking  the  eye  to  behold  itself.  But  this  is  not  the 
case.  We  distinguish  between  the  mind  and  its  opera- 
tions, and  ask  that  the  subject  consider  those  operations 


130      INTRODUCTION    TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

as  objects  of  knowledge.  Returning  to  the  analogy  of 
the  eye,  we  find  that  it  is  simply  required  to  give  an 
account  of  what  it  sees.  How  the  mind  actually  pro- 
ceeds when  it  beholds  its  own  activities  and  other  objects 
of  inquiry,  is  a  problem  as  insolvable  as  that  of  the 
modus  operandi  of  the  eye  in  obtaining  vision.  That  we 
can  watch  our  mental  operations,  is  established  as  a  fact, 
as  fully  as  that  of  seeing  with  the  eye ;  and  it  is  the 
given  fact  for  which,  an  explanation  is  nought.  Psy- 
chology therefore  deals  with  facts.  Not  with  facts  in 
general,  however,  but  only  with  such  as  are  a  manifes- 
tation and  revelation  of  its  own  processes. 

When  psychology  is  defined  as  mental  science,  or  sci- 
ence of  the  mind,  it  must  be  explained  in  what  sense  the 
term  "  science  "  is  used.  "Mind  "also  requires  expla- 
nation, in  order  to  determine  whether  psychology  con- 
siders it  metaphysically  or  phenomenally,  or,  perhaps, 
in  both  senses.  Besides,  the  term  must  not  be  taken  in 
the  limited  sense  of  intellect,  but  in  that  wider  one, 
including  all  the  inner  operations.  It  stands  for  soul, 
and  embraces  all  the  psychic  processes,  whether  intel- 
lectual, emotional,  or  volitional.  It  is  the  more  im- 
portant to  emphasize  the  breadth  of  the  term  u  mind," 
because  there  is  a  tendency  to  discuss  most  fully  the 
cognitive  faculties,  which  are  constantly  employed  in 
describing  the  psychic  processes ;  but  in  the  careful 
study  of  feeling  and  volition,  and  in  determining  their 
relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  intellect,  much  of  the 
future  progress  of  psychology  may  be  expected.  All 
ambiguity  will  be  avoided  by  defining  psychology  as 
the  system  of  the  soul's  operations.  It  is  a  psychic 
biology,  aiming  to  explain  the  origin  and  movement  of 
the  soul's  life  as  revealed  in  its  activities. 

It  is  easy  to  form  a  general  conception  of  this  disci- 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  131 

pline  ;  but  its  extent,  the  complication  of  its  phenomena, 
and  its  interweaving  with  other  disciplines,  make  its 
exact  limitation  difficult.  Many  works  on  psychology 
furnish  proof  of  this.  As  dealing  solely  with  the  mind, 
it  may  seem  to  comprehend  whatever  we  know,  —  all 
knowledge  being  a  possession  of  the  mind,  and  a  prod- 
uct of  mental  processes.  This  is  as  true  of  natural 
science  as  of  the  doctrine  of  the  soul  itself.  There  are 
for  us  no  facts  but  those  of  consciousness ;  and  if  we 
know  aught,  it  is  because  we  are  conscious  of  it  as  pro- 
duced according  to  the  principles  of  knowledge.  To 
regard  psychology,  therefore,  as  including  all  data  of 
consciousness,  makes  it  comprehend  whatever  exists  for 
the  intellect.  In  that  case  it  would  be  so  comprehen- 
sive as  to  be  the  only  possible  study.  But  conscious- 
ness with  its  contents  is  not  the  subject-matter  of  this 
discipline ;  its  peculiarity  consists  in  the  manner  of 
viewing  these  contents.  Psychology  does  not  consider 
what  they  are  in  themselves,  but  onty  so  far  as  related 
to  the  soul,  and  as  revealing  its  activities.  The  con- 
tents of  consciousness  are  objects  contemplated  solely 
for  the  sake  of  seeing  in  them  the  subject.  If  I  am 
conscious  of  light,  I  can  abstract  the  fact  of  conscious- 
ness, and  consider  the  light  itself,  inquiring,  What  con- 
stitutes it  ?  With  what  velocity  does  it  move  ?  How 
does  it  affect  plants,  animals,  and  inorganic  matter? 
These  and  similar  questions  are  not  psychological,  but 
belong  to  natural  science.  I,  however,  enter  the  domain 
of  psychology  when  the  consciousness  itself,  not  the 
light,  is  the  object  of  inquiry ;  as  when  I  ask,  How  did 
I  become  conscious  of  the  light?  What  is  meant  by 
the  fact  that  I  am  conscious  of  it?  How  does  this  fact 
affect  my  thoughts,  feelings,  and  volitions?  In  psy- 
chology we  therefore  abstract  from  the  contents  of 


132      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

consciousness  the  psychic  elements,  and  make  them  the 
objects  of  inquiry.  Thus  all  processes  of  the  soul,  from 
the  most  elementary  to  the  most  complicated,  are  in- 
cluded in  the  study,  as  sensation,  experience,  thinking, 
the  affections,  the  aesthetic  impressions,  and  the  action 
of  the  will.  We  might  call  it  a  natural  history  of  the 
mind.  While  logic  seeks  the  laws  necessary  to  discover 
the  truth,  psychology  inquires  into  the  actual  processes 
of  the  mind.  The  former  is,  therefore,  normative  ;  the 
latter,  historical  and  descriptive. 

From  this  definition  of  psychology  it  is  easy  to  deter- 
mine its  relation  to  the  other  departments  of  knowledge. 
In  all  of  them  the  knowing  subject  is  concerned ;  they 
consequently  have  a  psychological  basis.  When  I  con- 
sider the  conservation  of  energy,  I  want  to  learn  its 
nature  and  working ;  but  the  very  words  "  I "  and 
u  consider  "  have  a  psychological  bearing.  We  cannot, 
in  fact,  utter  a  sentence  without  implying  psychology. 
This  shows  the  fundamental  character  of  the  discipline  ; 
it  lies  at  the  basis  of  every  thing  that  is  for  us,  because 
we  can  know  of  it  only  through  the  mind,  the  object  of 
psychology.  If  we  adopt  the  language  of  Fichte,  and 
hold  that  there  is  nothing  but  the  Ego  and  the  non-Ego, 
we  at  once  see  that  we  can  view  all  things  only  from 
our  standpoint,  and  as  related  to  us.  We  can  behold  no 
object  except  in  the  light  of  our  soul ;  or  we  can  say 
that  the  soul  is  the  eye  which  sees  all  objects  according 
to  its  own  structure.  Now,  what  the  study  of  the  eye 
is  in  optics,  that  is  the  study  of  psychology  to  all  other 
objects  of  learning. 

It  is,  however,  not  definite  enough  to  define  psychology 
as  the  doctrine  of  the  soul.  That  soul,  as  we  have  seen, 
may  be  considered  according  to  its  essence,  the  ques- 
tions involved  being  such  as  these :  What  is  its  nature  ? 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  133 

Is  it  simple,  or  compound  ?  Is  it  material  ?  Or,  we  can 
confine  our  attention  to  the  operations  of  the  soul, 
inquiring,  How  does  it  act  ?  The  inquiry  into  the 
operations  of  the  soul  is  now  commonly  regarded  as 
the  business  of  psychology. 

The  total  separation  of  the  two  ways  of  viewing  the 
soul  is  the  result  of  development.  In  the  Socratic  school 
psychology  was  treated  as  a  part  of  physics ;  afterwards 
it  was  connected  with  metaphysics.  Even  when  treated 
as  a  separate  subject,  it  at  first  contained  the  whole  doc- 
trine of  the  soul,  the  metaphysical  elements  receiving 
special  prominence.  Christian  Wolff  was  the  first  to 
divide  psychology  into  empirical  and  rational.  To  the 
former  he  assigned  the  task  of  describing  the  inner 
(psychic)  processes  and  arranging  them  systematically, 
while  the  rational  made  the  nature  of  the  soul  its 
starting-point  for  the  explanation  of  the  psychological 
phenomena.  The  empirical  was  accordingly  to  make 
the  facts  of  consciousness  its  basis,  while  the  rational 
was  theoretical.  His  own  example,  however,  illustrated 
the  difficulty  of  keeping  the  two  wholly  distinct. 

In  the  division  of  psychology  into  empirical  and 
rational,  Wolff  still  has  followers,  while  some  have 
united  both,  and  still  others  recognize  only  the  empirical. 
The  searching  criticism  to  which  Kant  subjected  the 
mind  led  him  to  reject  rational  psychology  as  impossible. 
Herbart,  who  of  all  German  writers  gave  the  strongest 
impulse  to  psychological  studies,  wanted  in  psychology 
a  description  of  the  mental  phenomena  as  learned  by 
observation,  also  metaphysics  for  the  explanation  of 
their  origin,  and  mathematics  so  far  as  quantitative  ele- 
ments enter  into  the  operations  of  the  mind.  But  his 
contemporary  Beneke,  who  also  did  excellent  service  in 
promoting  psychology,  rejected  both  metaphysics  and 


134      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

mathematics  from  the  study.  He  held  that  it  should 
be  purely  experimental,  and  adopt  the  method  of  the 
natural  sciences,  beginning  with  experience,  and  ration- 
ally developing  the  results  thus  obtained.* 

In  England  there  has  been  a  strong  tendency  to 
absorb  the  whole  of  philosophy  in  psychology.  This 
movement  was  begun  by  Locke,  completed  by  Hume, 
and  imitated  by  their  followers.  In  his  "Treatise  of 
Human  Nature,"  Hume  discusses  some  of  the  pro- 
foundest  problems  of  philosophy,  such  as  the  nature  of 
abstract  or  general  ideas,  being  and  non-being,  substance, 
time,  space,  force,  causality,  and  the  like.  In  the  Intro- 
duction he  says  correctly,  "  that  all  the  sciences  have 
a  relation,  greater  or  less,  to  human  nature ;  and  that, 
however  wide  any  of  them  may  seem  to  run  from  it, 
they  still  return  back  by  one  passage  or  another."  How 
comprehensive  he  makes  the  system  of  human  nature, 
is  evident  from  the  following:  "There  is  no  question 
of  importance,  whose  decision  is  not  compriz'd  in  the 
science  of  man  ;  and  there  is  none,  which  can  be  decided 
with  any  certainty,  before  we  become  acquainted  with 
that  science.  In  pretending,  therefore,  to  explain  the 
principles  of  human  nature,  we  in  effect  propose  a  com- 
ple^t  system  of  the  sciences,  built  on  a  foundation  almost 
entirely  new,  and  the  only  one  upon  which  they  can 
stand  with  any  security."  If  Hume's  statement,  that 
"  the  principles  of  human  nature  "  give  "  a  compleat 
system  of  the  sciences,"  is  taken  literally,  it  results  in 
an  idealism  as  perfect  as  that  of  Fichte.  In  that  case 
psychology  includes  philosophy,  all  science,  and  in  fact 
all  knowledge.  He  does  not  distinguish  between  the 
principles  of  human  nature  as  the  subjective  condition 

*  Hence  the  title  of  his  work  :  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie  als  Natur- 
wissenschaft,  1845. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  135 

of  the  sciences,  and  the  sciences  themselves:  he  con- 
founds the  soil  with  its  products. 

By  reducing  philosophy  to  psychology,  Hume  oblit- 
erates the  distinction  between  what  is  and  what  ought 
to  be,  makes  the  mind  a  mere  observer  where  it  is  called 
to  be  a  critic,  and  a  passive  recorder  of  phenomena 
where  it  is  called  to  be  positive  energy  and  a  lawgiver. 
Empiricism  is  thus  made  a  law,  when  it  only  furnishes 
materials  for  laws.  Besides  the  other  defects  of  his 
psychology,  he  makes  sensation  and  association  the 
norms  of  all  thought,  and  in  his  philosophy  of  expe- 
rience fails,  with  Locke,  to  do  justice  to  the  mental 
factor  in  experience.  The  dread  of  innate  ideas  leads 
him  to  reject  what  is  innate  in  all  mental  processes ; 
namely,  the  subjective  conditions  for  receiving  and 
elaborating  impressions  from  the  external  world.  In 
reducing  logic  to  psychology,  he  fails  to  discover  the 
very  laws  of  thought,  which  he  continually  uses  in  order 
to  destroy  the  validity  of  thought  as  soon  as  it  rises 
above  empiricism.  His  dogmatic  scepticism  is  con- 
tained in  the  first  sentence  of  his  Treatise,  a  sentence 
not  proved,  but  a  pure  supposition.  The  importance  of 
psychology,  in  its  proper  place,  cannot  be  over-estimated ; 
but  out  of  its  sphere  it  becomes  the  means  of  the  most 
serious  perversions.17 

While  Locke  and  Hume  make  psychology  essentially 
philosophy,  the  systems  which  consider  it  as  both 
rational  and  empirical  must  also  assign  it,  or  at  least  its 
rational  elements,  to  philosophy.  That  it  was  originally 
taken  up  and  developed  by  philosophy,  just  as  physics, 
is  not  surprising ;  but  when  in  the  process  of  develop- 
ment it  becomes  independent  as  an  empirical  subject, 
with  an  aim  distinct  from  that  of  philosophy,  it  of 
course  cannot  retain  its  original  place  any  more  than 


186      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

physics.  Present  tendencies  are  intent  on  withdrawing 
it  from  the  metaphysical  and  rational  to  the  empirical, 
and  thus  to  sever  its  connection  with  philosophy. 

In  his  aim  to  describe,  explain,  and  systematize  the 
phenomena  of  mind,  the  psychologist  is  an  historian. 
No  more  than  a  writer  of  human  or  natural  history,  can 
he  describe  all  that  occurs  in  his  special  department ; 
but  he  selects  what  is  most  valuable  and  characteristic. 
This  does  not  mean  that  only  such  phenomena  are 
chosen  as  can  be  fitted  into  what  is  known  of  the 
organism  of  the  mind ;  for  frequently  the  exceptional 
is  valuable  for  progress,  in  that  it  gives  important  prob- 
lems for  solution.  Mysterious  phenomena  worthy  of 
scientific  investigation  are  unfortunately  left  largely  to 
charlatans.  That  many  supposed  marvels  are  based  on 
trickery,  is  no  evidence  that  this  is  the  case  with  all. 
So-called  spiritualism,  second  sight,  and  numerous 
strange  phenomena  well  authenticated,  lie  wholly  be- 
yond our  present  powers  of  explanation  ;  but  that  does 
not  prove  their  mystery  impenetrable.  We  no  longer 
believe  in  witchcraft ;  yet  under  that  name  many  things 
occurred  which  are  astounding  revelations  of  mental 
affections,  and  are  of  great  interest  to  the  student  of 
mind.*  The  true  psychologist  does  not  turn  away 
haughtily  from  things  beyond  his  ken  and  such  as  can- 
not be  made  to  fit  into  his  theories,  nor  does  he  sneer 
at  what  seems  to  savor  of  jugglery ;  but  he  regards  the 
unusual  and  the  marvellous  as  likely  to  contain  revela- 
tions of  value.  While  formerly  mysterious  phenomena 
absorbed  too  much  attention,  they  are  evidently  too 
much  neglected  now.  The  fact  that  superstition  gives 
interpretations  which  the  psychologist  cannot  accept,  is 

*  Many  illustrations  of  this  may  be  found  in  Horst's  Zauber  Biblio- 
thek. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  137 

a  reason  for  seeking  the  correct  explanation.  Both  the 
facts  and  their  meaning  must  be  determined  according 
to  the  principles  of  the  scientific  method.  The  student 
of  psychology,  while  regarding  as  most  important  what 
is  most  common  and  evidently  within  reach  of  the 
interpreting  mind,  will  learn  in  proportion  as  he  enters 
the  depths  that  there  are  mysteries  of  absorbing  inter- 
est and  worthy  of  efforts  at  solution.  Particularly  is  it 
essential  to  guard  against  hasty  conclusions  as  to  the 
limits  of  the  mind's  operations,  —  conclusions  calculated 
to  check  inquiry  and  thus  to  hinder  progress.  Physi- 
ognomy, phrenology,  and  so-called  mind-reading  (usually 
a  misnomer  for  determining  mere  locality  according  to 
indications  given  to  the  mind  through  the  body),  and 
similar  misnamed  sciences  or  phenomena,  deserve  study, 
even  if  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  overthrow  the 
errors  they  promote.  Not  that  certain  mental  phenom- 
ena are  mysterious  is  a  reproach  to  psychology,  for 
they  may  involve  insuperable  difficulties;  but  if  it 
ignores  them  it  is  seriously  at  fault.  Even  the  expo- 
sure and  exact  limitation  of  problems  may  be  of  great 
service.  The  confessed  ignorance  of  psychologists  may 
contain  more  wisdom  than  many  of  their  elucidations. 
Nevertheless,  psychology  would  become  unhealthy  if  it 
made  the  abnormal  and  the  mysterious  the  substance 
of  its  inquiries. 

In  psychology,  as  in  natural  science,  the  discovery, 
description,  interpretation,  and  classification  of  mental 
facts,  are  preparatory  to  the  discovery  of  their  causes 
and  the  determination  of  their  laws.  The  student  of 
mind  aims  to  learn  what  is,  how  it  is,  and  why  it  is,  and 
seeks  to  reduce  his  discoveries  to  a  completely  rounded 
system,  an  organism  in  which  facts  are  members,  laws 
are  joints,  and  the  soul's  energy  is  the  life. 


138      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Beginners  in  philosophy  have  usually  studied  psy- 
chology, and  it  is  here  taken  for  granted  that  they  are 
acquainted  with  its  general  scope.  Many  students, 
however,  testify  that  the  study  has  served  rather  to 
arouse  their  minds,  and  impel  their  thoughts  in  a  par- 
ticular direction,  than  to  give  them  sharply  defined 
concepts  of  the  nature,  aim,  objects,  and  relations  of 
psychology.  They  consequently  find  it  difficult  to 
determine  its  exact  relation  to  philosophy.18 

While  thus  distinguishing  between  subject  and  object, 
between  the  mental  processes  and  their  products,  and 
between  psychology  and  philosophy,  do  we  not  force 
psychology  into  the  same  category  as  the  natural  sci- 
ences? When  this  is  done  by  the  materialistic  and 
positivistic  schools,  they  are  only  consistent  with  their 
principles.  Nor  can  there  be  objection  to  classing  psy- 
chology with  natural  science,  if  science  means  simply 
systematized  knowledge  and  if  "  natural "  is  used  in  dis- 
tinction only  from  the  supernatural ;  but  it  is  differ- 
ent when  the  aim  is  to  wipe  out  the  distinction  between 
matter  and  mind.  Most  of  those,  however,  who  speak 
of  psychology  as  a  natural  science,  refer  merely  to  the 
method  of  treatment.*  To  this  there  can  be  no  objec- 
tion. All  they  mean  is  that  it  must  be  based  wholly 
on  experience ;  that  it  is  "  the  science  of  mind  worked 
out  in  the  way  of  the  natural  sciences."  f 

This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  into  the  dispute  between 
spiritualists  and  materialists,  whether  the  science  of  mind 
can  ever  be  reduced  to  a  natural  science  as  a  part  of 
physics,  or  of  physics  and  chemistry ;  nevertheless,  the 
student  should  be  warned  against  hasty  conclusions, 

*  This  is  the  case  with  Beneke,  J.  H.  Fichte,  Waitz,  "Wundt,  and 
others. 

t  Mind,  1883.  4.    By  the  editor. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  139 

and  reminded  that  (empirical)  psychology  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  question.  The  monistic  tendency  is  apt 
to  conclude  hastily  in  favor  of  whatever  system  may  at 
the  time  be  in  the  ascendancy.  When  idealism  pre- 
vails, it  is  made  the  explanation  of  all  things  ;  and 
when  materialism  becomes  predominant,  every  thing 
must  submit  to  be  classed  under  matter.  Instead  of 
fathoming  the  meaning  of  the  terms  "  matter "  and 
"  spirit,"  they  are  used,  with  all  their  indefmiteness  and 
obscurity,  as  if  perfectly  understood,  —  matter  as  the 
only  reality,  spirit  as  the  mere  negation  of  matter. 
Even  "  substance,"  with  which  Spinoza  and  his  suc- 
cessors operated  so  confidently,  is  becoming  shadowy 
in  our  day ;  and  a  philosophy  deeper  and  more  serious 
than  that  of  Hume  may  question  whether  the  mind  can 
conceive  of  the  abiding  reality  underlying  all  phe- 
nomena, which  it  is  intended  to  represent. 

Since  psychology  aims  to  describe  the  processes  of  the 
soul,  it  must  be  evident  that  these  should  first  of  all  be 
considered ;  and  that,  if  any  inference  is  to  be  drawn, 
it  should  be  done  after  they  have  been  fully  described, 
not  before.  To  begin  the  study  with  a  theory  of  the 
nature  of  the  soul,  particularly  when  that  is  so  much 
in  dispute  as  in  our  day,  is  to  begin  with  an  unproved 
hypothesis  and  with  a  prejudice.  We  must  begin  with 
facts,  operations,  exactly  as  in  nature:  from  what  it 
does  and  can  do,  we  must  try  to  discover  what  the  soul 
is ;  but  to  make  a  theory  of  the  essence  of  the  soul  the 
principle  for  the  explanation  of  its  operations,  is  both 
unphilosophical  and  unscientific.  No  more  in  mind 
than  in  nature  have  we  a  knowledge  of  the  substance 
otherwise  than  from  its  operations.  In  no  other  way  is 
a  manifestation  of  their  character  possible,  unless  it 
were  given  by  direct  revelation  from  some  other  source 


140      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

than  the  mind  and  nature.  What  can  a  manifestation 
of  mind  or  nature  mean,  other  than  an  operation  of 
mind  or  nature  ?  We  need  but  make  clear  to  our  minds 
what  we  mean  by  a  manifestation,  and  that  without  a 
manifestation  of  a  thing  we  can  have  no  knowledge  of 
it,  in  order  to  learn  that  only  from  their  operations  can 
we  judge  of  the  essence  of  objects.  Indeed,  an  exam- 
ination of  the  terms  we  apply  to  objects  will  convince 
us  that,  as  a  rule,  these  terms,  so  far  as  they  have  an 
intelligible  sense,  only  express  what  these  objects  can 
do.  We  may  imagine  that  we  know  the  essence  or 
substance,  when  in  truth  we  know  only  trie  powers 
revealed  in  the  operations ;  but  these  are  sufficient  for 
an  intelligent  apprehension  of  mental  and  material 
processes. 

Long  .before  our  minds  are  trained  to  critical  intro- 
spection or  to  reflection,  we  become  familiar  with  words 
in  common  use.  The  meanings  attached  to  them  un- 
consciously, or  at  least  uncritically,  are  apt  to  remain 
after  we  have  become  more  critical.  Many  terms  are, 
in  fact,  used  with  no  definite  sense.  This  is  particularly 
the  case  with  such  as  are  supposed  to  stand  for  funda- 
mental concepts,  and  for  principles  which  lie  far  beyond 
observation.  Words  thus  become  symbols  of  ignorance 
and  emptiness,  rather  than  of  knowledge  and  real  con- 
tent. The  use  of  some  such  terms  may  be  necessary 
as  an  indication  of  the  object  sought;  but  the  object 
still  sought  must  not  be  treated  as  if  already  found. 
Thus  the  terms  "  mind  "  and  "  matter  "  may  properly 
be  used  to  designate  the  object  of  psychological  or 
natural  inquiry ;  but  if  used  metaphysically,  as  if  they 
explained  the  essence,  they  deceive  us. 

While  careful  to  avoid  empty  phrases,  and  especially 
to  reject  them  from  the  foundation  on  which  we  build, 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  141 

we  must  rigorously  insist  on  investigating  every  thing 
according  to  its  own  laws.  In  this  respect  both  ideal- 
ism and  materialism  have  erred,  and  past  experience 
has  taught  that  all  reasoning  per  saltum,  from  one  sphere 
into  another,  is  apt  to  lead  to  confusion  and  error. 
Analogical  reasoning  must  be  closely  watched,  the  more 
so  because  it  is  often  insidious,  and  asserts  as  final  what 
has  not  even  been  established  as  probable.  In  respect 
to  mental  operations,  analogical  reasoning  is  frequently 
applied.  There  are  laws  which  are  applicable  to  limited 
spheres  only,  and  their  application  to  a  different  sphere 
is  a  perversion.  When  the  mind  is  familiar  with  a  cer- 
tain sphere,  it  is  liable  to  form  the  habit  of  applying 
the  laws  of  that  sphere  to  subjects  with  which  it  is  less 
familiar;  perhaps  it  even  makes  their  application  uni- 
versal. Materialism  and  idealism  frequently  depend 
much  less  on  facts  or  correct  reasoning  than  on  mental 
habits,  so  that  their  strength  is  in  association  rather 
than  reason. 

Physics  and  chemistry  cannot  explain  life,  much  less 
the  mind.  Trendelenburg  thought  he  had  discovered 
in  motion  something  common  to  matter  and  mind ;  but, 
aside  from  other  difficulties  in  his  explanation,  he  uses 
motion  as  applied  to  material  and  mental  phenomena 
in  different  senses.  At  best  there  is  only  analogy,  not 
identity ;  motion  applied  to  the  action  of  the  mind  is 
used  figuratively. 

The  most  eminent  scientists  agree  with  philosophers 
that,  however  intimate  the  relation  of  matter  and  mind, 
it  is  impossible  to  explain  the  operations  of  the  latter 
by  the  known  laws  of  the  former.  Respecting  the  sub- 
stance or  essence  of  mind,  we  are  in  the  presence  of 
a  mystery  thus  far  inscrutable.  This  is,  indeed,  not 
peculiar  to  mind  ;  matter,  as  we  have  seen,  is  equally 


142      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

mysterious.  Neither  spiritualism,  nor  idealism,  nor 
Spinoza's  " substance,"  nor  Professor  Bain's  "double- 
faced  unity,"  helps  us  out  of  the  difficulty,  or  throws 
any  light  into  the  darkness.  If  matter  really  does 
account  for  mental  phenomena,  it  must  certainly  have 
something  never  yet  discovered  in  what  is  called  matter. 
Those  who  speak  confidently  of  mind  as  material,  evi- 
dently use  terms  without  considering  their  sense.  Lotze 
declares  that  "it  is  nothing  but  an  empty  popular  phrase 
to  claim  that  the  doctrine  of  the  life  of  the  soul  is  to 
be  transformed  to  a  natural  science,  —  a  phrase  which 
either  has  no  meaning,  or  else  signifies  that  an  attempt 
is  made  to  hear  with  the  eyes,  and  see  with  the  ears."  * 
Yet  the  "  inveterate  habit  of  confounding  the  psychi- 
cal and  the  physical "  has  become  quite  common,  and 
is  justly  pronounced  "the  bane  of  modern  psychology."  f 
While  popular  scientists  frequently  confound  the  two, 
the  profound  are  usually  more  careful ;  though  even 
they  are  sometimes  'betrayed  into  transferring  the  laws 
with  which  they  are  familiar,  into  regions  where  they 
are  less  at  home.  Men  like  Helmholtz,  Virchow,  Du 
Bois-Reymond,  Tait,  Huxley,  are  too  cautious  to  endow 
matter  with  properties  never  yet  discovered  in  it.  If 
all  of  them,  Helmholtz  and  Tait  excepted,  at  times  use 
expressions  with  a  materialistic  flavor,  they  are  careful 
at  other  times  to  correct  them,  and  to  admit  their  igno- 
rance of  the  mental  substance.  Wundt  says,  "  I,  too,  re- 
gard it  improbable  that  purely  psychological  doctrines, 
whether  facts  or  theories,  can  ever  be  deduced  from 
physiological  statements."  J  Professor  Tyndall  makes 
the  following  admission :  "  The  passage  from  the  physics 

*  Medicinische  Psychologie,  32. 

t  James  Ward,  Mind,  1883.    481. 

J  Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  wiss.  Philosophic,  1879.    357. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  143 

of  the  brain  to  the  corresponding  facts  of  consciousness 
is  unthinkable.  .  .  .  Were  our  minds  and  senses  so 
expanded,  strengthened,  and  illuminated,  as  to  enable 
us  to  see  and  feel  the  very  molecules  of  the  brain  ; 
were  we  capable  of  following  all  their  motions,  all  their 
groupings,  all  their  electrical  discharges,  if  there  be 
such ;  and  were  we  intimately  acquainted  with  the  cor- 
responding states  of  thought  and  feeling,  —  we  should 
probably  be  as  far  as  ever  from  the  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem :  How  are  these  physical  processes  connected  with 
the  facts  of  consciousness?  The  chasm  between  the 
two  classes  of  phenomena  would  still  remain  intel- 
lectually impassable." 19 

In  the  use  of  such  adjectives  as  "mechanical"  and 
"vital,"  we  are  also  in  danger  of  taking  imaginary  for 
real  knowledge.  They  indicate  certain  methods  of  opera- 
tion, but  nothing  respecting  the  essence  of  their  sources. 
What  a  substance  must  be  in  order  to  work  mechani- 
cally, is  no  more  intelligible  than  the  origin  of  vital, 
mental,  and  spiritual  phenomena.  The  laws  of  the 
mechanical  processes  can  be  determined  with  more  ex- 
actness than  the  psychological ;  but  we  deceive  ourselves 
if  we  imagine  that  we  understand  what  is  inorganic  and 
mechanical  better  than  the  organic  and  mental.  Those 
who  think  that  the  mental  processes  are  made  clearer 
by  calling  them  mechanical,  need  but  attempt  an  ex- 
planation of  the  latter  term  in  order  to  learn  that,  in 
essence,  it  is  not  a  whit  more  intelligible  than  the  other. 

The  despair  of  finding  the  real  essence  of  mind  has 
been  the  most  powerful  motive  for  banishing  metaphysic 
from  psychology.  But  has  it  really  been  banished? 
Every  step  in  psychological  inquiry  confronts  us  with 
metaphysical  problems ;  and  however  decidedly  they 
may  be  pronounced  irrelevant,  they  are  usually  either 


144     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

actually  discussed,  or  underlie  the  discussions.  Hume 
professes  to  be  purely  empirical ;  but  surely  his  empiri- 
cism never  discovered  that  "what  we  call  a  mind  is 
nothing  but  a  heap  or  collection  of  different  percep- 
tions," or,  that  a  "  connected  mass  of  perceptions  .  .  . 
constitute  a  thinking  being,"  as  he  says  in  his  Treatise. 
Even  the  declaration,  made  by  some  modern  writers, 
that  the  mind  is  to  be  viewed,  not  as  substance,  but  as 
action,  is  metaphysical.  If  the  natural  sciences  may 
postulate  matter,  there  is  no  reason  why  psychology 
may  not  postulate  mind  as  a  peculiar  entity.*  It  must, 
however,  be  treated  as  a  mere  postulate,  and  the  sup- 
posed essence  must  not  dominate  the  entire  investiga- 
tion, as  if  its  nature  were  established. 

Aside  from  the  nature  of  the  soul,  how  shall  we  view 
its  activity  ?  Is  the  soul  distinct  from  the  activity,  or 
is  it  nothing  but  the  action  ?  If  it  goes  out  wholly  in 
action,  what  is  the  basis  for  future  activity?  These 
inquiries  lead  beyond  empirical  to  rational  psychology, 
but  it  is  almost  impossible  to  ignore  them  ;  and  in  psy- 
chology, as  in  every  other  department,  the  deepest 
problems  lead  to  philosophy.  The  metaphysical  factors 
which  enter  into  intellectual  activity,  whether  external 
and  internal,  or  wholly  mental,  seem  to  find  but  a  poor 
analogy  in  the  action  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  when 
uniting  to  constitute  water.  It  is  more  correct  to  say 
that  they  become,  than  that  they  form,  water.  A  better 
analogy  is  apparently  found  in  two  bodies,  which,  by 
affecting  each  other,  excite  electricity,  the  bodies  them- 
selves remaining  distinct  from  their  product.  The  con- 
ception of  mind,  as  cause,  does  not  remove  the  difficulty 
in  the  relation  of  the  soul  to  its  activity.  Aside  from 
the  other  difficulties  in  the  conception  of  cause,  can  any 

*  Discussed  more  fully  in  the  chapter  on  Metaphysics. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  145 

thing  be  called  a  cause  unless  it  goes  out  wholly  into 
the  effect?  Probably  the  best  view  of  mind  is  that 
of  force  and  energy,  or  (since  the  technical  sense  of 
"force"  in  natural  science  might  be  objectionable)  of 
power  and  energy,  the  latter  being  merely  the  former 
excited  to  activity.*  Mind  must  not  be  made  the  syno- 
nyme  of  consciousness  ;  it  also  exists  during  sleep.  Con- 
sciousness is  but  one  of  its  modes  of  activity,  much  of 
its  most  important  working  falling  below  consciousness. 
Our  unconscious  mental  activity  lies  at  the  basis  and 
accompanies  much  of  that  which  is  conscious.  There 
are  degrees  of  wakefulness  ;  and  when  most  fully  awake, 
and  when  its  attention  is  most  strained,  the  mind  may 
be  conscious  of  processes  which  at  other  times  are  hid. 
The  unconscious  mental  activity  is  no  doubt  as  rigidly 
subject  to  law  as  is  the  conscious.  Connected  with  our 
emotions  and  volitions,  as  well  as  with  our  intellectual 
operations,  there  are  unconscious  and,  therefore,  myste- 
rious processes.  As  our  unconscious  activity  influences 
the  conscious,  so  it  seems  that  the  unconscious  may  be 
influenced  by  the  conscious,  as  by  discipline,  volition, 
the  formation  of  habits,  and  by  fixing  the  attention  on 
certain  thoughts  or  objects.  It  may  be  that  certain 
activities  are  conscious  at  the  time  but  not  remembered, 
and  consequently  are  held  to  be  unconscious.  Thus, 
our  childhood  is  a  blank  to  us  now,  not  because  we  had 
no  consciousness  then,  but  because  we  do  not  remem- 
ber what  then  affected  us.f  It  is  an  interesting  query : 
If  an  impression  is  forgotten,  and  then  remembered 
again,  what  becomes  of  it  during  the  period  of  forget- 

*  For  a  discussion  of  the  soul  as  substance  and  as  action,  see  Wundt, 
Logik,  II.  502 

t  Are  not  various  occurrences  during  sleep  to  be  explained  in  the 
same  way?  We  are  conscious  of  them  at  the  time,  but  forget  them; 
that  is,  we  do  not  remember  the  consciousness. 


146      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

fulness?  There  can  be  no  question  that  the  form  and 
the  intensity  of  consciousness  have  much  influence  on  the 
memory. 

Even  when  viewed  as  purely  empirical,  treating  only 
of  the  activity  of  the  mind,  psychology  is  beset  with 
difficulties.  Those  who  want  to  place  it  in  point  of 
experiment  on  a  level  with  the  natural  sciences  must 
not  forget  that  it  does  not  admit  of  the  same  exactness. 
The  psychologist  does  not  have  the  mind  so  completely 
under  control  as  the  physicist  or  chemist  the  objects  he 
investigates  ;  besides,  he  cannot  use  the  same  instru- 
ments to  measure  and  weigh.  His  object  is  even  more 
complicated  and  difficult  than  that  of  the  biologist. 
From  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  there  is  no  hope  of 
ever  making  psychology  as  exact  and  definite  as  the 
natural  sciences. 

The  terminology  also  offers  difficulties.  Words  are 
used  vaguely ;  the  same  term  is  frequently  employed 
for  different  operations,  and  different  ones  for  the  same 
activity.  Then  there  is  great  diversity  in  the  manner  in 
which  thought,  feeling,  and  volition  follow  one  another, 
in  many  cases  putting  invariable  rules  out  of  the  ques- 
tion. So  much  depends  on  individual  peculiarities,  on 
training  and  surroundings,  that  an  endless  variety  is 
presented  to  the  student  of  psychology.  If  he  confines 
his  study  to  his  own  mind  and  to  those  immediately 
about  him,  he  will  be  narrow.  Exclusive  attention  to 
his  own  people,  or  a  special  predilection  for  them,  is 
the  source  of  the  all  but  universally  prevalent  national 
prejudice.  Even  by  taking  into  account  the  enlight- 
ened nations  of  a  particular  period,  a  comprehensive 
view  of  man  cannot  be  obtained.  In  order  to  over- 
come narrowness  and  prejudice,  a  scholar  must  study  all 
nations,  at  all  periods,  and  under  all  circumstances.20 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  147 

From  this  it  is  evident  that  the  field  whence  psy- 
chology draws  its  materials  is  exceedingly  large.  In 
order  fully  to  understand  the  mental  operations,  it  must 
observe  them  in  all  the  departments  entered  by  the 
mind.  The  psychologist  is  naturally  directed  first  of 
all  to  his  own  mental  processes.  These  are  capable 
of  the  most  direct  and  most  perfect  study,  though  intro- 
spection is  at  first  extremely  difficult.  There  is  another 
difficulty  in  the  fact  that  the  very  effort  to  observe 
the  mental  operations  is  apt  to  modify  them.  Most 
of  our  experiences  can  be  studied  only  in  the  form  of 
reminiscences ;  when  the  experiences  occur  we  are  not 
usually  in  a  mood  to  study  them.  Those  psychologists 
err,  however,  who  affirm  that  we  cannot  observe  what 
is  directly  before  the  mind,  but  only  what  has  become 
an  object  of  memory.  They  forget  that  what  memory 
contains  is  always  a  presentation  of  what  is  actually 
present,  whatever  its  relation  to  the  past  may  be. 

Next  to  the  study  of  self  comes  the  observation  of 
others.  That  of  children  is  especially  valuable,  their 
processes  being  most  simple.  In  the  case  of  older  per- 
sons many  things  complicate  the  process  of  observation. 
In  watching  them,  allowance  must  be  made  for  the 
necessary  imperfections  in  observation,  and  also  for 
the  possibility  of  a  disparity  between  the  inner  state 
and  its  outward  manifestations.  In  the  latter  respect 
the  emotions  and  volitions  present  peculiar  difficulties. 

Valuable  materials  may  also  be  gathered  from  biog- 
raphy, history,  travels,  linguistics,  sociology,  ethnology, 
and  from  all  subjects  that  treat  of  man  either  individu- 
ally or  socially.  Asylums  and  courts  of  justice  furnish 
important  subjects  for  study.  The  impulse  given  by 
Darwin  has  led  to  the  careful  study  of  comparative 
psychology — an  important  field  if  fact  and  fiction  are 


OF  THE 

UmVEESITY 


148      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

distinguished,  if  analogical  reasoning  is  kept  in  check, 
and  if  human  mental  phenomena  are  not  made  to  inter- 
pret the  action  of  brutes,  in  order,  in  turn,  to  use  the 
brutes  to  interpret  man.  There  is,  in  fact,  not  a  subject 
of  human  interest  from  which  the  psychologist  may  not 
learn  important  lessons.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  systematized  general  thoughts,  mirrored  in  the 
individual  facts,  constitute  psychology. 

So  extensive  is  the  field  that,  after  a  general  survey, 
the  student  may  find  it  advisable  to  make  a  specialty  of 
some  particular  department.  Not  only  is  there  need 
of  specialists,  but  there  is  also  great  encouragement  for 
them.  There  can  be  no  thorough  treatment  of  the 
whole  unless  the  various  parts  have  been  mastered. 
The  exhaustive  work  within  narrow  limits,  whether 
confined  to  a  particular  class  of  phenomena  or  persons, 
must  not  be  isolated,  but  made  tributary  to  the  whole. 
There  is  not  a  department  in  which  the  need  of  this 
special  work  is  not  felt.  Even  in  England,  where  so 
much  attention  has  been  given  to  psychology,  and 
whose  philosophers  are  mainly  psychologists,  there  is 
a  marked  lack  of  specialists.*  The  same  is  true  of 
America,  and  indeed  of  all  countries.  There  are,  it  is 
true,  tendencies  to  specialization  now,  but  chiefly  in  the 
relation  of  mind  to  body. 

The  distrust  with  which  speculation  is  viewed  has 
served  both  to  make  the  empirical  method  predominant 
in  psychology,  and  to  make  psychology  itself  a  favorite 
study.  Not  only  does  it  receive  an  unusual  amount  of 
attention  in  Germany,  England,  and  America,  but  also 
in  France  and  Scandinavia,  so  that  new  and  excellent 
works  on  psychology  abound.  Psychological  experi- 

*  "  For  all  the  name  it  has  made  in  the  world,  English  psychology 
has  never  been  remarkable  for  its  elaboration  in  detail."  —  Mind,  1883,2. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  149 

ments  have  also  become  common,  chiefly  through  the 
influence  of  those  conducted  in  the  University  of  Leip- 
zig; but  their  sphere  is  necessarily  limited.  While 
there  has  of  late  been  much  progre.ss  in  psychologic 
research,  even  the  most  thorough  works  *  make  the 
impression  that  respecting  some  of  the  most  important 
functions  of  the  mind  only  a  faint  beginning  at  inter- 
pretation has  been  made.  Even  respecting  the  sphere, 
the  method,  and  the  relations  of  psychology,  there  is  so 
much  uncertainty,  that  the  beginner  is  apt  to  be  greatly 
puzzled  as  to  fundamental  concepts  of  the  study.  Since 
psychology  is  the  necessary  basis  of  philosophy,  its  own 
imperfections  will  seriously  affect  the  latter. 

It  would  require  a  work  on  psychology  itself  to  give 
a  full  account  of  what  is  still  required  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  discipline ;  but  hints  on  the  subject  may 
serve  as  a  warning  against  most  common  errors,  and 
indicate  what  is  most  needed  to  insure  future  progress. 

The  beginning  of  conscious  life  is  involved  in  mys- 
tery ;  perhaps  it  dates  back  to  existence  in  the  womb.f 
In  the  observation  of  infants  the  subject  is  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  determine  exactly 
what  is  conscious  and  what  merely  reflex  activity. 

The  view  has  become  general,  that  "  we  are  only  con- 
scious as  we  are  conscious  of  change,"  or,  as  Bain  says, 
"We  do  not  know  any  one  thing  of  itself,  but  only 
the  difference  between  it  and  another  thing."  Think- 
ing is  comparison ;  and  consciousness  consists,  mainly  at 
least,  in  the  discrimination  of  objects.  But  if  there  is 

*  As  that  of  Yolkmann  in  German,  and  of  Sully  in  English. 

t  On  the  conscious  activity  of  infants  at  various  periods  after  birth, 
see  Kussmaul :  Untersuchunyen  iieber  das  Seelenleben  des  nenyebornen 
Menschen.  Hoeffding  thinks  it  possible  that  the  unborn  child  has  a 
sensation  of  touch  and  motion  :  Psychologic,  translated  into  German  by 
Bendixen,  4. 


150      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

no  consciousness  without  discrimination,  then  the  gen- 
esis of  consciousness  becomes  impossible.  With  what 
other  conscious  act  shall  the  first  one  be  compared,  and 
from  what  shall  it  be  discriminated?  It  seems  to  be 
more  correct  to  say  that  a  determination  of  the  what  of 
consciousness  requires  comparison  with  other  objects, 
but  that  the  fact  of  the  mere  consciousness  of  an 
indefinite  something,  of  a  dark,  undiscriminated  impres- 
sion, does  not  require  such  comparison.  The  first  con- 
scious act  must  therefore  be  indistinct,  an  unexplained 
presence;  and  because  so  indistinct  and  uncompared 
and  unrelated,  it  is  not  remembered. 

More  important  than  speculations  on  the  genesis  of 
consciousness  is  the  resolution  of  abstract  terms  domi- 
nating psychology  into  the  concrete  realities  for  which 
they  are  supposed  to  stand.  It  is  astonishing  what 
influence  these  abstractions  have  acquired  in  psychol- 
ogy, where  the  concrete  is  supposed  to  rule.  Among 
these  terms,  "  consciousness  "  itself  is  one  of  the  most 
important.  It  is  commonly  used  as  if  a  kind  of  faculty 
underlying  all  the  rest,  something  like  a  flat  surface  on 
which  objects  stand,  or  which  reflects  them  like  a  mir- 
ror. There  is  in  the  mind  no  real  object  answering  to 
the  term ;  but  there  are  conscious  objects  or  states  of 
which  we  are  aware,  and  "  consciousness  "  is  simply  an 
abstraction  from  these  objects.  By  dropping  all  the 
objects  before  the  mind  (all  the  real  content),  and 
retaining  solely  the  fact  that  we  were  aware  of  their 
presence,  we  get  the  abstract  notion  of  consciousness. 
By  treating  it  as  a  concrete  reality,  the  term  does  not 
merely  become  inexplicable,  but  also  leads  to  confusion 
and  error. 

The  same  kind  of  abstraction  is  found  in  thought, 
feeling,  volition,  and  numerous  other  instances.  Just 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  151 

as  there  are  conscious  acts,  but  no  reality  which  corre- 
sponds with  consciousness  except  in  these  acts,  so  there 
is  no  thought  in  the  abstract,  but  there  are  individual 
thoughts.  But  another  process  of  abstraction  is  here 
found.  Not  only  is  the  general  term  "  thought "  treated 
as  if  something  concrete,  distinct  from  definite,  individ- 
ual mental  acts,  but  it  is  also  regarded  as  if  it  could  be 
abstracted  from  the  mind  itself  and  could  exist  inde- 
pendent of  that  mind.  Thus  we  speak  of  thought  in 
books,  in  institutions,  in  nature,  forgetting  that  outside 
of  mental  operations  there  can  be  only  symbols  of 
thought,  while  thought  itself  is  found  only  in  the  mind 
possessing  it.  Thought  can  never  be  separated  from 
mind,  as  if  it  could  have  an  independent  existence. 
Thoughts,  feelings,  and  volitions  are  always  definite, 
concrete,  with  particular  contents ;  they  are  not  some- 
thing merely  on  the  mind,  but  they  are  acts,  states, 
manifestations  of  that  mind,  and  absolutely  inseparable 
from  it.  Thoughts  cannot  even  be  communicated; 
only  symbols  can  be  given,  and  thus  other  minds  can 
be  led  to  construct  the  same  or  similar  thoughts. 
Instead  of  imparting  thought,  or  reduplicating  it  as  if 
by  some  photographic  process,  every  thought  is  formed 
or  elaborated  by  the  mind  that  possesses  it,  so  that, 
whatever  its  suggestive  symbol  may  have  been,  the 
thought  itself  is  a  creation  of  the  mind  whose  state 
it  is. 

While  it  is  impossible  to  banish  abstractions,  and 
substitute  for  them  the  concrete,  we  should  be  careful 
to  use  abstract  terms  for  what  they  really  are,  and  not 
hypostatize  them  as  if  they  had  a  substantial  existence 
of  their  own.  Thus  we  cannot  do  without  the  term 
" mental  process;"  yet  it  is  a  mere  abstraction,  being 
wholly  empty  and  unmeaning,  unless  there  i&  some 


152      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

content  in  the  mind  with  which  some  process  is  con- 
nected. We  speak  about  such  processes  as  if  directly 
exposed  to  view :  yet  we  never  observe  a  process  itself, 
or  become  conscious  of  it,  but  are  aware  only  of  cer- 
tain objects  with  which  processes  are  performed.  In 
that  abstract  term  "  process  "  we  embody  the  thought 
that  something  goes  on  in  the  mind :  but  take  away  that 
concrete  something,  and  nothing  will  go  on ;  that  is, 
there  is  no  process,  no  going  on,  unless  there  is  some 
particular  content  passing  through  stages  of  develop- 
ment. 

While  warning  the  student  against  taking  mere 
generalizations  for  the  concrete,  it  is  scarcely  less 
important  to  urge  him  to  estimate  aright  the  anatomi- 
cal process  to  which  the  mind  is  so  often  subjected. 
That  it  is  a  unity,  a  living  organism,  with  members, 
but  without  fragments,  is  not  sufficiently  considered. 
Why  not  have  a  synthetic  as  well  as  an  analytic 
psychology  ? 

A  law  of  vast  importance,  but  heretofore  overlooked 
by  psychologists,  is  that  found  in  the  process  of  forming 
mental  states,  which  become  the  condition  and  criteria 
of  all  mental  activity.  According  to  this  law,  sensations 
become  perceptions,  and  percepts  concepts.  Thus  I 
receive  certain  impressions  through  the  eye,  and  at 
once  say  "tree,"  immediately  and  unconsciously  pass- 
ing from  the  impression  to  the  concept.  So  we  develop 
ourselves  into  certain  states  which  become  permanent ; 
and  it  is  these  states  that  are  affected  by  impressions, 
and  it  is  these  states  that  act.  Thus  our  states  are  an 
embodiment  of  our  total  past  experience,  a  summary  of 
what  we  have  thought,  felt,  and  willed.  Not  all  the 
individual  impressions  received  are  before  the  mind, 
but  their  effect  is  there.  The  law  that  prevails  is  this : 


PHILOSOPHY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY.  153 

There  is  in  the  development  of  the  mind  itself  a  general- 
izing process,  just  as  there  is  in  thought.  Thus  as  a 
general  term  includes  under  it  all  objects  having  the 
marks  of  that  term,  so  the  mind  itself  passes  through 
a  generalizing  process ;  and  every  stage  of  mental 
development  is  the  product 'of  all  the  stages  through 
which  the  mind  has  passed,  and  contains  in  itself  the 
elements  of  all  those  stages.  Our  perceptions,  our 
judgments,  our  affections,  always  depend  on  the  state 
attained.  Hence  the  differences  in  these  respects  at 
different  periods.  What  we  think,  feel,  and  do  is 
always  a  product  and  reflection  of  the  state  we  are 
in.  For  all  our  intellectual  operations,  for  aesthetics 
and  religion,  the  law  is  of  greatest  significance,  A  man 
always  does  what  he  is  at  the  time. 

There  are  many  other  points  in  pyschology  which 
deserve  especial  care  on  the  part  of  the  student;  but 
the  above  are  of  a  more  general  character,  and  better 
adapted  to  this  volume  than  the  details  in  psychologic 
study  which  should  receive  particular  attention.  They 
may  also  give  a  hint  of  what  yet  remains  to  be  done  in 
psychology. 

In  the  development  of  psychology  itself,  there  has 
been  a  process  of  specialization,  so  that  it  has  been 
differentiated  from  subjects  with  which  it  was  formerly 
identified.  This  is  not  only  true  of  its  former  inclu- 
sion in  physics  and  metaphysics,  but  also  of  its  relation 
to  physiology,  logic,  ethics,  and  aesthetics.  Instead  of 
being  amalgamated  with  allied  subjects,  they  are  now 
grouped  around  it  so  as  to  form  a  circle  of  disciplines 
by  themselves.  Being  still  in  the  process  of  this  devel- 
opment, we  cannot  determine  the  final  results  of  the 
various  efforts  at  classification ;  and  the  very  terms 
used  for  different  subjects  are  continually  undergoing 


154      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

changes.  Psycho -physics  (physiological  psychology, 
mental  physiology,  aestho-physiology)  treats  of  the 
relation  of  the  mental  to  the  physical  or  physiological 
processes.  There  is  no  agreement  as  to  how  much  of 
this  relation  belongs  to  psychology,  or  whether  any 
of  it  falls  within  the  domain  of  psychological  inquiry. 
It  is  admitted  that  the  action  of  the  body,  particularly 
of  the  nerves,  has  great  influence  on  the  mental  states. 
There  is  a  preponderating  tendency  to  consign  the 
whole  subject  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  body,  to 
psycho-physics  as  a  separate  discipline.  Highly  impor- 
tant as  anatomy,  physiology,  and  especially  neurology, 
are  for  the  psychologist,  they  are  preparatory  studies, 
and  his  special  department  begins  with  phenomena 
distinctly  mental.  No  motion,  however  essential  to 
sensation,  can  explain  the  fact  of  sensation  or  of  the 
conscious  state.  We  do  not  doubt  that  there  is  more 
than  parallelism  between  the  physiological  and  the 
mental ;  but  we  can  no  more  explain  how  the  former 
becomes  psychical  than  we  can  explain  how  a  volition 
produces  physical  motion.  Besides  psycho-physics,  we 
have  comparative  psychology,  treating  of  man's  relation 
to  brutes ;  also  pathological  psychology  or  psychiatry, 
discussing  the  effect  of  diseases  on  the  mind.  Anthro- 
pology has  at  times  been  treated  as  a  science  of  man.; 
but  it  has  also  discussed  the  relation  of  the  soul  to 
the  body,  and  has  been  viewed  as  a  history  of  human 
nature.  While  physicians  pay  special  attention  to  the 
relation  of  physical  to  mental  disorders,  lawyers  and 
ethical  writers  discuss  the  relation  of  the  physical  state 
to  morals,  especially  the  relation  of  diseases  and  insan- 
ity to  crime.  Sociology,  and  in  fact  all  studies  con- 
nected with  human  nature,  are  intimately  related  to 
psychology.  The  applications  of  psychology  are  numer- 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY.  155 

ous.  A  good  beginning  has  been  made  in  biblical 
psychology  (Delitzsch,  Beck),  and  also  in  the  psychol- 
ogy of  different  peoples  ( Voelkerpsychologie,  Lazarus 
and  Steinthal).  So  there  may  be  a  psychology  of  reli- 
gion, of  humor,  of  various  classes  of  persons,  and  of 
different  professions.  By  specialization  the  subject  can 
be  indefinitely  enlarged. 

Psychology  thus  finds  its  proper  place  between  the 
natural  sciences  and  philosophy ;  forming,  as  it  were, 
the  connecting  link  between  the  two.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  is  intimately  connected  with  physiology  and 
the  whole  department  of  biology,  while,  on  the  other, 
it  leads  directly  to  the  various  philosophical  disciplines. 
Owing  to  its  intimate  relation  to  other  subjects,  psy- 
chologists have  found  it  difficult  to  confine  themselves 
to  the  discussion  of  mental  phenomena  and  their  laws. 
Some  drop  psychology  too  much  into  physiology,  while 
others  exalt  it  too  much  into  the  domain  of  philosophy. 

Viewed  here  in  its  relation  to  philosophy,  this  is  not  the 
place  to  consider  the  practical  value  of  psychology ;  yet 
it  should  be  remembered,  that,  just  as  the  psychic  pro- 
cesses construct  philosophy,  so  they  are  also  the  means 
for  the  practical  application  of  its  speculations.  In 
this  respect  its  relation  to  ethics  is  peculiarly  intimate. 
Psychology  gives  a  knowledge  of  conditions  for  master- 
ing self  and  others ;  and  he  who  understands  the  asso- 
ciation and  sequence  of  the  thoughts,  affections,  and 
volitions,  and  the  relation  of  thought  and  desire  to  the 
will,  has  essential  conditions  of  power.  Comprehending 
humanity,  this  discipline  embodies  more  wisdom  than 
the  Greek  maxim,  "Know  thyself."  For  pedagogics, 
or  the  application  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  of  ethics 
and  aesthetics,  to  mental  training,  psychology  is  of  the 
first  significance.  In  order  successfully  to  instruct  and 


156      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

train  others,  the  teacher  must  understand  the  mind  and 
its  functions.  It  is  not  accidental  that  Herbart's  school 
developed  psychology  and  pedagogics  conjointly.  The 
two  naturally  go  together.  A  healthy  psychology  would 
banish  some  of  the  prevalent  views  of  education. 

But  psychology  must  not  be  expected  to  do  all  the 
mind  requires ;  it  cannot  take  the  place  of  philosophy.* 
The  tendency  to  confound  the  two  spheres  makes  this 
warning  doubly  necessary.  In  describing  what  transpires 
in  the  mind,  and  in  reducing  this  to  laws  and  system, 
psychology  does  not  give  the  philosophy  of  the  intellect, 
of  the  emotions,  or  of  the  volitions.  In  order  to  discover 
the  norms  of  thought,  of  emotion,  and  of  volition,  we 
must  ascend  from  the  phenomenal  to  the  rational,  from 
psychology  to  philosophy.  But  for  every  study  it  is 
fundamental,  making  us  acquainted  with  the  soil  from 
and  in  which  every  subject  must  grow. 

Every  serious  study  may  be  a  preparation  for  philos- 
ophy ;  but  psychology  is  peculiarly  its  propaadeutics. 
In  the  exact  description  of  the  origin  and  nature  of 
the  facts  of  consciousness,  in  its  careful  observation 
of  the  mental  processes,  and  in  its  thorough  analyses,  psy- 
chology not  merely  gives  philosophy  its  practical  basis 
and  legitimate  sphere,  but  also  promotes  the  introduc- 
tion of  scientific  exactness  into  philosophical  inquiries. 
From  what  actually  occurs  in  thought,  feeling,  and  voli- 
tion, we  want  to  rise  intellectually  to  what  ought  to  be, 
just  as,  volitionally,  we  want  to  proceed  from  the  ideal 

*  Numerous  efforts  have  been  made  to  apply  psychology  to  educa- 
tion. But  unless  psychology  is  made  philosophy,  or  at  least  includes 
it,  the  ideal  of  education  is  not  even  made  the  aim  in  these  efforts. 
Psychology  is  not  the  law  of  mental  development:  this  prerogative 
belongs  to  philosophy,  with  its  norms,  ideals,  and  principles.  But  a 
knowledge  of  psychology  is  a  condition  for  their  application  in  peda- 
gogics,—  the  discipline  for  the  psychological  application  of  philosophy, 
for  the  sake  of  mental  development. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY.  157 

as  the  law  for  the  real.  However  the  exclusive  advo- 
cates of  either  may  protest,  the  problem  to  be  solved 
is  the  union  of  the  empirical  and  the  rational,  of  psy- 
chology and  philosophy,  —  a  union  which,  however, 
fully  recognizes  their  differences. 

It  is  evident  that  among  scholars,  the  philosopher, 
most  of  all,  needs  psychology.  Unless  he  can  distin- 
guish clearly  between  the  different  objects  and  degrees, 
and  the  various  processes  of  consciousness,  he  will  be 
in  constant  danger  of  uniting  what  should  be  separated, 
and  vice  versa.  Psychology  is  the  door  to  philosophy. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  indicate  that  this  must  not 
be  understood  to  mean  that  psychology  is  to  be  the  law 
for  philosophy.  Even  if  the  process  of  sensation  could 
be  perfectly  described,  with  the  causes,  the  conditions, 
the  manifestations,  and  the  inter-action  of  thought,  to- 
gether with  the  relation  of  thought,  feeling,  and  voli- 
tion to  one  another,  that  would  not  determine  what  the 
mind  ought  to  be  and  do,  any  more  than  the  manners 
of  an  age  give  us  ethics.  We  must  look  to  the  theory 
of  knowledge  for  the  norms  of  thought.  And  even  in 
psychology,  both  in  its  construction  and  study,  we  find 
a  constant  application  of  this  theory  necessary.  To 
view  empiricism  as  the  sole  guide  in  psychological  in- 
quiry, is  a  serious  mistake.  It  is  not  sufficient  even  in 
considering  the  simplest  elements  of  knowledge,  because 
so  much  is  implied  in  them  which  can  never  become  an 
object  of  observation.  Thus,  the  relation  of  mind  and 
body ;  the  mental  and  physical  factors  in  the  process  of 
sensation ;  the  conceptions  of  the  Ego,  of  the  mind,  the 
soul,  and  consciousness ;  the  distinction  between  im- 
pressions and  the  comparisons,  abstractions,  develop- 
ment, and  conclusions,  of  which  they  are  the  occasion, 
—  require,  for  a  full  understanding,  much  that  is  never 


158      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

given  directly  in  experience.  Indeed,  much  that  is 
considered  in  psychology  requires  the  highest  powers 
of  the  mind,  and  the  deepest  processes  of  thought.  He 
who  treats  the  mental  process  as  a  mere  beholding  of 
what  is  directly  reflected  from  consciousness,  cannot 
form  a  psychology  worthy  of  the  name.  What  is  thus 
beheld  is  but  the  material  to  be  interpreted  by  thinking. 
Psychology  is  not  termed  empirical  because  it  is  formed 
by  an  empirical  process,  but  because  it  is  the  description 
and  scientific  interpretation  of  such  a  process. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Define  Psychology.  Difference  between  Empirical 
and  Rational  Psychology.  Relation  of  the  former  to 
Natural  Science.  Scientific  method  in  Psychology.  Re- 
lation of  Empirical  Psychology  to  Philosophy.  Viewing 
Mind  as  Subject  and  Object,  wherein  does  Psychology 
differ  from  other  disciplines?  Psychology  as  Propae- 
deutic to  Philosophy.  Relation  of  Psychology  to  the 
Theory  of  Knowledge.  To  Psycho-physics ;  Psychia- 
try ;  Anthropology  ;  Biology  ;  Physiology  ;  Sociology  ; 
Pedagogics.  Distinction  between  the  Soul  and  its 
activity.  Mind  and  Matter.  Mental  and  mechanical 
processes.  Empirical  Psychology  and  Metaphysics. 
Psychology  and  Philosophy  in  England.  The  Psycho- 
logical and  the  Rational  Process.  Sources  of  Psy- 
chology. Difficulties  and  Importance  of  the  Study  of 
Psychology. 


DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  159 


CHAPTER  V. 

DIVISION    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

As  the  mind  is  one,  so  also  is  there  unity  in  its 
possessions.  Every  element  of  knowledge  is  indissolu- 
bly  connected  with  every  other,  either  immediately  or 
through  other  elements.  We  cannot  imagine  a  thought 
as  isolated.  If  it  were,  how  could  we  ever  attain, 
understand,  or  remember  it?  Every  concept  necessa- 
rily forms  part  of  the  intellectual  cosmos,  from  which 
nothing  can  be  taken  without  disturbing  the  symmetry 
of  the  whole,  while  the  addition  of  a  single  foreign 
element  would  mar  its  beauty.  Fragmentary  as  our 
attainments  seem,  they  are  really  parts  of  a  perfect 
system,  and  need  only  be  properly  developed  in  order 
that  the  mind  may  permeate  the  entire  universe  of 
thought.  We  may,  indeed,  become  so  absorbed  by  a 
single  member  of  the  intellectual  organism  as  not  to 
observe  other  members,  much  less  the  complete  system ; 
but  our  limited  view  does  not  affect  the  vital  union  of 
the  members  forming  the  organism. 

Amid  the  infinite  variety,  we  are  in  danger  of  losing 
sight  of  the  underlying  unity,  and  of  treating  as  frag- 
ments what  are  in  reality  organs.  While  admitting 
the  advantages  of  specialization,  we  have  also  seen  its 
dangers ;  and  these  admonish  us  to  consider  that,  how- 
ever extensive  the  particular  field  we  cultivate,  it  is  not 
the  world,  but  is  connected  with  all  the  other  fields 


160      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  constitute  that  world.  "  In  view  of  the  separa- 
tion affected  by  the  pursuit  of  specialties,  and  of  the 
depreciation  of  departments  foreign  to  the  specialist,  so 
often  connected  with  specialties,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  one 
of  the  most  important  of  philosophical  duties  to  cherish 
the  conviction  of  the  relationship  of  the  sciences,  and 
to  maintain  that  all  the  scientific  interests  have  an 
equal  right  to  existence."  *  If,  then,  we  distinguish 
the  various  parts  of  knowledge,  it  is  not  our  aim  to 
separate  them,  but  we  want  to  make  each  more  distinct, 
and  to  indicate  its  exact  place  in  the  system.  Divisions 
consequently  give  the  intellect  an  advantage  in  under- 
standing and  elaborating  a  subject.  They  distinguish 
and  abstract,  without  parting.  Just  as  a  definition  is 
both  an  affirmation  and  a  negation, — affirming  what 
an  object  is,  and  denying  that  it  is  something  else,  — 
so  divisions  are  both  analytic  and  synthetic,  analyzing 
a  subject,  and  forming  the  subject.  We  divide  to 
unite. 

Owing  to  the  universal  character  of  its  principles, 
philosophy  is  best  adapted  to  promote  the  conviction 
of  the  unity  of  thought,  though  with  our  limitations 
we  may  not  be  able  to  indicate  all  the  connecting  links. 
In  seeking  the  divisions  of  philosophy  we  do  not  want 
to  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  it  is,  ideally  at  least,  a 
system,  and  that  all  distinctions  have  significance  only 
because  they  are  coherent  parts  of  a  grand  unity. 

In  dividing  philosophy,  therefore,  we  do  not  dissect 
it  so  as  to  leave  only  dead  parts  of  a  dead  system,  but 
we  distinguish  the  various  members  which  form  the 
living  intellectual  organism.  Just  as  an  organ  is  com- 
plete only  when  attached  to  the  body,  so  a  division  is 
not  perfect  in  its  isolation,  but  in  its  connection  with 

*  Wundt,  Logik,  II.,  Preface. 


DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  161 

the  whole  system.  Between  the  divisions  there  are 
interfacings  and  numerous  communications.  Some  of 
the  connections  seem  to  belong  equally  to  the  divided 
parts,  and  in  their  discussion  no  division  can  claim  a 
monopoly  of  them.  With  distinctions  in  the  same 
system  rather  than  with  mathematical  separations  as 
characteristic  of  philosophical  divisions,  we  are  not 
surprised  to  find  that  the  different  parts  of  philosophy 
lead  to  each  other,  and  tend  to  coalesce  so  as  really  to 
form  that  unity  which  they  are  ideally. 

The  intimacy  of  the  relation  makes  the  distinction  of 
the  parts  the  more  difficult,  and  also  explains  the  variety 
found  in  the  division  of  philosophy.  As  in  anatomy 
we  can  take  any  part  of  a  finger,  and  consider  it  by 
itself,  or  in  relation  to  the  other  parts,  or  can  take  the 
finger,  and  consider  its  relation  to  the  hand  or  to  the 
arm  or  to  the  whole  body ;  so  in  philosophy  we  can 
make  endless  divisions,  and  for  each  some  reason  can  be 
advanced.  But  in  the  midst  of  this  variety  we  do  not 
doubt  that  some  are  superior  to  others.  Our  search  is 
not  merely  for  a  division,  but  for  the  best. 

We  have  found  that  the  ultimate  principles  are  the 
objects  of  philosophy.  In  its  system  it  must  conse- 
quently include  all  these  principles.  Until  these  have 
been  discovered,  neither  the  system  nor  the  divisions  can 
be  perfected.  So  long  as  philosophy  itself  is  an  inquiry, 
an  object  of  search,  we  may  have  to  form  our  divisions 
with  a  view  to  the  discovery  of  the  principles,  and  can- 
not make  them  as  perfect  as  when  the  system  itself  is 
completed. 

In  the  various  philosophical  systems  the  divisions 
have  been  determined  by  the  views  of  philosophy,  the 
influence  of  preceding  systems,  the  character  of  the 
age,  or  the  desire  to  give  prominence  to  particular  parts. 


162      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

With  so  many  different  grounds  for  divisions,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  there  has  been  no  uniformity. 

The  particular  object  to  which  the  first  philosophers 
devoted  attention  was  to  them  the  whole  of  philosophy. 
We  have  seen  that  their  physics  was  not  the  same  in 
character  and  aim  as  ours.  "  The  ancients  were  wholly 
ignorant  of  the  investigation  of  nature  in  our  sense, 
based  on  experience ;  we  find  them  occupied  only  with 
philosophical  speculations  respecting  the  universe  in 
general,  its  origin  and  its  primitive  substance."  *  To 
them  the  domain  of  philosophy  consisted  of  theories 
respecting  nature.  They  had  made  considerable  prog- 
ress in  metaphysical  speculations  about  the  cosmos  when 
attention  was  directed  to  the  thinking  subject,  and  the- 
ories of  knowledge  were  discussed,  and  when  dialectics 
and  ethics  were  added  to  philosophy.  Thus,  instead  of 
taking  philosophy  and  analyzing  it  in  order  to  find  its 
divisions,  the  genesis  of  philosophy  added  one  subject 
after  another,  and  these  formed  the  various  parts. 
Plato  seems  to  have  been  the  first  who  had  a  compre- 
hensive view  of  the  proper  domain  of  philosophy,  and 
Aristotle  the  first  who  attempted  completely  to  system- 
atize knowledge. 

By  one  of  his  pupils,  Plato's  philosophy  was  divided 
into  ethics,  physics,  and  dialectics.  The  last  contains 
his  most  characteristic  views,  namely,  the  doctrine  of 
the  idea.  His  ethics  includes  politics ;  his  physics, 
the  discussion  of  the  soul,  or  psychology.  The  subject 
of  aesthetics  is  not  separately  treated ;  but  discussions 
of  the  beautiful  are  found  in  different  books,  particu- 
larly in  connection  with  the  doctrine  of  ideas.  In  his 
dialectics  the  discussions  are  essentially  metaphysical 

*  Dr.  J.  Mtiller :  Grundriss  der  Physik  und  Meteorologie,  13th  ed., 
Introd. 


DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  163 

and  logical.  It  is,  however,  impossible  to  make  a  sharp 
division  of  Plato's  works  according  to  subjects.  He  is 
imaginative,  speculative,  brilliant,  and  suggestive,  rather 
than  analytical  and  systematic,  being  a  union  of  the 
poet  and  the  philosopher. 

Aristotle  was  a  logician  and  systematizer,  being  in 
this  respect  the  opposite  of  his  teacher.  But  his  efforts 
to  systematize  knowledge  had  significance  rather  for 
certain  disciplines  than  for  philosophy  as  a  whole.  For 
the  present  stage  of  development,  his  division  of  philos- 
ophy into  theoretical,  constructive,  and  practical,  is  of 
no  special  importance.  The  first  includes  physics,  math- 
ematics, and  metaphysics;  the  second  discusses  the 
laws  of  art;  the  third  treats  of  ethics  and  politics. 
Logic  was  regarded  as  introductory  to  the  study  of 
philosophy.* 

The  division  into  theoretical  and  practical  philosophy, 
prevalent  since  Aristotle,  is  not  based  on  inherent  dis- 
tinctions. Besides,  this  division  is  misleading.  All 
philosophy  is  theoretical;  even  in  ethics  it  gives  the 
theory  or  principles  of  conduct,  and  in  aesthetics  the 
theory  of  art.  That  division  also  encourages  the  false 
notion,  already  prevalent,  that  the  theoretical  is  not 
practical,  whereas  it  may  be  intensely  practical  and  the 

*  The  condition  of  Aristotle's  works  is  such  that  it  is  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  determine  the  exact  nature  of  his  division.  The  perplex- 
ity is  partly  owing  to  the  fact  that  he  seems  to  have  had  no  fixed 
principle  of  division,  and  in  different  works  he  proposes  different  ones. 
In  the  Topics  he  speaks  of  philosophical  problems  as  ethical,  physical, 
and  logical ;  while  in  the  Metaphysics  he  divides  as  indicated  above. 
He  does  not,  however,  always  regard  philosophy  as  the  genus  under 
which  the  various  philosophical  disciplines  come  as  species.  Frequently 
the  view  is  found  in  his  works,  that  there  are  different  philosophies. 
This  is  implied  when  he  speaks  of  metaphysics  as  the  "  First  Philoso- 
phy," and  when  in  his  Ethics  he  speaks  of  another  or  a  different  phi- 
losophy. Zeller  divides  Aristotle's  works  into  those  devoted  to  logical, 
metaphysical,  physical,  ethical,  and  aesthetic  inquiries. 


164      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

basis  of  all  conduct.  It  is  a  thoughtless  popular  preju- 
dice, that  the  superficial  and  immediately  apparent  is 
practical,  while  the  deep  and  thorough  is  not,  —  a  view 
which  philosophy  is  to  combat,  not  to  promote. 

There  has  been  much  philosophizing  which  was  not 
completed  by  forming  a  system.  Among  the  Greeks 
this  was  true  particularly  of  Socrates ;  among  the  mod- 
erns, of  Leibnitz.  Their  thoughts  were,  however,  full 
of  inspiration,  gave  impulses  and  germs  for  future  sys- 
tems, and  became  influential  in  giving  direction  to  the 
course  of  philosophic  thinking.  As  Aristotle  systema- 
tized knowledge  in  the  Socratic  school,  so  Wolff  in  that 
of  Leibnitz.  Even  Kant  left  no  complete  system; 
nevertheless,  his  works  have  been  the  inspiration  of  the 
entire  process  of  philosophical  development  in  Germany 
for  a  whole  century,  and  have  deeply  affected  thinking 
in  other  countries.  In  point  of  comprehensiveness  and 
grandeur  of  aim,  the  system  of  Hegel,  developed  out 
of  Schelling's  system  of  identity,  must  be  placed  in  the 
first  rank.  With  an  introduction  (Phaenomenologie  des 
Greistes)  intended  to  prepare  the  mind  for  the  highest 
speculation,  the  system  itself,  consisting  of  logic  and 
metaphysics  (not  two,  but  one  subject),  natural  philoso- 
phy, and  the  philosophy  of  the  spirit,  aims  at  nothing 
less  than  the  unfolding  of  absolute  knowledge.  The 
dispute  as  to  the  merits  of  this  system  and  its  division 
is  not  ended.  It  is  not  surprising  that  in  this  vast 
repository  of  profound  thought  there  should  be  much 
to  inspire  the  highest  admiration,  and  also  much  to 
meet  decided  opposition  from  those  occupying  a  differ- 
ent stand-point.  That  the  system  and  its  divisions  are 
not  final,  is  generally  admitted  in  Germany  even  by 
those  who  are  warm  admirers  of  Hegel.  The  author 
himself  at  different  times  made  different  divisions. 


DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  165 

The  various  divisions  of  philosophy  thus  far  preva- 
lent no  more  determine  the  true  division,  than  the  vari- 
ous systems  determine  the  definition  of  philosophy. 
Not  all  philosophers  have  aimed  at  a  logical  division 
of  the  whole  subject.  When  we  consider  the  limits  of 
knowledge,  and  the  tendency  to  make  some  specialty 
supreme  and  absorb  the  attention,  we  cannot  be  sur- 
prised if  but  few  philosophers  are  able  to  treat  the  whole 
of  philosophy  systematically  and  with  equal  ability.  In 
the  entire  course  of  philosophic  thought,  men  like  Kant 
and  Hegel  have  not  been  numerous ;  and  in  our  day, 
partly  owing  to  their  labors,  the  demands  made  on 
philosophy  are  greater  than  in  their  time. 

At  present  there  are  writers  who  include  but  one 
subject  in  philosophy,  as  metaphysics,  psychology,  or 
the  theory  of  knowledge.  There  are  others  who  are 
more  true  to  the  history  of  philosophy,  and  yet  either 
fail  to  exhaust  the  subject,  or  else  include  too  much. 
No  one  questions  the  right  of  philosophizing  without 
regard  to  definite  system,  or  the  right  of  taking  any 
one  department  and  treating  it  separately,  without 
regard  to  the  rest;  indeed,  the  latter  course  is  often 
valuable  for  the  sake  of  giving  due  prominence  to  a 
neglected  subject.  But  such  procedure  does  not  help 
us  to  a  proper  division. 

In  the  history  of  philosophy,  the  systems  may  be 
treated  chronologically,  without  regard  to  their  inher- 
ent connections ;  in  that  case,  the  various  methods  of 
division  are  considered  as  they  arose  or  appear  in  the 
systems.  But  even  where  the  aim  is  to  give  the  divis- 
ion inherent  in  the  subject,  independent  of  the  histor- 
ical ojigin  and  development,  a  variety  of  divisions  is 
possible,  just  as  in  natural  science,  owing  to  the  dif- 
ferent stand-points  from  which  the  subject  is  viewed. 


166      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

A  mere  grouping  or  classification  of  subjects  according 
to  external  or  superficial  marks  indicates  that  philoso^ 
phy  itself  has  not  been  penetrated.  For  the  distinction 
of  parts  there  must  be  an  inner  reason ;  if  we  connect 
them  intimately,  there  must  be  inherent  oneness,  or 
organic  union.  The  divisions  must  exhaust  the  sub- 
ject, but  must  include  no  more  than  it  does.  The  prin- 
ciple of  division  must  be  the  same  for  all  parts.  Each 
part  must  be  unique,  and  none  embrace  the  same  class 
of  objects  as  another. 

If  the  absolute  beginning  of  philosophy  could  be 
found,  and  the  genesis  of  its  development,  we  might 
discover  the  divisions  by  following  the  process  of  the 
unfolding.  Hegel  claimed  to  have  found  this  begin- 
ning in  the  abstract  concept  of  being,  and  the  process  of 
both  thought  and  being  in  the  dialectic  method.  But 
neither  the  beginning  nor  the  method  has  been  estab- 
lished as  final.  Some  philosophers  claim  that  a  concept 
or  idea  must  be  the  start  of  philosophy,  but  there  is 
no  agreement  as  to  which  the  seed-thought  is.  Others 
hold  that  some  fact  of  consciousness,  something  given 
as  certain,  must  be  the  beginning ;  but  there  is  no  con- 
sensus respecting  the  experience  which  deserves  the 
preference.  Other  philosophers  deny  that  there  is  any 
absolute  beginning  for  philosophy.  Certain  it  is  that 
none  has  been  established.  The  beginner  is  not  in  a 
condition  to  discover  or  intelligently  adopt  one,  and  it 
would  defeat  the  very  aim  of  philosophical  instruction 
to  take  such  an  absolute  starting-point  for  granted,  and 
then  let  it  determine  his  divisions  and  entire  course  in 
philosophy. 

Reluctantly,  but  necessarily,  we  abandon  the  hope  of 
giving  the  student  the  ideal  principle  which  lies  behind 
all  others,  and  is  their  source,  and  which  need  but  be 


DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  167 

analyzed  to  give  the  divisions,  and  developed  to  give 
the  absolute  system  of  philosophy.  If  we  imagine  that 
we  have  found  what  is  still  an  object  of  search,  we  may 
fail  both  to  seek  and  to  discover  the  desired  object,  and, 
what  is  worse,  we  shall  envelope  ourselves  in  an  illu- 
sion. Under  the  circumstances,  we  can  only  take  the 
definition,  and  let  that  determine  the  division,  the  aim 
being  to  discover  by  synthesis,  rather  than  analysis,  the 
component  parts. 

We  therefore  ask,  What  must  those  principles  be 
which  give  the  ultimate  explanations?  This  question 
can  only  be  answered  by  finding  the  different  classes  of 
objects  whose  principles  are  sought.  An  examination 
of  consciousness  is  thus  required  in  order  to  discover  the 
various  groups,  including  all  possible  objects  of  contem- 
plation. The  first  class,  which  strikes  us  on  account  of 
its  prominence,  is  that  included  under  the  notion  of  the 
real,  that  which  exists.  This  leads  to  an  inquiry  into 
being  itself.  What  is  meant  by  being  ?  What  can  we 
learn  of  its  nature,  origin,  and  design  ?  The  inquiry 
into  being  in  general  leads  to  questions  of  concrete 
being,  the  nature  of  various  objects,  their  relations  and 
activities.  By  pursuing  this  thought,  we  should  em- 
brace in  our  investigation  all  real  objects  of  knowledge. 
We,  however,  exclude  from  philosophy  all  that  pertains 
to  experiment,  and  is  empirical;  this  leaves  for  our 
department  all  purely  rational  questions  respecting 
being. 

We,  of  course,  do  not  contemplate  being  as  abstracted 
from  thought,  but  as  the  object  of  our  thought.  This 
at  once  puts  us  or  our  own  being  in  relation  to  other 
being ;  and,  aside  from  the  inquiry  into  abstract  being, 
we  inquire,  What  relation  do  we  sustain  to  other 
beings  ? 


168      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  first  question,  What  exists  ?  is  thus  supplemented 
by  another,  What  is  my  relation  to  existence?  But 
why  make  our  relation  to  being  specially  prominent? 
Why  not  consider  our  own  relations  and  activities 
under  the  general  head  of  being  ?  Simply  because  we, 
as  inquirers  into  being,  have  a  special  interest  in  our 
own  relation  to  other  objects,  and  therefore  we  make 
it  a  point  of  special  investigation.  The  two  points  of 
our  philosophy  are  therefore  included  under  the  ques- 
tions of  being  and  of  our  peculiar  relation  to  objects. 

Our  conscious  relation  to  reality  cannot  well  be  con- 
sidered as  a  whole,  because  this  relation  itself  is  of  a 
threefold  character,  depending  on  our  intellectual,  emo- 
tional, and  volitional  activities.  This  gives  us,  besides 
the  principles  of  being,  those  of  thought,  feeling,  and 
volition,  as  the  divisions  of  philosophy. 

But  the  same  result  will  be  obtained  by  taking  from 
consciousness  the  four  groups  which  form  all  the  sub- 
jects of  rational  inquiry ;  namely,  we  find  in  conscious- 
ness the  concepts  of  being,  of  thought,  of  feeling,  and 
of  volition.  Nothing  can  be  conceived  which  is  not 
somehow  included  under  these  heads,  or  under  a  com- 
bination of  them. 

The  principles  of  being  belong  to  metaphysics.  Our 
intellectual  relations  involve  the  question  of  cognitions, 
and  are  included  under  the  theory  of  knowledge.  The 
subject  most  fully  developed  under  this  head  is  logic. 
Our  emotional  relations  involve  the  general  subject  of 
the  feelings,  and  are  included  under  the  theory  of  the 
feelings.  This  department  has  received  less  philosophi- 
cal attention  than  the  other  elements  of  our  psychic 
nature,  and  is  consequently  less  fully  developed.  The 
emotions  connected  with  the  beautiful  have  received 
most  attention  under  the  head  of  aesthetics.  Our  voli- 


DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  169 

tional  relations  involve  the  inquiry  respecting  what 
ought  to  be  done,  or  the  theory  of  conduct.  This  is 
the  department  of  ethics  or  morality.  Leaving  room 
for  the  development  of  subjects  under  the  third  and 
fourth  heads,  —  now  still  incomplete,  —  we  have  the 
following  division  of  philosophy  :  — 

1.  Metaphysics. 

2.  Theory  of  knowledge. 

3.  ^Esthetics. 

4.  Ethics. 

More  important  than  the  question,  how  we  get  this 
division,  is  this:  Is  the  division  justifiable?  This  in- 
volves two  others :  Does  it  include  all  the  ultimate 
principles  ?  Can  it  be  still  further  reduced  ? 

Philosophy  deals  with  the  real,  not  with  the  vision- 
ary or  imaginary.  Now,  as  intimated,  besides  being, 
thought,  feeling,  and  action,  we  cannot  think  of  any 
other  objects  of  inquiry.  To  beings  with  different  or 
more  powers  than  ours,  there  might  be  other  subjects 
for  investigation,  just  as  the  man  with  sight  has  a 
sphere  of  inquiry  which  the  blind  cannot  enter.  But 
we  can  form  no  conception  of  beings  with  powers 
totally  different  from  ours,  and  therefore  cannot  con- 
sider relations  peculiar  to  them.  Rationally  we  can 
inquire  only  into  what  is,  including  relation  and  activ- 
ity ;  and  then,  for  the  reason  indicated,  we  can  consider 
specially  our  activity  and  relation  as  thinking,  feeling, 
and  willing.  The  division,  consequently,  includes  all 
principles  which  can  be  subjects  of  inquiry  for  us. 

The  question,  Can  the  division  be  still  further  re- 
duced? must  be  answered  in  the  negative.  Nothing 
would  be  gained  by  saying  that  philosophy  is  divided 
into  being  and  our  relation  to  being,  since  the  latter 
is  divided  as  indicated. 


170     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  not  intended  to  substitute,  for  the  old  division 
of  the  mind  into  numerous  faculties,  the  three  powers 
of  the  understanding,  the  heart,  and  the  will.  That 
the  mind  has  modes  of  action  which  can  be  distin- 
guished in  thought,  however  they  may  be  united  in 
their  source,  is  evident.  There  are  serious  objections 
to  the  division  into  separate  faculties,  lying  side  by 
side  without  organic  union;  and  it  is  no  explanation 
of  mental  operations,  to  postulate  certain  faculties,  en- 
dowed with  certain  powers,  and  then  to  regard  all  the 
activities  as  but  the  product  or  working  of  these  facul- 
ties. In  this  way  the  very  thing  to  be  explained  is 
taken  for  granted ;  besides,  the  unity  of  mind,  the 
mental  organism,  is  destroyed.*  In  its  varied  activities 
it  is  the  mind  itself  that  is  seen.  Nevertheless  we 
cannot  resolve  thought,  feeling,  and  volition  into  a 
primary  activity  from  which  the  other  two  are  devel- 
oped, or  of  which  all  three  are  but  manifestations  or 
branches.  Repeated  efforts  have  been  made  to  find 
the  seed  from  which  all  our  mental  activities  grow ; 
but  they  have  not  proved  successful.  Is  feeling  the 
original  psychic  state  ?  Or  is  there  something  distinct 
from  feeling,  thought,  and  volition,  containing  them  in 
embryo  ?  We  do  not  know  what  this  something  is ; 
to  call  it  the  soul  itself,  throws  no  new  light  on  the 
subject.  We  cannot  tell  how  these  three  activities 
proceed  from  the  soul.  They  are  in  operation  long 

*  Herbart  and  Beneke  rejected  the  usual  division  of  the  mind  into 
faculties  as  innate  distinctions.  Such  an  analysis  had  a  show  of  knowl- 
edge, but  it  was  verbal  rather  than  real.  In  all  its  activities  the  same 
mind  is  seen,  but  in  different  lights;  and  if  the  faculties  are  regarded 
as  indicative  only  of  these  various  activities,  they  may  promote  a  clearer 
apprehension  of  the  mental  operations  without  destroying  the  under- 
lying unity.  We  do  not  view  the  faculties  as  distinct  from  the  soul,  but 
as  modes  of  the  soul's  activities,  through  which  the  character  of  the  soul 
reveals  itself. 


DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  171 

before  we  reflect  on  them,  and  we  cannot  get  behind 
these  conscious  activities  to  their  unconscious  origin. 
Many  hold  that  feeling  comes  first;  and  there  seems 
to  be  ground  for  letting  it  precede  thought  and  volition. 
But  by  taking  any  activity  as  primary,  we  cannot  show 
how  the  others  grow  out  of  it,  or  just  how  feeling  and 
thought  develop  into  or  produce  volition.  In  all  psychic 
states,  however  much  the  one  or  the  other  may  predom- 
inate, we  cannot  absolutely  separate  feeling,  thought, 
and  volition,  any  more  than  we  can  make  one  the  germ 
of  the  other.  Their  exact  relation  is,  therefore,  still 
an  unsolved  problem.  All  we  can  say  is,  that  they  are 
products  of  the  same  mind,  and  are  so  related  that  they 
affect  one  another.  We,  however,  separate  them  ideally 
and  consider  each  by  itself.  The  question  of  their 
relation  really  belongs  to  psychology.  Psychology  also 
furnishes  our  division  of  philosophy,  since  it  is  an  analy- 
sis of  consciousness  which  gives  the  objects  of  rational 
inquiry. 

Philosophy  is  rational  knowledge,  namely  of  princi- 
ples ;  or  it  is  principiant  knowledge.  On  first  view  it 
may  therefore  seem  as  if  the  theory  of  knowledge, 
instead  of  being  a  part  of  philosophy  merely,  is  the 
whole  of  it.  This  view  has  a  number  of  advocates,  and 
is  promoted  by  the  prominence  given  to  the  theory  of 
knowledge  or  epistemology.  This  is,  however,  an  error 
based  on  a  lack  of  proper  distinctions,  and  would  more 
likely  be  avoided  if  for  "  theory  of  knowledge "  we 
substituted  "theory  of  knowing."  All  principles  are 
elements  of  knowledge,  but  they  are  not  all  principles 
explanatory  of  knowledge.  We  mean  by  these  princi- 
ples only  such  as  are  concerned  with  knowledge  purely 
as  knowledge,  giving  the  interpretation  of  the  knowing, 
and  not  of  any  particular  kind  of  knowledge.  As  in 


172      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

psychology  the  soul's  activities  are  considered,  not  their 
products  as  distinguished  or  abstracted  from  the  soul 
itself  (as  the  object  from  the  subject),  so  in  our  search 
for  the  principles  of  knowledge  we  abstract  the  content 
of  thought,  and  contemplate  knowledge  as  knowledge, 
not  as  this  or  that  kind  of  knowledge.  As  after  discuss- 
ing psychology  we  still  find  certain  contents  of  the  soul 
to  consider,  namely  the  notion  of  being,  of  thought,  of 
feeling,  and  of  volition,  as  well  as  other  departments 
of  knowledge,  so  after  the  theory  of  knowledge  (know- 
ing) or  the  principles  of  thinking,  we  still  have  the 
content  of  knowledge  to  consider ;  namely,  the  princi- 
ples of  being,  feeling,  and  willing. 

That  a  certain  primacy  thus  belongs  to  the  theory  of 
knowledge,  is  evident,  and  it  deserves  great  prominence. 
But  even  from  this  point  of  view  we  shall  have  the 
same  divisions,  though  not  in  the  same  order.  Philoso- 
phy deals  purely  with  rational  knowledge  (genus)  ; 
and  in  rational  knowledge  it  seeks  the  principles  (spe- 
cies, distinguishing  it  from  other  rational  pursuits). 
As  rational  knowledge  of  principles,  philosophy  must 
explain  knowledge  itself,  which  gives  the  theory  of 
knowing  or  of  knowledge.  This  is  fundamental  for  all 
intellectual  operations.  Having  found  the  principles 
of  knowledge,  we  can  view  all  other  rational  inquiries 
as  merely  an  application  of  these  principles.  But  why 
are  these  principles  applied  in  philosophy?  For  the 
purpose  of  finding  the  principles  of  being,  feeling,  and 
acting. 

I  cannot  see  how  complete  principiant  knowledge  can 
omit  any  of  these,  or  can  include  more.  They  exhaust 
our  inquiries  into  ultimate  principles,  and  each  division 
has  a  clearly  marked  field  of  its  own.  Other  divisions 
extant  presuppose  a  different  idea  of  philosophy,  or  do 


DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  173 

not  exhaust  the  subject,  or  make  subdivisions  primary. 
Our  division  intentionally  omits  the  application  of  phi- 
losophy to  other  objects,  as  law,  language,  religion,  etc., 
—  applications  which  are  endless,  and  do  not  belong  to 
philosophy  proper.  Under  the  four  divisions  all  appli- 
cations of  philosophy  may  be  classified,  each  being 
placed  under  one  or  more  of  them.  Thus  there  is  no 
inquiry  which  does  not  involve  an  application  of  the 
principles  of  knowledge.  Law,  politics,  and  sociology 
are  largely  ethical,  and  may  be  viewed  as  coming  under 
social  ethics,  or  as  an  application  of  ethical  principles 
to  society. 

The  theory  of  knowledge,  and  metaphysics,  deserve 
especial  attention  in  an  introductory  work  ;  the  former 
on  account  of  its  fundamental  character,  the  latter 
because  its  inherent  difficulties  are  so  great.  But  aes- 
thetics and  ethics  are  also  worthy  of  careful  considera- 
tion. Their  spheres  are  more  easily  comprehended  than 
those  of  the  other  two  subjects,  and  their  discussion 
lies  more  within  the  range  of  ordinary  thinking ;  their 
ultimate  principles  are,  however,  beset  with  difficulties. 

For  the  reasons  given,  the  different  departments  of 
philosophy  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  order :  — 

First,   The  Theory  of  Knowledge  (Noetics).* 

Second,  Metaphysics. 

Third,  ^Esthetics. 

Fourth,  Uthics. 

*  In  Germany  this  theory  is  called  Erkenntnisslehre,  Erkenntniss- 
theorie,  Wissenslehre,  Wissenstheorie,  and  sometimes  Noetik.  The  word 
"  epistemology  "  has  gained  limited  currency  in  English  for  the  same 
subject.  Since,  however,  we  already  use  "  noetic  "  as  an  adjective,  the 
same  word  or  "noetics,"  analogous  to  "metaphysics,"  ' ' aesthetics," 
and  "  ethics,"  might  be  used  to  designate  the  theory  of  knowledge. 


174     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EEFLECTIONS. 

Why  divide  Knowledge  if  it  is  a  unit?  Principles 
determining  the  Division.  Can  the  analysis  of  any  one 
principle  give  the  Divisions  of  Philosophy  ?  The  Divis- 
ion. The  reason  for  this  Division.  Does  it  exhaust 
the  subject?  Criticism  of  other  Divisions.  Why  not 
consider  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  and  Naturphiloso- 
phie  as  also  separate  Divisions  ?  Does  Philosophy  be- 
come psychological  by  going  to  consciousness  for  its 
objects  ?  Where  can  Philosophy  find  its  objects  if  not 
in  consciousness?  Difference  between  an  empirical  ob- 
ject, and  an  object  of  consciousness.  How  does  an 
empirical  become  a  rational  object?  Reason  for  dis- 
cussing the  Theory  of  Knowledge  first. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  175 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  (NOETICS). 

THE  infinite  variety  of  being,  thought,  feeling,  and 
volition,  comprehended  in  philosophical  contemplation, 
forms  a  unit  in  that  all  is  considered  only  so  far  as 
rational,  and  as  leading  to  or  included  in  the  ultimate 
principles.  The  intellectual  threads,  on  which  every 
thing  is  strung  in  philosophy,  are  rational  and  princi- 
piant,  and  objects  are  philosophically  significant  in  pro- 
portion as  related  to  these  threads.  The  philosophic 
element,  in  the  multiplicity  of  concepts,  forms  the  bond 
of  unity;  and  that  element  is  the  object  of  search  in 
the  effort  to  pass  from  the  desire  for  wisdom  to  wisdom 
itself.  In  philosophy,  therefore,  we  do  not  seek  knowl- 
edge in  general,  but  the  knowing  element  in  all  that  is 
known.  The  aim  to  attain  full  and  the  highest  intel- 
lectual consciousness  leads  philosophy  beyond  the  con- 
sideration of  a  knowledge  of  particular  things,  to  the 
consideration  of  knowledge  itself,  making  that  the 
object  of  rational  and  principiant  inquiry. 

The  problem  of  knowing,  or  of  knowledge,  is  funda- 
mental. The  mind  which  recognizes  the  responsibility 
of  giving  to  itself  a  full  account  of  itself,  knows  that  it 
must  consider  the  nature  and  conditions  of  knowledge, 
before  it  can  rationally  discuss  the  various  objects  of 
knowledge.  ^An  object  of  knowledge  is  meaningless, 
unless  the  knowledge,  of  which  it  is  the  object,  is  under-  \ 


176      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

stood.  Our  cognitions  are  a  purely  intellectual  rela- 
tion between  the  subject  and  the  object ;  and  this 
relation,  being  the  fundamental  conception  of  knowl- 
edge, is  the  light  in  which  all  objects  known  must  be 
beheld.  Not  the  soul  (psychology),  not  the  objects 
to  which  it  is  related  (reality,  beauty,  morality),  form 
the  subject-matter  of  the  theory  of  knowledge.  This 
subject-matter  is  nothing  else  than  the  correct  thought- 
relation  between  the  knower  and  the  known,  neither  of 
which  is  considered  alone,  nor  even  at  all,  except  so 
far  as  they  are  necessary  to  bring  out  the  idea  of  all 
pure  knowledge.  The  principles  involved  are  those 
which  pertain  to  knowing  as  knowing ;  therefore  they 
are  general,  and  apply  equally  to  all  departments  of 
thought.  The  question,  What  must  a  mental  product 
be  in  order  to  be  knowledge  ?  excludes  from  a  content 
of  consciousness  every  thing  that  is  peculiar,  except 
what  constitutes  the  peculiarity  of  all  knowledge.  Be- 
tween the  knower  and  the  known  we  want  to  discover 
the  knowing.  For  all  intellections,  the  problem  is  con- 
sequently fundamental;  and  if  we  regard  psychology 
as  the  preface  to  philosophy,  the  theory  of  knowledge 
is  its  introductory  chapter. 

In  the  haste  to  acquire  objects  of  knowledge,  this 
introductory  chapter  is  frequently  skipped.  More  intent 
on  possessing  than  on  giving  an  account  to  itself  of  the 
character  of  its  possessions,  and  the  processes  involved 
in  their  acquisition,  the  mind  overlooks  the  deepest 
problems  of  the  nature  and  criteria  of  knowledge. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  strange  that  the 
intellect  fails  to  get  the  full  mastery  of  itself  and  its 
acquirements ;  and  with  all  its  boasted  wealth,  it  does 
not  so  much  possess  as  it  is  possessed. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  177 


THE   NEED   OP   SUCH   A   THEORY. 

This  theory  becomes  a  mental  necessity  so  soon  as 
the  mind  reflects  on  itself,  and  demands  proof  of  the 
validity  of  its  processes,  and  of  the  reliability  of  their 
results.  Whenever  we  rise  from  the  psychological  view 
to  the  critical  inquiry  into  what  must  be  in  order  that 
our  intellectual  attainments  may  be  true,  we  enter  the 
sphere  of  philosophy,  and  begin  to  construct  a  theory  of 
knowledge.  The  reason  in  the  mind  insists  on  rational 
standards,  and  requires  thought  to  justify  itself.  The 
philosophic  spirit  cannot  rest  in  consciousness  or  even 
self-consciousness,  but  only  in  truth-consciousness. 

Under  the  objects  of  knowledge  lies  the  question, 
What  is  knowledge  ?  The  answer  to  this  gives  rise  to 
other  questions :  Is  knowledge  possible  ?  If  so,  under 
what  conditions?  To  what  extent?  How  can  it  be 
tested?  Only  those  who  have  taken  the  answers  for 
granted  can  fail  to  see  the  difficulties  and  fundamental 
character  of  these  problems.  None  but  the  thoughtless, 
who  have  never  made  clear  to  themselves  the  meaning 
and  foundation  of  knowing,  will  regard  an  inquiry  into 
the  possibility  of  knowledge  useless.  This  possibility 
has  repeatedly  been  denied,  and  all  supposed  knowl- 
edge has  been  pronounced  mere  opinion.  This  scepti- 
ticism  was  by  no  means  confined  to  the  ancient  Greeks. 
In  modern  times  it  has  been  quite  common,  particularly 
in  certain  departments  of  thought.  This  is  evident 
from  the  philosophies  of  Hume,  Kant,  and  Comte,  and 
also  from  agnosticism.  This  scepticism  is  not  confined 
to  theology  and  philosophy,  but  extends  also  to  science. 
Ferrari,  an  Italian  philosopher  who  died  in  1877,  even 
denied  the  possibility  of  science,  holding  that  "  Logic 
and  Nature  are  contradictory  in  themselves  and  be- 


178     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

tween  themselves,  and  thought,  which  would  dominate 
facts  by  applying  itself  to  their  real  elements,  is  of 
necessity  involved  in  error."  *  Even  Descartes'  Cogito 
ergo  sum  is  not  final;  and  that  eminent  thinker  was 
unable  to  find  any  other  proof  that  our  minds  do  not 
deceive  us  when  they  present  clear  and  distinct  concep- 
tions, than  the  fact  that  God  is  truthful,  and  conse- 
quently will  not  permit  our  minds  to  deceive  us.  But 
we  reason  in  a  circle  if  the  proof  of  God's  existence 
depends  on  our  reason,  and  then  the  validity  of  reason 
is  made  to  depend  on  the  existence  of  God.  Our  age 
has  not  merely  inherited  the  scepticism  of  previous 
ages,  but  it  has  also  overturned  the  dogmatism  of  the 
past,  has  undermined  arguments  formerly  supposed  to 
be  irrefutable,  and  has  thus  deepened  and  broadened 
doubt  and  suspicion. 

Whoever  understands  the  deeper  undercurrents  of 
the  age  must  appreciate  the  need  of  subjecting  the 
problems  involved  in  cognition  to  the  most  thorough 
examination ;  and  even  a  superficial  view  shows  the 
importance  of  critically  determining  the  grounds  of 
certainty.  These  grounds  will  be  valued  in  proportion 
to  the  love  of  truth.  The  honest  doubter,  and  the 
anxious  searcher  for  an  immovable  basis  of  knowledge, 
know  the  difficulty  of  attaining  certainty  respecting 
many  of  the  most  important  subjects.  On  the  same 
points,  conflicting  views  prevail  among  those  who  have 
equal  facilities  for  understanding  them.f  Marked  dif- 

*  Mind,  1878.    Barzellotti  on  Philosophy  in  Italy. 

t  Every  discussion  makes  the  need  of  reliable  grounds  of  certainty 
evident.  The  origin  of  Locke's  celebrated  work  is  an  instructive  ex- 
ample. In  "  The  Epistle  to  the  Reader  "  he  says,  "  Were  it  fit  to  trouble 
thee  with  the  history  of  this  essay,  I  should  tell  thee  that  five  or  six 
friends,  meeting  at  my  chamber,  and  discoursing  on  a  subject  very 
remote  from  this,  found  themselves  quickly  at  a  stand  by  the  difficul- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  179 

ferences  prevail  respecting  the  inferences  to  be  drawn 
from  the  same  scientific  experiments  ;  and  with  all  their 
exactness  and  thoroughness,  scientists  are  by  no  means 
agreed  respecting  the  principles  and  results  of  science. 
One  need  but  hear  witnesses  of  the  same  occurrence 
testify  under  oath,  to  learn  how  hard  it  is  to  determine 
simple  questions  of  fact;  and  even  when  the  facts  are 
admitted,  different  and  perhaps  opposite  inferences  are 
drawn  from  them.  When  we  pass  from  facts  to  com- 
plicated systems  of  thought,  the  difficulties  are  multi- 
plied. In  religion  the  conflicting  views  are  innumerable, 
and  all  must  have  some  basis,  valid  or  invalid.  One 
will  affirm  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  as  stoutly  as 
another  denies  it ;  and  an  Athanasius  may  be  as  ready 
as  Servetus  to  die  for  what  he  regards  as  certain.  In 
philosophy  the  theories  respecting  the  first  principles 
vary  greatly,  and  thus  the  foundation  is  laid  for  diver- 
gences throughout  the  entire  domain  of  thought.  The 
theory  of  knowledge  teems  with  unsolved  problems  per- 
taining to  the  nature,  the  origin,  the  conditions,  the 
limits,  the  relations,  and  the  value  of  knowledge. 

So  important  has  this  theory  become,  that  it  threat- 
ens, for  the  present,  to  absorb  all  philosophical  inquiry. 
Since  it  involves  the  questions  on  which  all  knowledge 
depends,  their  fundamental  character  requires  that  they 
be  settled  before  others  pertaining  to  cognition  can  be 
determined.  In  America,  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Italy,  the  conflicts  between  empiricism  and  rationalism, 

ties  that  rose  on  every  side.  After  we  had  a  while  puzzled  ourselves, 
without  coming  any  nearer  a  resolution  of  those  doubts  which  per- 
plexed us,  it  came  into  my  thoughts  that  we  took  a  wrong  course;  and 
that,  before  we  set  ourselves  upon  inquiries  of  that  nature,  it  was 
necessary  to  examine  our  own  abilities,  and  see  what  objects  our  under- 
standings were  or  were  not  fitted  to  deal  with."  The  attempt  to  solve 
this  problem  resulted  in  the  Essay  on  Human  Understanding. 


180      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

materialism  and  idealism,  theism  and  atheism,  make  the 
significance  of  the  theory  evident.  In  Germany,  philo- 
sophical journals  and  books  are  full  of  the  subject,  and 
the  best  thinkers  devote  their  best  efforts  to  the  solution 
of  the  problems  involved.* 

THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  AND  LOGIC. 

One  of  the  principal  difficulties  in  noetics  consists 
in  determining  the  place  of  logic.  The  old  lifeless 
skeletons  which  formerly  constituted  this  discipline  do 
not  meet  present  demands ;  and  the  numerous  recent 
works  on  logic  in  America,  England,  and  Germany, 
seek  to  give  the  study  more  life  and  greater  practical 
value.  But  unanimity  respecting  the  nature,  sphere, 
and  method  of  logic  has  not  yet  been  attained.  Some 
hold  with  Kant  that  the  laws  of  thought  are  its  sub- 
ject-matter ;  others  make  it  a  discussion  of  the  princi- 
ples of  induction,  so  that  it  becomes  more  directly  the 
propaedeutic  of  the  sciences ;  and  others  want  it  to 
include  the  whole  theory  of  knowledge.  This  is  the 
case  with  Ueberweg,  who  defines  it  as  "  the  science 
of  the  normative  laws  of  human  knowledge."  His 
"  Logic  "  discusses  perception,  space,  and  time,  and  the 
relation  of  perception  to  reality,  as  well  as  the  usual 
topics  of  formal  logic.  Ulrici  opposed  Ueberweg's 
method,  and  advocated  logic  as  the  basis  of  the  theory 
of  knowledge,  giving  the  norms  of  thought,  while  the 
theory  determines  the  nature  and  possibility  of  knowl- 
edge. Sigwart  regards  logic  as  the  doctrine  of  the  art 

*  "  Speculative  philosophy  has  in  modern  times  changed  in  charac- 
ter from  a  theory  of  being  into  a  theory  of  knowing."  Mind,  1883,  21, 
by  the  editor.  "  The  theory  of  knowledge,  besides  being  separately 
treated,  is  included  in  all  the  newest  expositions  of  logic,  dominated 
as  these  no  longer  are  by  the  old  forrnalistic  conceptions."  —  WUKDT, 
Philosophy  in  Germany.  Mind,  1877. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


181 


of  thinking,  its  aim  being  to  establish  reliable  and 
general  rules  for  thought.  Instead  of  including  the 
entire  theory  of  knowledge,  he  wants  logic  to  deter- 
mine the  correct  method  of  thinking  (methodology). 
Among  the  most  important  of  recent  German  works  is 
that  of  Wundt,  whose  title  indicates  its  aim :  "  Logic  : 
An  Inquiry  into  the  Principles  of  Knowledge  and  of  the 
Methods  of  Scientific  Investigation."  The  first  large 
volume  is  devoted  to  the  theory  of  knowledge,  the 
second  to  the  method  of  the  sciences.  Of  the  great 
mass  of  learned  material,  comparatively  a  small  propor- 
tion belongs  to  what  was  formerly  discussed  in  works 
on  logic.  These  are  but  a  few  samples  of  the  variety 
of  opinions  on  the  subject. 

Logic,  as  giving  the  forms  of  correct  thinking,  can  no 
longer  be  isolated,  but  must  be  brought  into  organic 
union  with  the  other  elements  of  knowing.  This,  how- 
ever, does  not  require  that  it  include  the  whole  process 
of  obtaining  knowledge,  perception  for  instance,  or  that 
it  consider  the  material  as  well  as  the  forms  of  thought. 
The  norms  of  thinking  are  sufficiently  important  for 
separate  treatment,  and  they  constitute  the  peculiar 
province  of  logic.  Logic  is  thus  part  of  the  theory  of 
knowledge,  and  properly  comes  under  the  head  of  ori- 
gin of  knowledge,  namely  so  far  as  that  origin  depends 
on  correct  thinking.  This  place  secures  its  immediate 
connection  with  all  the  members  in  the  organism  of 
knowledge.  That  it  cannot  exhaust  the  whole  subject 
of  knowing,  is  evident,  though  it  performs  a  most  im- 
portant part.  Thinking  is  a  method  of  knowing;  in 
order  that  the  method  may  result  in  truth,  it  requires 
the  right  beginning  or  a  proper  object.  But  if  logic  is 
to  begin  with  sensation,  and  to  determine  the  correct- 
ness of  perception  and  the  right  apprehension  of  its 


182     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

object, — in  other  words,  if  all  that  precedes  the  act 
of  thinking  is  also  to  be  considered,  —  then  logic  must 
include  a  large  domain  of  psychology.  By  making  logic 
the  synonyme  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  it  must  also 
determine  the  relation  of  thought  to  reality.21  The 
form  of  thought  must  have  some  kind  of  content ;  how 
is  that  obtained  ?  What  is  its  validity  when  obtained  ? 
These  questions  include  much  more  than  belongs  to  the 
historically  limited  sphere  of  logic.  There  is  no  need 
of  changing  this  sphere.  The  laws  of  thought,  or  dis- 
cursive thinking,  can  still  be  regarded  as  the  domain  of 
logic,  which  the  larger  theory  of  knowledge  includes  as 
one  of  its  parts.* 

The  comprehensiveness  of  the  theory  of  knowledge 
makes  divisions  necessary  even  for  a  general  view  of 
its  multitude  of  important  subjects.  There  being  no 
generally  accepted  division,  one  will  here  be  made 
which  seems  best  calculated  to  give  the  student  a  clear 
conception  of  the  subject,  and  to  prepare  him  for  its 
study.  The  divisions  and  their  discussions  in  a  pre- 
paratory work  must,  however,  be  viewed  as  a  mere 
preface  to  the  depth  and  breadth  of  this  profound  and 
extensive  theme.  Each  of  the  three  heads  under  which 
we  consider  the  general  subject  seems  inexhaustible. 

1.  What  is  knowledge  ? 

2.  How  is  it  obtained  f 

3.  How  is  it  completed  f 

*  Volkelt  (Phil  Monatsh.,  1881.  540):  "It  is  my  conviction  that  the 
theory  of  knowledge  should  not  be  absorbed  by  logic,  but  that,  on 
the  other  hand,  logic  should  be  reduced  to  a  part  of  this  theory.  This 
theory  is  the  more  general,  more  comprehensive,  science.  In  the  course 
of  its  investigations  it  unavoidably  comes  in  contact  with  logical  think- 
ing, and  must  test  it  according  to  its  objective  worth.  This  task  cannot 
be  performed  without  considering  the  most  general  forms  and  laws  of 
thought,  which  are  usually  discussed  in  logic." 


THEOEY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  183 

1.   WHAT   IS   KNOWLEDGE? 

The  problem  for  solution  is  the  exact  meaning  of 
the  expression,  " I  know"  From  the  object  known  we 
abstract  for  examination  the  knowing.  The  first  glance 
shows  that  knowledge  is  not  co-extensive  with  the  con- 
tents of  consciousness.  In  distinction  from  the  emo- 
tions and  volitions,  it  is  intellectual.  But  there  are  also 
intellectual  elements  in  imaginations,  opinions,  and  be- 
liefs; yet  we  do  not  include  these  in  knowledge.  With 
whatever  tenacity  held  by  the  mind  possessing  them, 
they  are  not  authoritative  for  other  minds.  They  are 
recognized  as  having  something  peculiar,  individual, 
perhaps  arbitrary,  but  not  what  is  necessary  and  uni- 
versal. Knowledge,  on  the  other  hand,  is  universal,  and 
has  objective  as  well  as  subjective  authority.  If  dis- 
covered by  one  mind,  it  can  also  become  a  possession  of 
others,  and  the  grounds  on  which  it  rests  must  be  valid 
for  every  intellect  understanding  them.  It  does  not, 
like  so  many  of  our  mental  products,  depend  on  peculi- 
arities of  mind  or  training  or  experience,  but  on  an  in- 
herent necessity.  Our  inclinations  and  will  may  effect 
its  recognition,  not  its  reality.  It  is  absolute  and  final ; 
it  dominates  the  intellect  like  a  tyrant,  and  yet  the 
intellect  itself  is  that  tyrant. 

The  intellect  does  not  create  knowledge,  but  produces 
it  according  to  necessary  laws.  Just  because  it  beholds 
itself  in  this  product,  the  mind  cannot  alter  the  knowl- 
edge without  changing  itself.  Intellect  culminates  in 
knowledge,  and  recognizes  it  as  an  .imperative.  Knowl- 
edge is  power,  but  it  is  power  which  is  absolute  re- 
straint. The  mind  is  helpless  in  view  of  it,  and  there 
is  no  freedom  except  in  absolute  submission. 

Knowledge   is  truth  apprehended,  or  truth  become 


184     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

conscious.  We  ascribe  objective  reality  to  truth;  it 
exists  even  if  we  do  not  know  it,  and  it  remains  un- 
changed by  our  denial  and  rejection.  We  cannot  make, 
but  may  discover  it ;  and  cognition  is  the  process  for 
making  the  objective  subjective.  Whether  we  regard 
the  truth  as  consciously  existing  in  any  mind,  as  God's, 
or  not,  we  know  that  our  mental  attitude  toward  it  has 
no  more  effect  on  it  than  our  recognition  of  the  exter- 
nal world  affects  its  course.  The  truth  is  thus  a  realm 
of  its  own,  complete,  perfect,  absolute.  By  entering 
this  realm,  our  intellect  appropriates  its  possessions  and 
is  enriched,  but  the  realm  itself  is  not  impoverished. 
Knowledge  is  an  individualization  of  truth,  a  mental 
realization  of  an  ideal  existence. 

We  can  define  knowing  as  a  perception  of  truth,  — 
a  perception  based  on  grounds  evident  and  certain.  A 
man  may  dream  the  truth,  or  have  a  presentiment  of  it, 
but  that  is  not  knowledge.  Truth  may  be  possessed 
without  being  known  as  truth,  while  much  that  is 
thought  to  be  known  is  really  a  deception.  Standards 
vary;  where  many  claim  to  know,  the  more  critical 
discover  only  prejudice  or  opinion.  What  a  man  re- 
gards at  one  time  as  absolutely  known,  he  may  later 
reject  as  false,  or  as  beyond  the  limits  of  the  knowable. 

If  such  mistakes  and  self-deceptions  are  to  be  avoided, 
knowledge  must  be  sharply  defined,  and  its  criteria 
given.  We  speak  of  the  absoluteness  of  reason,  but 
forget  that  in  this  sense  reason  is  an  abstraction,  and 
that  our  minds  are  fallible,  still  wrestling  with  the  prob- 
lem, how  to  attain  the  ideal  reason.  The  same  mind 
that  knows  must  also  have  the  criteria  of  knowing.  It 
must-  determine  for  itself  the  -  standard  of  truth.  But 
this  standard  is  not  true^ -unless  a  universal  standard  for 
all  intellect.  If  peculiar,  it  is  false.  With  itself,  its 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  185 

criteria,  the  mind  should  therefore  be  mercilessly  criti- 
cal in  determining  what  to  accept  as  knowledge.  The 
vast  majority  are  satisfied  with  mere  opinion,  take  it  for 
knowledge,  and  inquire  no  further;  hence  the  impor- 
tance of  shaking  these  opinions  by  doubt,  so  that  the 
mind  may  become  conscious  of  itself,  and  pass  to  knowl- 
edge. But  even  after  the  mind  has  become  conscious 
of  itself,  and  is  willing  to  rest  only  in  what  is  reliable 
and  can  stand  the  severest  test,  it  is  extremely  difficult 
to  determine  the  limits  of  the  knowable.  Particularly 
hard  is  it  so  to  draw  the  line  between  faith  and  knowl- 
edge that  they  can  in  all  cases  be  clearly  distinguished. 
Both  have  degrees,  and  at  times  they  seem  to  merge 
into  each  other.  Faith  may  be  based  on  knowledge, 
and  must  be  if  reliable;  but  can  knowledge  ever  be 
based  on  faith  ?  If  only  that  is  known  which  is  abso- 
lutely demonstrated,  then  nothing  is  known.  Some- 
thing must  ultimately  be  regarded  as  so  certain  that  it 
needs  no  demonstration,  otherwise  all  reasoning  is  in  a 
circle.  If  every  thing  must  be  demonstrated,  on  what 
does  all  demonstration  finally  rest  ?  With  what  can  we 
begin  ?  For  instance,  can  we  prove  that  our  faculties 
do  not  deceive  us  ?  If  any  one  attempts  this,  he  must 
do  it  with  the  very  faculties  he  is  testing ;  that  is,  he 
must  take  for  granted  that  the  faculties,  whose  reliabil- 
ity he  is  testing,  are  reliable.  Call  it  a  belief,  an  as- 
sumption, a  postulate,  a  self-evident  truth,  or  what  you 
will,  something  must  at  last  be  taken  as  so  certain, 
that  it  needs  no  proof;  and  that  must  be  made  the 
ultimate  basis  of  knowledge,  and  the  starting-point  of 
reasoning. 

Nor  do  we  ordinarily  limit  knowledge  to  such  abso- 
lute demonstrations.  When  we  test  such  generally 
accepted  laws  as  causation,  gravitation,  the  indestruo 


186      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

tibility  of  matter,  the  conservation  of  energy,  we  base 
their  universality  on  some  undemonstrable  postulate. 
The  direct  observation  of  the  working  of  any  law  is 
necessarily  limited,  yet  we  do  not  hesitate  to  declare  it 
universal.  Nothing  is  regarded  as  more  certain  than 
the  demonstrations  of  mathematics;  yet  they  all  rest 
on  self-evident  truths,  which  are  axioms  just  because 
undemonstrable,  though  certain. 

Knowledge  presents  four  questions  for  consideration. 
What  is  its  object  (subject-matter)  ?  What  is  our  con- 
ception of  that  object?  How  is  the  conception  related 
to  the  object  ?  What  is  the  degree  of  certainty  respecting 
that  relation  ? 

Let  us  suppose  the  object  to  be  a  man.  If  my  con- 
ception of  him  is  correct,  I  have  the  truth,  but  I  may 
not  have  knowledge.  That  conception,  while  perfectly 
true,  may  be  a  mere  opinion ;  I  may  only  believe  that 
he  has  a  certain  character.  What  I  opine  may  be  true ; 
what  I  hold  as  certain  may  be  false.  The  difference 
between  knowledge  and  opinion  need  not  be  in  their 
object,  since  that  may  be  the  same  in  both ;  but  there 
must  always  be  a  difference  in  the  grounds  on  which 
they  rest.  A  correct  opinion  only  becomes  knowledge 
when  I  know  (not  merely  opine)  that  between  my  con- 
ception and  the  object  conceived  there  is  harmony. 
This  psychological  element  of  certainty  is,  therefore, 
essential  to  knowledge. 

The  truth  in  a  mind  may  consequently  be  far  more 
extensive  than  its  knowledge.  The  former  is  simply 
the  agreement  of  a  percept  or  concept  with  its  object ; 
the  latter,  however,  implies  that  this  agreement  is 
known.  The  difference  between  a  true  faith  and 
knowledge  consists  in  the  fact  that  in  the  one  case  the 
truth  is  believed,  in  the  other  it  is  known;  but  both 


i 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  187 

have  the  truth.  A  concept,  opinion,  or  belief  may  be 
true  or  false.  Knowledge  is  always  true. 

Knowledge,  then,  is  a  conscious  possession  of  truth : 
a  possession  whose  grounds  are  recognized  as  being  in 
harmony  with  reason,  and,  therefore,  irrefutable ;  or, 
knowledge  is  the  legitimately  and  certainly  recognized 
{conscious)  agreement  of  a  percept  or  concept  with  its 
object.  Thus  if  we  have  a  subject  and  predicate,  knowl- 
edge consists  in  the  established  certainty  of  the  har- 
mony between  the  two  ;  or,  if  we  have  a  perception  of 
something  real,  knowledge  will  consist  in  the  established 
certainty  that  there  is  harmony  between  the  mental 
presentation  and  the  thing  for  which  it  stands. 

Percepts  and  concepts  exist  only  in  consciousness, 
and  always  are,  in  themselves,  what  they  appear  to  be. 
It  is  not  in  beholding  them  that  mistakes  occur,  but 
only  in  passing  judgment  on  what  they  stand  for.  I 
commit  no  error  in  imagining  a  fictitious  character ; 
but  I  deviate  from  the  truth  as  soon  as  I  ascribe  ex- 
ternal reality  to  the  fiction.  I  abide  in  the  truth  so 
long  as  I  take  my  concepts  for  what  they  really  are.  A 
mind  fully  conscious  of  itself  and  of  the  nature  of  its 
possessions  cannot  err.  Viewed  in  this  light,  we  can 
define  knowledge  as  perfected  consciousness. 

Taken  in  the  widest  sense,  knowledge  embraces  all 
that  is  known,  irrespective  of  its  character.  Hence  it 
includes  fiction,  and  numerous  other  things,  which  are 
of  little  or  no  significance  to  the  scholar.  The  only 
knowledge  worthy  of  philosophical  investigation  is  val- 
uable and  real.  Whatever  its  idealism,  philosophy  aims 
to  become  absolutely  realistic ;  it  therefore  rejects  every 
concept  regarded  as  the  intellectual  counterpart  of  some 
reality,  when,  in  truth,  it  is  but  a  mental  fiction.  Not 
only  does  the  mind  create  such  fictions,  and  then  pro- 


188     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

nounce  them  realities,  but  it  also  takes  words  for  con- 
cepts, and  objectifies  its  own  concepts,  as  if  external 
existences.  We  speak  of  accidents,  for  instance,  as  if 
they  occurred  in  nature  ;  but  reflection  teaches  us  that 
they  only  represent  our  way  of  viewing  certain  occur- 
rences. Chance  and  accident  vanish  when  their  causes 
are  understood.  Perhaps  these  words  are  used  only 
to  indicate  that  something  occurred  without  intention 
on  our  part.  From  this  it  is  evident  how  essential  to 
knowledge  is  the  correct  interpretation  of  our  concepts. 

Where  reason  is  made  the  supreme  arbiter,  there  is 
no  danger  of  excluding  ideals  from  knowledge.  As 
objects  of  search,  or  as  the  goal  to  be  striveu  after,  they 
are  the  highest  reality.  The  true  man  is  an  ideal ;  but 
he  is  the  only  real  man,  all  others  being  imperfect 
copies.  When,  therefore,  we  speak  of  the  real  as  the 
object  of  knowledge,  it  is  taken  in  the  twofold  sense  as 
embracing  what  exists,  and  also  what  ought  to  be.  It 
includes  whatever  is  true.  Not  only  nature  and  mind, 
but  also  their  source,  relations,  activities,  and  products, 
are  its  objects.  In  mathematics  we  have  objects  of 
knowledge,  even  if  there  be  no  objective  (extra-mental) 
reality  to  correspond  with  its  figures  and  demonstra- 
tions. All  that  is  real  to  the  mind,  and  has  significance 
for  it,  is  an  object  of  knowledge ;  otherwise,  aesthetics 
and  ethics  could  never  be  objects  of  rational  inquiry. 

When  we  say  that  knowledge  aims  at  an  exhaustive 
understanding  of  the  real,  what  is  meant?  We  under- 
stand a  thing  when  we  know  its  nature,  its  origin,  its 
relation  to  other  things,  and  its  purpose.  A  little  re- 
flection shows  that  nothing  can  be  fully  understood 
unless  every  thing  else  is  known.  Aristotle  says  in  his 
Ethics  that  the  philosopher  must  follow  things  in  the 
order  of  their  orgin,  and  declares  that  the  beginning  is 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  189 

half  of  the  whole,  —  a  proverb  whose  application  to 
knowledge  is  evident.  But  in  order  to  comprehend 
fully  the  origin  of  a  thing,  we  must  follow  its  near  and 
remote  causes  through  all  the  processes  by  means  of 
which  it  has  been  developed,  going  from  effect  to  cause, 
until  we  reach  the  first  cause.  So,  in  order  to  compre- 
hend the  relations  of  an  object,  its  connection  with  the 
whole  universe  must  be  traced,  since  every  thing  is 
somehow  involved  in  these  relations.  The  purpose  or 
design  of  a  thing  is  fully  understood  only  when  all  its 
connections,  from  the  nearest  to  the  remotest,  are  con- 
sidered. It  is  thus  seen  that  the  thorough  study  of  any 
one  thing  leads  to  inquiries  which  involve  the  whole 
universe  of  being,  and  that  to  know  one  thing  perfectly 
means  to  know  all  absolutely.  A  deep  and  broad  con- 
ception of  knowledge  reveals  our  own  attainments  as 
extremely  limited. 

This  intimate  relation  of  all  objects,  so  that  they 
constitute  a  universe  in  which  nothing  is  isolated, 
greatly  complicates  knowledge.  It  is  impossible  to 
know  all  individual  objects,  nor  is  it  profitable  to  spend 
one's  strength  in  acquiring  unconnected  details.  From 
the  philosophic  point  of  view,  the  comprehension  of 
details  under  laws  and  principles  is  far  more  valuable. 
That  individual  objects  must  also  be  studied,  is  a  lesson 
which  science  is  constantly  teaching.  And  every  science 
has  its  (material)  logic  to  determine  what  shall  be 
regarded  as  scientific  knowledge  in  its  special  depart- 
ment. So  there  are  laws  of  historic,  literary,  and  lin- 
guistic criticism,  to  determine  what  the  conditions  of 
knowledge  in  their  respective  departments  are.  But 
the  facts  in  nature  and  mind  thus  learned  become 
means  for  induction  and  generalization.  The  intellect 
itself  impels  us  to  pass  from  facts  to  laws,  which  are 


190      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  foci  concentrating  all  the  rays  of  knowledge. 
Thinking  condenses  knowledge  into  its  essence. 

While  all  knowledge,  even  that  of  the  most  insignifi- 
cant details,  is  truth  known  as  such  by  the  mind,  the 
variety  in  its  objects  is  infinite.  Only  by  classification 
can  we  gain  the  intellectual  mastery  over  the  innumer- 
able objects.  Systematized  knowledge  is  most  available, 
and  in  forming  its  attainments  into  system  the  mind 
both  develops  and  economizes  strength.  The  best 
methods  of  classification,  as  we  have  seen,  are  deter- 
mined by  inherent  characteristics,  not  by  incidental  or 
external  marks.  The  nature  of  their  union,  and  the 
amount  which  objects  have  in  common,  determine  the 
intimacy  of  their  relation,  and  the  order  of  their 
classification. 

It  is  a  general  rule,  that,  the  more  objects  have  in 
common,  the  smaller  the  class  to  which  they  belong, 
and  vice  versa.  The  same  thought  may  be  expressed  in 
another  way :  A  concept  is  rich  in  content,  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  small  in  extent ;  and  the  poorer  in  content, 
the  greater  in  extent.  Intensively  and  extensively,  con- 
cepts are  thus  in  inverse  proportion.  In  the  concepts 
tree  and  organism,  we  find  that  the  latter  includes  the 
former,  and  all  that  can  be  predicated  of  the  nature  of 
an  organism  is  true  of  the  tree ;  but  the  concept  tree 
also  contains  much  more  than  the  more  general  concept 
organism.  In  content  the  concept  tree  is  much  the 
richer,  but  the  concept  organism  embraces  many  more 
individuals  than  tree.  A  tree  is  an  organism  only  so 
far  as  it  has  elements  common  to  all  organisms.  The 
last  sentence  implies  that  the  concept  organism  is 
poorer  in  content  than  tree,  but  richer  in  the  number 
of  objects  embraced. 

However,   then,  we   may   classify   an   individual,  it 


THEOBY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  191 

always  contains  more  than  the  class-name  indicates. 
This  is  merely  saying  that  the  concrete  is  richer  than 
the  abstract.  The  object  before  me  is  a  tree,  but  it  is 
something  more ;  it  is  an  oak,  a  white  oak,  a  particular 
one,  with  a  certain  form  and  size,  with  a  certain  num- 
ber of  leaves  and  quantity  of  fruit,  and  with  numerous 
other  peculiarities.  When  we  assert  that  an  object 
belongs  to  a  particular  class,  we  only  indicate  that  it 
has  the  marks  (notae)  common  to  all  the  objects  of  that 
class.  Knowledge  of  this  kind  is  general,  abstract. 
When  I  say,  "  This  is  a  man,"  I  indicate  nothing  that 
is  peculiar  so  as  to  distinguish  him  from  mankind  in 
general.  He  may  be  any  man.  Yet  our  general  notions 
are  indispensable  for  reasoning  and  for  all  thinking ;  we 
cannot  even  give  a  definition  without  them. 

The  most  general  (the  most  abstract  and  the  empti- 
est) of  all  notions,  that  of  being,  includes  extensively 
all  that  exists,  but  indicates  nothing  respecting  exist- 
ence except  that  it  is.  Can  we  predicate  any  thing  else 
of  all  being,  except  the  empty  fact  of  existence?  Is 
there  any  quality  or  property  which  belongs  to  all 
things  that  are?  Perhaps  the  very  thought  of  being 
implies  something  else.  If  this  is  so,  and  if  we  could 
discover  this  something  else,  we  should  gain  new  knowl- 
edge applicable  to  the  whole  universe  of  being.  By 
increasing  the  intensive  content  of  a  general  term,  we 
increase  our  knowledge  of  all  objects  included  under 
that  term. 

The  general  concept,  of  course,  has  significance  only 
because  there  are  concrete  objects  which  it  includes. 
The  concept  man  is  useless  unless  there  are  men.  Are 
the  universals  purely  mental,  or  do  they  represent  real 
existences?  Aside  from  the  conception  there  is  noth- 
ing that  can  be  called  absolutely  tree,  man,  or  moun- 


192      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

tain ;  but  there  are  trees,  men,  and  mountains.  A  still 
more  vital  question  is  this:  Have  we  really  general 
concepts,  or  have  we  instead  only  general  terms  to 
which  no  concept  corresponds?  Berkeley  and  Hume 
contended  that  what  we  call  general  or  abstract  ideas 
or  notions  are  pure  fictions.  An  abstract  idea  they 
declared  an  impossibility.  By  viewing  a  number  of 
similar  things,  say  triangles,  they  held  that  we  apply 
the  same  term  to  all,  but  that  to  this  general  term  noth- 
ing in  our  mind  corresponds.  The  term  "triangle  "  does 
not  stand  for  a  general  notion,  but  it  stands  for  each 
particular  triangle.  We  consequently  have  general 
terms,  but  no  notions.  An  inference  has  been  drawn 
from  this  view,  especially  by  Hume,  in  favor  of  empiri- 
cism and  sensationalism,  to  the  rejection  of  the  higher 
and  more  abstract  activities  of  the  mind. 

Emphatically,  however,  as  they  reject  all  general 
notions,  Berkeley  and  Hume  themselves  give  evidence 
to  prove  that  they  are  more  than  mere  words.  Thus 
they  institute  comparisons  between  objects,  and  abstract 
that  wherein  they  agree  from  that  wherein  they  differ. 
What  is  the  result  of  this  process?  The  general  con- 
cept which  is  designated  by  the  general  term.  From 
a  number  of  triangles  I  abstract  that  wherein  they 
agree.  They  all  have  three  sides,  so  drawn  as  to  en- 
close space,  and  to  form  three  angles;  but  the  peculiari- 
ties of  these  triangles  —  the  length  of  the  sides,  the 
size  of  the  angles,  the  amount  of  space  included  —  are 
not  considered.  The  result  of  this  process  of  abstrac- 
tion is,  that  what  all  the  triangles  have  in  common  is 
obtained.  The  general  term  "  triangle  "  does  not  indi- 
cate the  peculiarities  of  any  particular  triangle,  but  only 
what  every  figure  must  have  in  order  to  be  a  triangle, 
whatever  else  it  may  have.  A  general  notion  is  conse- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  193 

quently  real,  and  is  the  product  of  a  most  important 
mental  operation.  We  go  a  step  farther,  and  declare 
that  the  general  notion  is  not  merely  a  mental  reality, 
but,  so  far  as  it  is  a  notion  of  things,  something  real 
corresponds  to  it.  There  is  no  universal  in  nature ; 
but  we  make  the  mistake  of  looking  for  some  particular 
object  which  corresponds  with  the  general  notion,  when 
it  does  not  stand  for  a  particular  object  at  all.  It  stands 
for  what  is  found  in  all  objects  of  that  class,  but  which 
cannot  be  exclusively  concentrated  in  any  one  thing. 
That  which  constitutes  a  mountain  is  found  in  all  moun- 
tains ;  what  makes  a  figure  a  triangle  must  be  in  every 
triangle. 

The  difficulty  with  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  their  fol- 
lowers, on  this  subject,  is,  that  they  do  not  distinguish 
between  perception  and  conception.  Hume  distinctly 
rejects  all  that  cannot  be  perceived ;  it  is  either  a  fiction 
of  the  mind,  or  a  word  without  meaning.  Now,  we  can 
perceive  only  the  concrete  ;  but  by  mentally  elaborating 
our  percepts  (by  thinking),  we  form  general  notions. 
We  cannot  perceive  them  as  we  do  objects  of  sense, 
but  we  conceive  them ;  we  do  not  make  an  individual 
presentation  to  the  mind  of  what  is  general,  but  we 
think  it.  What  Hume  wants  to  behold  as  an  "im- 
pression "  or  "  image  "  of  a  thing,  the  mind  wants  to 
contemplate  as  the  intellectual  counterpart  of  reality. 

We  study  particulars  to  get  a  knowledge  of  all  like 
particulars,  and  we  generalize  to  individualize.  Knowl- 
edge in  any  comprehensive  sense  is  obtained  by  pro- 
cesses of  generalisation  and  individuation.  Cognition 
must  attend  to  details,  but  general  notions  are  equally 
indispensable  to  knowledge. 

The  question,  how  far  knowledge  extends,  may  also 
be  considered  both  extensively  and  intensively.  It 


194     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

would  be  presumptuous  to  claim  that  our  cognition  is 
co-extensive  with  being.  The  unconscious  processes  of 
our  own  minds  lie  wholly  beyond  the  sphere  of  our 
knowledge ;  and  there  may  be  entire  regions,  wholly 
different  from  those  known,  which  we  cannot  enter,  and 
of  whose  very  existence  we  cannot  even  form  a  concep- 
tion. With  other  or  different  senses  and  intellectual 
powers,  regions  might  be  revealed  which  must  now  re- 
main hidden.  The  limit  of  knowledge  is  one  of  the  most 
interesting  and  most  difficult  problems  in  the  theory  of 
knowledge. 

The  extent  of  knowledge  intensively  considered  re- 
fers to  the  limits  of  thought  respecting  the  objects 
within  the  sphere  of  cognition.  How  far  does  our 
knowledge  of  things  extend?  The  uncritical  imagine 
that  through  their  senses  they  come  into  direct  commu- 
nication with  things,  and  learn  to  know  them  immedi- 
ately ;  but,  in  reality,  we  know  directly  only  what  is  in 
our  consciousness.  Mentally  we  never  come  in  contact 
with  things  themselves.  They  reveal  themselves  to  us 
through  their  qualities  or  forces ;  they  are  manifested 
to  us  through  the  percepts  we  form  of  them.  It  is  not 
exact  enough  to  say  that  we  know  a  thing  from  what 
it  does,  for  it  may  do  much  of  which  we  can  know 
nothing;  but  from  what  a  thing  does  to  us  (how  it 
affects  us),  we  infer  what  it  is.  We  thus  distinguish 
between  phenomena  and  things  themselves.  According 
to  Kant,  we  can  know  only  the  phenomenal;  the  thing 
per  se  (" das  Ding  an  sich"),  we  cannot  know.  That 
things  can  only  be  known  according  to  what  they  are 
to  us,  is  self-evident.  It  is  but  saying  that  things  can 
be  to  us  intellectually  only  what  they  are  to  us  intel- 
lectually. The  existence  of  a  substance  underlying  the 
qualities  which  appear  to  us  is  an  inference,  the  cor- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  195 

rectness  of  which  is  much  disputed  at  present.  To  our 
minds  a  thing  is  always  what  it  does,  or  is  able  to  do. 
Matter  is  to  us  simply  the  sum  of  its  known  forces. 
If  we  are  not  satisfied  with  this  view,  we  must  make 
it  the  dark  something  in  which  the  forces  inhere,  and 
from  which  they  proceed ;  its  further  definition  is  still 
a  problem.  To  define  the  soul  as  immaterial  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  purely  negative,  showing  what  it  is  not,  but 
giving  nothing  positive.  Directly  we  know  only  its 
activity;  all  else  is  inference.  Even  the  problem  of 
its  immortality  is  a  question  of  conscious  activity.  By 
a  critical  examination  of  cognitions,  we  become  con- 
scious of  our  limitations ;  and  growth  in  the  knowledge 
of  self  is  largely  a  growth  in  the  consciousness  of  our 
ignorance. 

The  relation  of  knowledge  to  reality  has  been  in- 
volved in  much  perplexity.  We  do  not  doubt  that 
things  exist,  whether  we  have  any  knowledge  of  them 
or  not.  Our  thinking  does  not  affect  the  existence  of 
any  thing  except  the  thought  itself.  Nor  is  the  thought 
of  an  object  identical  with  the  object.  What,  then,  is 
their  relation  to  each  other  ?  Have  we  in  our  cogni- 
tions a  possession  of  reality,  or  of  its  copy?  Or  is 
thought,  perhaps,  independent  of  external  existence, 
being  wholly  a  mental  creation  ?  So  far  as  these  ques- 
tions belong  to  an  introductory  work,  they  can  best  be 
considered  under  the  next  head. 

2.   OKIGIN  OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

This  subject  might  be  relegated  to  psychology  if 
the  process  of  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  could  be 
watched  and  exactly  described.  It  is,  however,  per- 
formed unconsciously  (at  least  without  being  remem- 
bered) long  before  it  becomes  an  object  of  attention 


196      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  reflection.  We  can  still  watch  certain  processes  in 
the  formation  of  knowledge  afterwards,  and  the  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  of  knowledge  involves  important 
psychological  elements ;  but  psychology  cannot  solve 
the  problem  unless  we  are  prepared  so  to  enlarge  its 
sphere  as  to  include  the  critical  inquiries  of  Kant,  as 
well  as  the  sceptical  but  dogmatic  processes  of  Hume. 

Since  the  time  of  Descartes,  there  has  been  much 
dispute  as  to  whether  there  are  innate  ideas.  The 
advocates  of  the  doctrine  regard  as  innate  the  ideas 
called  universal  and  necessary.  It  is  not  meant  that 
they  are  universal  in  the  sense  that  every  human  being 
has  them,  but  that  they  are  necessarily  developed  in 
every  mind  attaining  a  certain  stage  of  culture.  The 
dispute  about  innate  ideas  has  in  large  part  been 
fruitless,  because  the  terms  were  not  sharply  defined. 
Descartes  himself  did  not  state  the  doctrine  clearly. 
Locke,  in  his  attack  on  innate  ideas,  showed  that  chil- 
dren, idiots,  and  savages  do  not  possess  them,  and 
therefore  concluded  that  they  cannot  be  innate.  He 
proved  that  these  ideas  are  not  born  with  us,  but  that 
experience  is  necessary  for  their  presence  in  conscious- 
ness ;  that  is,  he  clearly  established  what  probably  no 
philosopher  ever  questioned,  namely  that  at  birth  the 
mind  has  no  ready-made  notions  lying  about  in  con- 
sciousness. His  attack,  however,  made  it  necessary  to 
define  more  carefully  what  is  designated  by  the  ideas 
pronounced  innate.  In  answer  to  Locke,  Leibnitz 
admitted  as  true  that  to  the  intellect  nothing  is  innate, 
except  the  intellect  itself.*  He  saw  that  the  real  question, 
namely,  whether  there  are  not  certain  principles  inher- 
ent in  the  mind  which  determine  what  is  necessary,  was 

*  "  Nihil  est  in  intellects,  quod  non  fuerit  in  sensu,  nisi  ipse  intd- 
lectus." 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  197 

not  touched  by  Locke's  arguments.  He  held  that  of 
course  there  are  no  complete  notions  at  birth,  but  that 
the  mind  has  certain  tendencies  or  aptitudes,  which, 
with  proper  development,  give  necessary  truth.  These 
innate  aptitudes  he  uses  as  the  synoriyme  of  "innate 
ideas."  The  meaning  is  that  certain  notions  are  impli- 
cite,  not  explicite,  in  the  mind  at  birth.  Whether  this 
is  true,  is  the  real  question  at  issue. 

In  this  sense  Locke  himself  would  no  doubt  have 
accepted  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas.  His  view  of 
reflection,  besides  sensation,  as  a  source  of  knowledge, 
really  implies  it.*  But,  as  the  expression  is  ambiguous, 
and  has  often  been  misunderstood,  it  is  better  to  avoid 
the  words  "innate  ideas,"  and  substitute  for  them 
inherent  mental  aptitudes  or  laws. 

Kant  rejected  innate  ideas,  in  the  literal  sense,  as  dis- 
tinctly as  Locke  did,  but  taught  that  there  are  certain 
innate  conditions  of  knowledge,  certain  mental  forms, 
which  are  the  mind's  contributions  to  percepts  and  con- 
cepts.f  He  held  that  all  knowledge  begins  with  experi- 
ence, but  that  all  is  not  the  product  of  experience ;  this  is 
the  first  thought  of  the  Kritik.  He  taught  that  in  per- 


*  That  the  mind  acts  according  to  innate  laws,  is  not  merely  implied 
throughout  Locke's  Essay,  but  also  in  his  First  Letter  to  the  Bishop  of 
Worcester. 

t  In  writing  against  Eberhard,  Kant  says:  "  The  Kritik  absolutely 
admits  no  ideas  (Vorstellungeri)  which  are  created  or  born  with  us;  all 
without  exception,  whether  belonging  to  perception  or  to  conception, 
the  Kritik  views  as  acquired."  Respecting  a  priori  conceptions,  he, 
however,  adds,  "  But  there  must  surely  be  a  ground  in  the  subject 
which  makes  it  possible  for  the  ideas  to  arise  in  a  particular  way  and 
not  otherwise,  as  well  as  possible  to  apply  them  to  objects  not  yet 
given;  and  this  ground  at  least  must  be  innate."  He  declares  as  innate 
"  the  subjective  conditions  of  the  spontaneity  of  thought."  Drobish 
("^Zeits  fur  exacte  Phil."  1862.  6)  in  quoting  these  passages  says,  "  Thus 
Kant,  also,  does  not  regard  his  a  priori  forms  as  innate  ideas,  but  as 
acquired." 


198      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

ception  the  mind  furnishes  time  and  space,  which  are 
purely  internal,  as  the  mental  forms  into  which  all  the 
materials  or  contents  furnished  through  the  senses  must 
be  put.  For  the  concepts  the  understanding  furnishes 
certain  categories,  such  as  quantity,  quality,  relation, 
and  mode.  These  categories,  however,  do  not  appear 
in  the  mind  at  birth.  Sensation  is  necessary  to  arouse 
the  mind  to  activity;  but  when  thus  aroused,  it  fur- 
nishes these  various  forms  of  knowledge  spontaneously. 
"  No  one  would  have  the  concept  of  cause  if  by  means  of 
experience  he  had  not  perceived  causes.  No  one  would 
have  the  idea  of  virtue  if  he  always  lived  among  those 
who  are  nothing  but  thieves."  Hegel  also  regarded 
innate  ideas  as  only  implicite  in  the  mind  at  birth :  they 
are  there  in  the  form  of  capacity.*  Lotze  held  the  same 
view,  declaring  that  the  meaning  of  innate  ideas  is 
"  that  the  mind  is  so  constituted,  that,  when  manifold 
impressions  are  made  on  it,  its  own  nature  "  leads  it  to 
what  are  called  necessary  truths.f  Harms  advocated 
the  same  doctrine. {  "  Innate  to  the  mind  are  neither 
emotions,  nor  knowledge,  nor  strivings  ;  but  it  is  innate 
to  it  to  feel,  to  know,  to  strive ;  and  in  feeling,  know- 
ing, and  striving,  it  is  subject  to  a  law  which  must  be 
there  if  we  recognize  it,  and  cannot  be  merely  a  product 
and  habit  of  knowing.  It  is  innate  to  the  eye  to  per- 
ceive every  impression  as  color;  it  cannot  perceive 
tones.  It  is  innate  to  the  feeling  to  perceive  every 
emotion  as  an  agreeable  or  disagreeable  state.  But 
neither  feelings  nor  percepts  are  innate.  Just  as  little 
are  concepts  innate;  but  it  is  innate  to  us  to  know 

*  "  Nur  als  an  sick  und  in  der  Weise  der  Anlage  im  Menschen 
vorhanden."—  Ency.  I.  136. 
t  Nord  und  Slid,  1882,  340. 
t  Abhatidlunyen  der  system.  Philosophic,  137. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  199 

objects.  It  is  no  more  a  habit  of  consciousness  to 
know  objects,  than  a  stone  has  learned  by  habit  to  fall. 
The  laws  of  knowledge  operate  in  knowing  before  they 
themselves  are  recognized." 

From  the  time  of  Leibnitz  to  the  present,  German 
philosophy  has  been  dominated  by  the  thought  —  most 
fully  developed  by  Kant  —  that  certain  mental  elements 
which  are  innate  determine  the  character  of  our  think- 
ing. Even  the  realism  of  Germany  *  which  has  lately 
asserted  itself  is  no  exception  to  this  rule.  The  one- 
sided attention  to  this  innate  element  has  led  to  idealism, 
just  as  its  neglect  in  other  lands  has  led  to  sensational- 
ism and  materialism. 

Repeated  efforts  have  been  made  by  mysticism-  to 
account  for  our  highest  notions  by  viewing  them  as 
revelations.  The  mind  is  supposed  somehow  to  be  in 
immediate  communion  with  God,  so  that  a  knowledge 
of  Him  is  obtained  directly  (not  through  means).  Mys- 
ticism, though  often  intimately  connected  with  philos- 
ophy, is  not  a  part  thereof,  but  a  problem  for  solution. 

But  even  if  the  mystic's  view  of  the  direct  communion 
of  the  mind  with  God  is  rejected,  there  may  be  what  is 
termed  intuitive  knowledge,  such,  namely,  which  is  not 
dependent  on  logical  demonstration.  Some  notions  are 
so  self-evident  that  the  mind  at  once,  without  any 
media,  sees  their  truth.  It  is  a  kind  of  intellectual  be- 
holding or  contemplation  of  truth.  That  the  mind  has 
this  vision,  as  it  may  be  called,  is  beyond  dispute ;  the 
only  question  can  be  respecting  the  reason  why  the 
mind  immediately  perceives  truth  in  this  way.22 

The  hint  given,  while  speaking  of  psychology,  respect- 
ing the  state  we  form  in  the  process  of  development, 
may  be  of  service  to  us  in  interpreting  what  we  call 

*  As  that  of  J.  von  Kirchmann. 


200     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

intuitive  ideas.  As  a  sensation  is  at  once  interpreted 
into  a  percept,  so  certain  concepts  are  at  once  pro- 
nounced true.  The  recognition  of  their  truth  requires 
no  conscious  effort  on  our  part ;  it  is  immediate.  The 
states  in  which  we  have  these  intuitions  are  the  result 
of  culture,  and  the  processes  of  this  culture  can  un- 
doubtedly be  determined.  That  the  beholding  is  by  a 
state  which  is  not  innate,  but  the  product  of  develop- 
ment, does  not  affect  the  value  of  the  intuitions.  They 
may  be  based  on  innate  conditions  in  the  very  nature  of 
our  being,  so  that  the  ground  of  their  necessity  is  in  our 
constitution.  It  would  be  proper,  then,  to  speak  of 
certain  ideas  as  necessary,  and  therefore  universal. 

We  do  not  mistake,  then,  in  pronouncing  as  a  reality 
the  immediate  beholding  of  certain  ideas  as  true ;  but 
we  mistake  in  supposing  that  this  vision  is  a  direct 
state  of  nature  rather  than  a  resu]t  of  development. 
And  we  also  mistake  in  supposing  that  such  immediate 
beholding  pertains  only  to  what  are  commonly  called 
intuitions.  They  are  but  the  operation  of  a  very  com- 
mon law  of  our  being,  —  a  law  working  in  the  formation 
of  all  habits,  and  in  all  judgments,  in  which  the  mind 
overleaps  certain  links  in  the  process  of  reasoning.  The 
mind,  after  itself  passing  through  certain  processes  of 
generalization,  generalizes  unconsciously.  The  steps 
originally  conscious  in  forming  a  judgment  are  after- 
wards omitted.  The  first  and  last  link  of  the  chain  are 
seen,  and,  without  examining  the  rest,  the  mind  knows 
that  they  are  all  in  their  place. 

The  various  efforts  somehow  to  get  a  knowledge  of 
objects  directly  or  otherwise  than  through  sensation, 
have  been  opposed  by  those  who  held  that  the  mind  is 
wholly  passive,  or  at  least  wholly  dependent  on  exter- 
nal objects  for  what  it  knows.  The  advocates  of  empiri- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  201 

cism  have  been  no  more  careful  in  the  use  of  terms 
than  those  who  taught  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas. 
Whoever  regards  the  mind  as  originally  both  empty 
and  passive,  and  always  under  the  dominion  of  impres- 
sions from  the  external  world,  must  make  sensation  the 
source  and  explanation  of  all  cognition. 

Locke's  well-known  figure  of  the  mind  as  "white 
paper,"  is  frequently  quoted  as  evidence  that  he  re- 
garded the  mind  as  passive.  "  Let  us,  then,  suppose 
the  mi iid  to  be,  as  we  say,  white  paper,  void  of  charac- 
ters, without  any  ideas  ;  how  comes  it  to  be  furnished?  " 
.bocke,  however,  does  not  use  this  comparison  to  prove 
the  mind  inactive,  but  merely  to  show  that  at  birth  it 
has  no  ideas.  When  he  says  that  it  is  like  "white 
paper,"  he  only  means  to  say  what  he  adds,  that  it  is 
"void  of  all  characters,  without  any  ideas;"  but  the 
inference  so  often  drawn,  that  paper  may  be  written  on, 
but  cannot  write  on  itself,  is  drawn  by  others,  riot  by 
Locke.  That  he  does  not  regard  the  mind  as  passive,  is 
evident  from  the  same  section,  when  he  says,  "Our 
observation,  employed  either  about  external  sensible 
objects,  or  about  the  internal  operations  of  our  minds, 
perceived  and  reflected  on  by  ourselves,  is  that  which 
supplies  our  understandings  with  all  the  materials  of 
thinking."  To  the  question,  Whence  has  the  mind  "  all 
the  materials  of  reason  and  knowledge  ?  "  he  anwers, 
"  From  experience ;  in  that  all  our  knowledge  is 
founded,  and  from  that  it  ultimately  derives  itself." 
But  this  experience,  he  holds,  consists  of  sensation  and 
reflection ;  the  external  and  internal  factors  co-operate. 
After  speaking  of  sensation,  he  says  of  reflection,  "  The 
other  fountain,  from  which  experience1  furnisheth  the 
understanding  with  ideas,  is  the  perception  of  the  oper- 

*  Book  II.  1,  2. 


202     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

ations  of  our  own  minds  within  us,  as  it  is  employed 
about  the  ideas  it  has  got ;  which  operations,  when 
the  soul  conies  to  reflect  on  and  consider,  do  furnish  the 
understanding  with  another  set  of  ideas  which  could 
not  be  had  from  things  without ;  and  such  are  percep- 
tion, thinking,  doubting,  believing,  reasoning,  knowing, 
willing,  and  all  the  different  actings  of  our  own  minds ; 
which  we,  being  conscious  of,  and  observing  in  our- 
selves, do  from  these  receive  into  our  understandings  as 
distinct  ideas,  as  we  do  from  bodies  affecting  our  senses. 
This  source  of  ideas  every  man  has  wholly  in  himself."  * 

The  hints  given  by  Locke  respecting  reflection 
were  not  fully  developed  by  him.  He  says  it  might 
with  propriety  be  called  "internal  sense,"  thereby  indi- 
cating that  he  regards  its  function  mainly  as  that  of 
an  observer  of  the  inner  operations,  and  not  as  a  power 
that  works  over  the  impressions  received.  Even  in  his 
view  of  reflection  he  does  not  rise  above  the  psycholo- 
gical to  the  rational  activity  of  the  mind.  But  some  of 
his  followers  neglected  the  hints  he  gave  concerning  the 
mind's  activity,  and  made  the  outer  sense  the  only 
source  of  knowledge.  In  France,  Condillac  taught  that 
the  mind  is  passive ;  through  the  senses  the  world 
writes  its  figures,  or  photographs  its  images,  on  the  soul, 
which  may  view  them,  but  has  no  active  part  in  their 
production.  But  even  if  the  soul  were  passive  in  receiv- 
ing impressions  through  the  senses,  it  surely  cannot  be 
so,  as  Condillac  supposed,  in  working  them  over  in 
thinking. 

Materialists  go  still  farther  than  Condillac,  who  did 
not  hold  that  the  soul  is  material.  Epicurus  regarded 
the  soul  as  not  different  from  the  body,  and  held  that  the 
images  in  the  mind  are  produced  by  the  constant  emis- 

*  Book  H.  1,  4. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  203 

sion  of  fine  particles  from  the  surfaces  of  bodies.  Thus 
material  copies  were  thought  to  pass  from  things  into 
the  mind.*  Modern  materialists  regard  thought  as 
merely  a  physiological  function  of  the  brain.  Buech- 
ner  teaches  that  the  soul  itself  is  nothing  but  a  special 
endowment  of  the  vital  force,  conditioned  by  the  pecul- 
iar construction  of  the  material  of  the  brain.  He  says 
(Kraft  u.  Staff),  "The  same  power  which  digests  by 
means  of  the  stomach,  thinks  by  means  of  the  brain." 
Some  materialists  speak  of  thought  as  a  phosphores- 
cence of  the  brain ;  but  this  figure  throws  no  real  light 
on  the  mental  processes.  All  such  illustrations  take 
it  for  granted  that  we  know  body  better  than  mind, 
when  the  fact  is  "  that  we  know  more  of  mind  than  we 
do  of  body  ;  that  the  immaterial  world  is  a  firmer  reality 
than  the  material."  f 

Respecting  the  origin  of  knowledge,  conflicting  views 
are  thus  found  to  prevail.  An  idealism,  which  views  all 
cognition  and  its  objects  as  a  direct  product  of  the  soul, 
has  found  advocates,  as  well  as  sensationalism  and 
materialism,  which  regard  the  external  world  or  matter 
as  the  only  source  of  all  that  is  known.  We  shall  be 
fortunate  if  amid  this  confusion  we  can  give  hints  to  the 
beginner  to  direct  him  to  the  way  in  which  the  solu- 
tion of  the  problem  may  be  found. 

It  is  universally  admitted  that  knowledge  begins  with 
experience ;  by  examining  this,  therefore,  we  may  learn 
something  respecting  the  origin  of  knowledge,  and  the 
factors  it  contains.  Much  as  experience  is  discussed,  it 
is  too  often  treated  as  if  its  exact  nature  were  already 
determined,  and  needed  no  further  inquiry.  The  man- 
ner in  which  the  subject  is  frequently  discussed  makes 

*  Lange,  Geschichte  des  Mater ialismus,  first  ed'.  29. 
t  Huxley,  Science  and  Culture. 


204     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  impression  that  even  Locke  has  not  been  carefully 
studied ;  and  in  some  instances  his  standpoint  is  treated 
as  if  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  Kant  had  written  in  vain. 
The  most  evident  things  are  reiterated,  while  the  points 
needing  elucidation  are  overlooked. 

In  the  sense  now  generally  adopted,  experience  does 
not  primarily  express  the  act  of  testing  or  trying,  nor 
any  other  act  except  the  observation  of  what  is  in  con- 
sciousness. In  the  broadest  sense  we  experience  what- 
ever we  are  conscious  of.  We  may  hesitate  to  say  that 
we  experience  a  thought  or  an  idea ;  but  it  is  certain 
that  we  do  not  have  an  idea  or  a  thought  unless  the 
fact  that  we  have  it  is  a  matter  of  experience.  It  is 
true  that  it  is  more  common  to  use  the  term  "  experi- 
ence "  with  reference  to  sensations  and  feelings ;  and  in 
proportion  as  intellectual  activity  enters  into  sensation, 
the  less  apt  we  are  to  apply  the  term  "  experience  "  to  it. 
We  experience  the  pain  caused  by  a  burn ;  but  in  the 
beauties  we  see,  and  in  the  music  we  hear,  the  intellect 
is  more  active,  and  we  do  not  speak  of  these  as  experi- 
ence in  the  same  sense  as  of  pain  or  pleasure.  We  ex- 
perience trials,  but  think  thoughts  and  do  deeds.  When 
we  thus  speak  of  thought  and  deeds,  it  is,  however,  the 
active  mental  element  (the  producing  factor)  to  which 
attention  is  called,  not  to  the  fact  of  our  conscious- 
ness of  that  activity.  What  we  thus  distinguish  from 
experience  is  our  own  intellectual  activity,  and  it  is 
thus  seen  that  the  term  is  used  for  a  state  in  which  we 
are  affected  rather  than  active.  When  our  attention  is 
directed  absorbingly  to  intellectual  or  volitional  efforts, 
we  experience  little ;  but  when  we  yield  ourselves  more 
to  the  spontaneous  processes  of  our  minds,  to  the  imme- 
diateness  of  our  feelings,  we  experience  in  a  peculiar 
sense.  Experience  thus  pertains  to  the  psychological 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  205 

rather  than  the  rational  processes.  There  is  more  of  it 
in  the  busy  scenes  of  life  than  in  mathematical  demon- 
strations. And  by  systems  of  experience,  so  termed  in 
philosophy,  we  mean  those  which  have  much  immedi- 
ateness,  spontaneousness,  depending  much  on  direct 
sensation  and  observation,  not  so  much  on  the  mental 
elaboration  of  the  material  thus  gained.  An  experien- 
tialist  is  afraid  to  speculate,  for  fear  of  losing  the  bless- 
ings of  experience.  No  one  thinks  of  calling  Hegel's 
system  a  philosophy  of  experience ;  but  Locke,  Hume, 
and  their  followers  have  produced  systems  which  may 
be  so  called  with  much  greater  propriety.  Sensational- 
ists stoutly  oppose  the  intuitionalists,  overlooking  the 
fact  that  in  point  of  immediateness  (absence  of  discur- 
sive and  inferential  thought)  they  are  really  one.  Sen- 
sationalism affirms  for  the  outer  what  intuitionalism 
claims  for  the  inner  sense ;  and  there  seems  to  be  no 
good  reason  for  crediting  the  testimony  of  the  one,  and 
rejecting  that  of  the  other.  If  extremes,  they  may  serve 
each  other  as  correctives. 

Experience  is,  as  we  have  seen,  an  infallible  guide  so 
far  as  a  knowledge  of  what  is  in  consciousness  is  con- 
cerned ;  it  is  in  its  explanation  that  errors  arise.  It  is 
itself  purely  subjective,  and  indicates  nothing  as  to  the 
origin  of  its  objects.  They  may  come  from  within,  or 
from  without,  or  from  both.  To  appeal  to  experience, 
therefore,  as  the  source  of  all  cognition,  does  not  prove 
that  source  to  be  either  external  or  internal.  Whether 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  "  experience  "  is,  unfortu- 
nately, often  used  as  synonymous  with  "sensation." 
When  men  claim  to  have  settled  the  origin  of  knowl- 
edge by  declaring  that  it  comes  through  experience, 
they  have  in  reality  indicated  only  one  of  its  media, 
not  its  origin.  Many,  besides  confounding  experience 


206      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  sensation,  also  confound  mere  impressions  on  the 
senses  with  knowledge.  By  ignoring  what  Locke  called 
the  "internal  sense  "  or  "reflection,"  the  sensationalist 
may  imagine  that  he  has  succeeded  in  putting  all  his 
mental  operations  outside  of  his  mind  and  into  things. 

Let  us  begin  with  percepts  (sight,  sound,  etc.),  and 
see  whether  they  receive  their  character  wholly  from 
external  objects.  In  order  that  there  may  be  percep- 
tion, it  is  not  enough  that  the  organs  of  sense  be  af- 
fected. If  this  takes  place  during  sleep,  or  while  the 
attention  is  absorbed  by  something  else,  there  is  no  per- 
ception. This  is  only  found  where  the  mind  receives, 
or  re-acts  against,  the  impressions  made  on  the  organs. 
In  every  perception  of  external  objects  we  postulate 
three  factors,  namely  an  external  object,  the  tactual 
impression  on  the  senses,  and  the  activity  of  the  per- 
ceiving mind. 

Our  percepts  are  not  copies  of  what  transpires  in  the 
external  world,  which,  consequently,  cannot  be  the  only 
factor  in  their  production.  The  man  who  is  color-blind 
sees  objects  in  a  light  different  from  that  of  the  man 
who  is  not.  Sound  is  also  conditioned  by  the  character 
of  the  ear;  and  it  is  similar  with  reference  to  all  sensa- 
tions. But  the  third  factor,  the  perceiving  mind,  must 
also  be  taken  into  account.  We  see  light,  and  hear 
sounds,  and  yet  the  external  factor  consists  of  vibra- 
tions of  ether  or  air.  "  It  can  at  once  be  proved  that 
no  kind  and  no  degree  of  similarity  exists  between  the 
quality  of  a  sensation  and  the  quality  of  the  agent  in- 
ducing it,  and  portrayed  by  it.  ...  Our  sensations  are, 
as  regards  their  quality,  only  signs  of  external  objects, 
and  in  no  sense  images  of  any  degree  of  resemblance."  * 

*  Helmholtz,  Popular  Lectures,  390,  391.  In  another  place  he  states 
that  our  sensations  are  only  symbols  of  the  objects  of  the  external 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  207 

Thus,  even  in  the  most  elementary  experience,  we  must 
take  account  of  other  factors  than  the  external  world. 
We  make  mistakes  respecting  sensation,  and  afterwards 
correct  them ;  these  mistakes  and  corrections  are  men- 
tal acts.  In  our  perceptions  the  judgment  is  active, 
though  perhaps  unconsciously. 

If  now  we  take  sensations  as  elements  of  all  knowl- 
edge, we  have,  from  the  very  beginning,  to  deal  with 
a  mental  factor  which  sensationalism  is  apt  to  ignore. 
When  two  objects,  the  external  world  and  the  mind, 
co-operate,  the  result  must  be  regarded  as  the  product 
of  both  factors.  The  motion  resulting  from  the  impact 
of  two  moving  bodies  can  be  determined  only  by  con- 
sidering both  bodies  and  their  motions.  This  is  simply 
an  illustration  of  the  law  of  all  activity,  whether  mate- 
rial or  mental :  whenever  objects  affect  each  other,  the 
result  is  the  product  of  both. 

In  knowledge  itself  there  is  absolutely  no  factor  ex- 
ternal to  the  mind.  That  the  impression  on  the  organs 
of  sense  is  a  condition  for  a  knowledge  of  external  ob- 
jects, is  true ;  but  it  is  only  a  condition,  and  cannot 
properly  be  called  a  factor  of  knowledge  itself.  Aside 
from  this,  all  that  pertains  to  knowledge  is  purely  the 
product  of  mental  activity,  or  of  the  intellectual  elabo- 
ration of  what  is  given  in  sensation.  Were  the  mind 
passive,  or  had  it  nothing  but  consciousness,  so  as  to 
reflect  objects  as  from  a  mirror,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  do  any  thing  with  a  sensation  except  to  view  it. 
The  sensation  even  would  be  present  to  the  mind  only 
so  long  as  the  impression  itself  continued ;  its  longer 

world,  which  correspond  with  these  somewhat  as  written  letters  and 
the  sounds  correspond  with  what  they  represent.  They,  indeed,  give 
us  information  respecting  the  peculiarities  of  the  external  world;  but 
not  better  than  we  can  give  a  blind  man  information  of  color  by  means 
of  verbal  description. 


208     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

retention  or  reproduction  would  require  memory.  But 
even  with  memory,  it  would  be  impossible  to  change 
the  original  form ;  and,  aside  from  isolated  impressions, 
all  knowledge  would  be  out  of  the  question.  A  sensa- 
tion cannot  develop  itself,  and  cannot  attach  itself  to 
other  sensations ;  it  is  nothing  at  all  by  itself,  but  only 
something  for  the  mind  that  has  it.  To  ascribe  to  it 
the  power  of  developing  itself,  makes  it  an  independent 
substance.  Whoever  speaks  of  the  energy  of  sensations 
to  develop,  compare,  analyze,  or  unite  themselves,  need 
but  know  what  the  statement  means,  in  order  to  see  its 
absurdity.  A  mathematical  problem  can  as  easily  solve 
itself,  or  separate  points  connect  themselves  to  form  a 
line. 

From  the  mind  itself,  as  well  as  from  the  external 
world,  the  understanding  gets  materials  of  knowledge. 
Our  emotions  and  volitions  and  thoughts  are  products 
of  the  soul,  and  are  as  truly  a  revelation  of  reality  as 
are  our  presentations  of  external  objects.  The  wildest 
notion  that  ever  entered  the  human  mind  has  as  real 
a  cause  as  the  deepest  truth,  or  the  clearest  perception. 
A  notion  is  not  wild  or  false  because  uncaused,  but  be- 
cause it  itself,  or  its  cause,  is  misunderstood.  The  appre- 
hension of  the  cause  of  any  mental  phenomenon  always 
gives  real  knowledge.  Frequently  the  material  obtained 
by  watching  the  mental  operations  is  far  more  valuable 
than  that  whose  source  is  external,  since  it  gives  reve- 
lations of  self. 

But  whether  the  occasion  of  it  is  inner  or  outer,  expe- 
rience itself  is  always  purely  mental.  It  never  occurs 
outside  of  the  mind,  nor  can  we  ever  have  a  perception 
of  any  thing  not  in  the  mind.  Whoever  has  seriously 
reflected  on  the  subject  must  see  that  nothing  can  be 
more  absurd  than  the  statement  that  we  have  an  expe- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  209 

rience  of  the  outer  world.  How  can  the  mind  get  out- 
side of  itself  and  inside  of  that  which  is  outside  of  itself? 
All  that  we  can  experience  respecting  the  outer  world 
is  in  the  form  of  mental  impressions,  whose  source  or 
occasion  is  in  that  world. 

Those  who  try  to  reduce  the  mental  activity  in  the 
formation  of  knowledge  to  a  minimum  may  claim  that 
the  mind  can  do  nothing  but  develop  its  sensations,  and 
that  this  is  meant  by  the  statement  that  all  knowledge 
is  the  product  of  experience.  These  persons,  however, 
usually  forget  that  there  are  perceptions  from  within, 
as  well  as  from  the  outer  world,  and  that  the  whole 
process  of  developing  the  sensations  and  perceptions  is 
subjective ;  it  is  done  wholly  by  the  mind.  In  this 
process  the  mind  does  not  proceed  arbitrarily,  but 
according  to  laws.  But  these  laws  are  its  own.  Of 
its  perceptions  it  can  make  only  what,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, its  laws  demand.  The  percept  is  a  tool  of 
the  mind.  The  mechanic  uses  the  saw  as  he  pleases, 
but  he  cannot  use  it  as  a  gun ;  in  its  use  he  is  limited 
by  the  nature  of  the  implement.  The  union  of  differ- 
ent percepts,  the  formation  of  concepts  by  abstracting 
elements  common  to  the  percepts,  and  all  the  processes 
of  reasoning  and  thinking,  are  purely  mental,  and  are 
determined  by  the  object  of  thought  and  the  laws  of 
mind.  Even  in  the  case  of  the  experientialist,  the 
external  factor,  though  absolutety  necessary,  dwindles 
to  a  minimum  in  his  investigations. 

The  purely  mental  element  in  these  processes  is  not 
observed,  because  it  usually  works  spontaneously  and 
unconsciously,  and  because  the  attention  is  not  directed 
to  it,  but  solely  to  the  object  under  consideration.  Just 
because  the  intellect  is  not  foreign  to  us,  we  do  not 
readily  observe  its  operations.  They  are  means  to 


210      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  we  have  become  accustomed,  and  we  lose  sight 
of  them  while  intent  only  on  the  end  they  are  to  accom- 
plish. It  is  altogether  different  with  the  impressions 
received  through  the  senses:  we  take  them  up  con- 
sciously, in  order  to  work  them  over.  Only  by  a  special 
effort  of  reflection  can  we  learn  the  significance  of  the 
processes  usually  performed  unconsciously. 

Besides  ignoring  what  is  taught  respecting  the  mind 
by  its  own  operations,  the  cardinal  error  of  sensational- 
ism is  based  on  the  fact  that  it  fixes  the  attention  only 
on  the  beginning  or  condition  of  our  knowledge  of 
external  objects ;  but  the  fact  that  all  we  know,  what- 
ever its  external  conditions  may  be,  depends  on  the  laws 
of  the  mind,  is  overlooked.  The  nature  of  the  mind 
ultimately  determines  its  own  processes  under  given 
conditions,  so  that  we  cannot  otherwise  perceive,  expe- 
rience, or  think,  than  according  to  the  principles  im- 
planted within  us,  or  according  to  the  constitution  of 
our  being.  The  laws  of  thought  that  dominate  our 
intellectual  life  are  our  own  nature.  Their  working  is 
involuntary,  at  least  ordinarily,  and  they  can  be  learned 
only  by  watching  their  operations ;  but  when  once  dis- 
covered, they  are  final  for  us.  We  may  explain  and 
illustrate  these  laws,  and  give  the  principles  involved 
in  them,  and  indicate  the  sphere  of  their  operations; 
but  we  cannot  go  farther  in  our  explanation  of  them, 
than  the  statement  that  we  are  so  constituted  that  we 
cannot  do  otherwise.  Whoever  questions  the  validity 
of  his  mental  laws,  thereby  invalidates  his  own  objec- 
tions. It  is  more  irrational  to  question  the  validity  of 
our  mental  laws  than  to  question  the  validity  of  a  law 
of  nature ;  for  the  validity  of  a  law  of  nature  depends, 
for  us,  on  the  validity  of  our  mental  laws,  by  means 
of  which  the  laws  of  nature  are  established. 


TIIEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  211 

Observation  furnishes  nothing  but  isolated  facts. 
How,  then,  do  we  get  general  laws,  —  those  of  nature, 
for  instance  ?  An  apple  hangs  on  a  tree  ;  I  cut  off  the 
stem,  and  the  apple  falls  to  the  ground ;  I  connect  the 
change  of  location  with  the  cutting  of  the  stem,  calling 
the  latter  the  cause  of  the  change.  Were  this  repeated 
a  million  times,  and  always  with  the  same  result,  it 
would  not  teach  me  that  every  change  must  have  a 
cause,  but  only  that,  as  far  as  I  have  observed,  every 
change  has  a  cause.  Observation  gives  us  only  facts, 
but  never  the  necessary  and  universal.*  Whence,  then, 
the  general  law  that  every  change  must  have  a  cause  ? 
Should  we  not  substitute  for  it :  Every  observed  change 
had  a  cause  ? 

We  experience  the  fact  that  we  have  the  law,  but  no 
amount  of  experience  can  give  the  law.  Hume  makes 
the  law  of  causation  the  product  of  a  mere  habit  of 
mind.  We  learn  it,  he  claims,  by  observing  that  changes 
have  (what  we  call)  causes,  or  we  accustom  ourselves 
to  assume  a  cause  for  every  change.  To  this  habit  he 
naturally  denies  the  claim  of  establishing  any  necessity 
or  universality.  Only  in  mathematics,  dealing  not  with 
reality  but  with  the  relations  of  ideas,  does  he  recognize 
absolute  laws. 

It  is  a  fatal  objection  to  this  theory  of  habit,  that  it 
does  not  account  for  the  law  it  proposes  to  explain. 
By  observing  the  same  act  often  repeated,  and  always 
with  the  same  result,  I  may  form  the  habit  of  expect- 
ing that  result  under  the  same  circumstances ;  but  this 
expectation  is  not  at  all  the  thing  whose  explanation  is 
demanded.  What  is  to  be  explained  is  the  fact,  that 

*  "Necessity  and  strict  universality  are,  therefore,  sure  signs  of 
knowledge  a  priori,  and  they  are  inseparably  connected."  —  KANT, 
Kritik,  Introduction. 


212     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

we  have  the  notion  that  every  change  must  have  a  cause. 
This  necessity  is  purely  mental.  I  can  change  a  mere 
habit  by  setting  a  must  against  or  over  it ;  but  I  cannot 
alter  the  law  that  every  change  must  have  a  cause. 
But  even  if  Hume's  position  is  admitted,  it  confirms 
the  fact  that  we  cannot  get  behind  or  beyond  the  laws 
of  the  mind,  for  the  theory  of  habit  in  the  end  amounts 
to  this:  It  is  the  law  of  mind  to  form  the  habit  of 
regarding  every  change  as  having  a  cause.  And  the 
recent  efforts  to  explain  certain  or  all  general  notions 
as  hereditary  amount  to  the  same  thing ;  namely,  that 
it  is  a  law  of  mind,  in  the  process  of  development,  to 
transmit,  by  inheritance,  general  notions.  Thus  stated, 
the  doctrine  is  that  of  innate  ideas  in  a  literal  sense, 
and  is  liable  to  the  same  objections.  The  meaning  in- 
tended is,  however,  that  a  mental  predisposition  to  form 
certain  general  notions  is  inherited.  But,  supposing 
that  this  is  really  hereditary,  are  the  tests  of  the  heredi- 
tary also  hereditary  ?  Are  the  rational  criteria  of  truth 
inherited  ?  Only  so  long  as  we  move  in  the  sphere  of 
psychology,  can  heredity  have  any  significance  in  inter- 
preting mental  phenomena.  The  grounds  of  truth  and 
the  principles  of  knowledge,  to  be  found  only  by  pro- 
found investigation,  cannot  be  hereditary ;  no  more  than 
hard-earned  money  is  inherited.  The  fact  is,  that  no 
rational  theory  whatever  can  be  framed  whose  ultimate 
basis  is  not  some  law  inherent  in  the  mind  itself.  As 
soon  as  we  pass  from  the  descriptive  and  historical  to 
the  rational,  we  are  wholly-  dependent  on  the  unaltera- 
ble laws  of  thought.  These  laws  are,  consequently,  the 
ultimate  appeal  in  all  questions  pertaining  to  knowledge. 
We  are  now  prepared  to  inquire  into  the  validity  of 
thought  which  rises  above  mere  observation.  We  have 
seen  that  all  knowledge,  however  elementary  in  charac- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  213 

ter,  and  whatever  its  primary  conditions  (or  source), 
depends  ultimately  on  our  mental  laws.  Now,  if  the 
normal  action  of  the  mind  can  be  trusted  in  observa- 
tion, why  not  in  other  respects  ?  The  same  mind  forms 
the  percepts  and  the  concepts ;  and  there  is  no  reason 
to  regard  its  normal  action  a  whit  more  reliable  in 
one  case  than  in  the  other.  We  distinguish  between 
ordinary  and  scientific  observation,  the  latter  being 
reliable  because  made  according  to  critical  methods 
whose  validity  the  mind  has  established ;  while  the 
former  does  not  comply  with  rational  demands,  and  is 
consequently  liable  to  mistakes.  The  same  is  true  of 
all  mental  activity  ;  if  exact,  critical,  normal,  it  must 
be  reliable.  And  the  burning  question  in  the  theory 
of  knowledge  is  not,  What  can  be  known  by  means  of 
observation  and  experiment?  but  this,  What  are  the 
laws  of  mind,  or  the  norms  of  thought  ? 

Not  merely  is  all  thinking  determined  by  these  laws, 
but  it  is  also  a  revelation  of  them.  We  may  direct 
attention  so  exclusively  to  the  objects  before  the  mind 
as  to  disregard  the  mental  activity,  or  we  can  make  the 
latter  the  subject  of  study.  In  considering  the  law  of 
gravitation,  we  naturally  inquire  into  its  operations 
throughout  the  universe ;  but  we  can  also  inquire  into 
the  activity  of  the  mind  in  the  formation  of  the  law 
itself.  The  scientist  sees  nature  through  the  law,  while 
the  mental  philosopher  sees  the  mind  in  the  same  law. 

All  these  considerations  lead  us  to  change  the  ques- 
tion, Is  there  a  purely  mental  element  in  knowledge? 
so  as  to  read,  Is  there  any  knowledge  without  a  purely 
mental  element?  This  must  be  answered  in  the  nega- 
tive. But  this  is  different  from  the  question,  Is  there 
any  knowledge  whose  source  is  purely  mental?  What- 
ever may  originally  arouse  the  mind  to  activity,  all  that 


214      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

we  know  of  the  mind  itself  is  learned  only  from  its 
operations.  But  the  mind  can  create  no  knowledge  of 
real  objects.  All  that  we  can  know  of  reality  must  be 
given  either  directly  through  the  senses  or  through  the 
operations  of  the  mind,  or  it  must  be  an  inference  from 
something  thus  known  to  exist.  Hume  saw  correctly 
that  we  infer  from  the  existence  of  an  object  known, 
the  existence  of  another  unknown  object,  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  causality. 

But  even  if  the  mind  can  work  only  if  some  material 
is  given  it  from  within  or  without,  what  it  makes  of 
this  material,  or  infers  from  it,  is  the  product  of  its  own 
activity.  While  it  cannot  construct  a  real  world  of 
objective  existence,  it  does  construct  an  ideal  world 
which  to  it  is  real;  besides  that  which  is,  the  mind 
recognizes  what  ought  to  be.  From  habit  we  may  at 
first  form  the  notion  of  what  is  becoming ;  but  when  its 
activity  is  properly  aroused,  the  mind  subjects  it  to  a 
higher,  an  absolute  ought.  This  imperative  the  under- 
standing does  not  find  in  any  thing  given  directly  in 
consciousness,  but  in  it  the  mind  objectifies  itself.  This, 
of  course,  does  not  exclude  the  fact  that  the  mind  has 
been  trained  by  experience ;  but  experience  gives  no 
ideals.  In  forming  them,  the  mind  is  wholly  a  law  unto 
itself.  In  its  ideals,  it  mirrors  itself. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  our  mental  laws, 
unless  made  the  subject  of  special  reflection,  work  un- 
consciously. Thus  our  universal  notions  usually  come, 
we  know  not  how.  Necessity  and  universality  are  the 
product  of  the  mind ;  that  they  are  inferred  from  facts 
given  by  observation,  does  not  interfere  with  their 
mental  character.  A  particular  fact  or  truth  is  nothing 
but  that  particular  fact  or  truth,  and  in  itself  implies 
nothing  except  that  and  what  it  is.  All  that  is  implied, 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  215 

or  inferred,  is  put  into  it  solely  by  the  mind.  But  in 
every  particular  fact  the  mind  sees  a  necessary  and  uni- 
versal truth.  Whatever  occurs  once  must  always  occur 
again  under  the  same  conditions.  The  single  occur- 
rence is  given  by  observation,  the  "always"  and  "must" 
are  added  by  the  mind. 

In  order  to  discover  the  origin  of  the  notions  called 
universal,  necessary,  self-evident,  intuitional,  we  must 
notice  the  process  of  their  formation.  This  process  is 
determined  according  to  our  mental  constitution,  or  a 
law  inherent  in  our  being,  and,  aside  from  this,  nothing 
is  innate.  The  process  itself  only  takes  place  after  the 
mind  has  been  aroused  to  activity,  and  has  attained  a 
certain  stage  of  progress. 

Much  of  the  embarrassment  of  philosophers,  from 
Hume  to  Mill,  would  have  been  avoided  if  the  law 
active  in  the  formation  of  our  universal  notions  had 
been  discovered ;  if  instead  of  resting  with  custom, 
habit,  association,  as  final,  these  themselves  had  been 
properly  explained.  The  law  of  mind  which  produces 
our  general  ideas  is  final  for  us,  and  with  its  discovery 
our  inquiries  must  end.  What  this  law  is,  we  can  of 
course  learn  only  from  its  operation. 

We  have  seen  that  notions  called  necessary  and  uni- 
versal are  the  product  of  states  formed  in  the  process 
of  development,  being  generalizations  of  the  mind's 
own  generalization.  Let  us  now  see  whether  we  can 
discover  the  law  according  to  which  what  is  pronounced 
necessary  and  universal  is  formed. 

Logicians  usually  regard  it  as  a  fundamental  law  of 
mind  that  A  is  A;  even  with  the  sign  of  equality 
(A  =  A)  it  is  thus  interpreted.  Now,  that  A  is  A,  is 
undoubtedly  true  ;  but  it  is  empty  tautology  which 
neither  in  itself  nor  in  its  application  has  any  signifi- 


216     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

cance.  But  the  formula  that  A  equals  A,  gives  a  law 
of  the  mental  operations  very  fruitful  in  its  application. 
In  this  formula,  A  is  not  the  same  A  in  both  cases,  but 
the  one  is  exactly  like  the  other,  and  we  interpret  it  to 
mean :  Every  A  is  equal  to  every  other  A.  Thus  let 
A  =  stone,  then,  according  to  the  formula,  every  stone 
is  equal  to  every  other  stone ;  a  statement  which  at 
first  seems  absurd,  but  which,  properly  understood,  is 
literally  true.  Every  stone,  as  stone  (without  reference 
to  kind,  quality,  size,  or  other  peculiarities,  but  simply 
as  stone),  is  really  equal  to  every  other  stone  con- 
sidered merely  as  stone.  Let  A  =  power,  or  cause,  or 
any  thing  else,  and  it  will  be  found  that  the  formula  is 
always  applicable.  Power  is  always  power,  and  as 
power  it  equals  all  power  as  power.  A,  wherever  found, 
as  A,  always  equals  every  other  A. 

A  mental  standard  is  a  criterion  for  the  mind  only  if 
this  law  is  correct.  It  in  fact  lies  at  the  basis  of  every 
comparison  and  of  every  judgment.  Just  because  it  is  so 
universal  in  its  application,  it  is  important  to  formulate 
this  fundamental  law  distinctly.  It  is  but  an  applica- 
tion of  this  law,  when  we  affirm  that  what  occurs  at  one 
time  will  always  occur  when  the  same  conditions  are 
given.*  If  fire  burns  to-day  but  not  to-morrow,  then 
fire  is  not  the  same  to-day  and  to-morrow ;  that  is,  fire 
is  not  fire,  or  A  is  not  equal  to  A.  If  at  one  time  an 
unsupported  object  falls  to  the  ground,  a  like  object 
under  exactly  the  same  circumstances  will  always  do  so. 
A  single  event  contains  all  the  laws  involved  in  all 
equal  events,  just  as  completely  as  all  the  events  con- 
tain those  laws,  though  it  may  require  many  experi- 

*  Time  and  space,  whether  regarded  as  purely  subjective,  or  as  both 
subjective  and  objective,  have  no  influence  on  occurrences;  it  is  only 
what  is  in  time  and  space  that  can  have  such  an  influence. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  217 

ments  to  discover  with  scientific  exactness  the  nature 
of  the  event,  and  of  the  laws  involved. 

The  same  fundamental  law  applies  to  the  qualities  of 
things,  and  is  active  in  all  systematizing  and  classifica- 
tion. If  life  is  that  mark  of  a  single  object  which  con- 
stitutes it  an  organism,  then  it  is  necessary  to  constitute 
any  other  object  an  organism.  If  a  single  change  needs 
a  cause,  then  every  change  needs  one. 

From  this  law  we  readily  learn  the  origin  of  the 
truths  held  to  be  necessary  and  universal.  The  mind 
finds  them  implicite  in  particulars,  and  from  these  infers 
them.  Experience  is  necessary  for  their  discovery,  but 
it  does  not  give  them  ;  they  are  conclusions  of  the  mind, 
and  in  it  they  have  an  a  priori  basis. 

All  analysis  and  synthesis  are  performed  according  to 
the  law  given.  In  all  its  processes  the  judgment  acts 
on  the  supposition  that  things  are  alike  or  unlike ;  its 
function  is  that  of  comparison,  to  determine  whether  an 
object  or  a  notion  is  like  or  unlike  A.  Since  the  mental 
standards  determine  our  judgments,  we  can  see  why 
our  knowledge  is  not  limited  by  observation.  The 
general  laws  and  axioms,  according  to  which  we  judge 
the  material  furnished  by  observation,  are  a  mental 
necessity,  behind  which  we  cannot  go.  All  assertions 
to  the  contrary  are  somehow  contradictory.  To  limit 
the  law  that  every  event  must  have  a  cause,  by  experi- 
ence, is  to  destroy  the  law  itself;  it  is  a  law  only  be- 
cause it  is  not  limited.  J.  S.  Mill  limits  the  law  to 
experience,  and  supposes  a  case  which  is  really  incon- 
ceivable. "I  am  convinced  that  any  one  accustomed 
to  abstraction  and  analysis,  who  will  fairly  exert  his 
faculties  for  the  purpose,  will,  when  his  imagination  has 
once  learnt  to  entertain  the  notion,  find  no  difficulty  in 
conceiving  that  in  some  one,  for  instance,  of  the  many 


218      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

firmaments  into  which  sidereal  astronomy  now  divides 
the  universe,  events  may  succeed  one  another  at  ran- 
dom, without  any  fixed  law  ;  nor  can  any  thing  in  our  ex- 
perience, or  in  our  mental  nature,  constitute  a  sufficient, 
or  indeed  any,  reason  for  believing  that  this  is  nowhere 
the  case.  The  grounds,  therefore,  which  warrant  us  in 
rejecting  such  a  supposition  with  respect  to  any  of  the 
phenomena  of  which  we  have  experience,  must  be 
sought  elsewhere  than  in  any  supposed  necessity  of  our 
intellectual  faculties."  *  We  may  observe  events  with- 
out inquiring  into  their  causes;  but  we  cannot  really 
think  or  conceive  them  as  succeeding  one  another  at 
random,  without  any  fixed  law.  In  order  to  do  this, 
we  should  have  to  think  A  as  not  equal  to  A ;  that  is, 
we  should  have  to  conceive  events,  somewhere  beyond 
observation,  as  not  events.  Even  if  an  event  could 
happen  without  law,  the  mind  could  not  conceive  it  as 
thus  happening  ;  it  can  only  think  according  to  law,  and 
its  law  for  conceiving  events  is  according  to  the  law  of 
causality.  If  anywhere  a  change  needs  no  cause,  then  it 
nowhere  needs  one ;  if  it  has  one,  it  is  purely  accidental. 
Unconsciously,  but  with  absolute  reliability,  the  mind 
draws  conclusions  according  to  its  inherent  laws.  When 
we  become  conscious  of  these  laws,  and  make  them  the 
object  of  reflection,  we  can  do  nothing  but  accept  their 
validity.  All  our  reasoning  cannot  alter  them,  for  rea- 
soning is  itself  but  an  exercise  of  these  laws.  If  the 

*  Logic,  II.  95.  Mill  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  principles  adopted 
from  Hume,  when  a  few  pages  later  he  says,  "  The  uniformity  in  the 
succession  of  events,  otherwise  called  the  law  of  causation,  must  be 
received  not  as  a  law  of  the  universe,  hut  of  that  portion  of  it  only 
which  is  within  the  range  of  our  means  of  sure  observation,  with  a  rea- 
sonable degree  of  extension  to  adjacent  cases.  To  extend  it  further,  is 
to  make  a  supposition  without  evidence,  and  to  which,  in  the  absence 
of  any  ground  from  experience  for  estimating  its  degree  of  probability, 
it  would  be  idle  to  attempt  to  assign  any." 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  219 

mind  intuitively  sees  the  truth  of  an  axiom,  that  is  final. 
The  only  possible  question  could  be  whether  it  is  really 
an  intuition.  If  a  single  real  intuition  could  be  over- 
thrown, it  would  invalidate  the  reliability  of  all  mental 
processes.  Whether,  therefore,  necessary  and  universal 
notions  are  called  inferences,  axioms,  intuitions,  or  any 
thing  else,  they  have  their  basis  and  absolute  authority 
in  a  mental  necessity. 

In  answer  to  the  question,  What  is  the  origin  of 
knowledge  ?  we  therefore  answer,  It  is  neither  wholly 
from  within  nor  wholly  from  without,  but  both  the 
external  and  internal  factors  co-operate  in  its  formation. 
Knowledge  is  mental,  and  the  external  can  never  be 
more  than  merely  the  occasion  of  it ;  but  there  is  no 
knowledge  of  which  the  last  analysis  does  not  somehow 
include,  or  lead  to,  both  factors,  though  they  are  by  no 
means  always  equally  prominent. 

The  hints  given  on  the  origin  of  knowledge  have  pre- 
pared us  for  the  question,  What  is  the  relation  of  knowl- 
edge to  the  real  world  ?  Whatever  views  may  be  held 
respecting  the  nature  of  that  world,  no  one  doubts  that 
besides  the  thinking  mind  there  must  be  other  real  ob- 
jects. Every  effort,  however,  to  demonstrate  the  exist- 
ence of  a  world  external  to  us  must  fail,  because  we 
never  can  get  out  of  or  beyond  our  subjective  state.* 
The  usual  argument  to  prove  its  existence  is  that  we 
become  conscious  of  certain  phenomena  without  any 
effort  on  our  part.  They  must  consequently  have  their 

*  It  is  generally  admitted  that  the  existence  of  external  reality  can- 
not be  proved.  "The  reality  of  what  is  objective  to  us  can  never  be 
severed  from  its  subjective  basis ;  therefore  it  can  never  be  a  matter  of 
absolute  certainty,  but  at  best  only  very  probable."  —  VOLKELT,  Phil. 
Monatsh.,  1881, 534.  Mill,  Logic,  I.  9,  states  that  at  present  "  it  is  univer- 
sally allowed  that  the  existence  of  matter  or  of  spirit,  of  space  or  of 
time,  is  in  its  nature  unsusceptible  of  being  proved;  and  that  whatever 
is  known  of  them  is  known  by  immediate  intuition." 


220      INTEODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

source  in  something  else  than  ourselves.  With  eyes 
and  ears  open  we  cannot  help  seeing  objects  and  hear- 
ing sounds.  In  ourselves  we  can  discover  no  activity 
which  accounts  for  the  appearance  of  these  perceptions, 
and  we  have  no  control  over  them ;  they  are  apparently 
forced  upon  us.  It  is,  therefore,  concluded  that  their 
cause  must  be  in  something  else  than  ourselves. 

This  reasoning  is,  however,  based  on  the  supposition 
that  we  are  conscious  of  all  our  activity,  whose  products 
are  manifest  in  consciousness.  But  this  is  not  the  case. 
There  must  be  in  us,  as  we  have  seen,  a  sphere  of  great 
activity  lying  wholly  beyond  consciousness;  a  sphere 
whose  existence  must  be  postulated  in  order  to  account 
for  much  that  appears  in  consciousness.  Many  thoughts 
arise  unconsciously  whose  origin  must  be  in  ourselves. 
Thus  we  try  to  recall  a  name,  but  fail  after  long  effort ; 
we  dismiss  the  matter,  and  it  comes  without  effort. 
We  think  of  one  thing,  and  a  thought  altogether  dif- 
ferent enters  the  mind.  Behind  our  conscious  processes 
there  must  be  others  of  which  we  are  unconscious ;  and 
it  may  be  that  our  unconscious  activity  is  much  greater 
than  the  conscious.  It  is  consequently  impossible  to 
prove  that  something  must  have  entered  the  mind  from 
without,  because  we  are  not  aware  of  having  produced 
it.  But  the  fact  that  we  cannot  demonstrate  the  exist- 
ence of  an  external  world  does  not  weaken  the  convic- 
tion that  it  is  a  reality.  Idealism  cannot  be  refuted ; 
neither,  on  the  other  hand,  can  it  demonstrate  the  non- 
existence  of  the  world.  Aside  from  absolute  demon- 
stration, there  is  the  strongest  ground  for  accepting  its 
existence.  Indeed,  we  are  tempted  to  declare  the  de- 
monstration impossible,  just  because  the  existence  is 
self-evident. 

Postulating,  then,  that  there  are  objects  external  to 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  221 

us,  what  is  our  intellectual  relation  to  them?  The 
things  themselves  do  not  enter  the  mind,  nor  can  the 
mind  enter  the  things.  We  receive  impressions  from 
them  through  the  senses ;  but  it  has  already  been  shown 
that  these  impressions  are  not  duplicates,  or  even  photo- 
graphs, of  the  things  themselves.  We  have  no  way  of 
comparing  our  impressions  with  their  sources,  except  by 
means  of  impressions.  Our  minds  never  deal  directly 
with  the  objects,  but  only  with  the  effects  which  they 
produce.  Our  intellect  cannot  come  in  contact  with 
things ;  directly  we  deal  solely  with  phenomena,  and 
our  world  (that  of  which  we  are  conscious)  is  purely 
phenomenal.  This  conclusion  has  been  regarded  as 
derogatory  to  the  validity  of  knowledge,  and  the  most 
persistent  efforts  have  been  made  to  overthrow  it ;  but 
reflection  only  proves  that  no  other  result  is  possible. 
We  can  know  things  only  as  they  are  related  to  the  in- 
tellect. This  relation  is  one  of  knowing,  not  of  being. 
From  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  things  can  be  to  our 
intellects  only  what  they  appear  to  us.  Even  if  the 
mind  could  somehow  come  in  direct  contact  with  them, 
things  could  be  known  only  from  their  relation  to  us 
as  knowing,  or  as  they  appear  to  the  mind.  Objects 
manifest  themselves  to  us  by  means  of  qualities  or 
forces ;  but  these  are  qualities  of  the  things  themselves. 
Hence  we  can  know  things  only  through  the  relation  of 
their  qualities  to  our  intellects. 

This  conclusion  does  not  in  the  least  depreciate  the 
value  of  knowledge.  Our  knowledge  is  real  as  knowl- 
edge ;  it  is  not,  however,  any  thing  real  outside  of  the 
mind,  nor  does  it  profess  to  be.  Do  what  we  will,  our 
intellect  can  no  more  project  its  percepts  outside  of  our 
minds,  than  we  can  stand  on  our  shoulders.  We  have 
a  real  knowledge  of  real  things,  but  of  things  as  they 


222      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

manifest  themselves  by  means  of  their  properties  to  our 
minds  through  the  senses.  In  the  intellect,  we  have 
not  things  themselves,  but  a  knowledge  of  them ;  not 
objective  reality,  but  a  conception  of  it.  In  knowledge, 
therefore,  we  have  symbols  of  things,  intellectual  views, 
or  mental  representations  of  them ;  and,  as  such,  their 
validity  is  beyond  question. 

Much  of  the  discussion  respecting  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  leads  to  confusion,  because  the  meaning  of 
this  relativity  is  not  fathomed.  We  can  speak  of  knowl- 
edge as  the  product  of  a  relation,  —  as  that  of  a  subject 
to  its  object,  of  the  ego  to  the  non-ego ;  but  knowledge 
as  knowledge  is  never  relative.  It  is  knowledge  only 
because  it  is  absolute  for  all  mind.  If,  however,  the 
meaning  is  that  the  objects  of  knowledge  can  be  con- 
ceived only  as  related,  then  there  is  no  room  for  dis- 
cussion, for  the  statement  is  self-evident.  Things  that 
belong  to  the  same  universe  are  necessarily  related; 
how  else  could  they  constitute  one  universe?  In  con- 
ceiving objects  as  related,  we  consequently  conceive 
them  as  they  are.  The  absolute,  in  the  sense  of  some- 
thing unrelated,  is  a  pure  abstraction ;  but  even  as 
such,  it  is  a  contradiction  in  itself.  As  soon  as  you 
think  the  absolute,  you  think  it  as  related  to  the  intel- 
lect, and  thus  it  ceases  to  be  unrelated.  The  absolute 
has  become  a  bugbear  in  philosophy  by  treating  it  as 
unrelated,  whereas,  in  that  sense,  the  absolute  is  incon- 
ceivable. To  affirm  that  we  do  not  know  things  abso- 
lutely in  the  sense  of  exhaustively,  is,  perhaps,  too 
evident  to  require  serious  discussion. 

The  affirmation,  then,  that  we  know  things,  means, 
of  course,  that  we  know  them  as  they  appear  to  us 
intellectually.  If  by  thing  per  se  we  mean  a  thing  as 
it  is  in  itself,  but  not  to  us,  it  necessarily  lies  beyond 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  223 

our  power  of  apprehension.  If  we  conceive  it  at  all, 
we  necessarily  conceive  it  as  it  is  to  us,  or  appears  to 
us,  not  what  it  is  independent  of  this  relation  to  us. 
Whatever  I  conceive  must  be  related  to  my  intellect ; 
if,  now,  I  should  conceive  it  as  not  thus  related,  I  should 
conceive  it,  not  as  it  is,  but  as  it  is  not.  The  whole 
discussion  of  the  thing  per  se,  begun  by  Kant,  is  an 
attempt  to  discuss  things  as  if  there  were  no  intellect ; 
an  attempt  to  apprehend  things  with  the  mind  as  if 
there  were  no  mind.  Kant  puts  things  per  se  (noumena) 
and  phenomena,  or  things  as  they  appear,  in  opposition, 
just  as  if  they  excluded  each  other.  If  for  thing  per  se 
we  put  the  essence  of  a  thing,  which  is  really  meant, 
it  becomes  evident  that  the  phenomena  need  not  be 
wholly  foreign  to  the  thing  itself,  but  may  be  a  reliable 
manifestation  of  it.  That  things  are  to  us  only  what 
they  appear,  is  no  evidence  that  they  do  not,  in  some 
measure,  appear  to  us  as  they  are. 

That  our  knowledge  of  things  is  not  synonymous 
with  the  being  of  things,  can  only  disappoint  when  the 
nature  and  aim  of  knowledge  are  misunderstood.  In 
knowledge  I  do  not  seek  real  existence,  but  an  intel- 
lectual apprehension  of  it ;  I  do  not  want  things,  but  I 
want  to  understand  them.  There  can  be  no  confusion 
unless  we  confound  being  with  a  knowledge  of  being. 

These  reflections  make  it  seem  strange  that  the  theory 
of  knowledge  should  ever  have  been  regarded  as  the 
discipline  which  considers  the  relation  of  knowledge  to 
things.  The  latest  German  work  on  this  theory  says, 
"  The  general  aim  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  pertains 
to  the  solution  of  the  problem,  whether  and  to  what 
extent  objective  knowledge  is  possible  ;  "  *  and  the  large 

*  Volkelt:  Erfahrung  und  Denken.  Kritische  Gruudleyuny  der 
Erkenntnistheorie,  1886 ;  545. 


224      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

volume  is  devoted  to  the  question  of  the  objective  value 
of  subjective  knowledge.  This  view  of  the  subject  has 
become  quite  common.  But  why  call  it  theory  of 
knowledge  if  its  subject-matter  is  not  knowledge  itself, 
but  the  relation  of  knowledge  to  things  ?  It  considers 
the  relation  of  intellect  to  things,  which  is  a  relation  of 
knowledge ;  and  its  sphere  is  the  whole  department 
of  knowing,  whether  that  be  subjective  or  objective,  or 
both.  In  the  complete  and  thorough  discussion  of  the 
entire  domain  of  knowledge,  the  objective  value  of 
subjective  percepts  and  concepts  is  included,  but  it  does 
not  exhaust  the  subject. 

It  has  already  been  intimated  that  we  cannot  compare 
things  as  known  with  things  as  not  known  (or  other 
than  as  known)  ;  all  we  can  do  is  to  compare  one  con- 
cept of  external  reality  with  other  concepts  of  the  same, 
—  a  process  by  means  of  which  we  never  get  away  from 
our  conceptions.  If  I  could  somehow  compare  a  con- 
cept with  external  reality,  I  should  have  for  comparison 
a  concept  which  has  ceased  to  be  a  concept,  and  has 
become  the  reality  external  to  it.  That  the  intellect 
moves  only  in  the  sphere  of  the  intellectual,  should 
never  be  a  question  for  the  intellect. 

Since  all  knowledge  depends  ultimately  on  the  laws 
of  thought,  the  main  thing  is  correct  thinking.  This  is 
the  province  of  logic. 

LOGIC. 

Logic,  as  one  of  the  conditions  for  the  attainment  of 
knowledge,  is  naturally  placed  under  the  general  head  : 
Origin  of  Knowledge.  Here  the  term  is  used  in  the 
sense  of  pure  or  formal  logic,  not  material  or  applied. 
Its  aim  is  to  give  the  laws  of  thought  (normative  laws 
of  pure  thought),  without  taking  into  account  the 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  225 

objects  of  thought.  It  seeks  to  answer  the  question, 
How  must  we  think  in  order  to  attain  the  truth? 
What  must  the  sequence  of  thought  be  in  order  that 
truth  may  be  the  result?  It  thus  deals  simply  and 
purely  with  the  thought-conditions  of  knowledge, — - 
conditions  which  apply  equally  to  all  content.* 

It  is  not  definite  enough  to  say  that  logic  is  the 
science  of  "the  necessary  laws  of  thought."  For,  if 
the  laws  sought  are  necessary,  how  can  we  do  other- 
wise than  think  according  to  them  ?  If  necessary,  they 
must  operate  whether  we  know  them  or  not.  Yet, 
properly  understood,  it  is  correct  to  say  that  logic  treats 
of  the  necessary  laws  of  thought. 

Thought  is  not  lawless  or  arbitrary ;  it  is  a  rigid,  per- 
fect system,  of  which  mathematics  is  but  an  illustration  ; 
it  is  an  organism,  in  which  part  fits  into  part,  and  part 
follows  part,  with  perfect  regularity  and  consistency. 
As  in  the  solution  of  a  mathematical  problem  a  single 
mistake  vitiates  the  entire  process  which  follows,  and 
makes  the  result  false,  so  it  is  with  all  our  mental  pro- 
cesses ;  one  mistake  vitiates  the  whole.  It  is  common 
to  say  that  logic  aims  to  prevent  these  mistakes  by  giv- 
ing the  laws  of  correct  thinking,  and  the  criteria  by 
which  all  thought  must  be  tested.  This  will  do  if  we 
understand  what  is  meant  by  correct  thinking ;  it  evi- 
dently means  the  proper  sequence  of  thought.  All  real 
thinking  is  correct ;  if  there  are  mistakes,  it  is  because 
there  is  a  lack  of  thought.  He  who  says  2+2=5,  does 

*  Pure  or  formal  logic  thus  differs  from  applied  logic,  which  treats 
of  the  laws  of  thought  in  relation  to  the  material  or  content  of  thought. 
Pure  logic  gives  formal  truth,  applied  gives  material  truth;  the  former 
shows  under  what  conditions  thought  harmonizes  with  itself,  the  latter 
gives  the  laws  which  show  the  relation  of  thought  to  its  content.  By 
limiting  logic  to  the  laws  of  thought,  we  also  distinguish  it  from  Hegel's 
view  according  to  which  the  principles  of  thought  are  also  those  of 
being. 


226      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

not  think  2+2,  but  2+3.  So  he  who  says:  Most  men 
die  a  natural  death,  therefore  Socrates  died  a  natural 
death,  does  not  think  at  all.  Errors,  then,  do  not  spring 
from  thinking,  but  from  the  failure  to  think ;  it  is  by 
thinking  that  we  discover  errors,  which  are  the  product 
of  thoughtlessness  somewhere.  If  thinking  can  err, 
where  is  the  corrective  of  thinking?  We  often  use 
words  instead  of  thoughts,  and  thus  make  mistakes  ; 
but  by  thinking  through  a  subject,  and  by  putting 
thoughts  into  the  words,  we  correct  the  errors.  Logic, 
then,  simply  gives  the  laws  of  all  thought,  and  these  it 
learns  from  thought  itself ;  it  gives  the  laws  according 
to  which  men  must  think  in  order  to  get  the  truth,  but 
these  are  at  the  same  time  the  laws  which  all  men  follow 
who  really  think. 

Viewed  in  this  light,  logic  gives  the  deepest  philos- 
ophy of  the  mind.  In  its  thought,  the  intellect  mani- 
fests itself,  and  in  the  laws  of  thought  we  have  the  laws 
of  the  intellect.  Those  who  see  in  pure  logic  only  rules 
for  attaining  a  knowledge  of  other  objects  —  not  of  the 
mind  itself — do  not  know  what  a  revelation  they  miss. 
Thus  in  the  study  of  what  is  called  formal  logic,  real 
knowledge  is  gained,  namely  of  the  mind.  In  consider- 
ing the  forms  of  thought,  these  forms  themselves  are 
the  material  of  knowledge. 

Logic  deals  with  concepts,  and  with  them  exclusively. 
With  language  it  deals  only  so  far  as  it  embodies 
thought;  and  with  things  it  deals  only  through  their 
concepts.23  Language  is  viewed  in  logic  purely  as  a 
symbol  of  thought. 

The  basis  of  all  reasoning  must  be  absolutely  reliable 
and  universally  applicable,  namely  axioms.  The  pri- 
mary law  is  that  of  identity,  or  rather  equality  (being 
in  reality  two  laws),  namely  that  A  equals  A.  Its 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


227 


converse  is  the  law  of  contradiction.  A  is  not  equal 
to  non-A.  From  the  law  of  equality  we  also  get  that 
of  excluded  middle :  Every  thing  equals  either  A  or 
non-A. 

These  three  laws  contain  the  principles  of  all  com- 
parison ;  namely,  that  a  thing  is  like  or  unlike  the 
standard,  a  third  supposition  being  excluded.  All 
processes  of  syllogistic  reasoning  are  comparisons  or 
determinations  of  likeness  and  unlikeness. 

Abstraction  also  depends  on  the  same  laws :  it  is 
comparison  for  the  sake  of  discovering  and  abstracting 
what  is  common  to  different  objects.  B,  C,  D,  differ ; 
but  B  =  0,  6,  <?,  d  ;  C  =  a,  e,f,  g  ;  D  =  a,  A,  i,  k ;  that 
is,  they  all  agree  in  that  they  have  a.  We  can  express 
the  thought  thus :  B  does  not  equal  A  except  in  so  far 
as  it  is  the  same  as  A.  It  is  this  A,  or  this  element  of 
sameness  or  equality,  which  we  want  to  find  in  abstrac- 
tion. In  this  way  the  marks  of  things,  which  consti- 
tute them  classes,  or  arrange  them  under  the  same 
concepts,  are  found.  When  we  search  for  what  is  com- 
mon to  things,  we  call  the  process  abstraction ;  when 
we  search  for  what  is  common  to  events,  we  call  the 
process  induction.*  Deduction  is  the  reverse,  and  may 
be  viewed  as  a  concretion  of  the  abstract. 

For  science,  as  well  as  philosophy,  logic  is  fundamen- 
tal, and  has  been  regarded  so  since  the  days  of  Aristotle. f 
It  is  so  essential  because  it  disciplines  the  mind  for 
every  department  of  thought,  and  gives  the  normative 
laws  of  all  thinking.  Within  the  last  fifty  years  great 
efforts  have  been  made,  both  in  Germany  and  England, 
to  develop  logic  beyond  the  bare  skeleton  which  came 

*  Taine,  History  of  English  Literature,  on  Stuart  Mill,  says,  "  All 
the  methods  of  induction,  therefore,  are  methods  of  abstraction." 
t  Cicero  calls  it  Ars  omnium  artium  maxima. 


228      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

down  through  the  middle  ages  from  Aristotle.*  But 
the  much  already  done  shows  how  much  yet  remains 
to  be  done. 

Since  logic  is  usually  treated  more  fully  in  our  insti- 
tutions of  learning  than  any  other  department  of  phi- 
losophy, it  is  not  necessary  to  enter  into  details  here. 
It  is,  however,  important  to  note  that  the  correct 
sequence  of  thought  is  by  no  means  a  guaranty  that 
truth  will  be  the  result.  Only  on  the  right  basis,  or 
with  truth  as  the  starting-point,  will  correct  thinking 
end  in  truth.  And  it  will  generally  be  found,  that,  when 
men  disagree,  their  logic  is  less  at  variance  than  the 
premises  from  which  their  reasoning  starts.  Before 
entering  upon  an  argument,  the  disputants  should  first 
determine  whether  each  does  not  start  with  a  postulate 
different  from  that  of  the  other.  The  assumptions  are 
often  of  far  greater  significance  than  the  proofs. 

In  the  tendency  to  specialism,  there  is  a  twofold  dan- 
ger ;  namely,  of  choosing  a  basis  for  reasoning  without 
a  sufficiently  broad  induction,  and  of  applying  the  re- 
sults of  our  reasoning  to  spheres  that  really  lie  outside 
of  this  application.  In  the  one  case  our  argument  is 
too  narrow,  in  the  other  too  broad.  In  determining  the 
basis  from  which  reasoning  starts,  all  that  really  per- 
tains to  it  should  be  taken  into  account.  By  putting 
into  that  basis  more  than  belongs  to  it,  we  get  results 
that  are  not  warranted.  Thus  some  draw  from  their 
notion  of  a  substance  inferences  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance without  ever  considering  what  the  substance  really 

*  In  Germany  numerous  works  on  logic  have  appeared.  Hegel  gave 
a  new  impulse  to  the  study  by  his  work  on  the  subject.  Among  the 
more  recent  books  are  those  of  Ulrici,  Lotze,  Ueberweg,  Sigwart, 
Wundt,  Schuppe,  Bergmann.  In  England  Whately  revived  an  interest 
in  logic;  and  works  on  that  subject  have  been  published  by  Hamilton, 
Hansel,  Mill,  De  Morgan,  Whewell,  Boole,  Veim,  Jevons,  and  others. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


229 


is,  and  not  aware  that  what  they  infer  from  the  sub- 
stance is  only  that  with  which  their  own  imagination 
has  endowed  it.  Hence  the  object  of  reasoning  should 
first  of  all  be  thoroughly  mastered.  Then  the  conclu- 
sions should  be  rigorously  confined  to  the  objects  to 
which  they  have  been  found  actually  to  apply.  Rea- 
soning that  pertains  to  quantity  does  not  explain  quality. 
What  applies  to  material  processes  has  significance  only 
for  all  that  is  known  to  be  material.  Physiological 
demonstrations  can  determine  psychological  questions 
only  if  it  has  been  proved  that  physiology  is  psychology, 
or  that  they  have  a  sphere  in  common.  Just  because 
it  has  become  so  customary  to  determine  what  is  true 
in  one  sphere  by  what  has  been  established  in  another, 
the  student  should  train  his  mind  severely  to  limit  his 
conclusions  to  the  objects  and  spheres  for  which  they 
have  been  established. 

Three  rules,  then,  are  essential  for  the  attainment  of 
logical  truth  :  master  the  object  of  thought  so  as  to 
know  its  content ;  reason  correctly  respecting  that  which 
is  known  of  the  subject;  limit  the  conclusion  to  that 
respecting  which  it  has  been  established. 

3.   COMPLETION   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

Not  merely  truth,  but  truth  in  greatest  perfection,  is 
the  aim  of  intellect.  That  restless  impulse  to  know, 
which  the  Germans  call  Wissensdrang,  or  Wissenstrieb, 
may  be  the  inspiration  of  but  few ;  among  these,  how- 
ever, are  all  philosophic  thinkers.  Nothing  short  c:i 
the  deepest  thought  in  the  most  perfectly  developed 
stage  and  in  the  best  form  can  satisfy  the  aspiring 
mind. 

Hints  on  the  development  of  knowledge  itself  (not 
merely  of  an  individual's  attainments)  are  found  in 


230      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

works  on  logic,  psychology,  and  pedagogics ;  but  the 
subject  is  usually  treated  in  a  fragmentary  manner. 
Its  importance  justifies  separate  treatment,  in  order  to 
secure  for  it  more  thorough  and  more  systematic  dis- 
cussion. The  philosopher  and  educator  find  that  it 
teems  with  weighty  problems ;  and  the  student,  who 
wants  to  become  a  thinker  as  well  as  a  learner,  and 
who  desires  to  increase  knowledge  as  well  as  to  master 
what  is  already  known,  will  seek  principles  so  to  guide 
him  in  his  researches  as  to  develop  the  best  results  from 
the  thoughts  already  attained. 

The  very  idea  of  developing  something  new  from 
what  is  known,  implies  that  the  new  is  somehow  con- 
nected with  the  old,  or  lies  in  it  as  in .  embryo.  The 
present  rests  on  the  past,  and  the  future  lies  in  the 
present,  and  there  are  threads  which  lead  from  the  one 
to  the  other.  So  when  we  speak  of  the  completion  of 
knowledge,  we  want  to  find  the  threads  which  lead 
from  the  known  to  the  unknown.  Thought  is  a  seed 
with  a  certain  degree  of  development  at  a  particular 
time ;  and  future  progress  consists  in  the  development 
of  what  is  still  undeveloped  in  the  seed,  or  but  imper- 
fectly developed  in  the  plant. 

The  completion  of  thought,  therefore,  implies  abso- 
lute dependence  on  the  seed,  but  independence  of  the 
development  already  attained,  in  the  sense  of  not  being 
limited  by  it.  Independent,  original  thought,  guided 
by  the  energy  in  the  living  seed,  is  the  condition  for 
passing  to  what  is  new  and  yet  old ;  for  developing,  as 
Hegel  would  say,  the  energy  of  the  flower  into  the 
fruit  which  it  virtually  contains. 

For  the  increase  of  knowledge  in  any  department  it 
is,  therefore,  essential  to  learn  what  stage  of  develop- 
ment has  been  attained,  otherwise  there  is  danger  of 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  231 

wasting  time  in  searching  for  what  is  already  found. 
A  true  philosophy  does  not  undervalue  history,  but 
assigns  to  it  the  proper  place  in  intellectual  training. 
Historical  study  may  not  develop  intellectual  strength 
as  greatly  as  philosophy  and  science ;  but  only  when 
one  has  learned  what  others  have  done  in  his  specialty 
can  he  understand  what  yet  remains  to  be  done,  or 
work  successfully  to  do  what  is  still  needed.  In  the 
historical  knowledge,  seized  by  a  philosophical  mind, 
there  may  be  important  hints  and  impulses  for  new 
development.  New  problems  may  be  suggested,  the 
failures  of  other  thinkers  will  serve  as  warnings  against 
wrong  methods,  and  all  that  has  already  been  accom- 
plished should  be  the  starting-point  for  accomplishing 
what  is  yet  to  be  done.  Even  if  it  gives  only  this 
starting-point,  the  historical  knowledge  is  valuable, 
since  it  may  save  from  tedious  wanderings  over  beaten 
tracks.  The  methods  of  others  may  be  fit  for  a  help  or 
guide,  but  not  for  a  tether.  The  student  must  avoid 
ruts ;  and  with  a  safe  compass,  he  must  not  fear  to 
launch  out  into  the  deep.  A  pupil  may  find  a  teacher's 
method  invaluable  for  disciplinary  purposes ;  but  he 
cannot  hope  to  add  any  thing  new  to  the  stock  of 
knowledge  by  only  repeating  experiments  performed 
much  better  by  some  one  else.  The  young  mathema- 
tician might  learn  much  by  repeating  Newton's  elab- 
orate and  intricate  calculations,  but  he  would  not  be 
likely  to  add  any  thing  to  mathematical  science  by  the 
process. 

There  is  scarcely  any  danger  that  philosophy  will 
repeat  the  mistake  of  under-estimating  observation  and 
experiment ;  but,  from  what  has  been  said,  it  is  evident 
that  there  is  danger  of  expecting  from  these  themselves 
what  can  be  wrested  from  them  only  by  the  energy  of 


232     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

thought.  Whatever  may  transpire  outside  of  the  mind, 
and  however  necessary  for  knowledge  it  may  be,  intel- 
lectual progress  depends  on  the  amount  of  thought  put 
into  the  results  of  observation  and  experiment.  While 
this  is  true  in  science,  the  need  of  great  mental  energy 
in  regions  not  so  immediately  connected  with  observa- 
tion is  still  more  apparent. 

As  no  one  can  master  or  develop  all  subjects,  the 
student,  after  securing  a  liberal  education,  is  obliged 
to  limit  himself;  he  must  choose  something  as  a  specialty 
if  he  wants  to  become  an  authority  in  any  thing.  The 
choice  of  the  proper  subject  for  special  study  is  of  the 
first  importance,  and  is  by  no  means  wholly  determined 
by  the  profession  or  general  calling  chosen.  In  order 
that  the  choice  may  be  rational,  the  student  must  not 
merely  take  into  account  his  ability,  circumstances,  and 
opportunities,  but  also  the  importance  and  fruitfulness 
of  the  subject.  Inquiries  may  be  of  subordinate  value 
and  not  worth  the  time  spent  on  them,  or  they  may  be 
resultless  because  the  subject  itself  is  fruitless.  Espe- 
cially in  philosophy,  on  which  so  much  effort  has  been 
spent  in  fruitless  inquiries,  is  it  important  to  select  for 
profound  study  important  and  fruitful  problems. 

Usually  the  progress  of  knowledge  is  regarded  as  a 
growth  in  the  comprehension  of  the  causes  of  things. 
Science  is  largely  an  inquiry  into  immediate  causes,  as 
philosophy  is  an  inquiry  into  ultimate  principles,  which 
must  include  the  first  and  final  causes.  All  deeper 
thought  seeks  the  explanation  of  what  occurs,  by  deter- 
mining its  origin  (the  genetic  method).  Here  it  is  not 
necessary  to  emphasize  the  investigation  of  causes,  since 
its  importance  is  generally  admitted ;  it  will  be  more 
helpful  to  take  up  neglected  elements. 

Frequently  causes  lie  wholly  beyond  our  reach,  or  an 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  233 

inquiry  into  cause  may  be  irrelevant.  Thus,  to  inquire 
into  the  cause  of  being  is  the  same  as  inquiring  into  the 
being  which  existed  before  being.  But  in  dealing  with 
objects  there  are  numerous  other  problems  than  those 
which  pertain  to  cause, — problems  which  are  concerned 
with  a  full  understanding  of  the  thing  itself.  We  can 
ask  what  it  is,  how  it  compares  with  other  objects,  where 
it  is,  and  what  it  can  do ;  that  is,  instead  of  inquiring 
how  a  thing  became  what  it  is,  we  concentrate  our 
investigations  on  the  nature  of  the  thing  itself. 

In  philosophical  inquiries  we  deal  with  ideas  and 
concepts,  which  are  remote  from  concrete  objects.  The 
region  of  pure  thinking  is  peculiarly  difficult,  thought 
itself  being  the  sole  guide  and  corrective  of  thought. 
Unless  here  the  mind  is  fully  master  of  its  concepts,  it 
is  liable  to  take  the  flights  of  fancy  for  the  process  of 
reason.  Instead  of  taking  the  psychological  standpoint, 
and  merely  observing  the  movement  of  objects  in  the 
mind,  philosophy  checks  this  movement  in  order  to 
enter  the  objects  themselves,  to  think  them  exhaustively, 
so  as  to  leave  nothing  in  them  or  pertaining  to  them 
obscure.  We  thus  pass,  as  it  were,  from  physics  to 
chemistry ;  from  mere  relations  and  conditions  and 
movements,  to  the  nature  of  objects.  Take,  for  in- 
stance, the  notion  of  substance.  In  common  parlance 
the  word  is  used  as  if  perfectly  understood,  but  critical 
reflection  shows  that  there  are  depths  in  it  which  the 
mind  has  not  fathomed.  We  thus  operate  with  the 
word  as  a  mere  symbol,  while  the  thought  itself  is .  lost. 
The  meaning  of  the  term  "  substance  "  should  be  probed 
until  no  further  inquiries  respecting  it  are  possible,  or 
until  the  limit  of  thought  has  been  reached.  The  more 
comprehensive  and  abstract  a  term,  the  greater  the 
temptation  to  use  it  vaguely ;  and  this  vagueness  ueces- 


234      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

sarily  extends  to  all  objects  included  under  the  term. 
Common  among  such  vague  terms  are  "  being,"  "  cause," 
"matter,"  "spirit,"  "consciousness,"  "person."  The 
pronoun  "  I "  is  a  rich  subject  for  reflection.  Does  it 
include  all  that  is  meant  by  soul  or  spirit  ?  Does  it  in- 
clude the  body  ?  Is  it  the  representative  of  the  whole 
man,  or  only  of  the  conscious  self?  If  it  stands  for  the 
personality,  what  is  the  exact  meaning  of  that  personal- 
ity ?  Does  the  "  I  "  stand  for  a  substance,  or  is  it  only 
an  aggregate  of  the  various  states  of  consciousness? 

By  thus  taking  up  subjects,  and  giving  to  itself  a  full 
account  of  them,  the  mind  soon  discovers  that  it  is  in 
the  habit  of  operating  familiarly  with  concepts  which 
are  full  of  mystery ;  that  it  is  prone  to  inquire  into  the 
causes  of  things  before  understanding  the  things  them- 
selves; that  it  takes  symbols  for  things  and  concepts; 
and  that  in  many,  perhaps  by  far  the  most,  of  our  men- 
tal operations,  we  are  only  half  awake.  It  is  only  by 
deep  and  persistent  reflection  that  we  become  sufficiently 
conscious  of  ourselves  to  see  that  our  intellectual  life  is 
largely  a  dream,  —  a  dream  in  which  we  dream  that  we 
are  awake.  In  being  aroused  to  full  consciousness,  the 
mind  makes  real  progress,  attaining  a  state  which  will 
influence  all  its  future  operations.  The  result  is  not 
merely  a  clearing  of  the  understanding,  but  also  a  de- 
velopment of  our  knowledge.  Even  if  no  new  objects 
are  discovered,  the  old  ones  are  made  more  distinct,  and 
whatever  is  in  them  is  unfolded.  But  this  very  process 
may  also  lead  to  something  else ;  namely,  to  the  discov- 
ery of  germs  rich  in  the  promise  of  new  developments. 

This  method  of  taking  a  subject  and  holding  it  stead- 
ily before  the  mind  to  let  the  light  of  the  intellect  illu- 
mine every  part  of  it,  is  wholly  different  from  what  is 
called  discursive  thought.  We  do  not  proceed  from 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  235 

one  thing  to  another,  but  abide  by  one  subject.  Our 
thought  moves,  but  around  and  through  and  in  the 
same  object.  Subject  and  predicate  are  not  taken  apart 
and  viewed  separately,  as  sometimes  seems  to  be  the 
case ;  but  the  subject  is  seen  in  its  predicates,  so  that 
the  mind,  in  considering  them,  consciously  abides  by  the 
subject.  It  does  not  enter  on  a  process  of  syllogis- 
ac  reasoning  to  infer  something  else  from  the  subject. 
It  indeed  wants  to  make  new  discoveries,  but  those 
which  are  to  be  found  in  the  subject  itself,  not  outside 
of  it.  In  comparison  with  the  discursive,  we  can  call 
this  the  penetrative  and  exhaustive  method  of  thought. 

Let  A  be  the  object  of  this  penetrative  energy  of 
thought.  Instead  of  making  A  simply  a  link  in  a 
chain,  so  that  I  pass  from  it  to  B,  thence  to  C,  etc.,  I 
make  A  the  focus  on  which  all  possible  light  is  steadily 
concentrated.  I  want  to  know  just  what  A  is  and  con- 
tains. I  may  already  know  that  it  contains  the  predi- 
cates a,  £>,  c,  t?,  but  these  do  not  exhaust  it.  There  is 
an  unknown  x  which  I  want  to  discover,  and  for  that 
reason  I  confine  all  my  investigations  to  A.  If  I  proceed 
from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  it  is  from  the  known 
to  the  unknown  in  the  subject  itself.  In  this  process 
thought,  however,  does  not  confine  itself  permanently 
to  one  point.  Hegel's  dialectic  process  has  at  least 
demonstrated  this:  that  to  think  any  subject  exhaus- 
tively, necessarily  leads  beyond  the  subject  to  something 
else.  Individual  thoughts  may,  like  islands  of  the  sea, 
not  be  connected  superficially,  but  at  their  base. 

This  penetrative  method,  a  characteristic  of  all  philo- 
sophical thinking,  is  so  much  insisted  on  here  because  its 
neglect  is  so  common,  and  its  attainment  so  difficult. 
Our  modern  life,  with  its  endless  distractions,  and  its 
absorption  by  details,  with  much  reading  and  little 


236      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

thinking,  tends  to  make  thoughts  the  waves  which 
play  on  the  surface,  while  the  deep  remains  unfathomed. 
Thus  the  habit  is  formed  of  using  subjects  and  predi- 
cates without  thoroughly  understanding  them.  That 
men,  even  scholars,  constantly  use  concepts  which  they 
cannot  define,  is  one  of  the  worst  and  most  common 
vices  of  modern  thought. 

In  order  to  pass  from  the  subject  itself  to  something 
else,  we  must  distinguish  between  what  it  contains,  and 
what  the  mind  infers  from  it.  The  oil  painting  before 
me  is  nothing  but  canvas  with  certain  colors.  Analyze 
the  picture  as  I  will,  I  find  nothing  but  these.  But 
how  much  more  than  these  the  mind  infers  from  the 
picture !  It  was  painted,  it  did  not  grow ;  it  is  the 
product  of  an  artist ;  he  had  a  definite  end  in  view, 
embodied  in  the  picture  his  ideal,  and  had  skill  in 
execution.  And  these  conclusions  are  just  as  reliable 
as  the  fact  that  the  painting  consists  of  canvas  and 
colors.  But  every  inference  I  draw  respecting  the 
artist  depends  on  a  correct  apprehension  of  the  picture. 
If  it  is  a  chromo,  or  a  copy,  or  a  poor  picture,  I  make 
serious  blunders  in  my  inferences  by  reasoning  on  the 
supposition  that  it  is  a  Raphael. 

The  same  is  true  of  all  objects :  they  contain  some- 
thing, but  may  suggest  more ;  and  what  they  suggest 
depends  on  what  they  contain.  After  exhausting  the 
real  contents,  we  proceed  to  what  is  implied  by  them. 
I  want  to  learn  from  an  object  what  it  is,  and  what  it 
can  teach  me  respecting  other  objects  and  the  whole 
universe.  If  what  I  infer  from  an  object  is  really 
implied  by  it  (is  really  a  necessity  of  thinking),  then 
it  is  as  reliable  knowledge  as  any  other.  In  this  way, 
and  not  merely  from  observation,  we  get  new  subjects 
for  reflection.  Why  we  draw  these  inferences,  is  one 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  237 

of  the  important  problems  of  philosophy ;  how  to  draw 
them  correctly,  is  a  question  for  logic.  Because  some- 
thing is,  therefore  we  infer  that  something  else  must 
be.  This  is,  and  therefore  that  must  be,  really  involve 
all  that  can  be  known.  And  the  development  of  knowl- 
edge requires  the  mastering  of  the  concepts  of  what  is 
known  to  be,  and  then  the  following  to  their  utmost 
limits  the  inferences  legitimately  drawn  therefrom. 

From  this  it  is  evident  that  real  objects  of  knowledge 
are  not  merely  obtained  through  the  senses,  and  by 
watching  our  inner  operations,  but  that  they  may  also 
be  learned  from  correct  inferences.  In  science  this  has 
been  proved  by  inferring  the  existence  of  objects,  arid 
then  afterwards  confirming  the  inference  by  direct  dis- 
covery of  the  objects. 

Besides  this  exhaustive  method  in  treating  separate 
concepts,  progress  may  also  be  expected  by  connecting 
thoughts,  and  thus  forming  new  combinations,  and 
making  these  combinations  the  source  of  new  infer- 
ences. New  combinations  of  thoughts  are  new  discov- 
eries, and  may  furnish  new  germs  for  future  progress. 
Is  not  all  inference  in  reality  but  a  relating  process? 
Analysis  and  synthesis,  induction  and  deduction,  are 
but  processes  by  means  of  which  implied  relations  are 
made  explicit.  All  thinking  is  but  explication  of  an 
implication. 

If  knowledge  is  to  be  completed,  it  is  evidently  not 
enough  that  separate  concepts  be  mastered,  that  several 
of  them  be  combined,  and  that  the  implied  be  made 
explicit  by  means  of  inferences.  Disconnected  thoughts, 
lying  around  loose  in  fragments,  do  not  constitute 
knowledge  in  an  exalted  sense  any  more  than  stones 
scattered  about  constitute  a  building.  In  order  to  be 
completed,  knowledge  must  be  put  into  a  systematic 


238      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

form.  It  is  only  in  a  system  that  a  thought  occupies 
its  proper  place  in  relation  to  other  thoughts,  and 
attains  the  highest  perfection  of  which  it  is  capable. 

In  order  that  there  may  be  system,  a  subject  must 
be  clearly  defined,  so  as  to  determine  its  relation  to  the 
subjects  immediately  above  and  below  it.  After  its 
place  in  the  universe  of  knowledge  has  been  determined 
by  the  definition  and  necessary  explanations,  the  sub- 
ject must  be  separated  into  parts,  according  to  the 
logical  principles  of  division ;  that  is,  the  divisions 
must  include  the  whole  subject,  but  in  such  a  way  that 
they  do  not  include  one  another.*  Various  methods 
of  division  are  possible ;  and  the  one  adopted  must  be 
determined  by  the  nature  of  the  subject,  the  stage  of 
development  attained,  and  the  aims  of  the  author. 
The  divisions  may  be  chronological  or  geographical; 
they  may  be  determined  by  external  marks,  or  by 
internal  characteristics.  The  last  is  the  most  perfect, 
since  it  arranges  knowledge  according  to  its  inherent 
relations  and  real  connections.  In  every  case  the  same 
principle  of  division  should  be  followed  throughout. 
If,  for  instance,  a  subject  were  to  be  divided  partly 
historically,  partly  geographically,  partty  according  to 
its  inherent  character,  there  would  be  confusion  in- 
stead of  system,  overlapping  instead  of  division. 

Under  the  main  ones  come  the  subdivisions,  which 
must  also  follow  the  same  principles.  A  subject  can 
be  divided  and  subdivided  almost  endlessly.  The  ana- 
lytic process  may  be  carried  to  such  an  extent  that 
the  result  is  a  lifeless  skeleton.  The  scholasticism  of  the 
middle  ages  was  fond  of  nice  and  curious  distinctions, 
which  became  a  kind  of  mania;  but  by  this  process 
alone,  however  valuable  for  the  study  of  a  subject, 

*  See  the  chapter  on  the  Division  of  Philosophy. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  239 

living  systems,  intellectual  organisms,  are  not  produced. 
All  separation  is  for  the  sake  of  forming  the  parts  into 
an  articulated  union,  and  every  true  system  is  a  syn- 
thesis of  correlated  parts.  As  nothing  exists  except 
in  relations,  we  cannot  think  a  thing  correctly  if  we 
conceive  it  in  isolation.  There  is  no  individual  except 
as  part  of  the  whole ;  really  and  fully  to  comprehend  a 
thing  means,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  universe,  of 
which  it  is  a  part,  must  be  comprehended.  But  the 
synthetic  work  is  usually  far  more  difficult  than  the 
analytic.  Many  can  take  apart  a  watch,  who  cannot 
put  it  together  again  ;  and  yet  the  pieces  are  valuable 
only  because  they  form  the  watch.  The  dissection  of 
the  dead  body  is  so  important  because  it  enables  to 
understand  the  living  body  as  an  organism.  And  in 
mind  as  well  as  body  we  do  not  want  pieces  of  a  ruin, 
but  a  perfect  system. 

It  is  an  imperfect  view  of  a  system,  to  regard  it  as  a 
mere  form  which  does  not  affect  the  truth  itself.  As 
the  arm  is  something  very  different  on  the  body  from 
what  it  is  when  severed,  so  a  thought  is  not  the  same 
when  seen  by  itself  as  when  viewed  in  its  proper  con- 
nections and  relations.  In  the  system,  thought  is  given 
in  its  completeness  or  totality,  with  all  its  interlacings. 
All  questions  pertaining  to  relation,  cause,  and  pur- 
pose, have  relevancy  only  to  thought  in  an  articulated 
system. 

The  idea  of  system  presupposes  the  connection  of 
thought  so  as  to  form  a  unity.  But  how  can  this  unity 
be  established  or  rather  discovered?  By  finding  the 
principles  involved  in  a  subject  we  get  that  wherein  all 
pertaining  to  it  is  united.  A  system  consists  in  the 
arrangement  of  all  a  subject  involves  under  its  princi- 
ples according  to  their  organic  relations.  Some  idea  is 


240     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  animating  spirit  of  every  true  system,  giving  it  life 
and  determining  the  various  organs  of  the  system. 

From  this  it  is  evident  that  system  is  not  merely  of 
aesthetic  value,  nor  merely  an  expedient  for  remember- 
ing and  using  and  communicating  knowledge :  it  is 
necessary  for  the  completion  of  thought  itself.  The 
mind  demands  it.  Much  supposed  to  be  well  under- 
stood is  found  to  be  in  a  crude  state  as  soon  as  an  effort 
is  made  to  put  it  into  its  proper  place  and  articulations 
in  a  system.  Then  it  is  found  that  a  truth  unsystema- 
tized  is  only  half  truth ;  it  is  completed  truth  when  its 
exact  relation  to  other  truth  is  determined.  Thus  the 
very  effort  to  systematize  thought  leads  to  its  deeper 
study  and  more  perfect  development.  But  it  also 
makes  the  mind  conscious  of  its  limitations.  All  our 
systems  are  imperfect.  .  Many  of  our  thoughts,  espe- 
cially the  highest,  we  cannot  yet  put  into  a  system. 
Even  the  effort  to  harmonize  them  is  baffled.  In  their 
isolation  we  do  not  see  that  they  are  in  conflict,  but 
it  becomes  evident  so  soon  as  we  attempt  to  articulate 
them.  Most  painfully  do  we  become  conscious  of  limi- 
tation in  our  efforts  to  complete  all  knowledge  in  unity 
under  its  ultimate  principles.  This  is  the  ideal  of 
philosophy  in  its  search  for  those  final  explanations 
which  are  the  conditions  of  all  systems.  Only  when 
completed  can  the  theory  of  knowledge  determine  abso- 
lutely the  limits  of  human  thought. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Define  Knowledge.  Its  Origin.  Its  external  and  in- 
ternal factors.  Relation  to  Imagination,  Opinion, 
Faith.  Subjective  views  and  objective  Knowledge. 
Not  Certainty,  but  its  grounds  are  the  Criteria  of 
Knowledge.  Reasons  for  believing  in  an  external 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  241 

world.  Kant's  Ding  an  sich.  The  unconscious  basis  of 
conscious  operations.  Logic.  Formal  and  applied. 
Logic  as  a  revelation  of  the  nature  of  Mind.  What  is 
meant  by  Norms  of  Thought?  Can  real  Thinking  err? 
Laws  of  Thought  discovered  by  Logic,  as  mental  Pro- 
cesses by  Psychology.  What  is  abstract  thought  ?  Does 
reasoning  lead  to  the  discovery  of  objects  of  existence  ? 
Explain  Causation.  Hume's  view.  Basis  of  universal 
and  necessary  Truth.  Law  of  Identity,  and  Law  of 
Equality.  Doctrine  of  Innate  Ideas.  Views  of  Leib- 
nitz and  Kant  on  the  subject.  Relation  of  Thought 
to  Objects.  Harmony  of  Idealism  and  Realism.  Can 
we  identify  the  Laws  of  Thought  and  Being  (Hegel)  ? 
Place  of  the  Theory  of  Knowledge  in  Philosophy. 
Brilliant  and  penetrative  Thought.  Exhausting  a  Sub- 
ject, and  discursive  Thinking.  What  is  System  ?  How 
formed  ?  Its  effect  on  Thought.  Conditions  for  devel- 
oping and  increasing  Knowledge.  Limits  of  Thought. 
Their  relation  to  the  Limits  of  the  Real.  Significance 
of  the  Theory  of  Knowledge  for  the  times.  Is  Reason- 
ing more  than  comparison  ?  Basis  of  Reasoning. 
Kant's  analytic  and  synthetic  Judgments.  On  what 
grounds  do  we  infer  the  unknown  from  the  known  ? 


242      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

METAPHYSICS. 

BY  generalizing  the  various  objects  of  profitable 
thought,  we  can  comprehend  all  of  them  under  the  real, 
the  possible,  and  the  desirable.  The  first  includes  all  that 
actually  is,  the  last  embraces  the  ideals  to  be  sought, 
and  the  second  gives  the  sphere  in  which  their  realiza- 
tion may  be  expected.  As  the  severe  method  of  philos- 
ophy eliminates  from  its  inquiries  whatever  is  fanciful, 
it  finds  in  the  three  groups  all  that  can  claim  its  atten- 
tion. The  realm  of  thought  itself  consists  largely  in 
the  determination  of  what  is  possible.  Many  of  the 
problems  of  the  real  can  be  answered  only  in  terms  of 
logical  possibility  by  our  intellects.  The  third  division, 
the  desirable,  does  not  directly  concern  the  theory  of 
knowledge,  which  deals  primarily  with  what  the  intel- 
lect regards  as  necessary  or  possible  ;  but  in  that  divis- 
ion are  included  86sthetics  and  ethics,  which  deal  with 
ideals  and  their  realization.  The  problem  of  the  first 
division  leads  us  into  the  darkest  and  most  difficult 
region  of  thought,  namely  metaphysics. 

This  much-abused  term  represents  the  highest  aim  of 
philosophy,  and  the  ultimate  limit  of  intellectual  aspira- 
tion. The  word  itself  originated  in  the  title  given  by 
one  of  his  pupils  to  certain  works  of  Aristotle.  These 
treated  of  the  ultimate  principles  of  being  in  general, 
and  constituted  what  Aristotle  himself  called  "  Wis- 


METAPHYSICS.  243 

dom,"  or  "First  Philosophy,"  or  "Theology."  The 
fourteen  books  under  the  title  of  "  Metaphysics  "  were 
placed  after  his  works  on  Physics ;  and  this  circum- 
stance is  generally  supposed  to  have  determined  the 
title,  its  sense  being  that  these  books  should  follow 
those  on  Physics.  It  may,  however,  be  that  the  title 
was  intended  to  indicate  the  nature  of  the  contents, 
namely  such  as  lie  beyond  physics.* 

It  is  only  of  secondary  importance  what  the  original 
import  of  the  words  of  which  "  metaphysics  "  is  com- 
pounded may  have  been,  or  what  sense  was  attached  to 
the  compound  itself  by  him  who  first  used  it  to  desig- 
nate a  particular  subject.  Aristotle  himself  did  not 
designate  any  part  of  his  philosophy  by  this  term,  nor  is 
it  certain  that  all  the  books  placed  under  this  title  are 
by  him.  The  general  contents  of  these  books  may, 
however,  be  a  valuable  aid  in  understanding  the 
original  meaning  of  the  term ;  but  what  his  pupils  or 
successors  called  metaphysics,  can  no  more  be  a  law 
for  the  sense  of  the  term  at  present,  than  "physics," 
as  employed  by  the  ancients,  can  determine  its  use  by 
scientists  now.  But  the  aim  of  Aristotle  in  his  First 
Philosophy  indicates  the  aim  of  metaphysic  in  all  ages, 
being  the  thread  running  through  all  metaphysical 
systems. 

In  this  First  Philosophy,  Aristotle  aimed  to  discover 
the  general  principles  of  being,  in  distinction  from  the 
special  sciences,  which  are  devoted  to  particular  depart- 
ments of  being.f  He  sought  to  explain  what  lies 

*  Ta  fieri  TO.  ^vetted.  The  preposition  may  mean  either  after  or  beyond 
(trans). 

t  "  For  Aristotle,  metaphysic  is  the  science  which  has  to  do  with 
being  as  such,  being  in  general,  as  distinguished  from  the  special 
sciences  which  deal  with  special  forms  of  being."  —  Ency.  Brit.:  Meta- 
physics. 


244      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

behind  all  phenomena,  and  is  their  source.  The  main 
points  discussed  were  substance,  form,  cause,  and  de- 
sign, which  he  regarded  as  involving  the  problems  con- 
nected with  the  essence  of  being.  And  at  all  times  the 
questions  connected  with  being,  with  reality,  in  distinc- 
tion from  the  phenomenal,  and  from  our  conceptions, 
have  occupied  the  attention  of  metaphysicians.* 

While  metaphysic  has  from  the  first  dealt  with  being 
or  the  absolutely  real,  it  could  of  course  treat  this  only 
intellectually  or  as  an  object  of  knowledge.  All  ques- 
tions involved  might  be  resolved  into  this  one,  What 
can  be  known  respecting  the  ultimate  nature  of  reality? 
The  principles  of  being  are  sought,  the  explanation  of 
it,  an  intellectual  apprehension  of  what  is.  Thus  meta- 
physic of  course  involves  the  problems  of  knowledge, 
especially  that  of  the  limits  of  the  human  faculties. 
Does  the  power  of  thought  extend  to  reality,  or  is  it 
limited  to  phenomena?  It  is  not  surprising  that  in 
Hume,  Kant,  and  others,  the  question  of  metaphysics  led 
to  an  inquiry  into  the  limits  of  knowledge.  But  in 
order  to  get  a  clear  conception  of  metaphysic  itself  we 
must  distinguish  it  from  the  means  necessary  for  mas- 
tering it.  Certain  mental  conditions  are  necessary  for 
discovering  the  laws  of  nature,  yet  we  distinguish  be- 
tween these  laws  and  those  conditions.  The  same  is 
true  in  metaphysic.  Its  knowledge  is  the  highest,  and 
requires  the  greatest  mental  efforts ;  but  it  is  the  result 
of  these  efforts  which  is  to  be  viewed  as  metaphysic. 
By  keeping  this  in  mind  we  shall  avoid  the  mistake, 
which  is  common,  of  confounding  this  subject  with  the 


*  "  On  the  one  hand,  we  see  Plato  and  Aristotle  striving  to  seize 
absolute  existence,  and,  on  the  other,  to  apprehend  it  as  the  cause  of  the 
apparent  reality.  This  is  also  undoubtedly  the  main  purpose  of  meta- 
physics." —  FLUGBL  in  Zeitschrift  fur  exakte  Philosophic.  1875, 15. 


METAPHYSICS.  245 

theory  of  knowledge.  This  theory  is  related  to  meta- 
physic,  as  the  rules  of  science  to  the  science  formed  by 
their  application. 

Before  the  theory  of  knowledge  had  become  a  special 
and  prominent  department  of  philosophy,  it  was  natural 
that  questions  concerning  the  power  of  thought  should 
be  discussed  in  connection  with  metaphysical  inquiries. 
Even  now  the  metaphysician  may  find  it  necessary  to 
discuss  such  questions,  and  indicate  the  conditions  for 
attaining  a  solution  of  the  ultimate  problems ;  just  as 
the  scientist,  even  after  the  principles  of  science  are 
separately  treated,  may  find  it  necessary  to  discuss  those 
principles  as  he  applies  them.  But  for  the  metaphysi- 
cian the  main  purpose  is  the  solution  of  metaphysical 
problems,  and  not  to  lose  himself  in  the  investigation  of 
the  means ;  though  that  solution  can  only  be  found  by 
using  the  proper  means,  they  exist  for  the  sake  of  the 
end  they  are  to  attain.  Kant's  Kritik  is  an  inquiry 
whether  metaphysic  is  possible  ;  and  since  he  concludes 
that  it  is  not,  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  that  work  as  itself 
a  system  of  metaphysics. 

Questions  respecting  the  powers  of  the  human  under 
standing  belong  to  the  theory  of  knowledge  ;  yet  every 
subject  can  take  from  this  theory  whatever  it  may  need 
for  its  own  development.  But  it  leads  to  confusion  to 
make  metaphysic  partly  an  inquiry  into  the  limits  of 
the  understanding,  and  partly  an  explanation  of  abso< 
lute  being,  two  distinct  subjects  being  mixed  in  this 
way.  We  shall,  therefore,  distinguish  metaphysic,  or 
the  principles  of  being,  —  attempting  to  explain  the 
essence  of  what  is,  and  giving  the  ground  of  what  ap- 
pears,—  from  the  theory  of  knowledge,  or  from  the 
rules  necessary  for  attaining  these  principles. 

Where   the  naive  view  prevails  that  phenomena  are 


246      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  things  per  8e,  or  that  by  means  of  sensation  we  get 
at  the  very  heart  of  being,  there  will,  of  course,  be  no 
deeper  metaphysical  inquiries.  If  common-sense  is  the 
criterion  of  all  knowledge,  we  need  but  interrogate  it 
in  order  to  learn  all  that  can  be  known  about  being. 
Or,  if  our  knowledge  of  being  is  regarded  as  intuitive, 
we  need  but  behold  our  intuitions  to  get  our  metaphys- 
ics. So  far  as  sensationalism  has  prevailed  in  England, 
France,  and  other  countries,  the  metaphysical  problems 
have  not  even  been  apprehended.  If  all  the  gold  lies 
loose  on  the  surface,  no  one  will  be  so  foolish  as  to 
quarry  the  hard  rock  to  find  it.  If  common-sense  and 
intuitionalism  contain  all  the  treasures  of  wisdom,  the 
philosophical  problems  lose  their  difficulty.  In  Scot- 
land, where  special  stress  has  been  laid  on  these  two 
sources  of  knowledge,  they  have  been  regarded  as  fur- 
nishing the  final  solutions  of  metaphysics.  Indeed,  in 
that  country  metaphysic  has  largely  been  identified  with 
an  inquiry  into  the  first  principles  of  human  knowledge. 
Thus  Stewart  speaks  of  metaphysic  as  applicable  to  all 
inquiries  which  aim  "  to  trace  the  various  branches  of 
human  knowledge  to  their  first  principles  in  the  consti- 
tution of  the  human  mind."  President  M'Cosh,  in  his 
"  Logic  "  says,  "  The  science  which  treats  of  the  intui- 
tive operations  of  the  mind  is  called  metaphysics ;  the 
science  which  considers  the  discursive  acts  is  logic." 
Accordingly  his  work  on  "  The  Intuitions  of  the  Mind  " 
is  a  system  of  metaphysics.  This  makes  metaphysic 
part  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  that  part  namely 
which  pertains  to  intuitions.*  But  are  not  questions 

*  In  the  article  "  Metaphysics  "  in  Ency.  Brit.,  the  subject  is  defined 
as  that  "which  deals  with  the  conditions  of  all  knowing  and  being." 
In  the  article  of  Dr.  M'Cosh,  already  quoted,  he  says  of  the  principles 
of  the  intuitions,  "  A  system  or  systematized  arrangement  of  such 
principles  constitutes  metaphysics  or  mental  philosophy.  .  .  .  All  pro- 


METAPHYSICS.  247 

respecting  "  the  intuitive  operations  of  the  mind  "  psy- 
chological and  noetic  rather  than  metaphysical  ?  It  is 
well  known  that  scepticism  has  shaken  the  confidence 
in  these  intuitive  operations,  so  that  inquiries  respect- 
ing them  are  of  great  importance.  But  such  inquiries, 
like  those  of  Locke,  Hume,  and  Kant,  concern  the  nature 
and  the  limits  of  human  understanding.  If  it  is  once 
established  by  the  theory  of  knowledge  that  there  are 
such  intuitive  operations,  and  that  they  give  a  knowl- 
edge of  being,  then  this  knowledge,  the  result  of  these 
operations,  will  be  metaphysics ;  and  then  all  the  in- 
quiries into  these  intuitive  operations  will  be  the  propae- 
deutic of  metaphysics,  but  not  the  system  itself. 

We  must  hold  fast  the  idea  that  metaphysic  pertains 
to  being,  its  principles,  its  ultimate  explanation,  its 
essence.  Ueberweg  pronounces  it  "  the  science  of  prin- 
ciples in  general,  so  far  as  they  are  common  to  all 
being."  *  According  to  Lotze,  "  metaphysic  is  the  sci- 
ence of  the  real,  not  of  the  merely  thinkable.  Reality 
is  that  by  means  of  which  an  existing  object  is  distin- 
guished from  the  non-existing,  a  transpiring  event  from 
the  non-transpiring,  an  existing  from  a  non-existing 
relation."  f  One  of  the  latest  works  on  metaphysics 
also  regards  the  nature  of  being  as  the  object  of  meta- 
physical inquiry,  and  declares  that  it  is  the  province  of 
metaphysic  uto  explain  the  notion  of  being  and  the 
method  of  its  attainment."  J 

Hegel,  by  identifying  the  principles  of  knowing  with 

fessed  metaphysical  principles  are  attempted  generalizations  of  our 
intuitive  perceptions  and  judgments."  (593-595.) 

*  "  Die  Wissenschaft  von  den  Principien  im  Allgemeinen,  sofern  sie 
allem  Seienden  gemeinsam  sind."  — Loyik,  5  edit.,  9. 

t  Gnindziige  der  Metaphysik,  8. 

|  Teichmiiller:  Die  wirkliche  und  die  scheinbare  Welt.  Neue  Grundlaye 
der  Metaphysik.  1882,  3. 


248     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

those  of  being,  made  the  laws  of  thought  also  the  laws 
of  reality.  The  process  of  thought  is  the  process  of 
the  absolute  or  of  being  in  the  highest  sense.  His 
pantheism  is  a  panlogism.  Where  thought  and  being 
are  thus  identified,  it  is  necessary  that  one  system, 
metaphysics,  should  include  both.  But  the  confidence 
in  the  discovery  of  this  identity  has  been  lost,  and  it  is 
now  held  to  be  safer  to  view  thought  as  an  explanation 
of  being  than  to  imagine  that  the  essence  of  being  is 
already  given  in  thought  itself.  The  present  condition 
of  philosophy  demands  the  separate  investigation  of  the 
principles  of  knowledge,  and  then  the  application  of 
these  principles  to  the  explanation  of  being. 

When  metaphysic  is  declared  to  deal  with  the  "  con- 
ditions "  of  being,  the  meaning  can  only  be  the  condi- 
tions for  the  existence  of  particular  objects.  Let  any 
one  inquire,  for  instance,  Why  is  there  being  rather 
than  nothing?  and  he  will  soon  find  himself  in  a  region 
in  which  thought  is  lost.  Besides,  that  being  which 
has  conditions  is  not  the  ultimate  object  of  metaphysi- 
cal investigation:  it  seeks,  above  all,  a  knowledge  of 
that  being  which  is  unconditioned. 

The  term  "  being "  is  the  most  abstract  that  can  be 
conceived.  It  includes  all  that  is,  and  yet  indicates 
nothing  peculiar  to  any  kind  of  existence.  So  broad 
in  extension  as  to  embrace  every  thing,  it  is  so  empty 
of  content  (intensively)  that  Hegel  identified  it  with 
nothing.  There  is  no  pure  being  in  existence,  except 
in  thought ;  that  is,  there  is  nothing  of  which  it  can  be 
said  that  it  is  being  and  nothing  else.  Instead  of  empty 
being,  which  is  absolutely  nothing  but  the  thought  of 
mere  existence,  all  that  is  real  is  something  particular. 
The  thought  of  "  being  "  is  so  great  an  abstraction  that 
the  mind  at  first  finds  difficulty  in  grasping  it.  Instead 


METAPHYSICS.  249 

of  defining  metaphysic  as  dealing  with  being  or  the 
notion  of  being,  we  can  say  that  it  treats  of  reality,  of 
real  existence.  By  the  real  we  understand  that  which 
is  not  merely  thought,  but  which  exists,  whether  we 
think  it  or  not. 

Professor  Harms  says :  "  Metaphysic  treats  of  the 
being  of  that  which  is  thought,  as  it  is  outside  of 
thought  (praeter  notionem)  ;  logic,  however,  treats  of  the 
being  of  that  which  is  thought,  as  it  is  in  thought. 
As  the  latter  is,  however,  only  a  thought,  while  the 
former  is  called  a  reality,  the  one  treats  of  being,  the 
other  of  thought.  Both  conceptions  are  fundamental 
for  knowledge,  for  there  is  no  knowledge  in  which 
there  is  no  thought  and  being.  The  conception  of 
being  applies  to  the  known  outside  of  thought,  and 
that  of  thought  applies  to  that  known  in  thought." 
It  is  not,  however,  taken  for  granted  by  philosophy 
that  the  real  in  this  sense  is  self-evident ;  some  of  the 
deepest  problems  of  philosophy  are  involved  in  the 
notion  of  the  real.  Our  consciousness  informs  us  that 
thought  itself  is  real  in  the  sense  that  it  exists  for  us; 
but  is  the  object  of  thought  any  thing  real  ?  Does  any 
thing  outside  of  the  mind  correspond  with  my  thought 
of  an  object?  The  import  of  this  question  will  be 
clear  to  every  one  who  apprehends  the  fact  that  we 
have  an  immediate  knowledge  only  of  what  is  before 
consciousness. 

We  can  define  metaphysics  as  the  philosophy  of  the 
real,  involving  as  it  does  all  that  is  necessary  to  explain 
reality.24  Its  aim  being  to  explain  the  real,  the  charge 
that  it  is  visionary  can  have  significance  only  when  it 
becomes  false  to  itself.  Its  subjects  are  not  arbitrarily 
chosen  ;  their  basis  is  found  in  consciousness,  and  in  all 
deeper  inquiries  they  are  forced  on  the  mind.  One 


250      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

cannot  think  at  all  without  coming  to  metaphysical 
problems.  Experience  itself  needs  metaphysics  as  much 
as  a  tree  does  roots.  Behind  the  infinite  variety  mir- 
rored in  consciousness,  the  being  and  nature  of  mind 
furnish  deep  metaphysical  problems.  Behind  phenomena 
there  must  be  something  that  is  not  phenomenal,  but 
the  ground  of  all  phenomena ;  this  ground  metaphysic 
seeks.  At  the  basis  of  the  changeable  there  must  be 
something  that  is  unchangeable  ;  the  qualities  suggest 
a  substance,  and  the  apparent  the  real.  Metaphysic 
wants  to  discover  and  explain  the  eternal,  the  immu- 
table, the  uncaused  cause,  the  substance.  Every  con- 
sciousness assumes  something  as  real;  all  experience 
presupposes  it;  every  science  takes  its  existence  for 
granted ;  all  thought  ultimately  seeks  it ;  the  ordinary 
thinking  claims  to  have  it ;  the  metaphysician  wants  to 
make  sure  that  it  is  intellectually  in  his  possession. 
Experience  is  full  of  contradictions,  which  the  mind 
cannot  tolerate  ;  in  the  ultimate  source  of  all  there  can 
be  no  contradiction,  for  in  that  case  it  would  be  self- 
destructive.  Hence  the  ultimate  unity  and  harmony 
are  sought.  Something  appears,  then  vanishes  ;  but  it 
can  only  appear  if  something  else  is  that  makes  it  ap- 
pear. There  can  be  no  light  unless  there  is  something 
that  shines.  Now,  what  is  this  that  i«,  and  makes 
something  else  appear,  but  does  not  itself  appear?  Is 
it  matter?  Is  it  spirit?  Is  it  Plato's  idea?  Is  it 
Spinoza's  substance,  to  or  on  which  thought  and  ex- 
tension are  but  attributes  or  modes?  Is  it  the  monad 
of  Leibnitz,  or  the  Realien  of  Herbart  ? 

From  this  it  is  evident  what  the  leading  problems  of 
metaphysics  are.  In  the  ordinary  consciousness,  and 
by  the  sciences,  are  given  certain  notions  which  are 
supposed  to  be  ultimate.  These  are  taken  up  by  the 


METAPHYSICS.  251 

metaphysician,  and  subjected  to  the  most  rigorous  test, 
in  order  to  determine  their  validity.  His  aim  is  always 
to  find  what  is,  in  distinction  from  that  which  becomes. 
Such  terms  as  "  matter  "  and  "  spirit "  are  critically  in- 
vestigated, to  learn  just  what  they  present  to  the  mind. 
When  their  exact  sense  is  found,  all  sorts  of  questions 
still  remain  to  be  answered.  If  matter  is  ultimate,  how 
does  what  we  call  spirit  originate  from  it  ?  If  spirit  is 
ultimate,  how  does  it  produce  matter  ?  May  there  not 
be  something  behind  both  matter  and  spirit,  neither  the 
one  nor  the  other,  and  yet  the  cause  of  both  ?  Perhaps 
both  can  somehow  be  united,  so  that  they  are  in  reality 
one,  though  to  us  they  seem  wholly  dissimilar.  Besides 
the  question  of  the  nature  of  original  being,  there  are 
many  others.  Is  this  original  being  a  unit,  a  duality, 
or  a  plurality?  Thus  the  questions  of  monism,  of 
dualism,  and  of  pluralism  are  involved.  Is  the  original 
reality  but  one  in  nature  and  also  a  unit  in  itself,  the 
only  one  of  its  kind,  as  the  God  of  theism  ?  Or  is  it 
one  in  essence,  but  with  many  samples  of  the  same,  as 
the  atoms  of  Democritus?  But  the  various  conceptions 
of  original  being  are  only  the  beginning  of  metaphysi- 
cal inquiry, — a  beginning  which  is  yet  endless.  Were 
the  nature  of  the  original  known,  other  questions  would 
immediately  arise.  How  is  it  related  to  the  derived? 
Is  the  process  one  of  creation,  or  of  evolution  ?  It  is 
thus  seen  that  the  problems  are  those  of  theism  and 
atheism,  of  pantheism,  materialism,  and  idealism.  In 
order  to  understand  the  real,  we  must  know  how  it  is 
connected  so  as  to  form  a  universe  in  which  nothing 
is  isolated ;  this  involves  the  question  of  the  relation  of 
things.  In  considering  the  difference  between  what  is 
and  what  becomes,  we  come  to  the  questions  of  cause 
and  effect.  These  introduce  some  of  the  deepest  prob- 


252     INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

lems  discussed  by  Hume  and  Kant.  We  distinguish 
between  qualities,  and  the  substances  in  which  they 
inhere.  Is  the  substance  distinct  from  its  forces  or 
powers?  Are,  perhaps,  the  transpiring  events  them- 
selves the  only  realities,  while  force  and  substance  are 
mere  mental  creations?  Is  the  form  distinct  from  the 
substance  ?  Of  what  is  called  external  reality  we  ha\  e 
no  conception  except  as  existing  in  space ;  and  of  all 
that  is  external  and  internal  we  have  no  conception 
except  in  time.  What,  then,  are  space  and  time  ?  But 
there  are  still  other  problems  which  lie  at  the  heart  of 
all  reality.  Is  there  design  in  the  universe,  or  is  the 
cosmos  wholly  purposeless?  What  rules?  Reason, 
fate,  or  chance  ? 

These  and  the  numerous  problems  connected  with 
them  give  the  contents  of  metaphysics.  It  is  evident 
from  them  that  all  the  inquiries  pertain  to  being,  and 
that  the  ultimate  aim  always  is  to  get  the  explanation 
of  reality.  The  old  division,  whether  adopted  or  not, 
gives  a  clear  idea  of  the  subjects  of  metaphysics ;  namely, 
ontology,  cosmology,  rational  psychology,  and  rational 
theology.  Ontology  considers  the  principles  of  all  being, 
whatever  is  common  to  all  that  is.*  It  asks  what  being 
is.  What  must  an  object  be  in  order  that  being  may  be 
predicated  of  it  ?  What  is  the  distinction  between  being 
and  reality  ?  The  relation  of  being  to  becoming  (Sein 
und  Werderi)  also  belongs  to  this  division,  thus  introdu- 
cing the  subject  of  cause  and  effect.  The  notions  of 
substance  and  quality,  of  quantity  and  relation,  are  also 
involved.  The  other  three  divisions  take  up  the  three 
highest  classes  of  being,  or  the  realities  contained  in  the 
abstract  notion  of  being.f  Cosmology  treats  of  the  ma- 

*  It  has  been  called  Scientia  entis  in  genere. 
t  "  Scientia  entis  in  specie." 


METAPHYSICS. 


253 


terial  universe,  and  discusses  matter,  its  connections  and 
relations,  together  with  space,  time,  design,  and  the 
other  general  problems  involved  in  the  existence  of  the 
cosmos.  Rational  psychology  (also  called  speculative 
or  metaphysical  psychology)  discusses  the  essence  (na- 
ture) of  the  soul,  whether  material  or  spiritual,  whether 
a  unit  or  an  aggregation,  a  simple  or  a  compound  sub- 
Stance  ;  whether  free  and  immortal.  Rational  theology 
is  similar  to  what  has  been  called  natural  theology,  and 
treats  of  God  so  far  as  an  object  of  pure  reason.  It  dis- 
cusses the  question  of  his  existence,  testing  the  various 
proofs  which  have  been  adduced;  also  his  nature,  attri- 
butes, and  relation  to  the  world.* 

If  there  is  one  subject  which,  more  than  any  other, 
arouses  the  deepest  interest,  and  strains  the  mind  to  the 
utmost,  it  is  metaphysics.  If  in  it  speculation  and  ab- 
straction culminate,  it  also  absorbs  and  concentrates 
enthusiasm.  One  need  but  apprehend  the  nature  of  its 
problems  in  order  to  appreciate  the  deep  devotion  and 
intense  application  of  the  profoundest  philosophers  to 
metaphysical  studies.  Metaphysic  seeks  the  first  thought 
of  reality  in  order  that  it  may  derive  all  others  from  that 
original,  and  discover  the  last  thought ;  it  searches  for 
the  basis  (the  presupposition)  of  all  experience  and  all 
science  ;  it  attempts  to  solve  the  problems  of  the  world, 
of  man,  and  of  God ;  it  seeks  the  beginning  of  all  begin- 
nings. 

The  mind  which  understands  the  meaning  of  meta- 
physic,  and  yet  treats  the  subject  frivolously,  must  be 
essentially  profane.  "  The  anti-metaphysical  twaddle  of 

*  Lotze,  who  holds  that  metaphysic  aims  to  discover  the  laws  of  the 
connection  between  the  separate  elements  of  reality,  divides  the  subject 
into  three  parts  ;  namely,  ontology,  cosmology,  and  phsenomenology, 
or  rational  psychology.  Rational  theology,  also  a  part  of  the  old  meta- 
physic, is  treated  separately,  under  the  head  of  Philosophy  of  Religion. 


254      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

many  persons  reveals  great  levity  and  gross  ignorance 
respecting  the  most  weighty  problems."  *  The  intellect 
cannot  accept  as  final  the  words  of  M.  Renan :  "  God, 
providence,  immortality,  are  so  many  good  words,  per- 
haps a  little  lumbering,  which  philosophy  will  interpret 
in  senses  more  and  more  refined,  but  which  it  will  never 
replace  to  advantage.  Under  one  form  or  another  God 
will  always  be  the  summary  of  our  supernatural  needs, 
the  category  of  the  ideal"  This  writer  gives  a  significant 
insight  into  his  own  mind,  rather  than  into  metaphysics, 
when  he  says,  "  Metaphysic  is  nothing  but  a  most  ele- 
vated and  noble  manner  of  conceiving  and  grouping 
things ;  it  is  to  every  thinker  whatever  pleases  him."  f 

It  is  a  work  of  supererogation  to  plead  for  the  contin- 
uance of  metaphysics.  Some  kind  or  other  will  exist 
as  long  as  the  human  mind  ;  the  only  question  is,  what 
kind?  It  is  a  mental  necessity,  and  if  the  intellect 
cannot  get  a  rational  metaphysic,  it  will,  perhaps  un- 
consciously, adopt  one  based  on  mere  opinion.  Kant 
despaired  of  the  final  solution  of  the  highest  problems 
by  the  speculative  reason,  but  he  understood  human 
nature  too  well  to  question  the  continuance  of  meta- 
physics. He  said,  "  In  all  persons,  as  soon  as  their  rea- 
son rose  to  speculation,  there  has  always  been  some  kind 
of  metaphysics,  and  there  always  will  be."  A  shallow 
empiricism  attempts  to  flee  from  metaphysic  as  if  it  were 
a  ghost ;  it,  however,  invents  its  own,  but  of  the  crudest 
sort.  "Its  metaphysic  consists  in  this,  that  it  returns 
to  the  metaphysical  prejudices  of  the  common  conscious- 
ness, which  it  enriches  with  some  contradictions  intro- 
duced by  science."!  Its  superficial  character  alone 

*  Schilling:  Zeitschrift  fur  exacte  Philosophic,  1863. 
t  Ribot:  Mind,  1877,  381. 
J  Wundt:  Einfluss,  24. 


METAPHYSICS. 


255 


makes  it  questionable  whether  it  is  worthy  of  being 
called  metaphysics.  Positivism  relegates  the  subject  to 
the  antiquated  vagaries  of  the  past,  but  it  has  a  sort  of 
metaphysic  made  to  order  for  its  own  private  use.  "  It 
requires  little  subtlety  to  read  metaphysics  between  the^ 
lines  of  the  positive  philosophy.  The  difference  lies  be- 
tween the  metaphysic  which  recognizes  itself  as  such, 
and  that  which  does  not ;  between  the  metaphysic  which, 
because  it  understands  the  distinctive  nature  of  its  prob- 
lem, does  not  seek  the  solution  of  it  from  the  sciences 
which  themselves  form  the  problem  to  be  solved,  and 
that  which,  unaware  of  its  own  office,  though  unable  to 
discard  it,  interpolates  itself  into  the  sciences  and  then 
extracts  from  them,  under  the  guise  of  a  scientific  theory 
of  mental  phenomena,  what  are,  after  all,  but  the  first 
thoughts  of  metaphysic  clothing  themselves  in  a  new  set 
of  mechanical  or  physiological  metaphors."  *  Even  in 
England,  where  an  abhorrence  of  metaphysics  is  often 
expressed,  it  cannot  be  banished  from  natural  science 
and  psychology,  to  say  nothing  of  philosophy.! 

The  most  serious  opposition,  based  largely  on  Kant's 
Kritik,  regards  a  speculative  metaphysical  system  im- 
possible. The  failure  of  the  ruling  systems  at  the 

*  T.  H.  Green:  Contemp.  Rev.,  vol.  31,  26. 

t  Vigorous  thinkers  in  England,  not  dominated  by  sensationalism, 
are  making  an  earnest  effort  to  promote  a  deeper  study  of  metaphysical 
questions.  Philosophers  affected  by  the  movement  begun  by  Kant,  as 
well  as  by  that  which  Locke  inaugurated,  keenly  feel  the  neglect  or 
superficial  treatment  of  the  profoundest  problems.  The  late  Mr.  Green 
declared  that  Englishmen  have  not  taken  the  first  step  to  solve  the 
metaphysical  problem  left  by  Hume;  that,  in  fact,  in  England  the  prob- 
lem had  not  even  been  put  in  "  its  true  and  distinctive  form."  Respect- 
ing the  claim  of  English  writers  to  substitute  psychology  for  metaphysics, 
Mr.  Green  said,  "  It  is  not  really,  nor  can  be,  the  case  that  our  psychology 
has  cleared  itself  of  metaphysics,  but  that,  being  metaphysical  still,  it 
is  so  with  the  metaphysics  of  apre-Kantian,  or  even  of  a  pre-Berkeleian, 


256      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

beginning  of  this  century  has  promoted  this  view ; 
but  their  failure  must  not  be  identified  with  that  of 
philosophy.  Kant's  Kritik  is  not  final ;  it  is  the  begin- 
ning, not  the  completion,  of  the  critical  method.  Every 
theory  of  the  limits  of  the  human  understanding  is 
liable  to  be  negatived  by  that  understanding  itself,  and 
the  intellect  is  likely  to  take  its  own  achievements  as 
the  limit  of  its  powers.  Metaphysic  is  one  of  the  ideals 
of  philosophy,  even  the  greatest.  All  the  highest  aims 
are  ideals,  but  that  is  no  valid  reason  for  abandoning 
their  pursuit.  In  dealing  with  the  most  difficult  of  all 
problems,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  intellect  has  wan- 
dered much  in  its  search  for  the  right  road.  Has  it 
been  otherwise  in  any  other  department  ?  The  critical 
philosopher  is  not  so  presumptuous  as  to  claim  that  he 
has  the  explanation  of  the  universe ;  but,  strange  as  it 
may  seem,  those  who  most  vigorously  denounce  meta- 
physics, presumptuously  claim  to  have  solved  the  mys- 
tery. There  is  an  impudent  materialism  which  is  too 
conceited  to  recognize  itself  as  metaphysic  reduced  to 
a  guess  and  an  assumption.  Paulsen  says,  "Aside 
from  frivolous  materialists,  who  find  some  sense  in  the 
statement  that  perception  is  motion,  there  is  to-day 
probably  not  a  metaphysician  who  believes  that  he  has 
the  key  to  unlock  the  mysteries  of  the  world." 

In  the  various  systems  of  metaphysics,  we  see  how 
the  world-problem  has  been  mirrored  in  different  minds, 
and  how  they  have  attempted  its  solution.  Around 
this  problem  has  been  concentrated  the  deepest  think- 
ing of  the  ages.  Although  we  cannot  yet  think  the 
universe,  this  does  not  imply  that  the  inquiry  into 
its  ultimate  explanation  has  not  taught  valuable  lessons. 
We  may  not  be  able  to  explain  the  nature  of  electricity, 
and  yet  the  very  effort  to  find  the  explanation  may 


METAPHYSICS.  257 

teach  many  important  truths.  He  who  has  read  in  the 
history  of  philosophy  only  the  failure  of  metaphysics 
to  solve  its  problems,  may  have  had  his  eyes  open,  but 
his  mind  must  have  been  closed.  The  problem  has 
been  made  clearer;  its  depth  and  difficulties  have 
been  revealed ;  popular  fallacies  have  been  exposed ; 
cherished  methods  of  handling  the  problem  have 
been  proved  false  ;  conditions  for  the  solution  have  been 
made  plainer ;  the  search  for  the  highest  intellectual 
attainments  has  led  the  mind  into  the  sublimest  regions 
of  thought ;  and  deep  lessons,  and  numerous  valuable 
discoveries  and  truths,  lie  all  along  the  path  of  meta- 
physical inquiry.  What  one  finds  in  the  history  of 
metaphysics  depends  somewhat  on  the  ability  of  the 
seeker. 

We  are  living  in  an  era  when  metaphysic  is  viewed 
with  suspicion,  and  when  its  supposed  solutions  are 
received  with  scepticism.  There  is  no  reason  for  regret- 
ting this.  Metaphysic  needs  thorough  purging.  The 
time  has  come  when  dreams  and  visions  and  poetic 
inspirations  must  cease  to  be  viewed  as  the  intellectual 
counterpart  of  reality.  Metaphysic  has  been  too  hasty 
in  its  conclusions,  has  leaped  over  the  necessary  condi- 
tions, has  assumed  what  should  have  been  demon- 
strated, and  has  attempted  to  rear  its  structure  without 
properly  laying  the  foundation.  It  is  fortunate  that 
the  day  is  past  when  it  was  blindly  praised,  and  when 
its  wildest  conclusions  were  accepted  uncritically,  — 
fortunate,  because  now  its  vagueness  must  cease,  it 
must  pass  from  promises  to  real  solutions,  and  it  must 
prove  its  premises  instead  of  constructing  mythologies. 
What  it  has  lost  in  appearance,  it  will  gain  in  sub- 
stance and  solidity.  Metaphysic,  through  the  very  criti- 
cism to  which  it  has  been  subjected,  has  been  made 


258      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

conscious  of  itself.  The  recognition  and  removal  of 
its  diseases  are  the  conditions  of  health.  It  tried  to 
soar  instead  of  treading  on  solid  ground.  It  has  now 
learned  to  creep,  in  order  to  be  safe.  There  cannot 
be  too  much  healthy  criticism  and  caution  respecting 
the  profoundest  inquiries.  There  is,  it  is  true,  no  en- 
couragement for  pretenders,  or  the  frivolous,  to  enter 
the  deep,  dark  mine  in  which  metaphysicians  labor,  but 
the  loss  will  not  be  appreciable  ;  those  called  to  that 
sphere  will  feel  an  irresistible  impulse  to  enter  and 
quarry. 

So  far  is  metaphysic  from  opposing  inquiries  into  the 
limits  of  the  human  mind,  that  it  has  actually  given 
birth  to  them.  It  wants  to  work  wholly  in  the  domain 
of  the  possible  and  the  real.  To  be  metaphysical  in  the 
true  sense,  does  not,  then,  imply  an  abandonment  of 
reality,  but  rather  absorption  in  its  contemplation.  It 
is  in  the  effort  to  pass  from  the  phenomenal  to  the  real, 
that  the  mind  is  most  of  all  led  to  consider  the  ques- 
tion of  its  limitations,  which  is  seen  most  strikingly  in 
the  case  of  Kant.  Locke  was  more  a  psychologist  than 
a  metaphysician.  Berkeley  and  Hume  aimed  to  become 
metaphysicians  while  remaining  psychologists.  Kant, 
by  far  the  most  metaphysical  of  all,  penetrated  farthest 
in  considering  the  limits  of  the  reason.  m  His  whole 
investigation  of  the  reason  shows  that  metaphysic,  in- 
stead of  fearing  criticism,  demands  it.  But  while  it 
wants  to  determine  the  real  limits  of  the  mind,  it  opposes 
all  efforts  to  fix  them  arbitrarily.  Nothing  is  more 
deadening  to  intellect,  or  more  destructive  of  progress, 
than  the  thoughtless  dismissal  of  the  most  serious  prob- 
lems, with  the  unproved  dictum,  —  "  unsolvable  !  "  In 
many  cases  the  possibility  of  a  solution  can  only  be 
made  evident  by  its  discovery,  as  in  the  case  of  the  law 


M ETA  PII YSICS.  259 

of  gravitation,  the  power  of  steam,  and  the  electric 
telegraph. 

Our  age,  critical,  sceptical,  and  destructive,  is  more 
intent  on  studying  the  history  of  philosophy  than  on 
the  production  of  great  metaphysical  systems.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  course  of  the  beginner  cannot 
be  doubtful.  Although  a  learner,  all  his  learning 
should  be  a  discipline  in  thinking.  His  criticism  should 
be  relentless  but  sound,  and  destructive  for  the  sake 
of  becoming  constructive.  Digging  is  not  laying  the 
foundation,  and  yet  it  is  rational  only  when  under- 
taken for  the  sake  of  the  foundation  and  the  super- 
structure. As  the  deepest  of  all  studies,  metaphysic  ie 
worthy  of  the  profoundest  efforts.  No  question  of  the 
limits  of  our  faculties  should  be  permitted  to  interfere 
with  the  boldest  grappling  with  the  hardest  problems. 
It  is  presumptuous  to  fix  hastily  those  limits,  particularly 
in  an  age  in  which  all  efforts  to  settle  the  matter  have 
signally  failed  ;  and  however  highly  we  may  esteem 
noetic  inquiries,  it  is  foolish  to  claim  that  thought  shall 
suspend  its  operations  until  its  limits  have  been  deter- 
mined. Whether  Ihe  problems  are  solved  or  not,  the 
mind  is  exalted  by  seriously  considering  them,  and  is 
disciplined  by  penetrating  as  far  as  possible  toward  a 
solution.  If  the  philosopher's  stone  is  not  found, 
chemistry  may  be  evolved  in  the  search. 

Since  the  student  must  have  some  kind  of  meta- 
physic, the  question  is,  whether  it  shall  be  rational  or 
superficial.  "  No  one  who  has  been  aroused  to  reflec- 
tion can  dispense  with  the  aid  of  metaphysics;  no 
period  in  the  history  of  culture  has  been  able  to  with- 
draw from  co-operation  in  the  effort  to  solve  the  great 
riddle  of  existence;  and  even  modern  natural  science, 
which  would  like  to  reject  metaphysics,  has  its  own 


260     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

metaphysic  in  materialism,  although  an  extremely  poor 
and  wretched  kind."  *  The  very  impulse  which  leads 
the  thinker  to  seek  unity,  order,  reason,  in  the  universe, 
is  metaphysical.  Anaxagoras  already  thought  there 
must  be  a  Mind  which  orders  the  universe,  and  ac- 
counts for  the  wisdom  and  power  manifested;  and 
surely  the  progress,  since  his  day,  has  not  made  the 
mind  less  desirous  of  searching  for  its  own  similitude. 
Why  the  restless  impulse  to  seek  the  final  solution  of 
the  problem  of  being?  Kant,  although  despairing  of 
the  solution,  deeply  felt  the  significance  of  this  ques- 
tion. The  mind  most  fully  conscious  of  itself  is  in  its 
element  only  when  it  seeks  what  is  deepest.  To  the 
philosophic  thinker  the  cosmos,  the  soul,  and  God  will 
always  present  numerous  unsolved  problems,  —  goads 
to  inquiry;  solutions  found  will  give  birth  to  newer 
and  greater  problems.  Growth  in  knowledge  deepens 
and  darkens  mysteries,  but  it  also  solves  mysteries. 

Probably  at  first  the  result  of  metaphysical  inquiries 
will  be  of  a  negative  character,  proving  supposed  solu- 
tions false.  Everywhere  the  student  finds  that  solutions 
are  claimed  to  have  been  made  in  regions  where  these 
solutions  are  now  declared  impossible.  Tt  is  no  easy 
task  to  test  these  solutions,  —  to  clear  the  mind  of  the 
fictions  which  are  taken  for  reality.  It  may  be  discov- 


*  E.  von  Hartmann  (Phil  Monatsh.  vii.).  He  thinks  the  view  that 
the  great  problem  of  being  is  unsolvable,  rests  solely  on  the  fact  that 
heretofore  it  has  not  been  solved;  but  this  does  not  prove  that  it  cannot 
be  solved,  and  is  no  reason  for  ceasing  the  efforts  at  solution.  But  he 
holds  it  to  be  still  more  silly  to  regard  the  problem  as  so  easy  that  any 
journeyman  can  solve  it,  or  any  specialist,  with  no  particular  training 
for  the  general  problem.  He  adds:  "  The  standpoint  of  modern  investi- 
gators of  nature  is  not  seldom  the  strangest  and  most  contradictory 
hash  of  materialistic  metaphysic,  of  dogmatic  denial  of  the  possibility 
of  metaphysics  in  general,  and  of  subjective  pride  of  intellect,  which 
pronounces  the  metaphysical  problems  children's  toys." 


METAPII YSICS.  26 1 

ered  that  even  scientists  sometimes  work  by  the  light 
of  Aladdin's  lamp.  When  mind  is  lost  in  matter,  it  is 
its  first  task  to  find  itself  again,  or  all  is  lost. 

The  true  metaphysician  does  not  aim  at  that  beyond 
his  reach,  but  to  go  as  far  as  possible  and  grasp  all  within 
reach.  Only  so  far  as  it  can  move  securely  does  meta- 
physic  want  to  go.  And  he  who  goes  safely  thus  far  will 
find  enough  to  do  without  attempting  the  impossible. 

Of  fundamental  importance  for  the  beginner  is  the 
question,  On  what  basis  and  by  what  means  shall  the 
structure  of  metaphysics  be  reared?  The  master  mason 
must  learn  from  the  mistakes  of  former  builders.  There 
must  be  no  arbitrary  principles,  no  assumed  basis,  no 
fanciful  method.  Metaphysic  must  begin  with  what  is 
given,  which  exists,  and  has  some  good  reason  for  its 
existence.  It  begins  with  the  facts  of  consciousness 
and  the  results  of  science,  and  makes  them  the  basis  of 
its  inquiries.*  It  does  not  operate  with  these  facts  and 
results  in  a  method  peculiar  to  itself,  but  simply  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  thought.  It  asks,  With  the  given 
facts  of  consciousness  and  the  results  of  science,  what 
has  reason  to  say  respecting  them?  What  inferences 
must  reason  draw  from  them?  All  science  operates 
with  the  same  laws  of  thought,  and  thus  attests  their 
validity  ;  are  they  then  less  valid  in  their  fullest  devel- 
opment and  highest  application  ? 

*  Schopenhauer  declares  that  metaphysic  is  based  on  experience, 
and  is  its  interpretation.  He  accordingly  calls  it  the  science  of  expe- 
rience (Erfahrungswissenschaft),  "not,  however,  the  individual  experi- 
ences, but  the  total,  the  general  sum  of  all  experience,  is  its  object 
and  its  source."  Another  says  that  "  metaphysic  can,  in  the  end,  seek 
nothing  else  than  what  the  experimental  sciences  also  seek:  namely, 
to  know  the  connection  of  all  experience."  Siebeck,  in  Viertdj.  fur 
wiss.  Philosophic,  1878.  He  claims  that  the  mistake  has  been  that  it 
attempted  to  find  from  a  part  of  experience  the  principle  lying  beyond 
the  whole.  175. 


262      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  problem  which  metaphysic  presents  is  therefore 
simply  this :  With  the  knowledge  that  exists,  what  do 
the  laws  of  thought  teach  us  respecting  being  in  gene- 
ral, and  respecting  the  world,  the  soul,  and  God  ?  This 
statement  of  the  problem  gives  the  specific  character 
of  metaphysical  inquiry.  In  the  experimental  sciences 
the  attention  is  directed  solely  to  the  thing  experimented 
with ;  in  metaphysics,  however,  the  question  is  not 
what  the  thing  requires,  but  what  the  laws  of  thought 
demand.  The  scientist  is  absorbed  by  the  thing  in  hand, 
and  asks,  What  is  it  ?  the  metaphysician  is  not  limited  in 
his  inquiries  by  that  in  hand,  but  by  that  which  pos- 
sesses it,  which  contemplates  and  thinks  it.  Surely  it 
must  be  possible  to  determine  what  reason  demands, 
what  it  can  demonstrate,  what  it  must  postulate,  and 
why  it  must  postulate.  If  the  mind  makes  mistakes  in 
its  conclusions,  it  has  the  test  of  the  conclusions  and 
the  means  of  correction  in  itself.  And  when  reason 
reaches  its  limit,  it  will  as  surely  stop  as  life  does  at 
death. 

There  is  growth  in  metaphysics.  Depending  on  the 
attainments  in  science  and  in  general  knowledge,  and 
on  the  application  of  the  laws  of  thought  to  them,  it  will 
grow  as  there  is  development  in  these  respects.  It 
will  gradually  unfold  its  problems,  and  in  their  solution 
will  be  seen  a  reflection  of  the  knowledge,  the  views, 
and  the  thinking  of  the  age.  Every  period  completes 
itself  in  its  metaphysics. 

It  is  sometimes  charged  against  metaphysics,  that  into 
it  enter  other  than  purely  intellectual  elements  —  such 
as  religious,  moral,  and  aesthetic  interests.  So  far  as 
these  dim  the  intellectual  vision,  they  are  disturbing 
forces,  and  must  be  removed;  but  they  never  act  as 
such  when  metaphysic  is  true  to  itself.  That  it  takes 


METAPHYSICS.  263 

them  into  account,  is  in  its  favor,  since  it  proves  its 
completeness.  Whatever  may  be  said  of  external 
nature,  it  is  evident  that  every  account  of  man  which 
regards  only  his  physical  and  intellectual  condition  is 
sadly  incomplete,  and  that  all  theories  which  ignore  his 
moral,  religious,  and  aesthetic  interests,  are  partial. 
The  latter  need  explanation  as  much  as  the  physical  and 
the  purely  intellectual,  and  a  system  which  ignores  them 
cannot  be  final. 

Man  is  not  a  mere  calculating  machine ;  he  is  a 
mathematician,  but  also  something  besides.  There  are 
legitimate  spheres  of  thought  where  demonstrations 
are  out  of  the  question.  The  scientist,  as  well  as  the 
philosopher,  forges  chains  of  logic  without  being  able 
to  find  the  hooks  on  which  to  hang  the  first  and  the  last 
links.  No  more  in  metaphysics  than  in  science  can  we 
do  without  the  law  of  probability.  But  the  probability 
must  be  recognized  as  such,  and  not  be  made  an  axiom. 
The  mind  may  have  to  resort  to  postulates  whose  valid- 
ity is  unquestioned ;  they  may  be  a  mental  necessity, 
and  if  they  are,  that  is  final.  Such  postulates  even  the 
rigorous  Kant  admitted,  and  he  placed  them  beyond  the 
reach  of  all  sceptical  attacks.  The  difference  between 
the  man  who  admits  and  the  man  who  rejects  postulates 
is  that  the  one  knows  himself,  while  the  other  does  not. 

Hypotheses  are  not  science,  but  scientists  cannot  do 
without  them  ;  neither  are  they  metaphysic,  but  it  needs 
their  help.  Not  in  forming  them  are  metaphysicians  to 
blame,  but  in  forming  them  without  sufficient  reason, 
or  in  failing  to  test  them,  or  in  pronouncing  them  final 
principles.  In  forming  hypotheses,  metaphysic  may  err, 
thus  proving  that  it  is  human  and  on  exactly  the  same 
footing  as  all  other  pursuits.  Science  too,  as  we  have 
seen,  has  its  long  wanderings  without  positive  results, 


264     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  its  way  to  truth  often  lies  through  error.  It  has 
been  said  of  Kepler's  laws,  that  they  "  were  an  outcome 
of  a  lifetime  of  speculation,  for  the  most  part  vain  and 
groundless."  No  less  an  authority  than  Faraday  de- 
clares :  "  The  world  little  knows  how  many  of  the 
thoughts  and  theories  which  have  passed  through  the 
mind  of  a  scientific  investigator  have  been  crushed  in 
silence  and  secrecy  by  his  own  severe  criticism  and  ad- 
verse examination  ;  that  in  the  most  successful  instances 
not  a  tenth  of  the  suggestions,  the  hopes,  the  wishes, 
the  preliminary  conclusions,  have  been  realized." 

In  considering  psychology,  we  found  the  problems 
connected  with  the  essence  of  the  mind  beset  with  diffi- 
culties. Even  if  their  solution  were  possible,  this  would 
not  be  the  place  to  enter  on  a  full  discussion  of  them. 
The  reality  of  mind  is,  however,  of  such  vital  impor- 
tance as  to  be  worthy  of  attention,  even  in  an  intro- 
ductory work.  Besides  removing  false  impressions,  we 
must  aim  to  get  a  reliable  and  firm  working  basis. 

We  have  seen  that  the  intellect  deals  purely  with 
mental  products  in  proportion  as  it  rises  above  the 
immediate  impressions  of  sense.  The  sensations  cannot 
even  reflect  or  see  themselves,  much  less  can  they  form 
comparisons,  contrasts,  combinations,  and  inferences. 
These  require  mind.  There  are  only  units  in  nature ; 
but  we  can  bring  them  into  relations,  and  can  think 
large  numbers.  As  far  as  we  can  discover,  a  stone  in 
Africa  and  a  tree  in  America  do  not  affect  each  other  ; 
but  how  numerous  the  relations  of  quality  arid  quantity 
which  the  mind  can  determine  respecting  them  !  The 
vast  realm  of  thought,  in  distinction  from  sensation,  is 
a  purely  intellectual  sphere.  Not  that  the  mind  here 
is  creative,  but  it  is  determinative  :  it  does  not  make 
something  that  is  not,  but  it  discovers  what  is.  Its 


METAPHYSICS.  265 

discoveries  are  not,  however,  confined  to  what  we  call 
matter :  the  most  of  them,  in  fact,  have  no  direct  rela- 
tion to  what  is  known  as  such,  but  have  significance 
only  for  mind.  We  can  call  the  one  external,  the  other 
internal,  reality ;  and,  if  there  is  any  difference  in  the 
degree  of  validity,  it  is  in  favor  of  mind  rather  than  of 
matter. 

By  distinguishing  between  the  impressions  made  by 
external  objects,  and  what  thinking  makes  of  them,  we 
postulate  the  existence  of  both  the  mental  and  the 
physical  world.  All  that  we  term  concept,  idea,  logical 
norms,  and  indeed  the  whole  realm  of  the  rational  and 
of  philosophy,  transcends  the  material.  We  judge  of 
nature  itself  according  to  the  laws  of  our  minds,  and 
subject  to  this  test  even  the  direct  impressions  received 
from  the  outer  world.  The  first  hints  from  matter 
already  contain  a  mental  element ;  and  in  science,  phi- 
losophy, and  art,  the  mind,  in  the  use  of  the  conditions 
from  the  world  of  sense,  is  purely  a  law  unto  itself. 

The  deeper  this  line  of  thought  is  pursued,  the  more 
are  we  forced  to  admit  the  existence  of  mind  as  distinct 
from  matter.  The  world  of  intellect  is  a  reality,  —  a 
world  utterly  without  significance  and  explanation  if 
there  is  only  what  is  known  to  be  physical.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  two  is  not  a  question  of  reality,  but 
solely  of  the  kind  of  reality.  To  deny  that  reality 
which  is  the  only  source  of  all  knowledge  of  the  real, 
lands  us  in  the  abyss  of  nothing.  It  must  also  be  con- 
sidered, that  our  own  mental  acts  are  the  only  objects 
of  reflection  of  which  we  are  immediately  conscious. 

We  are  thus  warranted  in  asserting  that  the  exist- 
ence of  mind  is  of  all  things  the  most  certain.  By  no 
processes  of  observation  or  thinking  can  we  account  for 
the  origin  of  mind  from  matter.  As  far  as  we  can  now 


266      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

see,  such  an  origin  is  wholly  inconceivable.  The  last 
results  of  physiology,  as  well  as  of  psychology,  recog- 
nize mind  as  sui  generis ;  and  we  are  obliged  to  postu- 
late it  to  account  for  our  intellectual  operations,  just  as 
much  as  we  are  obliged  to  postulate  matter  in  accounting 
for  physical  processes. 

We  may  call  the  mind  a  substance,  if  we  mean  by  it 
only  that  it  is  the  reality  which  stands  under,  and  is  the 
source  of,  our  mental  activity ;  but  the  term  has  been 
employed  in  such  various  senses  and  so  obscurely,  that 
its  use  may  add  new  confusion,  instead  of  serving  as 
a  real  explanation.  Less  objectionable  is  the  term 
"entity"  indicating  a  real  existence,  the  source  and 
centre  of  activity,  without  attempting  to  indicate  its 
essence.  Mind,  then,  we  affirm,  is  an  entity  distinct 
from  other  objects,  with  a  peculiar  activity,  and  moving 
in  a  world  of  its  own.  While  thus  obliged  to  distin- 
guish it  from  matter,  we  do  not  claim  that  it  is  foreign 
to  the  external  reality.  They  are  not  identical,  but 
correlated,  forming  one  universe,  just  as  soul  and  body 
one  person.  Partly  they  form  a  parallelism  or  a  corre- 
spondence ;  partly  each  may  have  a  sphere  peculiar  to 
itself.  The  difference  between  the  two  is  not  suffi- 
ciently marked  by  ascribing  to  the  one  consciousness, 
and  denying  it  to  the  other.  The  character  of  the 
thought  in  consciousness  must  also  be  taken  into  ac- 
count. The  mental  world  is  not  a  negation  of  the 
material,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  does  it  find  in  that 
its  limits.  Thought  moves  in  a  sphere  which  encloses, 
but  also  transcends,  the  outer  world. 

By  basing  our  inferences  strictly  on  the  facts  of  mind, 
we  shall  be  true  to  the  scientific  method,  and  at  the 
same  time  have  a  solid  basis  for  philosophy.  Of  mind, 
just  as  of  matter,  we  know  only  what  it  does  ;  and  from 


METAPHYSICS.  267 

this,  we  infer  what  it  is.  Rebel  as  we  may  against  the 
conclusion,  to  our  intellects  a  thing  is  simply  what  it 
can  do.  It  is  by  interpreting  action  that  we  get  what 
we  term  substance,  which  is  always  an  impenetrable 
mystery,  unless  we  mean  by  it  merely  the  power  to 
account  for  certain  activities.  Mind  as  entity  —  as  not 
a  mere  relation,  not  a  mere  quality  of  something  else, 
not  mere  action  without  an  actor  —  gives  us  the  funda- 
mental conception  needed. 

All  the  possible  metaphysical  conceptions  respecting 
mind  and  matter  may  be  classified  as  follows :  — 

1.  They  are  different  manifestations  of  the  same  sub- 
stance.    The  ground  of  their  unity  is  behind  both,  —  in 
their  common  source.     Pantheism. 

2.  The  one  is  the   product   of  the  other.     Theism, 
Idealism,  Materialism. 

3.  They  are  in  no  way  united,  but  only  correlated. 
Dualism. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Origin  of  the  Name  Metaphysics.  Aristotle's  "  First 
Philosophy."  Define  Metaphysics.  Different  senses  in 
which  used.  Difficulties  of  the  subject.  Indicate  its 
exact  sphere,  and  the  character  of  its  objects.  Define 
Ontology.  Cosmology.  Rational  Psychology.  Rational 
Theology.  Possibility  of  Metaphysics.  Necessity. 
Metaphysics  of  Materialism.  Metaphysics  and  Theory 
of  Knowledge.  Method  of  Metaphysics.  Possible 
Metaphysical  Theories.  Criticism  of  each.  Hypothe- 
ses in  Metaphysics.  Distinction  between  Being  and 
Action.  Does  Action  imply  Being  as  its  Source? 
Conception  of  Substance.  Mind  as  Entity. 


268      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

AESTHETICS. 

REASON  in  the  form  of  feeling  may  be  more  difficult 
to  discover  than  in  thought  and  conduct,  but  we  do 
not  believe  it  to  be  less  real.  Its  existence  there  is 
admitted  whenever  we  speak  of  feeling  as  reasonable 
or  unreasonable,  —  terms  which  indicate  its  quality  as 
well  as  its  source.  We  may  say  that  in  emotion  reason 
is  latent,  unconscious,  not  sufficiently  evolved  to  recog- 
nize itself;  and  that  the  problem  for  it  is  how  to  find 
and  express  itself  as  reason.  The  solution  of  this  prob- 
lem would  give  a  complete  theory  of  the  emotions,  a 
system  of  the  rational  principles  involved,  so  great 
a  desideratum  in  philosophy.  That  without  their  expla- 
nation a  philosophical  system  is  incomplete,  becomes 
evident  on  considering  how  large  a  part  of  our  psychic 
nature,  not  included  in  thought  and  volition,  the  feel- 
ings constitute. 

Compared  with  the  other  mental  states  the  emotional 
has  received  least  attention,  both  in  psychology  and 
philosophy.  The  full  importance  of  the  subject  is  evi- 
dently not  appreciated.  An  emotion  does  not  obtrude 
itself  on  the  intellect,  but  rests  in  itself,  and  tends  to 
absorb  in  itself  as  emotion  the  whole  soul.  Knowledge 
and  conduct  require  effort,  and  demand  or  solicit  reflec- 
tion ;  but  feeling  is  supposed  to  take  care  of  itself, 
being  regarded  as  a  state  little  subject  to  direction  or 


AESTHETICS.  269 

control.  This  neglect  is  the  more  strange  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  so  many  regard  feeling  as  the  soul's  primitive 
activity,  giving  birth  to  all  the  other  psychic  operations. 
But  even  if  without  this  fundamental  significance,  the 
feelings  exert  a  powerful  influence  on  the  other  mental 
states,  play  a  prominent  part  in  morals,  and  constitute 
the  happiness  or  misery  of  life.  Nor  are  they  so  wholly 
beyond  our  control  as  some  imagine :  all  our  volitions 
and  efforts  at  culture  help  to  form  a  permanent  state, 
which  becomes  the  source  of  our  emotions  as  well  as  of 
our  other  mental  operations. 

The  difficulties  connected  with  the  nature,  cause,  and 
relations  of  the  feelings  threaten  to  baffle  all  efforts  to 
obtain  a  rational  explanation.  The  feelings  can  neither 
describe  themselves,  nor  does  their  course  terminate  in 
their  rational  equivalents.  The  direct  testimony  of 
consciousness  merely  states  that  they  are,  and  that  they 
have  a  certain  quality  and  quantity  (intensity).  All 
attempts  at  explanation  lead  away  from  them  into  the 
region  of  the  intellect.  By  concentrating  the  attention 
on  them  for  the  purpose  of  determining  their  character, 
the  feelings  themselves  are  modified;  and  every  attempt 
to  bring  them  under  the  focus  of  the  intellect  interferes 
with  their  immediateness  and  purity,  checks  their  spon- 
taneity, and  introduces  a  foreign  element.  Just  because 
feeling  is  immediate  to  consciousness,  the  intermediate 
or  producing  processes  being  hid,  it  is  so  difficult  to 
give  its  philosophy.  Only  by  a  direct  appeal  to  con- 
sciousness can  we  learn  what  it  is ;  but  even  the  psy- 
chology of  the  feelings  is  attended  with  peculiar  difficulty. 
All  explanations  must  be  given  in  intellectual  formulas ; 
but  it  is  no  easy  matter  to  find  their  intellectual  equiva- 
lents, if  it  can  be  said  that  they  have  any.  They  are 
too  volatile  to  be  confined  to  the  rigidity  of  concepts. 


270      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

They  are  not  thoughts,  and  yet  we  want  to  express 
them  in  thought.  But  we  can  no  more  transfer  them 
from  one  sphere  of  the  soul  into  another  than  we  can 
make  our  intellectual  apprehensions  a  direct  counter- 
part of  external  reality.  The  feelings  we  think,  by 
passing  into  thought  cease  to  be  feelings.  Every  defini- 
tion is  consequently  imperfect,  and  comes  far  short  of 
what  we  experience  in  the  feeling  itself.  We  can  give 
descriptions  of  our  emotional  states  ;  but  these  indicate 
how  we  felt,  not  what  the  feeling  in  itself  was. 

For  the  deepest  and  most  fruitful  study  of  this  sub- 
ject the  student  is  necessarily  referred  to  his  own  ex- 
perience. The  psychological  view  thus  obtained  will, 
however,  leave  much  unexplained.  We. want  a  full 
intellectual  apprehension,  a  complete  rational  interpre- 
tation, of  our  emotional  nature,  which  is  only  possible 
by  the  farthest  removal  of  feeling  from  its  immediate- 
ness  ;  it  demands  that  the  emotional  be  made  rational. 
In  our  feelings,  more  than  in  any  other  exercise,  we  are 
passive,  being  subjected  to  their  dominion ;  by  taking 
them  into  the  domain  of  the  intellect  we  make  them 
subject  to  ourselves,  and  master  them. 

The  very  passivity  of  the  emotional  state  (implied  by 
the  etymology  of  such  words  as  "pathos,"  "passion,"  and 
the  German  Leidenschaft)  interferes  with  the  intellectual 
elaboration  of  the  feelings ;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that 
those  who  indulge  this  state  most  are  least  intent  on 
its  explanation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  study  of  phi- 
losophy, with  its  constant  exercise  of  reason,  and  with 
its  effort  to  exalt  every  thing  into  the  domain  of  the 
rational,  tends  to  neglect  and  suppress  the  emotions. 
It  is  evident  that  the  mind's  passivity  will  be  limited  in 
proportion  as  its  voluntary  activity  is  increased.  Not 
seldom  philosophers  fail  to  appreciate  the  significance 


AESTHETICS.  271 

of  the  feelings,  because  they  cannot  forge  them  into 
logical  chains.  The  critical  philosophy  is  too  cold  and 
stern  to  give  them  their  deserved  prominence,  even  in 
the  domain  of  morals.  The  system  formed  around  the 
categorical  imperative  is  largely  a  skeleton,  which  lacks 
the  warmth  and  beauty  of  life.  Hegel,  still  more  than 
Kant,  depreciated  the  feelings,  and  sometimes  spoke  of 
them  contemptuously.  But  whatever  claims  a  system 
of  philosophy  may  have  to  rationality  and  intellectual 
absoluteness,  serious  defects  will  adhere  to  it  so  long  as 
the  emotions  do  not  receive  their  proper  place  and 
deserved  treatment. 

In  dividing  philosophy  into  the  principles  of  being, 
of  knowing,. of  feeling,  and  of  acting,  we  naturally  ex- 
pect under  the  third  head  a  complete  theory  of  the  feel- 
ings. But  instead  of  an  exhaustive  discussion  of  this 
theory,  only  one  department  in  its  wide  domain  has 
been  taken  out  of  psychology,  and  made  the  subject  of 
special  philosophical  inquiry ;  namely,  aesthetics.*  This 
term,  commonly  used  in  Germany  for  the  theory  of  the 
beautiful,  is  employed  in  various  senses  by  English 
writers.  "  ^Esthetics  is  the  term  now  employed  to  des- 
ignate the  theory  of  the  fine  arts,  —  the  science  of  the 
^beautiful  with  its  allied  conceptions  and  emotions. 

*  flu<70r,<rt?  signifies  perception  by  means  of  the  external  senses.  It 
was  used  by  Bauingarten  (^Esthetica,  1750)  to  designate  that  discipline 
which  investigates  the  nature  and  use  of  the  knowledge  obtained 
through  the  senses.  Under  the  knowledge  thus  obtained  is  that  of  the 
beautiful.  But  Bajirr|gprffinr  the  founder  of  aesthetics,  neither  indicates 
the  exact  relation  of  the  sensiialistie  and  intellectual  elements  in 
beauty,  nor  does  lie  give  a  complete  theory  of  the  beautiful.  In  his 
Kritik  of  Pure  Reason,  Kant  uses  the  term  "aesthetics"  in  its  etymologi- 
cal sense,  and  applies  it  to  sensation  in  general.  The  first  part  of  that 
work  he  calls  "  Transcendental  ^Esthetics,"  which,  he  defines  as  "  an  a 
priori  science  of  the  principles  of  sensation;"  and  he  discusses,  under 
this  head,  space  and  time  as  the  conditions  of  sensation.  In  his  Kritik 
of  the  Judgment,  Kant  uses  it  for  the  theory  of  the  beautiful. 


272     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  province  of  the  science  is  not,  however,  very  defi- 
nitely fixed;  and  there  is  still  some  ambiguity  about  the 
meaning  of  the  term,  arising  from  its  etymology  and 
various  use."  *  The  subject  is  popular,  and  has  received 
considerable  attention  in  various  languages ;  many 
writers,  however,  give  reflections  on  art  and  the  stand- 
ards of  taste,  rather  than  a  rational  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  the  beautiful.  Through  the  influence  of 
Kant  (Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft)  and  Hegel  (Aesthetik}, 
a  large  number  of  German  works  have  appeared  which 
discuss  the  subject  from  a  philosophical  standpoint.! 

The  sphere  of  aesthetics  is  too  limited  if  defined  as 
"  the  theory  of  the  fine  arts."  The  aim  in  such  cases 
is  to  make  beauty  the  essence  of  the  discussion ;  but 
then  the  beautiful  in  general  should  be  considered, 
whether  found  in  mind,  in  nature,  or  in  art.  Valuable 
and  even  indispensable  as  a  propaedeutic  to  art,  the 
essential  element  of  aesthetics  as  a  part  of  philosophy 
will  be  lost  by  limiting  it  to  art.  It  has  a  general  sub- 
ject, as  well  as  special  departments ;  and,  aside  from  its 
practical  application,  it  has  a  rational  value.  Even  if 
there  were  no  art,  we  can  well  conceive  that  the  mind 
would  take  an  interest  in  the  speculative  questions  con- 
nected with  taste.  ^Esthetics,  even  if  limited  to  an  in- 
quiry into  the  principles  of  beauty,  or  to  the  search  for 
the  reason  in  beauty,  is  a  philosophical  discipline.  But 
the  effort  to  make  it  merely  a  theory  of  the  fine  arts 

*  Ency.  Brit. :  ^Esthetics. 

t  Among  the  numerous  German  works  on  aesthetics  since  Hegel,  are 
those  of  Weisse,  Vischer,  Carriere,  Koestlin,  Krause,  Schasler,  and  Von 
Hartmann.  Vischer's  work,  in  three  volumes,  is  the  most  complete  dis- 
cussion of  the  subject  in  the  whole  range  of  literature.  The  history  of 
aesthetics  has  been  written  by  Zimmermann  and  also  by  Lotze.  On 
special  departments  of  the  subject,  the  German  literature  is  also  exten- 
sive and  valuable.  Of  the  older  writers,  Winckelmaun,  Lessing,  and 
Schiller  deserve  special  mention. 


AESTHETICS.  273 

indicates  the  triumph  of  empiricism,  and  proves  that 
the  rational  is  appreciated  only  as  a  preface  to  the  tech- 
nical and  artistic.  If  appreciated  at  all,  beauty  must 
be  esteemed  for  its  own  sake ;  but  this  means  that  it 
must  be  prized  wherever  found. 

In  claiming  that  aesthetics  is  a  rational  discipline, 
which  discusses  ultimate  problems,  we  do  not  want  to 
ignore  its  psychological  basis.  Much  remains  to  be 
done  by  psychology  in  order  to  determine  the  distinc- 
tion between  beauty  and  allied  emotions  and  concepts. 
A  complete  scale  of  animal  and  human  feelings,  which 
lead  up  to  the  beautiful,  would  be  valuable.  Instead 
of  antagonism,  the  most  intimate  co-operative  relation 
should  be  maintained  between  the  rational  or  philo- 
sophical and  the  psychological  factors. 

In  order  to  introduce  the  student  into  aesthetics  as 
usually  treated,  it  will  here  be  considered  as  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  beautiful.  Beauty  is  thus  made  the 
subject-matter.  Other  subjects  are  also  discussed  by 
writers  on  aesthetics;  but  these  subjects  are  loosely 
grouped  around  beauty,  not  so  connected  with  it  as  to 
form  a  distinct  organism.  At  the  close  of  the  chapter, 
it  will  be  shown  that  the  sphere  of  aesthetics  should 
be  enlarged,  so  as  to  form  a  rational  system  of  beauty 
and  of  allied  objects.  The  aim  of  aesthetics  will  then 
be  to  discover  the  peculiar  marks  of  all  objects  termed 
aesthetic,  and  to  bring  them  into  organic  connection. 

By  examining  the  various  works  on  aesthetics,  we  are 
struck  with  the  difficulties  connected  with  the  question, 
What  is  beauty  ?  Every  one  has  an  answer  in  his  con- 
sciousness in  the  form  of  an  impression,  but  not  in  terms 
of  rational  interpretation,  which  is  the  very  aim  of 
aesthetics.  Familiar  as  all  seem  with  the  beautiful,  its 
mystery  becomes  apparent  so  soon  as  we  attempt  to 


274     INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

define  the  term.  The  result  always  teaches  that  the 
impression  itself  is  far  more  distinct  and  vivid  than 
any  interpretation  we  can  give  of  it.  After  all  that 
has  been  written  on  the  subject,  one  need  but  examine 
the  current  definitions  of  beauty  in  order  to  learn  how 
little  has  been  accomplished  for  the  attainment  of  defi- 
niteness.  Much  of  the  confusion  arises  from  the  fact 
that  the  term  is  applied  to  entirely  different  spheres. 
Thus  we  speak  of  beauty  as  purely  subjective,  namely, 
as  an  emotion,  but  also  as  in  external  objects.  We  are 
apt  to  transfer  our  aesthetic  emotions,  as  well  as  the 
impressions  on  the  senses,  to  the  objects  occasioning 
them.  But  by  naming  these  objects  we  do  not  define 
beauty  itself.  Nor  can  the  definition  be  found  by  in- 
dicating the  characteristic  marks  of  objects  pronounced 
beautiful,  such  as  grace,  or  an  assemblage  of  graces,  har- 
mony, symmetry,  proportion,  the  adaptation  of  means 
to  end,  and  unity  amid  variety. 

This  vagueness  characterized  the  discussion  of  the 
subject  of  beauty  from  the  very  beginning.*  Although 
a  favorite  theme  with  Plato,  he  fails  to  distinguish  it 
sharply  from  the  true,  the  righteous,  the  good,  and  the 
wise ;  and  different  views  of  it  are  given  in  different 
books.  In  "Phsedros,"  Socrates  speaks  eloquently  of 
beauty ;  but  a  better  discussion  of  the  subject  is  found 
in  the  "Symposium,"  in  the  discourse  of  Diotema,  re- 
lated by  Socrates.  But  instead  of  an  analysis  of  beauty, 
we  find  here  rather  a  description  of  the  lover's  ecstasy 
in  beholding  the  beautiful.  Plato  describes  beauty  here 
as  the  eternal,  unchangeable,  divine  idea,  or  beauty  per 

t  In  Philosophiwhe  Monatshefte,  vol.  4,  p.  199,  Conrad  Hermann 
states  that,  the  history  of  aesthetics  among  the  ancients  must  consider 
chiefly  the  views  of  Pythagoras,  Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  of  the 
Neo-Platonists.  He  regards  Pythagoras  as  the  first  who  entered  upon 
philosophical  inquiries  into  the  beautiful. 


ESTHETICS.  275 

se,  not  as  embodied  in  any  thing  else.  Plotinus  in  his 
essay  "  On  the  Beautiful  "  follows  his  master  Plato  in 
exalting,  the  ideal  far  above  all  its  visible  manifestations. 
The  subject  received  little  attention  during  the  scholas- 
ticism of  the  Middle  Ages  ;  and  in  comparison  with  the 
themes  that  usually  engrossed  the  attention  of  thinkers, 
it  was  probably  not  thought  worthy  of  serious  inquiry. 
Locke  does  not  discuss  beauty  ;  Hume  mentions  it  in  a 
few  places,  but  confounds  it  with  the  agreeable.  The 
result  of  English  inquiries  is  indicated  in  the  article  on 
^Esthetics  in  the  "£ncx;k>  "  "  What 


strikes  one  most,  perhaps,  in  these  discussions,  is  the 
vagueness  due  to  the  great  diversity  of  conception  as  to 
the  extent  of  the  beautiful  in  the  number  of  objects  it 
may  be  supposed  to  denote.  .  .  .  There  is  certainly  a 
great  want  of  definiteness  as  to  the  legitimate  scope  of 
aesthetic  theory."  * 

We  pronounce  objects  beautiful  because  they  excite 
in  us  the  emotion  of  beauty.  But,  whatever  its  occasion, 
beauty  itself  exists  only  for  and  in  the  mind.  It  is  as 
purely  ours  as  sight  and  hearing;  and  all  definitions 
must  deal  vdth  it  primarily  as  a  mental  state  or  as  an 
emotion.  That  for  its  existence,  at  least  for  its  origin, 
the  notion  of  the  beautiful  depends  on  something  exter- 
nal to  us,  must  be  admitted  as  freely  as  in  the  case  of 

*  For  a  theory  of  art  among  the  ancients,  see  Eduard  Mueller:  Ge- 
schifhte  der  Theorie  drr  Kunst  bei  den  Alien,  2  vols.  A  brilliant  rather 
than  a  profound  discussion  of  the  beautiful  is  given  by  Cousin  in  his 
Lectures  on  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good.  The  latest  German 
works  on  aesthetics  are  by  E.  Von  Hartmann:  Die  deutsche  JSsthetik 
wit  Kant,  and  Die  Philosophic  des  Schoenen.  In  Preiissische  Jahrbuecher, 
August  and  September,  1887,  A.  Doering  has  two  excellent  articles  on 
the  history  of  resthetics.  The  discussion  of  the  subject  of  aesthetics  is 
usually  so  unsatisfactory  that  it  is  difficult  to  recommend  any  particular 
book  to  the  student.  A  brief  history  of  Theories  of  the  Beautiful  is 
given  by  Bain  in  Mental  and  Moral  Science,  301.  For  the  English  liter- 
ature on  the  subject  the  student  is  referred  to  ^Esthetics  iu  Ency.  Brit. 


276      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

vision  ;  but  it  can  never  be  conceived  as  any  thing  exist- 
ing independent  of  mind.  A  metaphysical  consideration 
of  the  subject  would  undoubtedly  conclude  that  the  emo- 
tion itself  has  its  basis  in  the  harmony  of  the  inner  and 
the  outer  being,  so  that  it  is  a  product  of  their  harmo- 
nious action  and  re-action. 

We  speak  of  beauty  as  an  emotion,  a  characteristic 
which  distinguishes  aesthetics  from  the  sphere  of  logic, 
as  well  as  from  that  of  ethics.  When  we  speak  of  our- 
selves as  sesthetical,  we  do  not  refer  to  our  purely  intel- 
lectual activities ;  it  indicates  a  state  which  no  amount 
of  mere  theoretical  contemplation  and  no  mere  volition 
can  express. 

^Esthetics  can  be  placed  under  the  general  head  of 
values.  In  this  point  of  view  it  considers  the  subjective 
significance  of  a  certain  class  of  emotions  and  of  the 
objects  which  excite  them.  By  this  method  of  classifi- 
cation we  should  have  to  include  under  values  sesthetics 
and  ethics,  both  beauty  and  right  having  worth  for  our 
feelings.  The  prominence  given  by  Herbart  and  Lotze 
to  this  view  of  the  subject  makes  us  feel  more  deeply 
the  need  of  a  general  theory  of  the  feelings,  and  particu- 
larly their  consideration  in  the  light  of  values.  Such 
a  theory  would  indicate  the  relation  of  both  sesthetics 
and  ethics  to  our  emotional  nature.  But  even  if  such 
a  theory  were  completed,  it  would  not  include  both  sub- 
jects under  emotions  in  the  same  sense  or  degree,  since 
in  ethics  the  feeling  is  not  the  essence,  as  in  sesthetics, 
but  conduct  or  the  will  is  the  controlling  factor. 

In  thus  giving  sesthetics  a  peculiar  relation  to  the 
emotions,  we,  of  course,  do  not  so  isolate  it  as  to  make 
it  independent  of  our  other  mental  operations ;  we 
only  indicate  its  general  psychological  sphere.  In  the 
division  of  the  emotions  into  those  of  pleasure  and 


ESTHETICS.  277 

displeasure,  beauty  is  included  under  the  former.  Amid 
the  prevailing  indefiniteness,  it  is,  however,  frequently 
confounded  with  the  agreeable,  without  indicating  its 
peculiar  pleasurable  elements.  The  sharp  analysis  of 
the  emotions,  —  an  analysis  psychological  in  character, 
and  yet  essential  as  a  basis  for  philosophical  treatment, 
—  which  determines  the  exact  quality  of  beauty,  is  too 
much  neglected.  Many  things  please,  and  are  pro- 
nounced agreeable  or  interesting,  which  we  do  not  term 
beautiful.  A  companion  may  have  all  these  qualities 
without  any  claim  to  beauty.  Pleasurable  impressions 
may  be  received  through  any  sense,  but  only  from  the 
higher  do  we  receive  impressions  of  beauty.  When 
Burke  speaks  of  this  impression  as  obtained  also  through 
lower  senses,  he  confounds  the  beautiful  and  the  pleas- 
urable. 

The  emotion  of  the  beautiful  is  not  to  be  classed  with 
animal  passion,  though  this  emotion  may  become  so 
strong  that  we  can  speak  of  a  passion  for  the  beautiful. 
This  emotion  cannot,  however,  be  put  on  the  ordinary 
level  of  mere  gratification.  There  is  in  beauty  an  intel- 
lectual element  which  exalts  it  far  above  mere  sen- 
tiency ;  and  we  can  call  it  an  intellectual  emotion  or  a 
sentiment,  in  which  there  is  a  union  of  intellectual  and 
emotional  factors. 

^Esthetic  pleasure  springs  directly  from  the  beholding 
of  the  beautiful  object.  The  beauty  strikes  us  at  once, 
though  continued  and  absorbing  contemplation  may  be 
necessary  for  its  full  appreciation.  The  immediate,  in- 
tuitive element  makes  its  effect  akin  to  inspiration,  and 
gives  beauty  the  character  of  a  percept  rather  than  of 
a  concept.  If  the  soul  is  absorbed  by  mere  reflection 
on  beauty,  without  permitting  a  re-action  of  the  feelings, 
the  impression  itself  is  weakened,  or  perhaps  wholly 


278      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

obliterated.  Neither  the  possession  of  an  object,  nor 
reflection  on  its  use,  increases  its  beauty :  this  being  in- 
dependent of  all  extraneous  circumstances.*  It  is  also 
different  in  character  from  the  ethical,  which  involves 
duty,  implies  choice,  and  cannot  be  appreciated  unless 
it  is  regarded  as  involving  freedom.  Beauty  is  sponta- 
neous ;  it  is  simply  beautiful,  and  nothing  more.  Thus, 
in  contemplating  the  highest  works  of  art,  we  do  not 
lose  ourselves  in  considering  their  purpose :  to  do  so 
would  substitute  reflection  for  the  impression.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  emotion  must  not  be  disturbed  by  the 
conviction  that  the  purpose  of  the  artist  was  not  accom- 
plished. The  art  must  be  such  that  all  reflection,  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  heightens  the  impression. 
Our  consciousness  is  so  limited  that  it  carries  on  but 
one  main  process  at  a  time,  to  which  all  else  becomes 
tributary.  The  more  absorbing  and  intense  an  emo- 
tion, the  less  room  for  reflection. 

The  reason  why  beauty  pleases  may  be  as  difficult  as 
the  question  why  certain  things  are  agreeable  to  the 
palate.  Taste,  whether  used  figuratively  or  literally, 
is  hard  to  explain.  When  we  affirm  that  beauty  pleases 
for  its  own  sake,  we  mean  that  its  value  to  the  mind 
consists  in  its  direct  contemplation,  not  in  the  fact 
that  it  gratifies  an  appetite  or  any  animal  craving,  nor 
because  it  involves  an  imperative.  But  by  thus  giving 
it  the  immediateness  of  intuition,  we  only  indicate  the 
more  clearly  that  it  must  have  its  basis  in  the  soul 
itself.  The  capacity,  at  least,  must  be  innate ;  which,, 
of  course,  does  not  imply  that  the  taste  is  not  suscepti- 
ble of  cultivation,  or  that  it  must,  in  every  respect,  be 
the  same  in  all  persons.  Its  ground  is  innate,  as  much 

*  In  his  Kritik  of  the  Judgment,  Kant  particularly  emphasizes  the 
fact,  that  the  mere  contemplation  of  an  object  produces  the  impression. 


AESTHETICS. 


279 


so  as  the  power  to  think  and  choose,  so  that  we  can  say 
that  the  conditions  of  the  beautiful  are  found  in  all 
men.  The  same  is  true  of  reason,  though  considerable 
mental  development  is  required  before  its  exercise  by 
the  child.  The  taste  for  the  beautiful,  like  reason,  is, 
in  a  certain  sense,  the  same  in  all  men,  and  yet  may  be 
differently  developed  and  exercised.  Just  because  it  is 
innate,  —  say  as  ability,  or  instinct,  or  as  a  germ, — and 
so  far  the  same  in  all,  we  can  give  laws  for  the  appre- 
ciation of  the  beautiful,  and  rules  of  taste  and  criti- 
cism;  and  just  because  so  much  of  the  individual 
appreciation  depends  on  the  degree  of  culture,  the  stage 
of  civilization,  the  training  and  the  surroundings,  —  all 
variable  elements,  —  we  find  that  there  are  different 
views  of  beauty.  In  all  such  cases  we  must  distin- 
guish between  the  rational  or  essential  element,  which 
is  necessary  and  universal,  and  the  accidental,  which  is 
local  and  temporal.  Persons  may  be  in  such  a  state  as 
not  to  be  able  to  appreciate  the  beautiful,  but  that  does 
not  prove  that  there  is  no  beauty.  At  different  times 
there  have  been  different  standards  of  right :  that,  how- 
ever, does  not  prove  that  there  is  no  absolute  standard, 
but  only  that  the  standard  adopted  ma}^  be  false.  The 
same  is  true  respecting  beauty.  With  the  same  sur- 
roundings and  the  same  degree  of  culture,  there  will 
also  be  agreement  respecting  the  essentials  of  beauty, 
thus  giving  its  laws  objective  reality,  and  making 
aesthetics  possible. 

In  vindicating  for  the  beautiful  the  same  eternal 
basis  as  for  the  true  and  the  good,  we  cannot  ignore  the 
fact  that  the  opinions  respecting  aesthetics  differ  greatly. 
This  is  partly  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  subject,  the 
newest  department  of  philosophy,  is  but  imperfectly 
developed ;  partly  to  inherent  difficulties.  Persons  may 


280      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

imagine  that  they  differ  respecting  the  beautiful,  when 
they  judge  only  respecting  the  agreeable,  which  depends 
so  largely  on  subjective  conditions.  While  beauty 
always  pleases,  we  do  not  always  discern  between  the 
beauty  and  other  characteristics  which  please.  In  the 
same  individual  the  taste  may  vary  at  different  times. 
We  are  continually  cultivating  our  souls,  but  are  by  no 
means  fully  conscious  of  the  process  or  its  results  ; 
perhaps  the  most  marked  effect  of  the  development  is 
on  the  unconscious  basis  and  background  of  our  con- 
scious activity.  We  may,  therefore,  know  what  pleases 
us,  though  unable  to  give  the  reason  for  the  pleasure. 
Indeed,  the  pleasure  itself  is  apt  to  be  so  engrossing  as 
to  leave  no  inclination  to  enter  upon  reflections  respect- 
ing its  nature ;  and  we  usually  pronounce  an  object 
pleasing  or  beautiful,  without  even  attempting  an 
analysis  of  its  pleasing  or  beautiful  qualities. 

Modern  German  writers,  especially  in  Hegel's  school, 
have  made  much  of  the  union  of  the  idea  with  its  sen- 
sible symbol  as  the  essential  element  of  beauty.  Thus 
in  art,  an  object  is  regarded  as  beautiful  in  proportion 
as  it  embodies  and  realizes  an  idea  or  ideal.25  That  cer- 
tain ideals  consciously  or  unconsciously  form  our  stand- 
ards of  taste,  is  no  doubt  true.  These  standards  or 
norms  may  change  with  our  culture  ;  but  we  cannot 
arbitrarily  determine  them,  they  must  have  their  basis 
in  necessary  laws.  They  are  always  in  the  mind,  and 
active  there,  though  we  may  not  be  aware  of  their  exist- 
ence. The  fancy  is  continually  cultivated,  and  uncon- 
sciously determines  the  manifestations  of  taste  as  they 
appear  in  consciousness.  There  are  no  doubt  numerous 
operations  below  consciousness  whose  influence  is  made 
manifest  in  impressions  of  pleasure  and  displeasure. 
The  fancy  darkly  throws  its  spell  over  an  object,  and 


AESTHETICS.  281 

heightens  its  beauty,  we  know  not  how.  The  object 
itself  may  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  a  symbol,  and  is, 
perhaps,  seen  rather  in  what  it  suggests  than  really  is. 
It  thus  becomes  the  occasion  for  fancy  to  exercise  its 
creative  power,  and  to  put  into  the  object  its  own  ideal 
forms.  Those  who  lack  fancy,  prosaic  natures  living 
wholly  in  matters  of  fact,  of  course  fail  to  appreciate 
the  most  exquisite  beauty.  Those  subtile  elements 
which  are  indescribable,  but  appeal  directly,  instinc- 
tively as  it  were,  to  the  soul,  and  form  the  essence  of 
beauty,  escape  their  notice.  There  are  many  who  cannot 
appreciate  the  beauty  of  Raphael's  Madonnas,  because 
they  do  not  see  the  ideas  veiled  in  or  shining  through 
them :  they  see  the  pictures,  but  not  what  they  repre- 
sent. 

This  intellectual  element  in  beauty,  exercised  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  raises  it  far  above  the  im- 
pressions which  come  through  the  lower  senses.  More 
intellect  enters  into  the  appreciation  of  a  beautiful 
landscape  than  into  the  pleasures  of  a  meal,  though  we 
may  be  as  little  conscious  of  thought  in  the  one  as  in 
the  other.  Beauty  comes  without  effort,  and  suggests 
none :  it  simply  presents  beauty,  and  that  intuitively. 
In  contemplating  it  the  soul  has  the  standard  of  beauty 
in  itself;  indeed,  it  may  be  said  to  see  with  this  stand- 
ard, and  to  apprehend  immediately  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement of  an  object  with  this  norm.  In  all  aesthetic 
appreciation  an  intellectual  perception  of  harmony  is 
mirrored  in  the  emotion  of  the  beautiful.  While  in  the 
domain  of  logic,  as  well  as  of  ethics,  the  soul  labors, 
being  impelled  by  the  necessity  of  truth  or  the  ought 
of  duty,  in  aesthetics  it  is  free,  controlled  only  by  its 
own  impulses.  This  freedom  is  play  for  the  spirit,  the 
paradise  of  the  most  delightful  spontaneity.  This  is 


282     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  domain  in  which  genius  revels  and  creates,  because 
it  cannot  do  otherwise.  Just  because  it  is  play,  the 
contemplation  of  beauty  is  not  the  business  of  life,  but 
its  relaxation  and  recreation.  It  is  accessory  to  life, 
rather  than  its  substance ;  and  he  who  makes  it  his 
mission  to  behold  only  beauty,  cannot  hope  to  drift  into 
the  higher  realms  of  truth  and  duty.  Indeed,  the  con- 
templation of  nothing  but  beauty,  at  last  wearies  and 
enervates.  That  its  admiration  is  not  devotion  to  the 
good,  and  that  the  substitution  of  aesthetics  for  ethics 
as  the  rule  of  life  is  not  an  exaltation  of  character,  is 
proved  by  numerous  examples  of  genius,  —  artists,  musi- 
cians, and  poets.  We  must  distinguish  between  the 
adornment  of  life,  and  that  life  itself  which  is  to  be 
adorned.  It  is  with  beauty  pursued  for  its  own  sake  as 
life's  highest  calling,  as  with  pleasure:  it  cannot  satisfy. 
As  the  sole  object  sought  in  marriage,  beauty  soon  loses 
its  charm ;  or,  rather,  other  considerations  interfere  with 
its  appreciation.  The  speech  whose  essence  is  its  adorn- 
ment soon  wearies,  and  is  pronounced  insipid.  We  pity 
the  man  who  cannot  leave  his  diamonds  for  fear  they 
might  be  stolen,  — pity  him  even  if  a  duke.  But  in  its 
proper  place,  aesthetics  exalts  the  soul  above  life's  vulgar 
associations,  to  the  contemplation  of  its  own  ideals,  and 
receives  inspiration  even  from  ethics.  If  our  ideas  are 
expressed  at  all,  they  ought  to  be  expressed  in  the  most 
perfect  form. 

But  is  beauty  when  ascribed  to  objects  mere  form  ? 
Is  it  never  the  substance,  but  merely  something  acces- 
sory? The  question  involves  the  extremely  difficult 
concepts  of  substance  and  form,  and  of  their  relation. 
When  we  speak  of  a  soul,  a  character,  or  an  idea,  as 
beautiful,  the  language  implies  that  beauty  is  more 
than  a  form.  Aside  from  the  more  purely  intellectual 


ESTHETICS. 


233 


objects  of  beauty  (ideas,  poetry),  we  are,  however,  jus- 
tified in  attributing  the  beautiful  to  the  form ;  but  this 
form  must  always  be  conceived  as  the  form  of  some- 
thing, so  that  it  is  never  any  thing  of  itself.  In  this 
sense  we  can  speak  of  form  as  constituting  beauty  in 
painting,  sculpture,  architecture,  and  music.  Is  it  not 
likewise  the  case  with  beauty  in  nature  ?  The  same 
face  may  be  beautiful  in  repose,  and  ugly  when  dis- 
torted ;  in  which  case  there  is  evidently  no  change  of 
substance  except  in  its  form.  It  is  the  harmonious 
arrangement  of  colors  or  of  sounds  which  we  pronounce 
beautiful.  The  highest  truth  may  be  expressed  in  an 
abstract  form,  which  can  lay  no  claim  to  beauty,  and 
the  deed  prompted  by  the  noblest  impulse  may  be  done 
awkwardly ;  but  when  something  in  itself  worthy  is 
expressed  or  embodied  in  the  manner  most  in  harmony 
with  the  object,  and  most  pleasing  to  the  spirit,  so  that 
this  recognizes  its  own  ideals  in  the  form,  we  have 
beauty.  Besides  the  love  of  truth  and  goodness,  an 
appeal  is  thus  made  to  the  imagination. 

The  general  term  "  form  "  is  a  mere  abstraction,  while 
the  realm  of  beauty  is  in  the  concrete.  In  every  beau- 
tiful object  the  form  is  definite,  as  well  as  the  form  of 
some  substance :  it  is  always  a  particular  form.  We 
must  therefore  regard  beauty  as  form,  not  as  separated 
from  the  substance,  but  as  that  substance  itself  in  a 
certain  stage  of  perfection.  And  those  substances 
which  are  capable  of  the  most  perfect  form  are  the  ones 
susceptible  of  greatest  beauty. 

Just  as  we  cannot  separate  quality  from  the  thing  in 
which  it  inheres,  so  it  is  with  form  and  substance. 
Indeed,  we  can  say  that  beauty  is  a  certain  quality  in 
objects ;  and  the  term  "  quality  "  expresses  the  general 
nature  of  beauty  better  than  the  term  "  form,"  particu- 


284      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

larly  when  we  speak  of  beauty  in  ideas,  in  poetry,  and 
generally  in  intellectual  elements. 

We  thus  find  the  sensible  and  the  rational,  the  sub- 
stance and  the  form,  harmoniously  blended  in  the  beau- 
tiful. Idealists  are  apt  to  see  the  eesthetic  element  too 
exclusively  in  the  idea,  while  empiricists  and  sensualists 
see  it  too  exclusively  in  the  external  forms  which  excite 
the  emotion.  The  latter  is  seen  especially  in  English 
writers  on  the  subject.  Empiricists  are  also  apt  to  de- 
grade it  to  the  level  of  sense  impressions,  and  to  over- 
look the  associated  intellectual  elements.  Instead  of 
this  one-sided  view,  whether  too  exclusively  idea  or 
sense,  we  have  in  the  contemplation  of  the  beautiful  a 
union  and  concentration  of  all  the  powers,  but  in  an 
unrestrained  manner.  In  the  most  beautiful  objects 
the  soul  sees  itself  at  its  best.  Beauty  interprets  the 
soul's  mysterious  longings  and  aspirations.  The  person- 
ality finds  itself  in  the  beautiful,  and  puts  itself  into  it. 
The  soul  is  interpreted  in  the  form,  and  recognizes  it  as 
its  appropriate  body.  In  beauty  there  is  something 
peculiarly  human  and  soulful ;  it  is  the  mirror  of  the 
spirit's  ideals. 

In  the  preceding,  reference  has  been  made  repeatedly 
to  beauty  in  objects.  This  will  not  be  misunderstood 
if  it  is  remembered  that  the  meaning  is,  that  there  is 
something  in  them  which  excites  the  emotion  of  beauty. 
Things  are  not  beautiful  in  the  sense  in  which  they 
have  forces  or  are  extended.  The  forces  work,  whether 
seen  or  not ;  but  there  is  no  beauty  where  there  is  no 
contemplating  mind.  It  is  not  a  force ;  it  is  not  in 
objects  any  more  than  there  is  thought  in  them.  But 
objects  may  be  the  occasion  of  that  emotion,  and  we 
want  to  learn  what  it  is  that  excites  the  emotion. 

To  determine  what  is  called  beauty  in  objects,  consti- 


ESTHETICS. 


285 


tutes  the  aim  of  aesthetic  criticism,  and  is  an  exercise  of 
the  judgment.  There  may  be  taste  without  criticism, 
because  that  taste  acts  unconsciously,  immediately,  be- 
ing itself  unaware,  as  a  rule,  of  its  principles  of  action. 
In  criticism  we  seek  the  laws  which  determine  its 
activity;  we  want  to  make. the  taste  conscious  of  itself. 

Beauty  in  objects  is  divided  into  the  beautiful  in 
nature  and  in  art.  The  beautiful  objects  are  numerous 
and  widely  different,  the  essential  elements  of  beauty 
being  the  unity  in  the  infinite  variety.  However  abso- 
lute the  sesthetic  norms  may  be,  their  application  in 
criticism  depends  very  materially  on  our  subjective 
state,  as  is  evident  from  our  different  judgments  at 
different  times  respecting  the  same  object.  There  may 
be  disturbing  influences  which  interfere  materially  with 
the  purity  of  the  judgment.  However  beautiful  an  ob- 
ject seen  alone,  when  very  common  it  may  fail  to  excite 
any  emotion.  The  surrounding  of  things,  or  their  set- 
ting, has  much  influence  on  their  effect :  a  fact  the  more 
easily  understood  when  it  is  remembered  that  beauty  is 
essentially  an  order,  arrangement,  form,  not  the  sub- 
stance by  itself.  A  beautiful  woman  among  many  plain 
ones  makes  a  deeper  impression  than  among  a  thousand 
equally  beautiful.  She  is  as  beautiful  in  herself  in  one 
case  as  in  the  other ;  but  the  frame  or  setting  differs, 
in  one  instance  the  power  of  contrast  being  absent. 
It  is  always  necessary  to  distinguish  between  beauty 
in  objects,  and  the  psychological  conditions  for  its 
appreciation. 

An  ideal,  when  embodied  either  in  nature  or  in  a  work 
of  art,  is  the  concrete  form  of  an  abstract  idea  :  it  is  an 
individual  object  in  which  the  general  idea  is  realized. 
The  ideal  woman  is  a  specimen  of  the  idea  of  woman- 
hood, and  the  soul  finds  every  thing  beautiful  in  which 


286      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

it  discovers  the  ideal  of  its  idea  of  perfection.  Hence 
Hegel  defines  beauty  as  "  the  sensible  manifestation  of  the 
idea."  *  Not  the  marble,  as  marble,  is  beautiful,  but 
the  marble  with  a  certain,  form,  so  that  the  suggestion  is 
not  that  of  marble,  but  of  some  mental  idea.  But  as 
the  mind  must  at  times  be  aroused  in  order  to  discover  the 
thoughts  hidden  in  nature,  so  it  may  have  to  be  awak- 
ened to  full  consciousness  in  order  to  discover  the  ideals 
veiled  in  objects  of  beauty.  When  some  other  faculty 
is  predominantly  active,  the  fancy  may  not  be  able  to 
throw  its  spell  over  an  object,  or  to  follow  the  sugges- 
tions hinted  at.  The  spirit  must  freely  lose  itself  in  the 
contemplation  of  beauty  if  the  sesthetic  emotion  is  to 
prevail.  There  are  in  music  no  charms  unless  the  soul's 
dream  of  harmony,  of  unity,  and  of  sweetness  is  realized 
in  the  sounds :  a  scientific  analysis  of  the  notes  destroys 
the  beauty.  Even  if  we  adopt  Wagner's  theory  that  all 
thoughts  can  be  expressed  in  sound,  we  must  admit  that 
we  are  neither  able  to  find  sounds  for  all  concepts,  nor 
to  interpret  the  meaning  of  all  sounds.  Music  appeals 
to  the  emotions,  and  it  is  impossible  to  interpret  it  as  if 
every  sound  had  a  definite  sense.  It  may  be  full  of 
ideas,  but  they  are  in  the  form  of  emotions :  it  is  thought 
struggling  through  sound  and  entangled  in  feeling.  For 
the  appreciation  of  music,  the  mood  of  the  spirit  is, 
consequently,  of  special  significance.  The  charm  of  a 
symphony  may  consist  chiefly  in  what  of  memory,  or 
aspiration,  or  prophecy  the  imagination  interprets  into 
it.  Night,  stillness,  moonlight,  water,  the  historic  asso- 
ciations of  a  place,  the  poetry  or  romance  thrown  over 
a  scene,  have  much  to  do  with  the  effect  of  a  melody. 
As  Kant  observes,  the  nightingale  heard  in  the  dark 
forest  makes  a  different  impression  from  the  perfectly 

*  "  Das  sinnliche  Scheinen  der  Idee." 


ESTHETICS. 


287 


imitated  sounds  when  the  fact  of  the  imitation  is  known. 
The  same  is  true  of  beauty  in  visible  objects :  its  effect 
is  due  to  our  own  ideas  and  associations.  Symmetry 
and  harmony,  the  agreeable  blending  of  colors,  the  unity 
in  variety,  are  of  themselves  not  enough  to  constitute 
beauty  :  they  must  somehow  excite  the  fancy,  and  allure 
the  soul  to  attach  its,  ideals  to  them.  The  object  must 
not  overwhelm  the  imagination,  but  give  it  opportunity 
for  free  and  full  play.  If  it  overwhelms  or  stuns,  the 
emotion  is  that  of  the  sublime.  This  includes  all  that 
suggests  the  incomprehensible  and  the  infinite.  Hence 
the  awe  it  excites.  In  the  stormy  ocean,  in  the  vast 
expanse  of  the  starry  heavens,  and  in  the  high  moun- 
tain, there  is  more  than  the  mind  can  grasp.  But  while 
the  mind  is  overwhelmed  by  sublimity,  and  is  lost  in  the 
very  effort  to  find  itself,  it  is  at  home  in  beauty,  and 
finds  itself  in  the  contemplation.  The  realm  of  the 
beautiful  lies  between  the  neat  and  the  sublime. 

The  fact  that  our  first  aesthetic  impressions  are  some- 
times reversed,  particularly  respecting  persons,  is  no 
argument  against  the  immediateness  of  beauty.  The 
change  may  not  be  a  reversal  of  opinion  respecting  the 
same  elements,  but  is,  perhaps,  owing  to  the  discovery 
of  something  hidden  before.  Thus  the  charm  in  the 
expression  of  sentiment  and  in  the  varied  play  of  fea- 
tures may  be  discovered  only  on  nearer  acquaintance. 
Grace  of  motion  and  poetic  beauty  of  mind  transcend 
the  attraction  of  mere  regularity  or  symmetry  of  fea- 
tures, or  may  amply  compensate  for  their  absence. 

While  the  contemplation  of  beauty  opens  to  us  the 
whole  domain  of  nature  as  well  as  of  art,  its  production, 
of  course,  limits  us  wholly  to  the  consideration  of  the 
latter.  Is  art  an  imitation  of  nature  ?  Does  it  surpass 
nature?  These  are  old  questions,  and  will  probably 


288      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

cause  discussion  in  the  future  as  in  the  past ;  but  they 
are  really  irrelevant,  for  as  they  stand  they  can  be 
answered  both  affirmatively  and  negatively.  However 
much  the  mind  may  depend  on  nature  for  the  means  of 
culture,  its  norms  of  beauty  must  be  found  in  its  own 
ideals.  In  producing  these  ideals,  the  external  or  natu- 
ral element  is  a  factor,  and  it  would  be  erroneous  to 
pronounce  them  otherwise  than  potentially  innate.  If 
art  aims,  in  some  instances,  at  a  perfect  imitation  of 
nature,  that  does  not  circumscribe  its  limits:  it  may 
also  produce  what  can  nowhere  be  found  in  nature, 
putting  in  one  object  an  assemblage  of  graces  or  excel- 
lences which  are  not  found  in  such  perfection  in  any 
real  object.  Here  comes  the  distinction  between  the 
ideal  and  the  real.  The  mind  has  its  own  standard  of 
beauty.  Suggestions,  hints,  and  various  aids  may  be 
given  by  external  nature  ;  but  these  can  never  do  more 
than  develop  a  power  already  in  the  mind.  The  highest 
art  is  not  imitative,  but  the  product  of  genius,  which 
is  a  law  unto  itself.  In  a  certain  sense,  all  true  art  is 
natural.  The  laws  of  nature  are  simply  the  laws  of 
our  own  minds ;  hence  the  creations  of  the  mind  that 
follow  its  own  laws  are  in  harmony  with  the  laws  of 
nature.  The  unnatural  in  art  is  objectionable,  because 
it  violates  the  laws  of  mind.  But  art,  while  natural  in 
the  sense  of  being  in  harmony  with  natural  and  mental 
laws,  is  not  limited  to  the  objects  of  nature,  but  pro- 
duces ideals  not  found  in  nature,  and  yet  doing  no 
violence  to  it.  These  ideals  fulfil  what  is  given  in 
nature  only  in  the  form  of  types  and  prophecies.  The 
ideal  man  is  not  found  in  reality,  but  he  is  not  un- 
natural ;  indeed,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  him 
the  only  true  man.  In  its  relation  to  nature,  art  is  the 
ideal  perfection  of  hints  discovered  therein.  We  thus 


ESTHETICS.  289 

vindicate  for  art  a  sphere  for  creative  energy.  Its 
greatest  productions  transcend  nature,  just  as  mind 
does.  This  is  true  of  the  great  works  of  art,  from  the 
masterpieces  of  Greek  genius  down  to  Thorwaldsen. 
Nature  must  be  reflected  in  the  highest  creations,  other- 
wise they  are  abortions ;  but  the  mind  must  be  their 
soul,  otherwise  they  are  not  creations.  In  art  the  mind 
rises  in  a  peculiar  sense  into  its  own  element ;  and  in 
its  harmony  with  nature,  which  is  nevertheless  a  con- 
trast, it  can  be  original.  It  is  as  vain  to  hunt  for 
Guide's  Aurora  in  nature  as  to  search  for  Milton's 
descriptions  in  history.  So  exalted  is  the  true  artist 
that  we  never  think  of  classing  him  with  the  mechani- 
cal imitator  or  the  slavish  copyist.  His  art  expresses 
nature,  but  it  is  his  nature. 

The  term  "  fine  arts "  does  not  really  express  what 
is  intended  to  be  designated.  The  term  "  useful  arts  " 
shows  the  aim  of  the  objects  included;  and  when  we 
contrast  fine  arts  therewith,  we  expect  the  adjective  to 
be  the  counterpart  of  "  useful."  Why  may  not  the  use- 
ful arts  also  be  fine  ?  It  would  be  no  improvement  to 
substitute  "beautiful"  for  "fine,"  since  in  the  arts 
thereby  designated  there  is  much  that  can  be  termed 
neither  beautiful  nor  fine.  They  would  be  more  fully 
designated  by  calling  them  representative  arts ;  their  aim 
being  to  represent  some  object  or  ideal,  and  their  value 
consisting  in  this  representative  element.  Or  they 
might  be  called  contemplative  arts,  to  indicate  their 
purpose  as  intended  solely  for  contemplation. 

In  all  the  arts  called  fine,  there  may  be  many  things 
which  increase  the  interest  without  heightening  the 
beauty.  Sometimes  the  accessories  to  beauty,  or  the 
associated  considerations,  are  very  prominent,  arid  at 
times  something  else  than  beauty  is  the  chief  aim  of  the 


290      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

artist.  Thus  the  value  of  a  picture  may  consist  in  the 
truthfulness  with  which  it  represents  an  object  or  his- 
torical scene.  While  the  Laocoon  was  evidently  in- 
tended not  to  offend  the  taste,  mere  beauty  was  certainly 
not  its  main  object.  It  is  probably  an  effort  to  put  a 
description  into  marble,  and  the  artist  wanted  to  make 
it  as  true  as  possible  to  the  description,  or  to  the  idea 
to  be  represented.  One  need  but  study  the  best  gal- 
leries to  learn  how  small  a  proportion  of  the  art  makes 
beauty  its  sole  aim  ;  very  frequently  it  is  only  accessory 
to  some  other  aim  of  the  artist.  The  Greeks  were 
especially  successful  in  making  their  art  the  embodi- 
ment of  particular  ideas.  In  their  statues  of  the  gods, 
as  Jupiter,  Mercury,  Minerva,  Venus,  some  special 
characteristic  is  to  be  represented.  The  exact  represen- 
tation of  that  idea  is  the  aim ;  but  this  is  to  be  done  as 
perfectly  as  possible,  and  it  is  in  this  perfection  that  the 
beauty  is  to  be  found.  The  beautiful  is  intended  to 
bring  out  the  truth,  or  the  idea,  in  the  best  manner. 
In  many  works  of  art,  beauty  is,  therefore,  merely 
incidental,  not  the  first  aim.  Where  the  direct  aim,  it 
must  of  course  appear  as  the  representation  of  a  con- 
cept which  is  in  itself  pleasing.  If  Satan  is  represented 
as  beautiful,  it  must  be  at  the  expense  of  truth.  Much 
of  Michael  Angelo's  Last  Judgment  is  so  full  of  horror 
as  to  suppress  the  emotion  of  the  beautiful. 

Some  regard  the  characteristic,  the  peculiar,  and  the 
individual  as  the  essential  element  of  beauty  in  art. 
Artists  have  peculiarities,  and  the  works  of  a  master  or 
even  of  a  school  may  be  recognized  by  certain  charac- 
teristics of  style.  Generally  it  is  easy  to  pick  out  the 
works  of  Titian,  Rembrandt,  and  Rubens  in  a  gallery. 
However  broad  and  varied  an  artist's  range  of  subjects, 
in  all  of  them  the  characteristic  marks  of  his  mind  and 


ESTHETICS.  291 

skill  must  appear :  he  cannot  deny  himself  in  his  works. 
Perhaps  his  most  marked  peculiarity  is  a  mere  manner- 
ism. Its  originality  may  make  it  interesting,  or  there 
may  be  other  qualities  which  commend  it ;  but  in  itself, 
as  a  mere  mannerism,  it  is  a  defect.  This  becomes 
evident  so  soon  as  it  is  imitated ;  and  it  is  most  likely 
to  be  imitated  just  because  it  is  individual  and  striking. 
Hegel,  in  distinction  from  what  is  peculiar,  emphasized 
the  rational  and  universal  in  art.  He  viewed  objects  as 
defective  in  proportion  as  they  are  peculiar,  but  perfect 
in  proportion  as  they  are  universal.  That  is  not  beauty 
which  pleases  me  only,  but  which  commends  itself  as 
beautiful  to  all  capable  of  its  appreciation.  The  more 
art  accordingly  rises  above  the  individual  and  peculiar 
—  above  mannerism  especially  —  into  the  rational  and 
universal,  the  more  perfect  it  becomes,  because  the 
more  ideal.  But  while  this  is  true,  there  need  be  no 
irreconcilable  conflict  between  the  characteristic  and  the 
universal.  That  which  is  not  a  characteristic  (manner- 
ism) of  an  artist,  but  a  peculiarity  or  characteristic  of 
the  object  represented,  becomes  a  source  of  beauty  in 
proportion  as  it  is  brought  out  properly.  An  ideal  has 
characteristic  elements  which  distinguish  it  from  all 
other  ideals;  and  it  cannot  be  represented  correctly 
without  those  elements.  If  female  beauty  is  to  be 
painted,  that  which  distinguishes  it  from  all  other 
beauty  must  be  brought  out;  the  elaborate  details  of 
dress  become  offensive  if  they  hide  the  loveliness  of  the 
face,  or  receive  more  attention  than  the  characteristics 
of  female  beauty.  If  the  frame  is  more  beautiful  than 
the  picture,  the  artist's  aim  is  defeated.  A  discord  is 
in  itself  always  disagreeable ;  but  if  it  serves  to  bring 
out  more  fully  any  characteristic  harmony,  it  has  an 
aesthetic  value ;  it  heightens  the  impression  of  beauty. 


292     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  is,  it  seems  to  me,  the  true  place  of  the  charac- 
teristic in  art:  it  is  an  excellence  so  far  as  it  heightens 
what  constitutes  the  essence  of  beauty  in  an  object.  In 
this  sense  the  characteristic  is  co-extensive  with  the 
ideal,  and  is  in  reality  universal,  while  mannerism  de- 
tracts from  the  ideal  in  that  it  attracts  the  attention 
from  ideals  themselves  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  artist. 
Raphael's  ideals  of  beauty  have  merely  psychological  or 
historical  interest,  except  so  far  as  they  approach  the 
universal  ideals.  When  we  find  that  in  his  pictures  of 
the  Infant  Christ  and  the  Virgin  Mary  he  makes  every 
thing  tend  to  present  what  is  most  characteristic  in  the 
beauty  of  the  objects  represented,  we  admire  the  charac- 
teristic just  because  it  is  universal.  He  makes  the 
characteristic  of  beuaty  itself  his  peculiarity,  so  as  to 
exalt  his  individual  taste  to  that  of  the  universal  con- 
sciousness. That  characteristic  in  art  is  valuable  which 
represents  a  universal  ideal.  This  is  the  harmony  be- 
tween the  characteristic  and  the  universal,  —  it  is  a 
universal  characteristic. 

These  general  remarks  are  only  intended  as  an  intro- 
duction to  the  central  thought  of  aesthetics.  Details 
are  of  course  out  of  the  question.  Numerous  subjects 
grouped  around  the  centre  must  be  omitted  ;  their  treat- 
ment belongs  to  works  on  aesthetics.  The  student  will 
soon  find,  that,  much  as  has  been  written  on  this  branch 
of  philosophy,  much  more  remains  to  be  done.  The 
agreeable,  the  sublime,  the  tragic,  the  comical,  and  re- 
lated subjects,  need  careful  consideration,  as  well  as 
beauty  itself.  The  theme  is  fruitful  and  fascinating; 
but  its  proper  treatment  requires  a  union  of  qualities 
rarely  found  in  one  man.  It  still  waits  for  its  master. 

Besides  the  general  work  yet  to  be  done  in  deter- 
mining the  nature  of  beauty  and  its  relations,  much  also 


ESTHETICS. 


293 


remains  to  be  determined  respecting  the  several  arts. 
"But  comparatively  little  has  been  done  in  a  purely 
scientific  manner  to  determine  the  nature  arid  functions 
of  art  so  as  to  fix  the  relations  of  the  different  arts  to 
simple  or  natural  beauty.  .  .  .  There  seems  even  now 
no  consensus  of  opinion  as  to  the  precise  aims  of  art, 
how  far  it  has  simply  to  reproduce  and  constructively 
vary  the  beauties  of  nature,  or  how  far  to  seek  modes 
of  pleasurable  effect  wider  than  those  supplied  by 
natural  objects.  A  theory  of  art  at  all  comparable  in 
scientific  precision  to  existing  theories  of  morals  has  yet 
to  be  constructed.  The  few  attempts  to  establish  a 
basis  for  art  of  a  non-metaphysical  kind  are  charac- 
terized by  great  one-sidedness."  *  There  is  not  even 
agreement  as  to  the  division  of  the  representative  arts. 
Architecture,  sculpture,  painting,  music,  and  poetry  are 
the  main  divisions ;  but  this  classification  is  not  com- 
plete.f  Shall  rhetoric  be  added  ?  There  may  be  beauty 
in  gardening,  in  furniture,  in  dress,  in  oratory,  in  style. 
It  will  not  do  to  dismiss  these  with  the  statement  that 
in  them  beauty  is  not  the  sole  or  main  object ;  neither 
is  that  always  the  case  in  the  divisions  given  above. 
How  about  theatrical  and  operatic  representations? 
The  most  complete  union  of  all  the  arts  is  found  in  the 
opera,  with  its  poetry,  music,  acting,  and  scenic  effects, 

*  Ency.  Brit. 

t  Cousin  divides  the  arts  into  "two  great  classes:  arts  addressed  to 
hearing,  arts  addressed  to  sight;  on  the  one  hand,  music  and  poetry;  on 
the  other,  painting,  with  engraving,  sculpture,  architecture,  gardening." 
107.  This  division  according  to  the  senses  addressed  seems  to  be  too 
external.  Is  there  no  internal  relation  between  the  arts  themselves 
to  determine  their  connection  and  division? 

Schasler  also  divides  the  fine  arts  into  two  classes,  namely  those 
viewed  simultaneously  and  those  viewed  successively.  Under  the  first 
head  he  places  architecture,  sculpture,  and  painting;  under  the  second, 
music,  mimicry  (pantomine),  and  poetry. 


294      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

giving  opportunity  to  introduce  all  the  departments  of 
art.  This  variety,  with  an  idea  as  the  bond  of  union  in 
the  various  elements,  adds  much  to  the  attractiveness 
of  the  opera.  But,  at  the  same  time,  the  opera  is  un- 
natural, and  this  mars  its  beauty ;  it  is  art  that  is  not 
true,  and  this  makes  it  artificial.  The  opera  wants  to 
represent  life,  but  in  life  comedies  and  tragedies  are  not 
sung,  and  men  do  not  die  with  an  orchestral  accompani- 
ment. The  opera  is  not  the  perfection  of  the  real,  nor 
the  ideal  fulfilment  of  any  prophecy  veiled  in  life.  The 
charm  of  music  in  the  opera,  which  gives  it  the  advan- 
tage over  the  drama,  is  also,  as  far  as  nature  is  con- 
cerned, its  disadvantage.  One  must  often  suppress 
reflection  if  the  most  touching  scenes  are  not  to  become 
supremely  ludicrous.  Art,  whose  essence  is  truth,  may 
be  developed  into  harmony  with  nature ;  but  if  its 
essence  is  or  contains  a  falsehood,  it  never  can  harmonize 
with  nature  or  with  an  ideal.  The  opera  contains  the 
elements  of  destruction  in  itself;  and,  to  say  the  least,  it 
is  very  doubtful  whether  a  cultivated  taste  can  perma- 
nently endure  any  thing  so  thoroughly  artificial.  No 
doubt  every  sentiment  and  emotion  may  somehow  be 
expressed  or  interpreted  in  sound ;  but  to  sing  the  most 
trivial  and  the  most  solemn  emotions  and  descriptions, 
—  to  sing  household  affairs,  mechanical  labor,  historic 
scenes,  remorse,  all  that  pertains  to  life  and  death,  to 
self  and  the  world,  —  is  ridiculous.  It  turns  tragedy 
into  comedy,  and  life  into  caricature.  And  the  time 
may  yet  come  when  the  degree  of  true  culture  attained 
by  certain  ages  will  be  estimated  by  their  enthusiasm 
for  the  opera.  The  proper  sphere  of  the  opera  is  in 
romance  rather  than  real  life. 

^Esthetics  as  accessory  to  life  and  thought,  not  their 
essence,  is  subordinate.     As  such  its  value  is,  however, 


AESTHETICS.  295 

very  great.  Its  mission  is  to  bring  to  the  most  pleasing 
perfection  something  really  worthy  of  supreme  excel- 
lence. Art  is  degraded  whenever  it  represents  a  debas- 
ing object  as  pure,  beautiful,  and  attractive.  To  pursue 
beauty  —  a  pure  abstraction  —  for  its  own  sake,  instead 
of  something  really  valuable  which  deserves  to  be  made 
beautiful,  is  a  perversion  of  life  and  its  functions,  and 
must  be  placed  among  the  aberrations  of  the  mind. 
To  put  the  fanciful  and  imaginative  in  place  of  the  real, 
is  a  species  of  insanity. 

The  ethical  element  in  aesthetics  deserves  more  at- 
tention, not  merely  for  the  sake  of  ethics,  but  also  of 
aesthetics.  Numerous  tendencies  in  art  prove  this,  and 
the  claim  has  actually  been  made  that  aesthetics  is  inde- 
pendent of  moral  considerations.  It  has  been  tacitly 
held,  and  also  publicly  proclaimed,  that  artists  are  not 
to  be  judged  by  the  same  moral  standards  as  humanity 
at  large.  Such  views  are  destructive  both  of  aesthetic 
and  of  moral  health. 

But  in  its  proper  place  aesthetics  cannot  be  too  highly 
prized.  Thus  the  soul,  life,  ethics,  religion,  worship, 
and  all  that  is  noble,  may  be  developed  to  perfection 
and  become  beautiful.  Not  by  assigning  to  beauty 
a  fictitious  realm  by  itself,  but  by  putting  it  into  true 
and  organic  connection  with  ethics,  does  it  obtain  a 
worthy  mission.  We  want  to  develop  to  beautiful  per- 
fection the  substance  found  in  metaphysics,  the  thought 
found  in  noetics,  and  the  right  discovered  in  ethics. 


The  student  will  probably  find  peculiar  difficulty  in 
determining  exactly  the  nature  and  sphere  of  aesthetics. 
In  the  current  literature  on  the  subject  he  will  be  struck 
more  by  the  multitude  of  details  than  by  the  precision 


296      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  definiteness  of  the  discussion.  ^Esthetics  is  still 
in  its  preparatory  stage ;  the  discussion  is  tentative, 
materials  are  gathered,  and  classifications  are  made. 
But  the  time  for  synthesis  into  a  compact,  completely 
rounded,  and  sharply  limited  system  has  not  yet  come. 

After  the  preceding  general  consideration  of  the 
subject,  the  student's  attention  is  now  directed  to  two 
points  as  especially  worthy  of  consideration,  both  for 
the  sake  of  obtaining  clearness,  arid  a  basis  for  future 
progress.  These  two  points  are :  the  determination  of 
the  exact  sphere  of  the  aesthetic  emotion,  and  the  ex- 
planation of  the  conditions  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  A 
careful  consideration  of  these  points  will  lead  into  the 
very  heart  of  the  subject,  and  will  concentrate  attention 
on  what  is  most  essential  in  aesthetic  theory. 

First,  then,  What  is  the  spJiere  of  the  aesthetic  emo- 
tions ? 

The  very  question  implies  that  there  is  in  these  emo- 
tions something  which  constitutes  them  a  peculiar  class. 
What  now  is  it  that  makes  them  peculiar  ?  What  are 
the  characteristic  marks  of  what  we  term  the  sesthetical  ? 
Evidently  we  make  a  mistake  if  we  treat  beauty  as  the 
characteristic  mark  of  the  aesthetic.  That  beauty  does 
not  exhaust  the  sphere  whose  limits  we  are  seeking,  is 
tacitly  admitted  by  all  writers  on  aesthetics  when  they 
draw  so  many  other  subjects  into  the  discussion.  Thus, 
in  considering  the  representative  arts,  they  cannot  con- 
fine attention  to  beauty,  that  being  but  one  of  many 
elements  entering  into  those  arts.  ^Esthetics  as  the 
theory  of  these  arts  must  necessarily  include  all  per- 
taining to  them,  while  beauty  alone  leaves  much  in 
them  unexplained.  But  the  sublime,  the  tragic,  the 
comical,  are  usually  treated  as  also  belonging  to  aes- 
thetics,—  surely  sufficient  proof  that  there  is  a  large 


ESTHETICS.  297 

class  of  objects  having  in  common  what  is  called  ses- 
thetical,  and  that  of  these  objects  beauty  forms  but  a 
part,  not  the  whole.  We  must  thus  try  to  discover 
what  beauty  and  these  allied  subjects  have  in  common 
to  constitute  them  aesthetical. 

That  aesthetics  lies  in  the  domain  of  the  agreeable,  is 
universally  admitted.  Thus,  whatever  its  source  may 
be,  the  aesthetic  effect  is  always  pleasing.  Even  when 
the  subject  is  tragic,  it  must  be  so  presented  as  to  be 
fascinating.  But  the  peculiarity  of  the  pleasure  in 
such  cases  has  not  been  clearly  defined ;  and  for  this 
reason  the  aesthetic  element  in  agreeable  objects  has 
often  been  confounded  with  the  agreeable  in  general. 
It  is  of  first  importance,  therefore,  to  seek  the  charac- 
teristic mark  of  the  pleasing  element  in  aesthetics. 

We  have  already  seen  that  whatever  is  low  or  merely 
sensual  is  not  aesthetic.  The  vulgar  does  not  belong  to 
the  sphere  we  are  seeking.  The  same  is  true  of  all  that 
does  not  rise  above  the  limits  of  mere  sense-impressions 
into  the  sphere  of  the  intellect.  Likewise  the  impres- 
sions through  the  lower  senses  are  excluded ;  they  do 
not  furnish  material  for  such  intellections  as  are  required 
in  aesthetics.  Taste,  smell,  touch,  and  the  organic  sen- 
sations are  too  grossly  real,  too  directly  adherent  to  the 
material,  to  admit  of  the  spiritualization  found  in  aesthetic 
concepts.  Sight  and  hearing  are  more  intellectual,  the 
media  through  which  they  are  excited  are  more  refined, 
their  spheres  are  more  exalted ;  and,  while  less  domi- 
neered by  gross  matter,  they  are  more  free  for  intellect- 
ual play.  The  very  extent  of  the  spheres  of  these  two 
senses  suggests  a  certain  degree  of  freedom ;  while  the 
others  move  in  a  small  sphere,  and  are  severely  limited. 
The  higher  senses  give  immediate  play  to  the  intellect, 
while  what  the  other  senses  present  must  be  dropped 


298      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

before  such  play  is  possible.  The  latter  are  therefore 
properly  called  the  lower  senses,  and  are  the  conditions 
for  the  lower  pleasures  of  life,  while  the  others  are  higher 
in  the  intellectual  scale,  and  furnish  material  for  aesthet- 
ics. Whatever  is  aesthetic  must  transcend  the  vulgarly 
or  physically  agreeable,  such  as  the  pleasures  of  appe- 
tite, and  must  rise  into  the  sphere  of  intellectual  con- 
templation. The  aesthetic  emotions  consequently  imply 
a  certain  degree  of  intellectual  development,  and  also 
culture  and  refinement.  The  aesthetic  element  in  Plato's 
"Symposium"  consists  in  the  intellectual,  not  in  the 
gustatory,  feast. 

Having  now  risen  to  the  agreeable  as  a  mental  qual- 
ity, and  having  taken  aesthetics  out  of  the  realm  of 
vulgar  pleasures,  it  remains  to  determine  its  exact  place 
among  refined  gratifications.  The  question  is,  What  is 
the  intellectual  character  of  aesthetic  pleasures,  or  what 
peculiarity  in  our  intellectual  operations  constitutes  the 
charm  of  aesthetics  ? 

All  aesthetic  pleasures  are,  of  course,  subjective,  but 
they  are  not  personal ;  that  is,  they  do  not  spring  from 
the  fact  that  on  me,  as  an  individual,  any  benefit  has 
been  conferred.  What  is  purely  personal  and  exclusive, 
pertaining  to  me  only,  and  of  interest  only  to  me,  is 
excluded  from  aesthetics.  There  is  thus  nothing  selfish 
in  it.  The  joy  that  springs  from  an  acquisition  of  for- 
tune or  of  honor  is  no  more  aesthetic  than  is  the  taste  of 
a  savory  meal.  Neither  is  a  tragedy  in  real  life  aesthetic. 
This  gives  an  important  hint  as  to  the  place  of  aesthetic 
emotion ;  it  is  not  found  in  any  natural  affection,  nor  in 
any  real  experience.  Joy  and  sorrow  occasioned  by  real 
personal  affections  are  not  in  the  sphere  of  aesthetics. 

Nor  is  the  purely  intellectual  element,  intent  only  on 
truth  and  understanding,  the  sphere  of  aesthetics.  This 


ESTHETICS.  299 

excludes  mathematics,  logic,  and  science.  However 
great  the  pleasure  connected  with  the  discovery  of 
truth,  the  demonstration  and  judgment  of  truth  do  not 
constitute  the  essence  of  aesthetics.  That  these  may  be 
the  occasion  of  aesthetic  emotions,  is  not  questioned,  but 
from  them  these  emotions  do  not  spring  directly. 

It  is  thus  evident  that  the  real  alone  does  not  consti- 
tute the  sphere  we  are  considering.  It  must  be  some 
particular  aspect  of  the  real,  or  some  relation  it  sustains 
to  the  intellect,  or  some  notion  or  suggestion  of  the  real. 
Thus  the  mere  reality  of  a  flower,  or  the  science  of  that 
flower,  or  the  fact  that  edible  fruit  will  grow  from  the 
flower,  has  no  aesthetic  significance.  For  the  cow  that 
eats  it,  but  not  for  the  artist,  the  mere  reality  of  the 
flower  is  the  only  consideration.  That  nevertheless 
truth  and  reality,  particularly  in  the  form  of  ideals,  are 
essential  to  genuine  aesthetics,  has  already  been  suffi- 
ciently indicated. 

The  entire  discussion  forces  us  to  regard  the  imagin- 
ation as  the  sphere  of  the  aesthetic  emotion.  Not  the 
logical  inferences  from  the  real  and  from  truth  consti- 
tute aesthetics,  but  what  the  mind  in  its  free  play,  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  possibility,  makes  of  them.  The 
combinations  and  creations  in  aesthetics  must  be  true 
(according  to  rational  principles)  while  free.  Thus  the 
imagination  is  not  wild,  not  a  lawless  fancy,  and  its 
products  are  not  monstrosities,  but  it  works  within  the 
domain  of  reason.  All  its  productions,  if  aesthetic,  have, 
however,  a  relation  to  our  emotional  nature  ;  their  appeal 
to  the  soul  is  responded  to  by  a  feeling  of  pleasure. 

The  imagination  deals  with  the  real  in  a  representa- 
tive manner,  and  this  representative  element  is  charac- 
teristic of  all  aesthetic  objects.  Not,  then,  what  an  object 
is  in  itself,  but  what  it  represents,  what  it  is  in  point 


300      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  suggestiveness,  makes  it  aesthetic.  The  mere  fact  of 
brilliancy,  no  more  than  its  carbon,  makes  the  diamond 
an  aesthetic  object ;  that  fact  may  be  made  simply  the 
occasion  of  scientific  inquiry,  without  an  appeal  to 
the  emotions.  So  a  real  sorrow  is  simply  sorrow,  but  its 
representation  or  description  may  be  aesthetic.  See  the 
storm  with  King  Lear !  Suffering  itself  is  painful ;  yet 
its  description  is  not  only  free  from  actual  suffering,  but 
may  also  be  very  fascinating.  So  the  descriptions  of 
pleasure  may,  by  means  of  representative  elements,  pro- 
duce aesthetic  effects.  Thus,  in  what  are  termed  beauti- 
ful arts,  the  effect  depends  on  what  they  suggest,  on 
what  they  represent,  and  on  the  manner  of  the  represen- 
tation. In  thus  transferring  the  sphere  of  the  aesthetic 
emotions  from  the  real  to  the  representative,  we  find 
the  interpretation  of  the  conspicuous  part  played  in 
sesthetics  by  symbolism. 

The  representative  element  in  art  will  readily  be 
admitted,  but  its  existence  in  natural  objects  termed 
beautiful  may  not  be  so  evident.  This  may  be  a  reason 
why  aesthetics  has  by  some  writers  been  limited  to  art, 
while  the  beauty  in  nature  has  been  excluded.  But  a 
careful  study  of  the  aesthetic  effects  of  natural  objects 
will  also  prove  that  these  effects  depend  on  representa- 
tive elements.  Thus  no  natural  object  has  an  aesthetic 
significance  if  beyond  its  bare  reality  it  has  no  sugges- 
tions or  inspiration  for  the  mind.  A  landscape  viewed 
merely  as  so  much  nature,  or  as  of  certain  utility,  has 
no  aesthetic  value.  But  when,  aside  from  its  utility  and 
science,  nature  appeals  to  the  imagination,  it  may  have 
aesthetic  effects.  A  mouse  may  be  one  thing  to  the 
peasant,  and  something  very  different  to  the  poet 
Burns  ;  yet  its  bare  reality  may  be  to  either  of  less 
significance  than  to  a  cat.  It  is  thus  evident  that  the 


AESTHETICS.  301 

aesthetic  effect  depends  in  every  instance  on  what  the 
mind  associates  with  an  object,  or  on  what  the  imagin- 
ation interprets  into  an  object  or  constructs  from  it. 
Not  the  little  faded  flower  is  charming,  but  the  withered 
hopes  it  symbolizes  make  it  so  attractive. 

The  discussion  of  the  sphere  of  the  aesthetic  emotions 
has  already  led  us  to  the  second  point,  which  we  must 
now  consider  more  fully;  namely,  the  conditions  of 
cesthetic  appreciation. 

The  consideration  of  this  point  confirms  in  a  remark- 
able degree  the  correctness  of  the  indicated  sphere  of 
the  aesthetic  emotions.  We  do  not  look  for  aesthetic 
appreciation  where  the  training  has  been  merely  utilis- 
tic  or  scientific ;  how,  then,  is  it  obtained  ? 

This  appreciation  is  only  possible  when  we  rise  above 
the  naturalistic  and  realistic  standpoint,  into  the  realm 
where  the  imagination  moves  amid  symbols  and  repre- 
sentations, and  is  free  to  form  its  own  constructions. 
JEsthetic  appreciation  thus  depends  on  a  peculiar  kind 
of  culture,  —  a  culture  in  the  discernment  of  the  repre- 
sentative element  in  objects,  and  also  a  culture  of  the 
feelings  which  respond  to  this  element.  All  other 
things  being  equal,  the  minds  richest  in  suggestiveness 
(minds  called  by  the  Germans  geistreicK)  will  be  most 
aesthetic.  With  the  richness  of  suggestion  we  must  not 
confound  the  depth  of  emotion ;  what  a  mind  lacks  in 
variety  of  suggestiveness  may  be  compensated  for  by 
depth  of  emotion.  The  broken  column  on  a  tomb  may 
be  richer  in  suggestion  to  the  poet  than  to  the  mother 
who  erected  the  monument ;  but  the  one  suggestion  to 
the  mother  excites  deeper  emotions  than  all  the  sugges- 
tions of  the  poet. 

The  aesthetic  faculty,  as  it  may  be  called,  like  all 
other  mental  powers  requires  exercise,  training,  develop- 


302      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

merit.  The  first  things  that  claim  attention  are  such  as 
meet  physical  needs;  hence  the  appetites  are  so  pre- 
dominantly exercised  for  years,  and  we  cannot  speak  of 
sesthetic  appreciation  in  the  infant.  For  the  develop- 
ment of  this  appreciation,  or  taste,  the  exercise  of  the 
imagination  is  the  condition.  With  its  earliest  intel- 
lectual operations  the  child  enters  the  sphere  of  the 
representative.  Thus  the  very  name  "mamma"  is  a 
symbol,  being  representative,  as  all  language  is. 

In  order  to  understand  the  conditions  of  aesthetic 
appreciation,  we  must  again  recur  to  the  formation  of 
mental  states.  We  are  apt  thoughtlessly  to  regard 
every  judgment  as  independent  of  our  subjective  state  ; 
we  treat  it  as  if  invariable  and  universal :  in  other 
words,  we  treat  subjective  judgments  as  if  they  were 
objective.  Where  judgments  are  purely  mathematical, 
logical,  or  scientific,  we  of  course  place  ourselves  on  the 
objective  standpoint ;  and  we  generally  make  the  mis- 
take of  regarding  all  judgments  as  of  the  same  char- 
acter. This  is  fruitful  of  error,  particularly  in  social, 
ethical,  aesthetic,  and  religious  matters,  and  in  all  cases 
when  a  purely  subjective  element  enters  into  the  judg- 
ment. There  is  a  large  class  of  subjects  which  cannot 
be  determined  according  to  the  strict  principles  of  exact 
science.  We  might  call  judgments  respecting  them 
subjective,  determined  largely  by  the  estimated  value 
of  objects  to  ourselves;  although  the  aim  should  con- 
stantly be  to  attain  the  objective  standpoint,  which  is 
the  norm. 

Since  so  many  of  our  judgments,  opinions,  and  views 
depend  on  our  subjective  condition  or  state,  it  at  once 
becomes  evident  that  attention  to  the  state  is  of  first 
importance.  The  very  word  "  taste  "  refers  to  the  sub- 
jective state,  and  thus  implies  that  the  norms  of  taste 


AESTHETICS.  303 

are  not  necessarily  found  in  objective  nature  or  art. 
Let  us  call  this  inner  condition,  on  which  so  much  of 
aesthetic  appreciation  depends,  the  aesthetic  state.  How 
is  it  formed  ? 

We  have  seen  that,  whatever  of  our  mental  processes 
is  conscious,  the  formation  of  mental  states  of  more  or 
less  permanence  is  a  process  below  the  horizon  of  con- 
sciousness. As  in  the  growth  of  plants  and  animals, 
so  in  the  development  of  mental  states,  we  can  see 
the  results,  but  not  the  process  itself.  The  temporarily 
conscious  operations  of  the  mind  leave  a  permanent  im- 
press on  the  mind  itself :  they  must  be  viewed  as  real 
operations  or  conditions  of  that  mind,  not  as  mere  hap- 
penings on  its  surface.  Every  thought,  in  proportion 
as  it  is  deep,  works  changes  in  the  mind,  and  no  thought 
leaves  us  as  it  finds  us.  Particularly  by  repetition  are 
ideas  and  thoughts  embodied  in  our  state,  assimilating, 
as  it  were,  the  mental  organism  to  them,  and  determin- 
ing the  character  of  its  life.  All  habit  is  an  illustration 
of  the  fact  that  there  is  a  tendency  in  our  nature  to 
become  what  we  do. 

Under  certain  processes  of  culture  the  representative 
element  becomes  a  permanent  and  a  prominent  factor  in 
our  mental  state.  Thus  certain  objects  become  sym- 
bols, and  their  real  meaning  may  have  less  significance 
than  the  symbolical.  But  not  only  does  an  object  lose 
its  real  in  its  representative  element,  but  the  thing  sym- 
bolized is  also  lost  in  the  symbol.  How  often  is  a  word 
taken  for  the  concept,  and  the  sign  for  the  thing  signi- 
fied !  Idolatry  is  a  striking  illustration.  Thus  we  may 
have  hieroglyphics,  but  not  their  interpretation.  The 
power  of  symbols  or  of  the  representative  element 
depends  on  mental  association  ;  and  this  association  de- 
pends on  past  experience  and  training,  as  they  have 


304     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

become  permanently  embodied  in  the  state  which  they 
have  formed.  The  very  fact  that  they  have  formed  the 
state  implies  that  they  are  somehow  subsumed  into  that 
state,  and  continue  to  live  and  work  in  it.  Thus  on 
our  past  history  the  associations  and  the  suggestions 
of  our  minds  depend.  Owing  to  the  difference  of  states 
and  of  consequent  associations,  that  which  causes  one 
to  weep  makes  another  laugh. 

The  process  of  forming  representative  elements  and 
symbols  goes  on  ceaselessly.  While  all  language  is 
based  on  this  process,  it  is  most  apparent  in  that  which 
is  figurative.  One  thing  is  made  to  stand  for  or  to 
represent  another,  so  that  an  object  may  be  the  symbol 
of  an  infinite  variety  of  objects.  Then  the  association 
of  an  object  takes  the  place  of  the  object  itself.  Thus 
the  joy  that  springs  from  an  object  may  make  that 
object  the  symbol  of  joy  in  general ;  as  light,  a  feast, 
a  song,  or  a  dance.  In  this  way  objects  which  most 
deeply  or  most  frequently  affect  us  become  representa- 
tives of  all  objects  of  the  same  class. 

There  is  thus  a  constant  cultivation  of  a  state  in 
which  the  representative  element  is  prominent,  a  state 
which  is  the  condition  for  aesthetic  appreciation.  And 
our  aesthetic  state  depends  on  the  difference  in  the 
mind's  symbolism.  The  moonlight  has  a  different 
effect  on  one  who  sees  in  it  only  a  condition  for  more 
efficient  work  at  night,  from  what  it  has  on  him  to 
whom  it  has  associations  of  poetry,  music,  and  love.  Its 
effect  on  lovers  on  the  Grand  Canal  at  Venice  differs 
from  that  on  the  gondolier  who  earns  a  few  more  sous 
than  in  a  dark  night. 

In  the  state  formed  gradually  by  culture  we  have  the 
standard  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  It  may  be  a  prosaic 
or  poetic,  a  commercial  or  an  aesthetic,  a  scientific  or 


AESTHETICS.  305 

an  imaginative  state ;  but  whatever  the  state,  it  is 
always  the  condition  of  aesthetic  effects.  We  judge, 
esteem,  appreciate,  feel,  according  to  that  state  which 
conserves  in  itself  the  sum  total  of  the  impressions  made 
on  us  during  the  past ;  the  present  factors  in  influ- 
encing that  state  must  of  course  not  be  overlooked. 
Hence  the  difference  in  impressions  on  the  same  person, 
by  the  same  object,  at  different  times. 

Just  because  the  state  itself  determines  the  nature  of 
the  impressions,  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  standard 
according  to  which  the  impressions  work.  In  aesthetics 
there  is  usually  an  immediate  beholding ;  the  impres- 
sion is  received  directly,  intuitively,  as  it  were,  by  the 
sum  total  of  the  state.  The  mental  process  in  the  im- 
pression is,  like  all  other  mental  processes,  known  only 
in  its  results.  The  mind's  standard  in  the  appreciation 
is  the  state  that  mind  is  in  ;  or  we  may  say  that  the 
standards  are  latent  in  the  mind,  being  there  potentially 
and  working  there,  but  not  consciously.  Thus  it  re- 
quires a  special  effort  of  reflection  to  determine  the 
reason  of  aesthetic  appreciation,  the  taste  being  first 
and  immediately  active  as  appreciative,  and  then  as 
critical;  it  first  receives  the  aesthetic  impression,  and 
then  searches  for  the  cause  of  that  impression.  Appre- 
ciation and  criticism  are  therefore  not  necessarily  equally 
strong  in  the  same  person. 

The  immediateness  of  the  aesthetic  beholding  or  in- 
tuition is  proof  that  the  mind  is,  at  the  time,  not  con- 
scious of  the  standards  according  to  which  it  acts ;  yet 
it  is  commonly  ignored  that  the  mind  unconsciously 
acts  according  to  its  standards  or  ideals,  just  as  it 
unconsciously  forms  them.  Even  when  in  vigorous 
exercise,  they  may  elude  the  efforts  of  reflection  to  dis- 
cover them  ;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  but  few  per- 


306     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

sons  are  aware  of  the  standards  which  determine  their 
appreciation.  In  order  to  determine  all  the  elements 
which  enter  into  the  appreciation  of  a  flower,  scene,  or 
picture,  all  the  factors  embodied  in  our  state  through 
the  whole  course  of  past  development,  and  now  working 
there,  would  have  to  be  known.  No  more  in  a  purely 
intellectual  than  in  an  aesthetic  appreciation  is  the  whole 
past  experience  involved.  We  must  therefore  conclude 
that  the  ideals  formed  in  the  process  of  development 
and  actively  working  in  the  mind  are  its  standards  of 
appreciation ;  but  these  ideals  are  embodied  in  our 
state,  or  help  to  constitute  it,  so  that  they  work  in  that 
state  itself,  though  unconsciously. 

Since  unconscious  associations  and  unconscious  ideals 
operate  in  aesthetic  appreciation,  we  can  understand 
why  so  much  remains  obscure  in  the  process.  We  have 
not  consciously  at  command  all  the  factors  which  enter 
into  aesthetic  emotion.  In  art  criticism  we,  however, 
seek  to  interpret  the  emotion  by  analyzing  its  elements. 
The  various  processes  which  the  student  of  art  at  first 
performs  slowly,  laboriously,  and  consciously,  at  last 
become  habitual,  easy,  and  unconscious.  Thus  even 
the  rules  of  criticism,  like  those  of  grammar,  work 
directly,  and  are  applied  unconscious^.  While  aesthetic 
appreciation  is  therefore  immediate,  the  condition  for 
its  immediateness  and  character  may  be  the  product  of 
years  of  development. 

There  is  a  striking  difference  in  the  effect  produced 
by  the  different  arts.  This  is  largely  owing  to  the 
nature  of  the  representative  element.  Poetry  is  the 
most  definite  of  the  arts,  music  the  most  indefinite. 
The  preceding  views  will  help  us  to  understand  this. 
It  has  been  said  that  poetry  appeals  to  the  feelings 
through  thought,  but  music  to  thought  through  feeling. 


AESTHETICS. 


307 


Indeed,  we  may  arrange  the  various  arts  according  to 
the  distinctness  of  their  representative  elements,  —  a 
striking  confirmation  of  the  theory  that  the  representa- 
tive is  the  sphere  of  aesthetics.  Poetry  is  so  definite 
because  it  uses  language  which  expresses  ideas  in  the 
clearest  manner.  But  let  one  hundred  musicians  hear 
the  same  piece  of  music,  and  the  chances  are  that  no 
two  of  them  will  agree  exactly  as  to  the  thoughts 
intended  to  be  expressed.  The  explanation  is  found 
in  the  symbol  used ;  namely  sound,  but  not  in  the 
form  of  articulate  language.  Sound,  as  a  symbol,  is 
vague,  the  same  tone  being  capable  of  different  inter- 
pretations. The  obscurity  of  the  symbol  thus  explains 
the  fact  that  the  appeal  of  music  to  the  imagination  is 
so  indefinite.  And  yet  therein,  in  part,  is  its  power, 
since  it  gives  so  much  free  scope  to  the  imagination. 

After  determining  the  exact  place  of  aesthetics  and 
the  conditions  for  aesthetic  appreciation  in  general,  spe- 
cial inquiries  can  be  instituted  respecting  beauty,  the 
chief  object  of  aesthetics.  In  beauty  we  have  the  high- 
est object  of  aesthetic  appreciation,  the  culmination  of 
taste.  All  that  constitutes  the  aesthetic  element  in  any 
object  must  also  be  found  in  beauty.  Thus  its  sphere 
is  found  in  imagination,  in  an  intellectual  symbolism. 
Perhaps  the  most  serious  mistake  has  been  made  in  the 
attempt  to  treat  it  as  the  only  aesthetic  object,  or  as 
peculiarly  aesthetic,  whereas  it  shares  its  general  charac- 
teristics with  other  aesthetic  objects.  But  in  beauty 
certain  aesthetic  qualities  reach  their  highest  develop- 
ment. Into  beauty  enter  the  reason,  the  spirit ;  beauty 
pertains  to  what  is  most  agreeable  to  the  imagination. 
Perhaps  the  term  "  beauty  "  is  used  so  vaguely,  and 
applied  to  so  many  merely  agreeable  objects,  just  be- 
cause it  lacks  those  striking  peculiarities  which  have 


308     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

been  sought  in  it.     Whatever  is  beautiful  has  a  peculiar 

excellence ;   and,  instead   of  a   peculiarity  of  quality, 

beauty  is  rather  an  exalted  degree   of  qualities   also 

/  found  in  objects  not  pronounced  beautiful.     Beauty  is 

|   an  cesthetic  emotion,   excited  by  a  pleasing  object  which 

appeals   to   the   imagination  with  a  degree  of  perfection 

/    approaching   the   ideal.     Beauty,  thus,  always   pleases. 

\  The  medium  of  the  pleasure  is  the  imagination ;  and 
it  pleases,  because  it  approaches  the  highest  concepts 
of  excellence  in  representation.  Thus  the  blending  of 
agreeable  sounds  in  music,  the  harmonious  arrangement 
of  colors  in  painting,  the  symmetry  of  form  in  statuary, 
are  beautiful  in  proportion  as  they  present  to  the  imagi- 
nation representations  of  pleasing  objects  in  a  state  of 
perfection  approaching  or  suggesting  the  mind's  ideals. 
Beauty  is  thus  mental :  it  is  an  idea,  existing  in  the 
mind.  But  there  are  numerous  symbols  of  beauty. 
The  idea  may  be  embodied  in  an  object ;  that  is,  cer- 
tain objects  may  be  symbols  of  the  idea,  or  they  may 
represent  ideals. 

Since  beauty,  like  sight  and  sound,  whatever  its  occa- 
sion may  be,  is  always  mental,  the  soul  is  peculiarly 
drawn  to  objects  in  which  beauty  is  represented.  The 
soul  seems  to  discover  itself  in  such  objects.  Beauty, 
so  far  as  spoken  of  in  objects,  meets,  expresses,  and 
interprets  the  soul's  longings,  though  often  indistinctly, 
as  in  music.  And  genius  in  art  consists  in  the  power 
to  form  constructions  and  creations  which  appeal  with 
an  ideal  effect  to  the  imagination,  and  express  most 
perfectly  the  soul's  conception  of  representative 
excellence. 


AESTHETICS.  309 


REFLECTIONS. 

Etymology,  Meaning,  and  History  of  ^Esthetics. 
Define  Feeling.  Importance  of  a  theory  of  the  Feel- 
ings. Their  Origin.  Their  relation  to  Thought  and 
Volition.  Their  Immediateness.  Does  Feeling  deter- 
mine Values?  What  is  Beauty?  Relation  to  the 
Pleasurable.  Is  Beauty  always  an  idea  or  ideal  em- 
bodied in  form?  Unconscious  mental  basis  of  the 
Beautiful.  Beauty  in  mind  and  in  objects.  Freedom 
or  play  of  the  soul  in  contemplating  Beauty.  Power 
of  contrast  on  the  emotion  of  the  Beautiful.  Effect  of 
reflection  on  the  emotion.  Relation  of  Beauty  to  Good- 
ness and  Truth.  Distinction  between  Beauty  and  its 
conditions.  Is  Beauty  in  the  ideal,  or  in  its  represen- 
tation? Views  of  Beauty  in  empirical  and  idealistic 
schools.  Is  it  mere  form  ?  What  is  Genius  ?  In  what 
sense  is  it  a  law  unto  itself?  Is  it  unconscious  of  its 
law?  Define  Art.  Give  its  divisions.  Aims  of  the 
so-called  Fine  Arts.  Classify  them.  Indicate  the 
aesthetic  element  in  each.  Advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages of  the  Opera.  Esthetic  value  of  the  various 
Arts.  Aim  of  ^Esthetic  Criticism.  Define  Taste.  Can 
Beauty  ever  exist  as  the  sole  quality  or  characteristic 
of  an  object?  If  Beauty  is  perfection  of  substance  (in 
quality  or  form),  can  Beauty  have  a  value  independent 
of  the  substance?  Apply  this  to  Poetry,  Oratory, 
Style.  What  value  is  attributable  to  Beauty  in  objects  ? 
Application  of  ^Esthetics  to  education,  religion,  and 
other  departments.  Define  the  sphere  of  the  ^Esthetic 
Emotions.  The  significance  of  the  representative  ele- 
ment. Symbolism.  Conditions  of  ^Esthetic  Apprecia- 
tion. How  are  mental  states  formed  ?  What  elements 
are  conserved  in  our  states  ? 


310     INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

ETHICS. 

HOWEVER  complete  a  thought  may  be  in  itself,  we 
regard  it  as  complete  in  its  relation  to  our  personality 
only  when  it  somehow  affects  the  feelings  and  the  will. 
When  knowledge  becomes  sesthetical  and  ethical,  we 
have  seed  and  flower  and  fruit.  But  also  in  another 
sense  we  see  in  ethics  the  crown  of  philosophy.  Being 
based  on  a  knowledge  of  thought,  of  being,  and  of  feel- 
ing, it  concentrates  the  results  thus  obtained,  in  order 
to  find  the  principles  of  morality,  and  to  construct  the 
theory  of  doing.  While  thus  the  completion  of  rational 
thought,  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  also  fundamental, 
since  ethical  principles  are  involved  in  the  construction 
of  logic,  metaphysics,  and  aesthetics. 

As  a  philosophical  discipline,  ethics  seeks  the  princi- 
ples of  the  volitions  or  of  conduct.  It  is  rational  and 
theoretical,  aiming  at  the  discovery  of  the  principiant 
element  in  action.  It  is  frequently  placed  under  the 
head  of  practical  philosophy,  since  it  aims  to  give 
the  law  for  all  practice ;  yet  it  is  not  an  art,  but  the 
philosophy  of  the  art  of  the  true  life.  There  are  numer- 
ous phases  of  life  which  it  does  not  discuss  directly, 
but  in  no  sphere  is  practice  possible  whose  fundamental 
principles  are  not  found  in  ethics.  It  seeks  not  the 
totality  of  reason  in  conduct,  but  this  reason  so  far  as 
it  has  a  moral  bearing.  Hence,  instead  of  ethics,  we 
have  the  term  "  morality,"  or  moral  philosophy. 


ETHICS. 


811 


A  clear  and  distinct  apprehension  of  the  idea  of 
morality  reveals  a  sphere  different  from  metaphysics, 
noetics,  and  aesthetics,  yet  intimately  connected  with 
them.  All  it  has  in  common  with  them  is  made  pecul- 
iar in  that  it  is  viewed  exclusively  in  its  moral  aspect. 
It  is  the  peculiarity  of  the  ethical  concept  on  which 
attention  is  now  to  be  concentrated. 

Both  an  intelligence  which  works  necessarily,  and  a 
law  which  operates  blindly,  exclude  the  ethical  idea. 
This  idea  involves,  as  a  constitutive  element,  the  con- 
ception of  an  alternative.  A  being  without  choice  is 
reduced  to  the  level  of  natural  objects,  controlled  by 
force,  and  cannot  be  moral.  The  doctrine  of  fate  anni- 
hilates the  will,  and  makes  ethics  impossible.  Equally 
destructive  of  ethics  is  the  doctrine  of  chance.  If  there 
is  no  unalterable  law,  then  there  is  no  standard  to 
which  conduct  must  be  conformed  in  order  to  be 
moral.  Morality  cannot  be  arbitrariness.  If  each  will 
can  determine  arbitrarily  the  ethical,  then  morality  is 
not  objective  :  it  is  not  grounded  in  reason,  and  cannot 
fix  a  rule  of  action.  If  fatalism  retains  the  name  of 
ethics,  it  reduces  the  discipline  to  a  natural  science, 
while  chance  reduces  it  to  chaos. 

All  morality  involves  choice  between  alternatives, 
but  not  every  choice  is  a  moral  act.  The  character  of 
the  choice  is  determined  by  the  end  in  view,  and  by  the 
means  for  the  attainment  of  that  end.  The  ultimate 
end  chosen  (design,  purpose,  aim,  motive)  always  in- 
volves ethics;  but  the  choice  of  the  particular  means 
for  its  attainment  is  not  necessarily  moral.  If  the  ulti- 
mate aim  is  carnal  gratification,  the  choice  is  manifestly 
immoral ;  if  right  is  the  aim,  the  choice  is  moral.  It  is 
the  ultimate  aim,  —  the  object  sought  as  the  consumma- 
tion of  all  choices,  — which  determines  the  character  of 


312     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  life,  casting  its  light  or  darkness  over  the  entire 
course.  There  may  be  mistakes  in  the  choice  of  means 
to  attain  the  end,  but  success  or  failure  may  involve 
much  that  lies  beyond  our  power;  and  we  are  not 
responsible  for  the  inevitable,  nor  for  a  knowledge 
beyond  our  reach.  Not  results  beyond  our  control,  but 
solely  the  ends  honestly  chosen,  arid  consistently  sought, 
determine  the  moral  quality  of  life.  Hence  the  attri- 
butes generous,  miserly,  noble,  selfish,  good,  bad,  right, 
wrong,  may  designate  the  life  as  a  totality,  giving  the 
ruling  motive  as  the  vital  force,  and  determining  the 
ethical  character  of  the  products.  Hence  character, 
judged  as  a  totality,  and  not  according  to  separate  acts, 
which  may  be  exceptional,  must  be  measured  by  the 
end  chosen,  and  by  the  measure  of  consistency  with 
that  end.  That  life's  aim  also  affects  the  choice  of 
means,  and  determines  the  character  of  the  means,  is 
evident.  Consistency  with  a  good  purpose  makes  bad 
means  impossible.  But  for  the  realization  of  certain 
ends  various  means  may  appear  to  be  equally  effective 
and  good.  In  that  case  it  becomes  morally  indifferent 
which  is  chosen.  If  means  are  morally  equal,  the 
choice  may  depend  on  other  than  ethical  grounds.  By 
following  to  its  utmost  consequences  all  the  considera- 
tions which  enter  into  a  choice,  we  should  undoubtedly, 
in  every  instance,  come  to  an  ethical  principle ;  but  this 
does  not  mean  that  what  ultimately  involves  ethics  also 
implies  an  ethical  element  in  the  details  of  the  choice 
of  an  individual,  since  the  ultimate  principles  rationally 
involved  may  lie  wholly  beyond  his  reach.  Not  what 
is  ultimate  in  ethics,  but  what  is  ultimate  for  one,  in  my 
peculiar  circumstances  and  with  jny  peculiar  attain- 
ments, is  the  standard  of  my  responsibility.  Such 
reflections  make  evident  the  need  of  a  general  theory 


ETHICS.  813 

of  conduct  as  a  preparation  for  ethics,  just  as  in 
aesthetics  we  felt  the  demand  for  a  general  theory  of 
the  emotions. 

Can  a  being  perfectly  good,  and  meeting  with  no 
opposition,  be  called  moral?  Its  perfection  would  be 
much  like  that  of  a  law  of  nature ;  the  difference  being 
that  the  perfect  being  would  work  intelligently,  with  a 
definite  end  in  view.  God  is  moral  in  the  sense  that 
He  is  always  perfectly  in  accord  with  the  moral  law, 
not  because  He  has  an  alternative.  We  must  view 
Him  as  the  source  and  embodiment  of  the  moral  law, 
and  His  deeds  as  expressive  of  the  perfection  of  His 
nature.  He  is  free  in  that  He  is  not  subject  to  exter- 
nal restraint.  His  acts  are  determined  by  His  own 
nature.  In  Him,  therefore,  we  find  freedom  and  neces- 
sity united.  The  term  "  morality  "  can  consequently 
be  applied  to  God  in  a  peculiar  sense  only  ;  and  to  pre- 
vent confusion,  it  is  better  to  avoid  it  altogether,  and 
substitute  for  it  "  holiness." 

The  subject-matter  of  ethics  is  the  good,  or  that 
which  has  moral  worth.  If  in  the  good  is  found  the 
characteristic  mark  of  all  that  is  ethical,  it  must  be 
determined  what  constitutes  the  distinctive  peculiarity 
of  the  good,  what  its  criteria  are,  how  it  is  related  to 
truth  and  aesthetics,  wherein  consists  its  distinction 
from  the  pleasurable  and  the  useful,  and  how  it  can  be 
attained.  Such  subjects  as  man's  personality,  his  rela- 
tion to  God,  the  freedom  of  the  will,  the  nature  of  con- 
science and  character,  the  essence  of  right,  virtue,  duty, 
responsibility,  and  the  questions  connected  with  motives, 
means,  and  ends,  —  all  belong  to  ethics.  It  thus  deals 
with  the  problems  which  involve  the  greatest  concerns 
and  the  deepest  interests  of  life;  and  one  need  but 
appreciate  its  significance,  to  understand  why  so  many 


314      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

thinkers    have   viewed    it   as   the   culmination   of    all 
philosophy. 

We  distinguish  between  philosophical  and  theological, 
or  Christian,  ethics.  While  the  latter  discusses  the 
principles  of  morality  found  in  and  demanded  by  the 
Christian  system,  the  former  investigates  those  discover- 
able by  human  reason.  In  speculative  theological  ethics 
(especially  the  work  of  Richard  Rothe),  there  is  a  union 
of  Christian  and  philosophical  elements.  While  Chris- 
tian and  rational  ethics  may  be  treated  separately,  they 
cannot  be  permanently  divorced.  A  complete  philo- 
sophical ethical  system  must  include  the  Christian  ele- 
ments which  are  rational ;  and  a  Christian  system  of 
morality  cannot  ignore  any  ethical  demands  of  the 
reason.  They  cannot  both  be  final  unless  there  is  an 
essential  agreement  between  them.  If  such  an  agree- 
ment cannot  be  established,  either  the  Christian  or 
the  rational  system  will  be  regarded  as  supreme,  and  the 
other  subordinate,  or  else  the  one  will  attempt  to  super- 
sede the  other.  If  Christian  ethics  is  viewed  as  a 
purely  human  product,  philosophical  ethics  will  seek  to 
give  its  rational  explanation,  and  will  wholly  absorb 
it,  —  all  that  is  in  it  being  valued  only  so  far  as  it  is 
rational ;  but  if  viewed  as  divine  in  its  origin,  its  rela- 
tion to  philosophical  ethics  will  have  to  be  determined. 
Christian  ethics  must  be  rational,  not  indeed  in  the 
sense  that  all  its  principles  can  be  discovered  or  fully 
explained  by  limited  human  reason,  but  in  the  sense 
that  faith  in  them  must  be  reasonable.  We  are  con- 
cerned here,  however,  only  with  philosophical  ethics.* 

*  On  the  relation  of  Christian  to  philosophical  ethics,  see  Dorner, 
System  of  Christian  Ethics,  17-28.  For  the  literature  on  ethics,  philo- 
sophical, as  well  as  Christian,  see  the  same  work,  28-42.  The  valuable 
list  of  English  and  American  works  on  the  subject,  39-42,  is  by  the 
translator,  Professor  C.  M.  Mead. 


ETHICS. 


315 


While  in  theological  ethics  the  principles  are  taken 
from  Scripture,  philosophical  ethics  searches  for  them 
in  the  light  of  reason.  The  objects  of  its  search  are 
the  good,  absolutely  and  relatively,  and  the  ultimate 
grounds  and  norms  of  conduct.  Its  principles  must  be 
universal,  applying  to  all  moral  beings,  and  including 
in  their  application  both  the  individual  and  society. 
The  essence  of  the  ethical  impulse  is  the  imperative 
ought.  While  it  works  immediately,  unconscious  of  the 
ingredients  involved,  it  is  really  very  complicated,  and 
includes  all  that  pertains  to  the  moral  process.  That 
something  ought  to  be,  implies  that  it  is  not,  and  also 
that  it  will  not  come  of  itself.  The  very  possibility  of 
ethics,  therefore,  implies  incompleteness,  imperfection, 
—  a  recognition  of  a  more  perfect  state  than  the  existing 
reality,  and  the  need  of  effort  for  its  realization.  We 
do  not  feel  ourselves  bound  by  the  things  that  are,  but 
by  that  which  ought  to  be.  The  imperfect  real  is  not 
our  standard,  and  cannot  give  it.  The  ideal  is  our  law. 
Being  in  antagonism  with  the  existing  reality,  this 
law  cannot  have  its  origin  in  the  things  about  us.  The 
consciousness  of  an  ought  springs  from  a  contemplation 
of  the  contrast  between  the  real  and  the  ideal.  Ethics 
is  a  forecasting,  a  projection  of  the  mind  beyond  what  is, 
and  a  prophecy  of  better  things.  We  stand  on  the  real, 
but  only  to  rise  above  it,  and  to  work  up  to  something 
beyond.  We  must  not,  however,  imagine  that  the  mere 
contemplation  of  the  imperfect  and  the  perfect  makes 
morality  possible.  We  must  recognize  ourselves  as 
related  to  both,  as  somehow  responsible  for  the  relation 
sustained,  and  as  able  to  promote  the  ideal  by  the  use 
of  the  real.  Thus  the  ethical  always  involves  a  process, 
an  effort,  a  development.  It  is  possible  only  in  a  world 
that  is  imperfect,  and  yet  has  in  it  the  seeds  and  condi- 


316      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

tions  of  perfection :  it  involves  ideals,  the  possibility 
of  their  attainment  or  of  approach  thereto,  and  a  con- 
sciousness of  responsibility  respecting  their  realization. 
Much  as  intellect  and  feeling  have  to  do  with  ethics, 
the  will  is  the  supreme  factor. 

From  the  time  of  Socrates  till  the  present,  an  effort 
has  been  made  to  discover  the  principle  of  morality,  or 
the  standard  of  right.  The  fundamental  question  has 
been,  What  is  the  ultimate  appeal,  the  final  law?  In 
opposition  to  the  sophists,  who  made  morality,  as  well 
as  truth,  something  subjective,  individual,  a  matter  of 
opinion,  Socrates  aimed  to  establish  it  on  a  universal 
and  eternal  basis.  Plato  finds  the  moral  ideal  in  God, 
who  is  the  supreme  good ;  and  this  is  the  view  preva- 
lent in  his  school.  While  the  same  idea  lies  at  the 
basis  of  Aristotle's  ethics,  he  discusses,  in  his  book  on 
that  subject,  moral  conduct  and  the  particular  virtues 
more  fully  than  the  fundamental  principles.  The  impor- 
tance of  the  subject  has  led  to  the  frequent  discussion 
of  ethics  in  recent  times.  Principles  formerly  thought 
to  have  been  firmly  established  are  now  attacked. 
Different  philosophical  schools  have  set  up  different 
standards  of  right ;  and  in  this,  as  in  the  other  depart- 
ments of  philosophy,  the  conflict  of  different  views  is 
radical.  Respecting  details,  as  well  as  many  general 
rules,  there  is  much  unanimity;  but  respecting  the 
ultimate  principles,  such  as  the  nature,  the  basis,  and 
the  criteria  of  the  good,  there  is  great  diversity.  It 
is  in  ethics  that  the  fundamental  differences  of  theism 
and  atheism,  of  idealism  and  materialism,  are  most 
apparent.  While  much  remains  to  be  done  in  order 
to  determine  particular  moral  laws,  the  most  essential 
thing  needed  is  the  discovery  of  the  basis  011  which  the 
whole  system  of  ethics  rests. 


ETHICS.  317 

Viewed  with  respect  to  this  basis,  the  various  ethical 
schools  are  usually  grouped  under  two  heads ;  namely, 
the  intuitional  and  the  utilitarian.  These  names,  how- 
ever, embrace  a  great  diversity  of  views.  Frequently 
the  intuitional  and  utilitarian  principles  are  represented 
as  diametrically  opposed;  but  sometimes  an  effort  is 
made  to  unite,  or  at  least  to  reconcile,  them.  Too  fre- 
quently the  fundamental  principles  adopted  are  stated 
so  indefinitely  that  their  exact  nature  cannot  be  deter- 
mined. The  terms  "intuitionalism"  and  "utilitarian- 
ism" themselves  need  more  careful  definition.  As  a 
general  rule,  the  intuitional  school  finds  the  standard  of 
moral  conduct  inherent  in  man,  as  something  a  priori, 
not  learned  from  experience.  If  this  is  taken  in  the  sense 
that  the  capacity  for  morality  is  innate,  so  that  man  need 
only  be  properly  developed  in  order  to  become  ethical, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  objection  can  be  found  to 
this  position.  It  puts  the  innate  element  in  morals  on 
exactly  the  same  basis  as  that  in  noetics  and  aesthetics. 
But  if  the  a  priori  element  excludes  the  a  posteriori,  so 
that  not  merely  the  capacity  for  morals,  but  also  the 
moral  ideas,  are  made  innate,  intuitionalism  is  subject 
to  the  same  objection  as  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  in 
general.  But  if  it  is  found  that  there  is  a  basis  for 
morality  in  the  very  constitution  of  our  being,  ethics 
will  be  placed  on  an  immovable  foundation.  Right  will 
have  its  source  and  law  in  the  very  nature  of  things, 
and  should  be  done  for  its  own  sake ;  and  then  it  is  an 
end  in  itself,  not  merely  means  for  attaining  something 
else.  It  is  this  absoluteness  and  ultimateness  of  right 
which  the  intuitional  school  seeks  to  establish.  The 
utilitarian  school,  on  the  other  hand,  denies  that  there 
is  such  an  inner,  inherent  standard,  but  holds  that  the 
useful  determines  the  right ;  hence  the  name  "  utilita- 


318      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

rianism."  The  useful  has  itself  been  variously  con- 
ceived, sometimes  being  taken  in  a  lower,  at  others  in 
a  higher  sense ;  sometimes  as  the  means  of  pleasure,  or 
happiness,  or  well-being,  or  some  other  real  or  imagined 
good.  Bentham  held  that  it  is  the  aim  of  morals  to 
secure  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number,  and 
this  view  has  generally  prevailed  in  modern  utilitarian 
ethics. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  relation  of  the  principles 
of  the  two  schools  continually  varies.  Sometimes  these 
principles  approach  each  other,  as  if  a  truce  was  to  be 
made ;  and  then  again  they  are  antagonistic.  They  are 
treated  as  if  they  excluded  each  other,  when  this  is  not 
necessarily  the  case.  A  utilitarianism  may  be  possible 
which  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  intuitionalism.  The 
subjects  overlap:  they  are  two  circles  which  intersect 
and  thus  have  a  part  in  common.  Both,  if  they  go  deep 
enough,  must  take  something  as  innate  ;  both  must  learn 
from  experience ;  both  recognize  the  useful.  Hence, 
in  reality,  both  are  intuitional,  and  both  are  utilistic. 
According  to  their  usual  treatment  they,  however, 
differ  in  their  intellectual  apprehension  of  the  right, 
not  respecting  what  is  innate,  unless  intuitionalism 
means  innate  ideas,  or  utilitarianism  means  that  absurd 
empiricism  which  finds  outside  of  the  mind  what  can 
only  be  in  the  mind.  There  is  no  reason  in  intuitional- 
ism itself  why  it  should  not  regard  right  as  inherent 
in  our  nature,  and  determined  by  the  constitution  of 
things,  and  yet  regard  the  right  as  the  useful.  The 
difference  is  thus  less  a  question  of  inherence  than  of 
intellectual  development ;  though  it  is  evident  that  the 
intuitional  school  seeks  a  metaphysical  basis,  while 
the  utilitarian  moves  more  in  the  realm  of  the  phenome- 
nal. Yet  when  traced  back  to  its  source,  the  impulse 


ETHICS. 


319 


to  do  right,  whether  it  be  synonymous  with  the  useful 
or  not,  must  necessarily  have  its  basis  in  the  nature  of 
our  being.  Whatever  may  be  its  external  occasion,  the 
ought  is  always  inner,  personal. 

As  intuitionalism  refers  primarily  only  to  the  psycho- 
logical source  of  ethics,  so  utilitarianism  refers  primarily 
only  to  means,  not  the  end.  Both  names  are,  therefore, 
objectionable  as  a  designation  of  the  entire  system  of 
morality.  A  less  satisfactory  word  than  "  utilitarianism  " 
could  hardly  have  been  chosen  for  the  ultimate  princi- 
ples of  morality.  The  useful  is  always  means,  never 
an  end.  How,  then,  can  the  means  to  an  end  be  the 
end  of  moral  conduct?  Perhaps  we  cannot  conceive 
an  ethical  system  in  which  the  right  and  useful  are  not 
in  the  end  perfectly  harmonious.  But  if  the  useful  is 
the  law  for  ethics,  we  at  once  ask:  Useful  for  what? 

There  are  certain  precepts  which  we  regard  as  of 
binding  authority.  What  constitutes  them  an  impera- 
tive command  ? 

It  is  here  assumed  that  this  authority  really  exists 
for  every  normally  developed  human  being.  Its  non- 
existence  would  prov£  a  being  not  moral.  If  the  intel- 
lect may  be  so  perverted  that  the  normal  exercise  of 
thought  becomes  impossible,  why  may  not  the  moral 
nature  be  so  perverted  as  to  fail  to  discern  between 
right  and  wrong  ?  But  the  moral  perversions  of  men, 
and  the  diversity  of  views  respecting  the  right,  are  no 
evidence  that  morality  has  no  basis  in  the  constitution 
of  human  nature. 

Morality,  being  something  objective,  and  the  same 
for  all  responsible  beings,  not  mere  subjective  prefer- 
ence, whim,  opinion,  or  arbitrary  determination,  it  is  as 
subject  to  laws  as  are  our  reasoning  faculties.  The 
deepest  inquiry  must  always  conclude  that  these  laws 


320      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

have  their  basis  in  the  nature  of  things ;  and  that,  in 
their  ultimate  consequences,  they  must  tend  to  produce 
harmony.  Laws  which  govern  phenomena  cannot  them- 
selves be  made  phenomenal.  Were  there  no  moral  order 
in  the  universe,  our  moral  laws  would  not  be  harmless 
fiction  merely,  but  an  actual  perversion.  However  we 
may  define  the  right,  its  last  interpretation  must  be 
consonant  with  our  own  being  and  with  the  design  of 
things.  This  broad  and  deep  view  of  morality  reveals 
it  as  objectively  real  and  eternal.  But  we  must  distin- 
guish "between  the  absolute  norm  for  morality  and  its 
conscious  possession.  Just  because  so  deep,  it  is  diffi- 
cult of  discovery ;  and  different  views  of  the  standard 
of  right  arise  from  different  apprehensions  of  the  nature 
and  source  of  things,  or  because  the  individual  and  the 
temporal,  instead  of  the  universal  and  eternal,  are  made 
the  basis  of  morality.* 

We  are  not  born  with  a  code  of  morals  ready  for 
immediate  application ;  such  a  code  can  only  be  formed 
by  training  and  education  and  surroundings.  As  these 
vary  greatly,  so  may  the  views  on  particular  points  of 
conduct,  however  universal  and  alike  the  innate  moral 
basis.  But  why  is  a  moral  training  at  all  possible  ? 
Because  there  is  moral  capacity  in  man,  making  him 


*  It  is  the  narrow  and  shallow  conception  of  morality  which  con- 
stantly leads  us  to  misapprehend  its  nature.  The  very  terms  generally 
used  to  designate  moral  conduct  and  relations  need  but  be  understood 
in  their  full  breadth  and  depth  in  order  to  get  at  the  essence  of  morals. 
When  we  speak  of  the  right,  we  do  not  get  the  full  meaning  of  the  term 
unless  we  take  it  in  all  its  relations;  namely,  right  in  consideration  of 
all  that  exists.  We  want  to  do  what  is  due  and  proper,  not  merely 
when  we  consider  ourselves  only,  but  in  view  of  other  men  also,  of  the 
universe,  and  of  God.  If  we  cannot  take  all  this  into  the  account  in 
moral  action  or  in  determining  the  right,  the  difficulty  is  with  our  intel- 
lect; and  our  inability  to  apprehend  the  broad,  eternal  basis  of  the  right 
should  not  lead  to  a  perversion  of  morality  itself. 


ETHICS. 


321 


susceptible  to  moral  impressions,  and  capable  of  moral 
aspiration  and  of  resisting  immoral  tendencies. 

While  no  amount  of  training  or  education  could 
make  a  being  ethical  unless  it  had  an  innate  moral 
capacity,  the  peculiar  direction  of  morality  in  an  indi- 
vidual depends  largely  on  the  intellectual  development. 
The  different  elements  of  our  nature  are  so  intimately 
related  that  the  state  of  the  one  must  also  affect  that 
of  the  other.  The  innate  element  of  conscience  consists 
not  in  the  apprehension  of  this  or  that  conception  of 
right,  for  that  would  imply  the  existence  of  innate 
ideas.  With  increased  knowledge,  our  previous  judg- 
ments may  be  reversed.  It  is  thus  seen  that  they  are 
intellectual,  dependent  on  our  mental  attainments.  So 
long  as  the  purely  theoretical  element  in  morals  is  made 
its  essence,  conscience  cannot  be  regarded  as  either 
innate  or  unchangeable.  Conscience  is  an  impulse  to 
the  right.  This  impulse  has  its  basis  or  possibility  in 
the  nature  of  our  being.  Without  this  emotional  or 
impulsive  element,  we  might  contemplate  truth  theo- 
retically, without  any  feeling  of  personal  responsibility 
respecting  it.  When  the  intellect  has  discovered  the 
right,  conscience  impels  us  to  do  it.  Conscience,  viewed 
as  merely  or  mainly  a  discerner  of  right,  is  put  on  an 
intellectual  basis.  How  inadequate  this  view,  is  evi- 
dent from  the  fact  that  conscience  does  not  merely 
impel  to  do  the  right  known,  but  also  impels  to  seek 
the  right  and  the  truth.  Thus  instead  of  being  an 
intellectual  apprehension,  conscience  is  an  impulse 
behind  all  intellectual  activity ;  it  is  the  ethical  energy 
in  human  nature. 

Viewed  in  this  light,  conscience  reveals  a  most  im- 
portant aspect  of  our  nature.  The  fact  that  we  are 
not  indifferent  to  right  and  wrong  establishes  the  truth 


322      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  we  are  moral  beings,  —  a  truth  whose  significance 
for  our  position  and  relations  in  the  universe  is  of  in- 
estimable value.  This  truth  is  the  basis  of  all  ethics. 
We  may  not  always  be  able  to  determine  with  absolute 
certainty  what  is  right,  but  that  does  not  interfere  with 
the  absoluteness  of  conscience.  The  way  to  the  right 
may  be  lost,  but  this  very  possibility  implies  that  it 
exists.  So  the  impulse  to  seek  and  to  do  the  right  may 
be  partly  suppressed  by  lust  or  other  agencies,  and  thus 
the  normal  action  and  development  of  conscience  may 
be  hindered.  But  the  absence  of  certain  tendencies 
and  impressions,  under  particular  circumstances,  does 
not  prove  that  in  a  normally  developed  human  being 
they  would  not  be  present.  The  arguments  against 
the  innateness  of  conscience  are  largely  of  this  negative 
character,  and  in  reality  prove  nothing  against  morality 
as  an  essential  element  of  human  nature. 

While  emphasizing  healthy  moral  views  as  a  condi- 
tion of  healthy  moral  conduct,  we  need  not  hold  with 
Socrates  that  correct  knowledge  is  the  only  thing  re- 
quired. In  a  being  otherwise  perfect,  this  would 
indeed  be  the  case ;  but,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  as 
striking  evidence  in  human  nature  of  emotional  and 
volitional  as  of  intellectual  perversion.  What  is  appre- 
hended as  right  by  the  intellect  must  be  chosen  by  the 
will  before  there  can  be  moral  conduct.  The  frequent 
rejection  by  the  will  of  what  is  recognized  as  right,  is 
too  common  to  require  special  mention.  The  different 
elements  of  our  nature,  involved  in  morality,  greatly 
complicate  the  subject.  While  the  will  is  the  most 
essential  factor  in  the  realization  of  morality,  this  will 
depends  largely  on  the  proper  relation  of  the  intellect 
and  the  emotions  to  the  right.  In  morals  we  have  an 
aspect  of  truth  different  from  that  given  in  logic  and 


ETHICS. 


323 


aesthetics,  an  aspect  which  puts  us  into  peculiar  relation 
to  it :  the  relation  of  responsibility.  In  morality  we  are 
made  to  sustain  a  personal  relation  to  the  truth.*  An 
intellectual  being  without  the  ability  to  discern  right 
and  wrong,  and  without  the  feeling  of  responsibility, 
would  wholly  miss  a  certain  aspect  of  truth.  The  truth 
would  be  viewed  only  in  its  objective  relation,  not  as 
having  a  personal  interest.  Such  a  being  would  lack 
a  peculiar  sense,  and  all  that  pertains  to  morality  would 
be  as  foreign  to  him  as  color  to  a  blind  man. 

That  personal  relation  to  the  truth  which  exists  in 
morality  is  the  ground  of  all  moral  law  or  of  duty. 
Take  that  away,  and  it  becomes  absurd  to  talk  of 
morals.  How  do  we  account  for  the  consciousness  of 
this  relation  ?  Why  can  we  not  rest  in  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  ideal  good,  just  as  we  do  in  that  of  the  ideal 
beauty  ?  Ethics  begins  when  besides  the  contemplation 
of  the  ideal  we  recognize  any  degree  of  responsibility 
for  its  realization.  There  is  always  in  morality  a  cate- 
gorical imperative,  though  its  content  may  differ  from 
that  formulated  by  Kant.  What  makes  this  imperative 
ought,  always  found  in  morals  and  never  in  any  thing 
else?  We  have  answered  that  it  has  its  seat  in  con- 
science ;  but  this  leads  to  the  question,  How  did  it  get 
there  ?  In  rational  ethics  we  seek  an  explanation  of  that 
impulse  which  is  the  basis  of  morality. 

In  harmony  with  a  broad  tendency  of  modern 
thought,  conscience  has  been  pronounced  a  product  of 
evolution.  How  this  was  possible  is  not  explained  sat- 
isfactorily, nor  is  there  agreement  as  to  the  exact  nature 
of  the  process :  but  whatever  the  differences  respecting 

*  A  relation  involving  the  whole  person  as  a  person.  Personality 
involves  self-consciousness  (the  consciousness  of  self  as  distinct  from  all 
other  objects)  and  self-determination. 


324     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

details,  evolutionists  usually  regard  conscience  and  the 
whole  of  ethics  as  the  product  of  natural  development. 
Some  lay  the  stress  on  heredity,  by  means  of  which  cer- 
tain predispositions  and  tendencies  are  supposed  to  be 
explained ;  others  emphasize  the  training,  the  influence 
of  the  environment,  and  the  association  of  ideas  induced 
by  habit.  The  theory  of  evolution  has  certainly  di- 
rected attention  to  important  elements  heretofore  too 
much  neglected.  The  basis  with  which  an  individual 
starts  (whether  the  product  of  heredity  or  not),  the  his- 
torical development  into  whose  results  he  is  placed,  the 
statutory  laws,  the  customs  of  the  people,  the  prevalent 
views  of  morality,  and  the  habits  he  forms,  are  all  potent 
factors  in  determining  his  views  of  morals  and  his  moral 
conduct.  The  correct  theory  of  ethics  cannot  be  found 
by  ignoring  or  rejecting  these  factors,  but  by  fully 
considering  them,  and  critically  distinguishing  their  real 
from  their  imagined  influence.  Since  what  is  innate 
and  implicitly  (potentially)  present  may  be  subject  to 
evolution  so  as  to  be  explicitly  (really)  present,  there 
is  no  reason  why  intuitionalism  and  evolution  may  not 
be  harmonized. 

Over-jealous  Darwinians  (especially  materialists  like 
Carl  Vogt)  are  apt  to  create  suspicion  even  respecting 
those  elements  in  the  theory  which  are  well-founded. 
Thus,  as  is  so  common  in  such  cases,  the  theory  is  estab- 
lished before  the  inductions  justify  it,  and  then  it  is 
used  as  an  absolute  law  to  interpret  facts.  The  efforts 
to  evolve  morality  and  religion  from  brutes  depend 
wholly  on  analogical  reasoning ;  and  it  is  evident  that 
frequently  human  elements  are  interpreted  into  brutes, 
in  order  to  discover  in  brutes  ethical  and  spiritual  germs. 
If  the  animal  could  develop  itself  up  to  man,  or  if  some- 
thing could  be  added  to  it  which  would  make  it  human, 


ETHICS.  325 


the  question  would  be  settled.  But  this  very  possibility 
remains  to  be  proved.  The  process  of  evolving  men 
from  brutes  is  too  often  accomplished  by  first  making 
men  brutes.  Here  is  a  region  in  which  hypotheses  luxu- 
riate in  the  name  of  exact  science.  Some  of  the  very 
advocates  of  this  theory  fail  to  study  man  himself  as  an 
individual,  as  a  part  of  humanity,  and  in  connection 
with  the  history  of  human  development.  Until  the 
specific  element  of  morality  is  found  in  matter  or  in 
the  animal,  —  not  merely  an  imagined  something  from 
which  its  evolution  may  be  imagined,  —  we  shall  be 
limited  to  its  discussion  where  certainly  found,  namely 
in  man.  The  apparent  analogies,  mere  interpretations 
on  our  part,  do  not  establish  a  real  likeness  or  sameness. 
Heredity,  the  laws  of  association,  historical  develop- 
ment, the  training  of  the  individual  and  his  environ- 
ment, the  statutory  laws  and  prevalent  views  of  legal 
right,  can  at  best  account  only  for  prevailing  moral 
opinions.  They  never  lead  beyond  the  historical  and 
psychological  contemplation  of  morality.  Let  us  sup- 
pose, too,  that,  in  accounting  for  what  is,  they  explain 
the  opinions  respecting  what  ought  to  be,  and  give  an 
impulse  to  seek  what  is  recognized  as  right.  Now,  if 
besides  these  nothing  else  were  involved  in  morality, 
the  question  of  its  origin  might  be  settled,  very  largely 
at  least,  by  an  appeal  to  these  factors ;  the  origin  of  the 
imperative  ought  would  of  course  not  be  explained. 
But  these  are  not  the  only  factors.  Instead  of  letting 
all  that  may  have  come  through  inheritance,  the  laws  of 
association,  historical  development,  training  and  envi- 
ronment, the  constitution  and  laws  of  a  land,  the  views 
of  legal  right,  or  any  or  all  existing  views  and  theories, 
determine  the  ethical  laws,  I  subject  all  these  to  criti- 
cism, interpret  them  rationally,  accept  some  and  reject 


326      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

others,  and  form  a  standard  of  right  which  is  not  given 
by  all  of  them  combined.  There  is  such  a  thing  as  his- 
torical morality,  but  we  distinguish  it  from  the  rational 
and  philosophical.  The  latter  may  even  use  the  historical 
as  a  help  in  the  formation  of  its  ideals  ;  but  history  or 
custom  can  never  determine  the  character  of  rational 
ethics.  The  laborious  ethical  process  starting  with  the 
historical,  the  hereditary,  and  the  environment,  but  ris- 
ing above  them  under  the  sole  guidance  of  reason,  and 
making  all  of  them  subject  to  its  criticisms  and  laws  — 
surely  no  one  will  claim  that  this  process  is  hereditary, 
or  associational,  or  historical,  or  a  product  of  the  envi- 
ronment. The  fact  is,  that  purely  evolutional  morality, 
in  ignoring  the  rational  element,  is  not  morality  at  all ; 
it  reduces  the  moral  processes  to  natural  law,  and  thus 
robs  them  of  the  very  thing  that  makes  them  moral. 
But  rational  morality  can  use  all  that  such  evolutionists 
claim,  and  can  give  it  full  weight  in  determining  the 
character  of  morality.  Give  evolution  something  to 
evolve;  give  education  something  to  educate  ;  give  the 
environment  something  that  is  environed  ;  determine  not 
merely  what  the  laws  of  association  do,  but  why  they 
work  as  they  work  ;  in  other  words,  let  reason  give  an 
adequate  philosophical  explanation,  instead  of  the  par- 
tial psychological  and  historical  ones  usually  given,  and 
all  that  enters  into  morality  will  receive  its  proper  place 
in  the  system.  We  only  get  morality  when  we  interpret 
what  is,  and  what  must  be,  into  an  ought;  and  this 
interpretation  is  only  possible  if  the  interpreter  is 
rational,  personal,  and  responsible.  I  can  be  moral  just 
because  I  can  rise  above  all  that  I  have  been  made  by 
heredity  and  other  influences,  toward  an  ideal  which 
springs  from  my  own  being,  and  whose  contemplation 
impels  me  to  seek  its  realization.26 


ETHICS. 


327 


Whoever  admits  the  distinction  between  what  is  and 
what  ought  to  be,  virtually  admits  the  supremacy  of 
mind  in  moral  questions.  It  is  in  morality  that  the 
autonomy  of  mind  appears  in  its  most  perfect  form. 
Unless  we  are  a  law  unto  ourselves,  whatever  may  be 
needed  to  develop  us  to  become  such  a  law,  a  system  of 
ethics  is  impossible.  Man  is  an  ethical  being  because  he 
can  be  himself  in  the  inexorable  nexus  of  things,  and 
can  say  yes  when  the  environment  says  no.  In  ethics 
man  lifts  himself  to  the  height  of  his  own  ideals,  and 
rises  from  things  to  personality.  Morality  is  not  a 
creation  out  of  nothing,  but  from  that  which  is  only  in 
mind.  We  cannot  go  behind  this  :  our  mind  is  so  con- 
stituted that  in  its  normal  development  the  moral 
ideals  are  produced.  This  may  be  called  idealism,  be- 
cause the  ordinary  realism  cannot  produce  it  or  even 
account  for  it;  but  it  is  an  idealism  which  is  the 
intensest,  and  the  only  true  and  abiding  realism. 

We  have  already  found  that  the  utilitarian  and  intui- 
tional schools  do  not  necessarily  exclude  each  other. 
Even  if  the  basis  of  morality  is  intuitive,  that  does  not 
exclude  a  utilitarianism  which  adapts  means  to  a  certain 
end,  though  it  opposes  the  substitution  of  means  for 
end.  The  end  sought  by  utilitarianism  may  be  pleas- 
ure for  the  individual  or  society  at  large,  or  it  may  be 
the  preservation  of  the  individual  and  society,  or  wel- 
fare, well-being,  health,  efficiency.  In  all  these  cases 
the  right  (in  the  sense  of  means)  is  determined  by  the 
useful.  Where  morality  is  viewed  as  part  of  biology 
or  natural  history,  it  will  be  regarded  as  somehow  the 
product  of  the  effort  of  conscious  lifo  to  follow  "  the  line 
of  least  resistance  "  or  "  the  line  of  least  pain,"  and  to 
make  hunger  or  physical  craving  its  occasion  or  source. 

Usually  hedonism  and  eudaemomsm  reject  the  ego- 


f4£ff5s& 


328      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

tistic  and  favor  the  altruistic  or  social  view,  recog- 
nizing the  happiness  or  welfare  of  society  at  large  as 
the  great  aim  of  morals.  It  is  admitted,  too,  that  the 
pleasures  sought  are  not  the  low  ones,  but  the  highest. 
Sometimes  they  are  spoken  of  as  rational,  and  the  desire 
to  attain  them  is  called  a  rational  desire  in  distinction 
from  the  sensuous.  The  meaning  of  course  is  not  that 
the  libertine  and  savage,  in  the  pursuit  of  gross  pleas- 
ures, have  morality  to  perfection.  This  is  not  even  the 
doctrine  of  Epicureanism,  though  it  is  frequently  so 
understood.  The  social  and  rational  are  connected  as 
intimately  as  possible  with  this  pleasure.  But  taken 
even  in  its  most  rational  sense,  can  pleasure  or  happiness 
be  regarded  as  the  ultimate  end  of  conduct? 

In  examining  utilitarian  writers,  one  is  struck  with 
the  difficulty  of  remaining  consistent  with  their  theory. 
It  is  frequently  found  that  they  actually  abandon  the 
theory,  or  else  make  concessions  on  important  points. 
Thus  J.  S.  Mill,  a  true  Benthamite  in  the  theory  that 
pleasure  is  the  only  good,  makes  a  significant  confes- 
sion.* Speaking  of  a  crisis  in  his  mental  history,  he 
says,  "  I  never,  indeed,  wavered  in  the  conviction  that 
happiness  is  the  test  of  all  rules  of  conduct,  and  the  end 
of  life.  But  I  now  thought  that  this  end  was  only  to 
be  attained  by  not  making  it  the  direct  end.  Those 
only  are  happy  (I  thought)  who  have  their  minds  fixed 
on  some  object  other  than  their  own  happiness  ;  on  the 
happiness  of  others,  on  the  improvement  of  mankind, 
even  on  some  art  or  pursuit,  followed  not  as  a  means, 
but  as  itself  an  ideal  end.  Aiming  thus  at  something 
else,  they  find  happiness  by  the  way.  The  enjoyments 
of  life  (such  was  now  my  theory)  are  sufficient  to  make 
it  a  pleasant  thing,  when  they  are  taken  en  passant, 

*  Autobiography,  142. 


ETHICS.  329 

without  being  made  a  principal  object.  Once  make 
them  so,  and  they  are  immediately  felt  to  be  insufficient. 
They  will  not  bear  a  scrutinizing  examination.  Ask 
yourself  whether  you  are  happy,  and  you  cease  to  be  so. 
The  only  chance  is  to  treat,  not  happiness,  but  some  end 
external  to  it,  as  the  purpose  of  life.  Let  your  self- 
consciousness,  your  scrutiny,  your  self-interrogation,  ex- 
haust themselves  on  that ;  and  if  otherwise  fortunately 
circumstanced,  you  will  inhale  happiness  with  the  air 
you  breathe,  without  dwelling  on  it  or  thinking  about 
it,  without  either  forestalling  it  in  imagination,  or  put- 
ting it  to  flight  by  fatal  questioning.  This  theory  now 
became  the  basis  of  my  philosophy  of  life."  Surely  a 
strange  end  that  is  defeated  when  made  "the  direct 
end  " !  If  enjoyments  are  to  be  taken  "  en  passant, 
without  being  made  a  principal  object,"  it  is  hard  to 
understand  in  what  sense  they  are  to  be  made  the 
ultimate  end  or  "principal  object." 

If  happiness  is  the  sole  object,  then  the  means  for  its 
attainment  must  be  right,  and  there  is  no  difference  in 
the  moral  quality  of  pleasures ;  yet  this  the  advocates 
will  not  admit.  As  soon  as  any  moral  quality  aside  from 
the  pleasurable  itself  is  admitted,  pleasure  ceases  to 
be  the  sole  object  of  moral  choice.  If  the  happiness  of 
others  is  the  final  moral  law,  then  if  I  have  the  choice 
of  making  fifty  good  men  or  fifty-one  bad  men  supremely 
happy,  I  ought  to  confer  the  happiness  on  the  bad,  and 
leave  the  good  in  misery.  If  not,  why  not  ? 

The  debauchee  makes  pleasure  the  ultimate  rule  of 
conduct:  why  condemn  him?  To  say,  because  his 
pleasures  are  wrong,  is  yielding  the  whole  point,  and 
making  something  else  than  pleasure  the  rule.  At 
best  it  can  only  be  claimed  by  the  hedonist  that  the 
debauchee  is  mistaken  as  to  the  means  of  obtaining 


330      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

pleasure,  since  by  his  licentiousness  he  destroys  the  very 
capacity  for  enjoyment,  and  ruins  himself.  The  state 
of  a  man  may  be  such  that  what  pleases  him  works 
destruction  ;  then  he  must  be  put  into  a  state  in  which 
his  pleasure  will  conduce  to  his  welfare.  This  means 
that  if  a  man's  state  is  right,  his  pleasures  will  be  bene- 
ficial. Make  yourself  what  you  ought  to  be,  then  you 
will  do  what  gives  the  highest  pleasure.  No  one  doubts 
that  if  he  becomes  perfect  his  greatest  pleasure  will  be 
in  the  perfect,  and  that  this  pleasure  will  be  right. 
But  here  character  is  made  the  great  aim,  being  viewed 
as  the  end  to  be  attained  irrespective  of  the  pleasure, 
while  pleasure  is  regarded  as  but  a  natural  consequence 
of  that  character.  Not  what  is  merely  means  is  sought, 
but  the  end  for  which  the  means  are  the  condition ;  not 
what  is  merely  phenomenal,  as  pleasure,  is  the  aim  of 
ethics,  but  what  is  substantial  and  permanent,  namely  a 
state  or  character. 

But  if  character  is  the  ultimate  aim  for  the  individ- 
ual, why  shall  he  make  any  thing  else,  as  happiness  or 
welfare,  his  aim  in  dealing  with  his  fellow-men?  If 
for  himself  character  is  the  condition  of  the  highest 
well-being,  must  it  not  likewise  be  so  for  every  other 
member  of  society?  Those  who  admit  this  may  still 
claim  that,  while  character  is  the  great  aim,  it  is  sought 
solely  for  the  sake  of  the  happiness  it  affords.  One 
need  but  state  the  proposition  in  this  bald  way  to  show 
that  no  one  can  really  advocate  it;  and  it  may  be 
unconditionally  affirmed  that  he  who  seeks  character 
solely  for  the  sake  of  pleasure,  will  neither  form  a 
perfect  character  nor  attain  the  highest  pleasure. 

If  pleasure  or  happiness  is  the  aim,  how  can  I  ever 
feel  it  a  duty  to  sacrifice  for  the  sake  of  others?  It 
may  not  be  to  me  a  pleasure  to  sacrifice  myself  for 


ETHICS. 


331 


others ;  indeed,  if  it  is  a  pleasure,  it  is  hard  to  under- 
stand wherein  it  is  a  sacrifice.  Hedonism  either  de- 
stroys all  sacrifice  for  human  welfare,  or  else  reduces 
it  to  the  blind  instinct  or  impulse  of  the  brute.  To 
regard  sacrifice  as  the  result  of  calculating  the  amount 
of  pleasure  to  be  gained,  destroys  its  nobility.  Sacrifice 
is  noble  when  performed  for  the  sake  of  right  and  duty, 
and  it  is  regarded  noble  in  proportion  to  the  intensity 
of  the  suffering.  That  the  joy  of  doing  right  more  than 
balances  the  pain  of  the  suffering,  may  be  true,  but  it 
does  this  because  it  is  right ;  but  the  right  is  not  done 
for  the  sake  of  securing  greater  pleasure. 

Frequently  the  appeal  is  made  from  pleasure  to  the 
right.  A  man  finds  his  joy  in  the  lowest  pleasures,* 
and  he  is  urged  to  forsake  them  because  they  are 
wrong.  Surely  in  such  cases  the  appeal  is  not  made 
from  one  pleasure  to  another,  but  to  something  quali- 
tatively different.  If  the  difference  in  the  pleasure  is 
only  quantitative,  the  man  living  in  the  grossest  pleas- 
ures of  vice  differs  only  in  degree  from  the  man  who 
is  virtuous,  benevolent,  and  in  every  respect  morally 
perfect.  With  pleasure  as  the  standard,  misery  is  the 
only  vice. 

In  the  discussion  of  utilitarianism,  it  is  common  to 
confound  things  that  are  wholly  distinct,  and  for  this 
reason  so  much  of  the  discussion  is  inconclusive.  The 
confusion  is  largely  the  result  of  confounding  an  intel- 
lectual with  an  emotional  element.  Thus  the  appre- 
hension of  the  right  is  continually  contrasted  with  the 
desire  for  happiness,  whereas  the  two  may  be  in  perfect 
harmony.  The  conflict  in  this  case,  if  there  is  any  at 
all,  is  between  the  intellect  and  the  emotions.  Instead 
of  contrasting  the  intellectual  apprehension  of  right 

*  How  can  pleasures  be  low  if  the  pleasurable  is  the  right  ? 


332      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

with  a  desire,  we  should  compare  the  intellectual  appre- 
hension of  right  with  the  intellectual  apprehension  of 
the  pleasurable.  When  this  is  done,  it  will  at  once  be 
seen  that  the  two  are  not  synonymous.  The  apprehen- 
sion of  the  right,  in  the  broadest  sense,  takes  into 
account  all  moral  relations.  Applied  by  the  individual 
to  himself,  it  implies  a  correct  relation  to  all  things. 
If  he  takes  account  only  of  his  intellect,  or  only  of 
his  feelings,  or  only  of  his  conduct,  his  view  of  the 
relation  will  be  partial ;  he  must  take  his  whole  being 
into  account.  This  relation  must  include  the  family, 
humanity,  in  fact,  all  things  in  all  their  bearings,  in 
order  to  be  full  and  perfect.  In  all  respects  the  indi- 
vidual wants  to  be  right  in  his  relation  to  all  things. 
The  right  in  this  full  sense  is  what  is  due  or  becoming, 
what  is  in  harmony  with  truth,  with  God,  with  the 
perfect  ideal.  The  fact  that  we  cannot  take  so  deep 
and  broad  a  view  of  things  does  not  interfere  with  the 
idea  and  the  eternal  basis  of  right  itself.  This  Tightness 
of  relation,  this  correctness  of  myself  in  view  of  the 
whole  universe  of  being,  involves  the  right  relation  of 
my  being,  and  all  that  proceeds  from  it;  and  thus 
includes  character  and  apprehension  and  desire  and 
conduct,  and  not  feeling  merely. 

When  now  we  turn  from  this  broad,  all-comprehen- 
sive, rational  view  of  right,  to  the  pleasurable,  what  is 
the  difference?  While  the  former  includes  the  pleas- 
urable so  far  as  right,  but  only  as  an  element  in  con- 
nection with  Tightness  of  being,  thought,  and  conduct, 
the  pleasurable  as  the  aim  of  morality  takes  a  partial 
view  of  right,  namely  only  so  far  as  related  to  the 
feelings,  and  ignores  all  the  others.  For  this  reason, 
however  the  pleasurable  may  be  harmonized  with  right, 
it  can  never  be  the  complete  basis  of  ethics ;  it  puts  a 


ETHICS. 


333 


part  for  the  whole,  and  thus  destroys  the  possibility  of 
a  perfect  system.  Another  vice  in  this  method  is  the 
fact  that  it  makes  this  part  an  emotional  instead  of  a 
rational  element. 

The  deeper  we  pursue  these  considerations,  the  more 
defective  hedonism  appears.  Its  advocates  cannot  be 
consistent,  because  they  put  on  the  throne  what  is 
subordinate ;  they  make  the  conclusion  the  major  prem- 
ise. It  is  certainly  strange  that  vulgar  pleasures  and 
the  highest  approval  of  conscience  should  be  put  into 
the  same  category  as  pleasurable.  Better  substitute  for 
pleasure  Tightness  of  emotion,  and  under  this  include 
all  the  feelings  which  spring  from  a  proper  relation  to 
objects.  It  thus  includes  intellectual  joys,  peace,  and 
all  true  gratification,  but  rejects  false  pleasures  which 
have  their  source  in  a  false  relation  to  things.  We 
thus  distinguish  ethical  from  base  pleasures.  The  stand- 
ard of  the  former  is  something  objective ;  the  standard 
of  the  latter  is  subjective  only. 

This  Tightness  of  being  and  relation,  demanded  by 
ethics,  presupposes  that  there  is  a  possible  harmony 
between  the  moral  being  and  the  universe.*  With  this 
deep  basis  of  ethics  in  the  nature  of  things,  we  shall 
have  no  difficulty  in  harmonizing  the  views  which 
make  the  right  and  the  pleasurable  the  end  of  morals. 
We  have  already  seen  that  the  former,  as  the  more 
comprehensive,  includes  the  latter.  If  there  is  reason 
in  the  universe,  then  the  right  relation  of  being  must 
result  in  pleasure  to  a  creature  with  sensibility.  Pleas- 
ure is,  in  fact,  only  a  harmonious  emotional  relation. 
Rightness  in  being  and  relation  implies  harmony,  satis- 

*  To  view  man  only  in  relation  to  his  environment  is  belittling, 
unless  the  whole  universe,  physical  and  spiritual,  is  regarded  as  that 
environment. 


334      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

faction,  and  all  the  emotions  which  can  spring  from 
the  proper  influence  of  one  being  on  another  being. 
Where  the  right,  then,  in  the  full  comprehensiveness 
of  its  meaning,  is  attained,  pleasure  must  be  one  of  the 
results.  It  is  an  effect,  but  not  the  whole,  there  being 
other  effects  also ;  it  is  not  a  cause  or  the  end.  It  is  a 
good ;  but  a  good  which  has  its  source  in  the  supreme 
good,  in  a  character  which  puts  a  man  in  every  respect 
into  the  right  relation.  When  this  right  relation  is 
contemplated  rationally,  I  get  the  idea  of  right ;  when 
I  view  it  in  relation  to  my  emotions,  I  get  the  notion 
of  pleasure,  happiness,  welfare ;  when  I  view  it  in 
relation  to  conduct,  I  get  the  law  for  moral  action. 

When  morality  is  compressed  into  the  sphere  of  the 
emotions,  instead  of  being  viewed  as  a  rational  prin- 
ciple, its  aim  must  of  course  be  made  happiness  or 
pleasure.  If  the  desire  refers  to  a  feeling  as  the  object 
sought,  it  must  of  course  be  happiness.  All  feelings  are 
pleasurable  or  painful ;  no  one  can  desire  the  latter, 
unless  he  can  desire  what  is  not  desirable.  To  speak  of 
a  desire  for  pleasure,  is  really  tautology ;  we  can  have 
no  other  desire  as  desire.  In  opposition  to  all  such 
efforts  to  make  morality  merely  emotional,  Kant  is  right 
in  emphasizing  the  purely  rational  element  in  ethics ; 
but  he  goes  too  far  in  wholly  rejecting  the  emotions 
from  ethical  conduct.  A  course  is  not  right  because  I 
desire  it,  but  I  ought  to  desire  it  because  it  is  right. 

Is  feeling  the  sole  motive  power  of  the  will  ?  Many 
claim  that  this  is  the  case,  and  it  is  taken  for  granted 
by  those  who  affirm  that  the  pleasurable  determines  the 
right.  But  in  spite  of  the  generally  adopted  theory 
to  the  contrary,  feeling  is  not  the  sole  motive  power  of 
the  will.  There  is  no  feeling  unless  it  is  felt ;  and  it 
is  evident  that  much  of  our  conduct  is  not  preceded  by 


ETHICS. 


335 


emotion.  So  in  the  purely  theoretical  contemplation 
of  the  right,  we  can  decide  what  it  ought  to  be  in 
the  abstract,  without  considering  our  emotional  nature. 
Having  decided  what  it  is  theoretically,  in  the  abstract, 
it  can  be  chosen  as  the  theory  of  conduct  without  con- 
sidering its  personal  application  and  without  giving  an 
occasion  for  any  personal  feeling  to  arise.  Not  in  the 
abstract  determination  of  right,  any  more  than  in  any 
other  abstract  question  of  truth,  need  my  feelings  be 
aroused.  But  in  the  specific  application  of  the  theory, 
when  it  comes  to  practical  details,  personal  feeling 
enters  into  consideration.  In  determining  the  right  in 
the  abstract,  we  carry  on  a  purely  intellectual  process. 
And  when  the  right  has  once  been  determined,  there  is 
no  reason  why  it  should  not  be  made  the  law  of  con- 
duct, without  considering  feeling,  or  even  against  feel- 
ing. We  seek  the  truth  because  it  is  the  truth,  some- 
thing final  in  itself;  we  seek  the  right  because  it  is 
right,  also  something  final.  And  if  feeling  or  prejudice 
interferes  with  truth,  we  reject  such  interference  ;  and 
we  do  so  equally  respecting  the  right.  So  far  from  let- 
ting our  emotions  determine  conduct,  reason  demands 
that  its  own  voice  is  supreme  and  shall  alone  be  heard. 
A  moral  judgment  is  an  imperative ;  but  just  because  it 
is  a  judgment,  it  is  not  an  emotion.  The  love  of  duty 
or  the  pleasure  in  the  doing  does  not  lessen  the  morality 
in  the  case ;  the  moral  element  is,  however,  not  in  the 
love  or  the  pleasure,  but  in  the  duty.  As  in  aesthetics, 
so  in  ethics,  we  form  a  state  (character),  and  the  norms 
embodied  in  this  state  act  directly,  without  waiting  for 
an  emotion  to  intervene.  In  ethical  conduct  we  do 
what  we  are,  not  merely  what  we  feel. 

The  root  of  many  perversions  in  ethics  is  to  be  found 
in  the  false  theory  that  feeling  is  the  sole  motive  power 


336      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  will.  Can  we  not  choose  to  make  reason  the 
standard  instead  of  feeling  ?  Undoubtedly.  But  what 
is  the  motive  in  thus  choosing  reason  ?  The  fact  that 
this  choice  is  worthy  of  my  being.  I  thus  prefer  worthi- 
ness of  being  to  phenomenal  emotion.  Only  by  con- 
founding preference,  which  may  rest  on  other  than 
emotional  grounds,  with  pleasure,  does  the  theory  of 
feeling  as  the  sole  motive  of  the  will  find  any  basis. 
There  may  indeed  be  a  choice  between  different  pleas- 
ures, but  there  may  also  be  a  choice  between  pleasure 
and  reason.  Even  if  we  view  ethics  wholly  in  the  light 
of  values,  we  can  value  the  law  of  reason  above  the 
impulse  of  an  emotion.  We  can  choose  nothing  in 
which  we  do  not  somehow  have  a  personal  concern  and 
an  interest;  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  regard  feeling,  or 
more  specifically  the  feeling  of  pleasure,  as  the  only 
human  concern.  I  may  even  recognize  it  to  be  my 
duty  to  do  the  very  thing  my  feelings  oppose  ;  if,  then, 
conscience  can  oppose  all  impulses  to  pleasure,  how  can 
pleasure  be  the  impulse  of  conscience  ?  By  making 
subjective  pleasure  the  standard  of  ethics,  its  ideals  are 
degraded  and  destroyed. 

One  of  the  latest  German  works  on  ethics  *  affirms 
that  "  what  is  in  no  sense  a  good  for  me,  I  cannot  desire 
solely  for  the  sake  of  good  to  others ;  but  only  in  case 
it  also  has  for  me  a  perceptible  and  appreciable  value. 
In  this  sense  it  must  be  affirmed  that  in  every  human 
volition  is  necessarily  involved  not  merely  eudsemonism, 
or  a  reference  to  the  feeling  of  pleasure  in  general,  but 
also  egoism,  or  the  reference  to  the  feeling  of  personal 
pleasure.  It  is  totally  impossible  for  a  human  being  to 
choose  an  end,  and  the  necessary  means  for  its  attain- 
ment, which  have  no  relation  to  his  personal  feeling." 

*  Vorfragen  der  Ethik,  von  Dr.  Christopb  Sigwart;  886,  p.  6. 


ETHICS.  337 

It  should  readily  be  admitted  that  every  choice  is  related 
to  our  feelings,  and  the  realization  or  failure  will  neces- 
sarily effect  the  feeling ;  but  this  is  not  the  point  in  dis- 
pute. The  question  is  whether  feeling  is  necessarily 
the  motive  or  the  aim  of  the  choice  ?  This  presents  a 
radical  problem,  and  the  character  of  a  system  of  ethics 
will  depend  largely  on  the  nature  of  the  solution. 

In  ethics  we  move  in  the  domain  of  values,  and  no 
choice  is  possible  unless  the  object  chosen  has  some 
worth  in  our  estimation.  This  is  implied  in  the  choice 
itself,  and  is  an  essential  element  in  all  volition.  But 
it  is  a  mistake  to  make  the  feeling  of  pleasure  the  test 
of  worth.  If  an  object  has  worth  for  me,  I  of  course 
rejoice  in  its  attainment ;  but  if  I  choose  it  because  it  is 
noble,  true,  right,  it  is  a  perversion  to  make  the  joy 
which  is  merely  an  incidental  result  of  this  choice  the 
motive  of  the  choice.  I  do  not  choose  the  true  for 
the  reason  that  I  prefer  it  to  the  false,  for  that  is  putting 
truth  on  a  level  with  mere  subjective  whims ;  but  I  prefer 
it  to  the  false  because  it  is  the  truth.  In  other  words,  the 
ultimate  ground  of  choice  is  not  the  mere  fact  of  prefer- 
ence ;  but  the  fact  of  truth  is  the  reason  for  the  pref- 
erence, and  the  ultimate  ground  of  choice.  I  thus  make 
truth  the  rule  for  my  preference,  not  my  preference  the 
rule  for  the  apprehension  of  truth.  In  choosing  the  truth 
as  truth,  I  do  not  at  all  consider  the  effect  on  my  feel- 
ing ;  how,  then,  can  feeling  be  the  motive  of  the  choice  ? 
By  making  it  the  motive,  we  simply  make  an  effect  the 
cause.  The  very  fact  that  I  can  choose  what  is  right  in 
the  abstract,  and  because  it  is  right,  without  regard  to 
the  feeling  produced,  is  conclusive  proof  that  I  choose 
for  the  sake  of  the  right,  not  for  the  sake  of  any  pleas- 
ure it  may  produce.  Even  in  the  choice  of  the  right, 
I  have  satisfaction  or  pleasure ;  but  it  is  not  for  the 


338      INTEODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

sake  of  this  pleasure  that  I  make  the  choice,  but  for 
the  sake  of  the  right,  and  the  pleasure  is  simply  a  con- 
comitant of  the  choice.  Let  us  say  that  we  love  the 
right,  and  that  we  choose  it  because  we  love  it ;  then  of 
course  the  choice  of  right,  as  a  mere  choice,  is  put  on  a 
level  with  the  choice  of  the  basest  gratification,  although 
it  may  spring  from  the  noblest  nature.  But  why  do  we 
love  the  right  ?  Not  because  it  produces  pleasure  in  us, 
but  because  it  is  in  harmony  with  a  righteous  character. 
And  where  reason  has  become  the  guide  of  life,  the  right 
is  loved  and  chosen  for  the  sake  of  what  it  is,  not  for 
the  sake  of  the  emotion  it  excites.  So  I  affirm  that  I 
take  pleasure  in  truth ;  but  does  that  mean  that  I  value 
truth  only  for  the  sake  of  the  pleasure  it  excites?  It 
is  thus  evident  that  the  real  motive  in  choice,  whether 
selfish  or  altruistic,  or  purely  rational,  or  whatever  it 
may  be,  depends  on  the  character  of  the  person,  and  on 
the  rule  adopted  for  life.  I,  of  course,  cannot  prefer  a 
thing  without  preferring  it;  but  that  does  not  mean 
that  I  prefer  a  thing  because  it  gratifies,  since  the  ques- 
tion of  gratification  may  not  at  all  have  entered  into  the 
consideration.  If  I  can  contemplate  an  object  as  it  is 
in  itself,  abstracting  wholly  from  its  relation  to  my  feel- 
ing, then  I  can  also  abstract  from  my  feelings  in  choos- 
ing it.  Against  my  feeling  I  can  put  an  imperative 
ought,  and  can  choose  a  standard  against  my  feelings. 
In  other  words,  reason,  conscience,  character,  as  well  as 
the  desire  for  pleasure,  can  be  made  the  motive  of  con- 
duct. Epicureanism  is  possible,  but  so  also  is  stoicism. 
It  is  thus  evident  that  a  sharp  distinction  must  be 
made  between  the  motive  of  the  choice  and  the  feeling 
which  is  merely  concomitant.  The  very  fact  that  there 
may  be  reason  in  a  choice,  implies  that  the  rational 
element  may  predominate  over  the  emotional. 


ETHICS.  339 

The  position  here  taken  disposes  of  such  questions  as 
these :  Does  ethics  depend  on  something  inherent  in 
the  mind  and  on  the  relations  of  the  mind,  or  does  it 
consider  only  results  ?  Is  it  grounded  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  things,  or  in  considerations  of  what  is  yet  to 
become?  Such  inquiries  are  based  on  a  supposed 
antagonism,  where  in  reality  there  is  none.  What 
results,  and  what  ought  to  become,  must  somehow  be 
in  the  constitution  of  things.  In  the  completeness  with 
which  it  contemplates  objects,  ethics  takes  into  account 
both  what  is  and  what  ought  to  be.  But  in  consider- 
ing what  ought  to  be,  ethics  again  takes  into  account 
the  constitution  of  things.  It  aims  at  a  state,  something 
that  abides,  not  merely  to  produce  a  transient  emotion. 
Instead  of  making  a  feeling  the  standard  of  reason,  it 
makes  reason  the  standard,  and  feeling  an  element  in 
the  process  of  realizing  its  end.  By  making  emotion 
its  law,  we  reduce  ethics  to  the  level  of  aesthetics ;  but 
by  making  it  inhere  in  the  constitution  of  things,  and 
seek  a  state  or  condition  in  harmony  with  the  ideal  of 
this  constitution,  we  get  the  true  idea  of  ethics. 

We  have  now  attained  a  standpoint  from  which  we 
can  judge  all  moral  claims.  Every  aim  short  of  the 
Tightness  mentioned  falls  short  of  the  final  aim.  This, 
of  course,  does  not  imply  that  the  aim  itself  is  wrong ; 
it  may  be  right  but  not  final ;  it  may  be  embraced  in 
that  final  aim,  as  an  arc  in  a  circle.  If  it  is  said  that 
the  aim  is  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  we  ask,  fittest  for 
what?  If  the  survival  of  the  fittest  means  the  fittest 
to  live,  that  is  likely  to  survive  without  any  help.  How 
can  the  fittest  to  live  do  otherwise  than  survive  the 
unfit  or  the  less  fitted  ?  If  the  aim  is  the  preservation 
of  life,  the  question  arises,  why  preserve  life  ?  Neither 
is  the  "  efficiency  of  the  social  organism  "  the  final  aim. 


340      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Efficiency  for  what  ?  Every  aim  short  of  Tightness  of 
being  and  relation  fails  to  reach  the  tap-root  of  ethics. 
Every  deep  inquiry  pushes  down  to  this  lightness ;  and 
while  the  modern  horror  of  metaphysics  may  seem  to 
absolve  men  from  the  necessity  of  finding  this  tap-root, 
it  does  not  oblige  them  to  deny  its  existence,  and  to 
affirm  that  the  roots  lying  on  the  surface  are  the 
deepest. 

Do  what  we  may,  we  cannot  get  morality  as  a  natural 
process,  but  only  as  a  process  of  reason.  To  the  must 
in  nature,  I  oppose  the  ought  of  reason.  So  if  the  pleas- 
urable only  is  the  object  of  choice,  we  are  forced  to 
take  our  place  with  Socrates,  and  say  that  we  need  but 
know  the  right  to  do  it.  The  ought  in  this  case,  as 
much  as  in  the  other,  becomes  a  must.  I  ought,  how- 
ever, to  do  the  right  even  if  I  cannot  see  just  what 
pleasure  will  flow  from  it;  I  ought  to  do  it  even  with- 
out considering  the  question  of  pleasure.  If  the  pessi- 
mist sees  in  suicide,  not  merely  of  the  individual  but 
of  humanity,  the  only  hope  of  relief  from  misery,  why 
not  commit  suicide?  Ought  not  the  parent  to  strangle 
his  child  if  that  is  the  only  way  to  save  it  from  misery  ? 
What  right  has  he  to  let  it  live  if  happiness  is  the 
reason  of  the  ought? 

The  freedom  of  the  will  involved  in  ethics  has  caused 
much  speculative  difficulty.  Its  theoretical  explanation 
was  regarded  by  Kant  as  impossible,  but  he  held  that 
it  is  a  necessary  postulate  of  the  practical  reason  ;  and 
he  did  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  the  primacy  belongs 
to  the  practical,  not  to  the  speculative  reason.  Alter- 
natives are  presented  to  us,  as,  for  instance,  the  objects 
of  reason  and  of  sense,  and  we  choose  the  one  and  reject 
the  other.  So  far  there  is  no  practical  difficulty.  True 
or  ideal  liberty  is  frequently  spoken  of  as  a  union  of 


ETHICS.  341 

freedom  and  necessity,  namely,  the  voluntary  choice 
of  that  which  is  true,  right,  eternal,  or  which  is  for 
reason  a  necessity.  This  removes  from  the  freedom  of 
the  will  all  mere  arbitrariness.  If  it  wants  to  be  truly 
free,  it  must  choose  what  is  objectively  true  and  right. 
The  ultimate  ground  of  this  freedom  is  in  the  spirit ; 
it  is  free  because  it  has  the  power  of  self-determination 
so  far  as  its  own  conduct  is  concerned.  It  can  choose 
between  an  external  and  an  internal  law ;  it  can  become 
a  slave  of  things,  or  can  be  a  law  unto  itself.  This  is 
involved  in  the  idea  of  personality.  Our  reasoning  is 
so  involved  in  the  chain  of  cause  and  effect,  that  we 
usually  regard  all  cause  as  itself  only  the  effect  of 
something  else.  We  even  regard  being  as  involving 
the  idea  of  cause,  when  it  does  nothing  of  the  kind. 
Change  involves  the  idea ;  but  being  is  that  which  i«, 
while  only  that  which  becomes  involves  the  idea  of 
cause.  A  being  that  is  free  does  not  necessarily  create, 
but  it  chooses.  It  cannot  be  part  of  the  mechanism  of 
nature,  that  mechanism  which  in  our  day  is  often  so 
exclusively  viewed  as  to  be  made  the  standard  for 
judging  all  things.  The  spirit  cannot  be  mechanical 
and  yet  have  choice.  We,  indeed,  imagine  that  we 
understand  the  mechanism  of  nature,  while  the  choice 
of  the  spirit  is  pronounced  an  unfathomable  mystery. 
But  we  have  seen  that  we  understand  the  one  just  as 
perfectly  as  the  other,  the  necessity  in  nature  being 
not  a  whit  more  explicable  or  rational  than  the  choice 
of  the  spirit.  Besides,  if  the  mechanism  of  nature  is 
the  law  of  mind,  then  not  only  does  all  the  mystery 
remain,  but  thought  is  also  involved  in  contradictions. 
How  can  this  mechanical  necessity  produce  the  con- 
viction of  freedom,  of  choice,  and  all  the  activity  of 
conscience  ?  Then  the  belief  in  freedom,  and  all  other 


342     INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

views,  true  or  false,  are  a  necessity.  But  if  necessary, 
they  must  be  true ;  in  other  words,  error  is  truth.  Not 
on  a  mechanical,  but  only  on  a  rational  basis,  is  a  system 
of  ethics  possible. 

In  our  subject  philosophy  verges  on  religion;  moral- 
ity is,  in  fact,  their  point  of  contact  and  the  ground 
which  they  have  in  common.  While  in  rational  ethics 
we  consider  man  in  his  relation  to  the  universe,  in  reli- 
gion we  consider  his  relation  to  God.  But  ultimately 
his  relation  to  the  universe  depends  on  his  relation  to 
God,  and  thus  religion  and  ethics  are  found  to  have 
essentially  the  same  basis.  In  any  true  sense,  a  system 
of  ethics  is  impossible  on  atheistic  principles.  If,  for 
instance,  there  is  no  design  in  the  universe,  there  can 
be  no  end  which  I  ought  to  realize.  It  is  absurd  to 
claim  that  man  ought  to  seek  certain  results,  if  he  is 
not  made  or  intended  for  any  thing.  In  ethics  we  have 
the  very  strongest  argument  for  design.  Even  utilita- 
rianism need  but  be  probed  to  the  bottom  in  order  to 
discover  that  it  must  finally  rest  on  a  theistic  basis. 
With  nothing  but  matter  and  invariable  laws,  it  never 
can  establish  the  fact  that  I  ought  to  sacrifice  for  the 
good  of  the  greatest  number ;  all  it  can  do  is  to  claim 
that  I  must  let  myself  go  as  the  unalterable  laws  force 
me.  Even  if  I  can  persuade  myself  that  there  is  a  moral 
order  of  the  universe,  or  a  moral  law,  whose  source  is 
not  in  a  personality,  I  do  not  see  how  this  involves 
an  imperative.  Why  not  let  this  law  or  order  take 
care  of  itself?  It  must  be  self-evident,  that  without 
the  conception  of  obligation  a  system  of  ethics  is  not 
possible ;  but  it  is  equally  clear  that  to  affirm  obligation 
without  giving  its  ground  is  irrational.  For  the  fact  of 
the  ought,  the  reason  demands  the  why,  in  order  to  learn 
whether  the  fact  is  authorized.  Just  here  is  the  point 


ETHICS.  843 

where  various  systems  fail :  they  attempt  to  build  ethics 
without  laying  the  foundation.  They  do  not  go  deep 
enough;  they  assert  responsibility  without  giving  a 
sufficient  reason  for  it ;  they  construct  a  system  which 
has  significance  only  for  personality,  but  ignore  person- 
ality itself,  or  at  least  its  legitimate  inferences;  and 
their  whole  work  is  an  effort  somehow  to  conjure  from 
the  must  of  nature  the  ought  of  reason.  What  wonder 
if  in  such  systems  of  ethics  the  essential  characteristic 
of  ethics  is  wanting?  However  we  may  try  to  avoid 
them,  there  are  certain  postulates  without  which  a 
moral  system  is  impossible :  Personality  as  the  ground 
of  obligation  and  the  condition  for  its  apprehension  ; 
reason  or  design  in  the  universe,  giving  certain  ends 
or  an  end  to  be  realized ;  and  a  future  life  for  meting 
out  that  justice  which  is  not  attained  here.  If  these 
are  admitted,  it  will  also  be  necessary  to  postulate  the 
existence  of  God,  without  whom  it  is  impossible  to  find 
for  them  a  rational  basis. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Definition  of  Ethics.  Relation  to  other  departments 
of  Philosophy.  Rational  and  theological  Ethics.  Basis 
of  Ethics  in  human  nature.  Different  Systems  of 
Ethics.  Their  relation  to  this  basis.  Relation  of  Right 
and  Happiness.  Criticism  of  Intuitionalism  and  Utili- 
tarianism. What  is  Conscience  ?  How  regarded  by 
Evolutionism?  Objections.  What  is  involved  in  the 
concepts  of  Obligation  and  Responsibility?  Define 
Personality.  The  Useful,  or  Means  as  an  End.  The 
Conception  of  Freedom  demanded  by  Ethics.  Ethics 
of  Materialism.  Source  of  Ethical  Ideals.  What  is 
the  Good  ?  God  as  ethical.  Personal  and  social  Ethics. 
Relation  of  Law,  Politics,  Sociology,  to  Ethics.  Ethical 


344     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

demands  in  view  of  Socialism.  Pleasure  and  Worthi- 
ness. Ethics  of  Feeling  and  of  Reason.  Why  seek 
the  Happiness  of  the  Greatest  Number  ?  Sacrifice ; 
Benevolence.  If  Pleasure  is  the  end  of  Morality,  how 
can  pleasure  ever  be  wrong  ?  What  is  involved  in  the 
conception  of  base  pleasures?  Brute-impulse  and  Con- 
science. Hope  of  Immortality  as  based  on  Ethics. 
Kant's  Argument  on  Immortality.  Heredity,  Environ- 
ment, and  Rational  Ethics.  Objective  Standard  of 
Ethics.  Mind  freeing  itself  from  things  in  Ethics. 
Ethics  and  Design.  Is  he  responsible  for  any  thing 
who  is  not  intended  for  any  thing?  Kant's  Categor- 
ical Imperative.  His  Essence  of  Morality  in  a  Good 
Will.  Aristotle's  Essence  of  Morality  in  the  realization 
of  the  Design  of  our  being.  Is  a  Good  Will  original 
or  acquired?  How  is  Remorse  possible?  Is  a  knowl- 
edge of  Right  and  Wrong  innate?  What  is  innate? 
The  relation  of  Reason  and  Feeling  to  Volition. 
Ethics  as  the  culmination  of  Philosophy.  Freedom  of 
the  Will.  Relation  of  Morality  to  Religion.  Postu- 
lates of  Ethics. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.         S45 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE   SPIRIT   AND    THE    METHOD  IN    THE   STUDY 
OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

INQUIRY  among  students  from  the  most  prominent 
institutions  has  revealed  the  surprising  fact  that  they 
were  permitted  to  finish  their  collegiate  course  without 
receiving  special  instruction  respecting  the  aim  and 
value  of  the  particular  studies,  and  respecting  the 
proper  spirit  and  best  method  in  their  pursuit.  As  a 
consequence,  certain  branches  were  studied  simply  be- 
cause required  as  conditions  of  graduation,  not  because 
their  importance  for  mental  development  and  practical 
application  was  appreciated.  Under  these  circum- 
stances it  is  not  strange  that  so  many  studies  are  pur- 
sued in  a  mechanical  way,  and  tend  to  hinder  rather 
than  to  develop  the  spirit  of  the  real  student.  A 
study  should  be  made  rational  by  indicating  its  nature 
and  aim,  and  by  showing  how  it  can  be  pursued  most 
successfully.  It  is  certainly  presuming  too  much  to 
suppose  that  the  student  understands  the  purposes  of 
studies  which  are  entirely  new  to  him ;  and  many  who 
are  eager  to  learn  do  not  get  the  full  benefit  of  instruc- 
tion in  the  classics,  mathematics,  history,  and  philosophy, 
because  they  are  left  to  grope  their  way  in  the  dark. 
The  answer  of  many  students  to  the  question,  Were 
you  taught  the  aims  of  your  various  studies,  and  the 
best  method  of  pursuing  them  ?  is,  "  No  ;  I  was  left  in 


346      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  dark  until  I  discovered,  after  years  of  hard  toil, 
what  I  should  have  known  in  the  beginning."  Not  a 
few  admit,  even  after  graduation,  that  they  do  not 
know  how  to  study. 

Of  all  studies,  philosophy  is  the  most  purely  rational ; 

/  and   in   order   that   its  pursuit   may  be    rational,    the 

/  student  should  get  a  clear  idea  of  the  nature  of  philos- 

•<    ophy,  of  the  aim  and  spirit  in  the  study,  and  the  best 

/     method  for  attaining  success.     If  heretofore  the  chief 

/      aim  has  been  to  determine  the  nature  and  purpose  of 

philosophy,  the  attention  will  now  be  concentrated  on 

^     the  demands  made  by  philosophy  on  the  investigator ; 

in  other  words,  we  shall  now  consider  the  spirit  and 

method  in  the  study  of  philosophy. 

While  this  spirit  and  method  are  necessarily  involved 
in  all  the  preceding  discussions,  their  separate  treat- 
ment affords  an  opportunity  for  a  definite  statement  of 
what  was  all  along  implied,  and  for  giving  a  summary 
of  the  conditions  essential  for  the  solution  of  the  prob- 
lems presented.  While  this  chapter  is  therefore  in  part 
a  review  of  the  course  already  taken,  its  chief  aim  is  to 
help  the  student  to  become  an  independent  philosoph- 
ical inquirer. 

Philosophy  is  theoretical  wisdom,  or  the  idea  of  wis- 
dom traced  to  its  ultimate  principles.  The  study  of 
philosophy  requires  practical  wisdom,  which  consists 
in  the  choice  of  a  worthy  end,  in  identifying  the  spirit 
with  that  choice  and  end,  so  that  it  becomes  an  embodi- 
ment of  them,  and  in  selecting  the  best  means  for  the 
attainment  of  the  end.  For  the  student  of  philosophy, 
practical  wisdom  therefore  requires  a  clear  conception 
of  philosophy  itself,  and  a  knowledge  of  the  way  to  its 
attainment,  —  requirements  peculiarly  difficult  when  the 
mere  comprehension  of  the  nature  of  the  desired  object 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.         347 

demands  such  laborious  investigation  as  philosophy. 
If  an  object  can  be  discovered  only  by  pursuing  the 
way  that  leads  to  that  object,  it  is  not  very  logical 
to  ask  the  student  to  determine  definitely  the  object 
desired,  in  order  that  he  may  find  the  way  to  it.  This 
forecasting  of  the  mind,  this  anticipatory  and  prophetic 
element,  which  becomes  the  impulse  and  guide  to  reali- 
zation and  fulfilment,  is  among  the  most  important  of 
our  mental  functions.  A  sketch  is  thus  made  by  the 
mind  which  it  afterwards  fills  out ;  an  ideal  is  shad- 
owed, and  life  is  absorbed  in  the  effort  to  make  the 
ideal  itself  clearer  and  real.  Thus  we  define  an  object, 
and  then  we  seek  the  object  itself  with  all  its  wealth 
of  fulness.  Were  the  definition  more  than  a  shadow, 
we  should  not  be  required  to  follow  its  outlines  so  long 
and  laboriously  in  order  to  find  the  substance.  But 
how  important  the  shadow  of  philosophy  if  it  leads  to 
the  substance  which  casts  it ! 

The  object  of  search  is  brought  nearer  and  becomes 
more  distinct  in  proportion  as  progress  is  made  in  the 
journey.  The  mountain  outlined  against  the  distant 
horizon  gives  but  a  faint  idea  of  the  real  ascent.  Just 
as  the  domain  of  science  grows  clearer,  as  conquest 
after  conquest  is  made,  so  the  nature  and  the  sphere 
of  philosophy  can  be  understood  only  in  the  ratio  of 
progress  in  philosophical  study.  The  student  must 
expect  the  greatest  difficulties  in  the  beginning;  but 
with  the  right  start,  he  will  find  that  every  forward 
step  leads  him  to  greater  clearness  and  to  richer  pos- 
sessions. The  most  extensive  view  can  be  obtained 
only  on  the  summit ;  but  every  progress  in  the  ascent 
enlarges  the  view  and  makes  the  summit  itself  more 
distinct. 

Philosophy,  then,  is  presented  to  the  student  simply 


348      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

as  a  problem  for  solution.  He  is  requested  to  define 
it  sharply,  and  to  ponder  the  definition  until  the  out- 
lines stand  distinctly  before  his  mind.  But  for  the 
contents  of  philosophy  we  are  obliged  to  refer  him  to 
the  solution  itself. 

The  subject-matter  of  philosophy  may  be  represented 
by  concentric  circles ;  the  outer  one  representing  being ; 
the  next,  the  theory  of  knowledge ;  the  third,  the  theory 
of  feeling,  or  aesthetics ;  the  fourth  and  innermost,  the 
theory  of  volition,  or  ethics.  Philosophy  does  not  pro- 
pose to  exhaust  the  contents  of  these  circles,  but  only 
to  give  the  principles  and  their  rational  systems.  In 
each  case  philosophy  goes  behind  the  details  to  find  the 
first  thought,  the  beginning,  not  dependent  on  other 
thoughts,  but  itself  the  condition  of  all  thinking  in  that 
particular  circle.  A  dark  background,  impenetrable  to 
our  reason,  may  lie  behind  that  basis  from  which  all 
our  reasoning  must  start ;  but  human  philosophy  does 
not  demand  the  discovery  of  what  is  absolutely  first,  but 
only  what  is  necessarily  the  starting-point  for  human 
thinking.  If  we  are  unable  to  comprehend  the  whole 
circle  of  truth,  philosophy  demands  that  the  mind  pass 
to  the  utmost  limit  of  its  capacities,  so  that  it  may 
reach  what  for  human  reason  is  ultimate.  Philosophy 
is  thus  a  limitation  for  the  sake  of  a  determination  of 
the  first  and  last  rational  thought.  Distinct  from  reli- 
gion, and  yet  in  many  respects  intimately  related  to  it ; 
sharply  separated  from  the  special  sciences,  yet  giving 
the  basis  and  completion  of  all  science ;  related  to 
psychology  as  the  temple  to  the  vestibule ;  related  to 
history  as  the  rational  to  the  phenomenal,  and  to  life 
as  the  theoretical  is  to  the  practical,  —  the  ideal  philoso- 
phy is  peculiar,  with  its  domain  clearly  marked,  and 
yet  in  living  connection  with  all  the  other  realms  of 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD   IN   THE  STUDY.         349 

thought.  Philosophy  can  no  more  exist  by  itself  than 
we  can  breathe  without  air;  and  other  departments  are 
no  more  complete  without  philosophy  than  is  the  gene- 
sis of  the  oak  without  the  acorn  as  its  seed  and  fruit. 

Philosophy,  which  is  viewed  objectively  as  a  system 
of  ultimate  rational  principles,  is  to  be  made  subjective, 
or  the  real  possession  of  the  mind.  In  the  effort  to 
solve  this  problem,  the  question  respecting  the  spirit 
required  in  the  study  of  philosophy  is  of  fundamental 
importance.  While  the  spirit  is  first  considered,  we 
are  well  aware  that  it  cannot  be  wholly  separated 
from  the  method.  Thus  dogmatism,  scepticism,  criti- 
cism, eclecticism,  empiricism,  and  idealism  indicate  a 
particular  method  in  philosophy,  but  also  a  certain 
spirit  as  the  source  or  accompaniment  of  the  method. 
While  the  one  always  accompanies  the  other,  we  give 
the  preference  to  the  spirit  as  supreme,  and  as  really  the 
determining  factor. 

An  attractive  view  of  truth  regards  it  as  a  seed 
planted  in  the  mind  as  the  soil,  and  growing  according 
to  its  own  inherent  powers  and  laws,  into  the  whole 
system  of  truth.  This  makes  a  truth  its  own  spirit 
and  method,  the  mind  merely  furnishing  the  nourish- 
ment required  for  the  growth.  Then  a  correct  thought 
deep  and  broad  enough  need  but  be  discovered  and 
planted  in  order  to  develop  itself  into  the  whole  system 
of  philosophy.  The  figure  certainly  has  the  merit  of 
indicating  the  absorption  of  the  mind  required  in  the 
development  of  philosophic  systems.  But  the  objection 
to  it  is  that  a  process  is  attributed  to  thought  which  is 
really  performed  by  the  mind  itself.  No  thought  grows 
of  itself;  all  the  productiveness  attributed  to  it  inheres 
in  the  mind.  It  is  consequently  better  to  change  the 
figure,  and  to  regard  the  truth  as  an  organism  which 


350      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

has  become  independent  of  the  womb,  and  develops 
itself,  and  appropriates  all  that  enters  into  contact  with 
it.  This  organism  is  the  spirit  itself  as  the  embodiment 
of  a  particular  truth.  The  energy  of  thought  is  but  the 
intellectual  energy  of  the  mind  itself.  Without  hyper- 
bole we  can  say  that  the  truth  becomes  spirit,  and  the 
spirit  truth.  It  is  no  more  possible  to  divorce  the  spirit 
from  its  thought,  than  to  separate  the  sap  from  the 
living  tree.  The  consideration  of  the  condition  of  the 
spirit  is  therefore  of  primary  importance,  since  its  char- 
acter and  degree  of  attainment  determine  its  apprehen- 
sion of  truth,  beauty,  and  goodness,  and  the  nature  of 
the  development  formed  by  the  apprehension  of  them. 

Intellectual  development  is  as  truly  self-culture  as  is 
the  formation  of  character ;  and  it  can  never  be  under- 
stood so  long  as  we  regard  it  as  a  process  which  takes 
place  in  us,  but  of  which  we  are  not  a  part.  Of  every 
one  it  must  be  said,  "  As  he  thinketh  in  his  heart,  so 
is  he."  A  new  thought  is  a  new  mental  fibre  ;  it  both 
gives  us  what  we  had  not,  and  makes  us  what  we  were 
not.  The  mind  is  not  a  receptacle  into  which  thought 
is  put  and  held,  as  something  distinct  from  it;  but  an 
organism,  which  in  the  production  of  a  fresh  thought 
puts  all  its  mental  attainments  into  new  relations  by 
introducing  this  new  element,  and  also  itself  attains 
new  relations  and  assumes  new  attitudes.  Whatever 
it  may  be  potentially  or  ideally,  the  intellect  is  really 
only  what  it  thinks ;  and  in  the  deepest  sense  a  man 
possesses  intellectually  only  what  he  thinks. 

This  view  of  the  organic  union  of  the  mind  and  its 
products  —  instead  of  the  mechanic  one  permitting  a 
total  separation  of  the  two  —  reveals  the  essentialness 
of  a  true  spirit  in  the  investigation  of  truth.  In  our 
thoughts  we  have  not  merely  a  manifestation  of  truth 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY.         351 

or  error,  but  also  a  revelation  of  the  intellect.  It  is 
not  exact  enough  to  say  that  in  intellectual  progress 
there  is  a  constant  series  of  action  and  re-action,  for 
there  is  in  reality  only  mental  action ;  but  we  can  say 
that  the  truth  grows  in  the  mind,  and  the  mind  grows 
in  the  truth. 

Since  the  mind  and  its  products  constitute  an  organ- 
ism, all  that  has  intellectual  significance  must  enter 
this  organism  and  become  part  of  its  constitutive  ele- 
ments. There  are  in  reality  no  laws  for  a  mind  except 
so  far  as  they  are  laws  of  that  mind.  Rules  for  a  study 
or  an  art  are  valuable  in  proportion  as  they  become 
spirit.  Their  aim  is  pedagogical.  Coming  first  as  a 
foreign  element,  they  are  to  domineer  over  the  mind 
until  it  is  trained  into  harmony  with  them,  and  becomes 
an  embodiment  of  them.  We  learn  rules  of  grammar 
to  forget  them ;  but  we  so  completely  grow  them  into 
ourselves  that  we  naturally  speak  correctly.  The  same 
is  true  of  logical,  sesthetical,  and  ethical  rules  ;  their 
mission  is  accomplished  when  they  become  life  and 
spirit,  act  spontaneously,  and  require  special  reflection 
if  we  are  to  become  conscious  of  them.  Genius  does 
not  ignore  law ;  it  is  law  become  personality  and  spon- 
taneity. Since  its  rules  are  so  purely  personal  and  sub- 
jective, not  foreign  and  external,  genius  may  be  least 
able  to  explain  its  operations. 

Rules  being  for  discipline  and  for  training,  their  sig- 
nificance, particularly  in  philosophical  studies,  consists 
less  in  what  they  teach  than  what  they  make  us.  The 
spirit  itself  must  be  true  if  its  impulses  are  to  be  toward 
the  truth.  In  a  peculiar  sense  a  man's  philosophy 
depends  on  himself;  in  the  system  he  produces,  the 
philosopher  gives  expression  to  himself.  Hence  Fichte 
said,  "  The  philosophy  which  one  chooses  is  determined 


352      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

by  the  character  of  the  man  ;  for  a  philosophical  system 
is  not  a  dead  article,  it  is  animated  by  the  soul  of  the 
man  who  has  it."  In  the  case  of  Fichte,  as  well  as  of 
Kant,  the  strong  moral  elements  of  the  man  are  seen  in 
his  philosophy.  How  can  a  philosophy  be  true  to  the 
man,  unless  he  himself  is  the  soul  of  the  system  ?  We 
can  seek  and  comprehend  only  that  to  which  there  is 
an  analogy  in  the  mind;  and  we  can  produce  those 
thoughts  only  whose  seeds  are  within  the  soul.  These 
considerations  make  it  evident  that  philosophy,  so  often 
treated  as  purely  objective  and  as  a  mere  abstraction, 
can  become  real,  concrete,  only  by  becoming  subjective ; 
and  that  the  subjective  state,  the  character  of  the  spirit, 
will  determine  the  objective  character  of  the  philosophy. 
This  is  only  an  application  of  the  law  that  the  cause 
must  be  equal  to  the  effect. 

The  influence  of  thought  on  volition  is  universally 
recognized,  but  the  power  exerted  by  the  will  on  the 
thoughts  is  not  fully  appreciated.  Thinking  contains 
an  ethical  as  well  as  a  logical  element ;  and  frequently, 
when  mistakes  and  errors  occur,  the  will  rather  than 
the  intellect  requires  changing.  Pestalozzi's  saying 
applies  to  intellect  as  well  as  to  life  :  "  If  a  man  resolves 
any  thing  firmly,  he  can  accomplish  more  than  he  be- 
lieves." Jacobi  affirms,*  that  experience  and  history 
had  taught  him,  "  that  the  action  of  man  is  less  depend- 
ent on  his  thinking,  than  his  thoughts  depend  on  his 
conduct."  We  are  not  philosophers  by  nature,  nor  is 
the  usual  training  calculated  to  make  us  philosophical 
thinkers.  In  order  to  philosophize,  it  is  necessary  to 
infuse  the  energy  of  thought  with  the  energy  of  the  will. 
Amid  the  ordinary  interests  and  tendencies  of  men,  it 
requires  a  character  of  peculiar  strength  to  devote  the 

*  In  a  letter  to  Hamann. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.         353 

intellect  to  the  problems  of  philosophy,  and  to  make 
the  sacrifices  involved  in  this  devotion.  The  Greeks 
regarded  philosophy  as  in  a  special  sense  a  free  choice, 
as  something  that  must  be  deliberately  willed,  and 
purely  for  its  own  sake.  He  who  cannot  exercise  this 
rational  choice,  and  put  his  whole  spirit  into  it,  has  not 
grasped  the  meaning  of  philosophizing.  The  necessity 
for  philosophy  is  in  the  irresistible  energy  of  the  free 
mind.  So  far  is  it  from  finding  its  occasion  in  the  ordi- 
nary pursuits  of  life,  that  philosophy  may  even  interfere 
with  many  of  them,  regarding  them  unworthy  of  the 
effort  required.  It  is  not  accidental  that  it  does  not 
usually  appear  among  a  people  until  their  immediate 
necessities  are  supplied,  and  industrial  and  commercial 
interests  have  ceased  to  absorb  the  attention.  Philos- 
ophy is  not  pursued  as  a  bread-and-butter  study ;  it 
does  not  lead  to  wealth,  but  it  gives  riches  their  true 
value  as  means,  while  despising  them  as  an  end;  the 
learned  professions  do  not  make  it  a  condition  of  mem- 
bership ;  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  a  man  popular,  but 
rather  unfits  him  for  the  usual  level  of  popularity. 
"  No  man  of  science  ever  has  in  view  the  utility  of  his 
work,"  said  Liebig;  indeed,  he  is  too  much  absorbed  by 
science  itself  to  consider  any  ulterior  aim.  The  same  is 
true  of  the  philosophic  spirit.  It  does  not  ignore  or 
question  the  utility  of  its  pursuit,  but  neither  does  it 
permit  this  utility  to  distract  its  purely  rational  aim. 
The  immediate  use  of  philosophy  consists  in  the  satis- 
faction it  affords  the  mind  itself,  and  in  that  it  constantly 
impels  the  mind  to  become  deeper,  higher,  and  broader. 
If  what  is  vulgarly  called  "practical"  robs  the  mind  pf 
its  ideals,  or  leads  to  their  depreciation,  philosophy 
denounces  it  as  a  positive  degradation  of  individuals 
and  nations.  The  ideals,  as  forecastings  and  prophecies 


354      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  mind,  give  freshness,  inspiration,  and  a  worthy 
aim  to  the  spirit,  and  furnish  the  standard  by  which  the 
practical  should  be  measured.  They  are  real,  not  as 
actual  attainments,  but  as  ends  to  be  sought ;  and  their 
destruction  means  the  death  of  the  highest  mental  life. 
Where  the  ideals  die,  pessimism  flourishes. 

If  asked  to  concentrate  into  one  term  all  that  consti- 
tutes the  true  spirit  of  the  student  of  philosophy,  I  refer 
to  the  etymology  of  the  word,  and  answer :  the  love  of 
wisdom.  Love  is  an  affection,  and  cannot  be  translated 
into  thought ;  but  when  wisdom  is  loved,  the  affection 
has  its  source  in  the  conviction  of  the  desirableness  of 
wisdom,  and  the  consciousness  of  its  lack.  Where  con- 
ceit flourishes,  there  is  no  room  for  philosophy.  Humil- 
ity grows  with  depth ;  and  the  profoundest  philosopher  is 
intellectually  the  humblest.  Intellectual  pride  may  lift 
the  empty  head,  never  the  full  one.  Few  fathom  self 
enough  to  know  how  little  they  know.  The  true  stu- 
dent of  philosophy  soon  learns  that  mental  verdancy 
culminates  in  conceit,  just  as  the  folly  of  fashion  in 
vanity ;  and  in  proportion  to  the  depth  attained  will  he 
appreciate  the  well-known  saying  of  Newton,  "  I  do  not 
know  what  I  may  appear  to  others,  but  to  myself  I  seem 
to  have  been  only  like  a  boy  playing  on  the  seashore, 
and  diverting  myself  in  now  and  then  finding  a 
smoother  pebble  or  a  prettier  shell  than  ordinary, 
whilst  the  great  ocean  of  truth  lay  all  undiscovered 
before  me."  Only  those  who  know  not  of  the  undis- 
covered ocean  are  lost  in  pride  over  the  pebble  and  the 
shell. 

The  work  of  Socrates  consisted  largely  in  leading  the 
mind  to  examine  itself  with  a  view  of  becoming  con- 
scious of  its  needs.  The  knowledge  of  one's  ignorance  he 
regarded  as  the  essence  of  wisdom.  Plato  (Symposium) 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY.         355 

puts  into  his  mouth  the  sentiment  that  neither  the  gods 
nor  any  one  already  wise  either  philosophizes  or  desires 
wisdom,  for  one  longs  only  for  what  he  has  not.  Nor 
do  the  ignorant  seek  wisdom,  because  they  are  satisfied 
with  their  ignorance.  Both  the  stupid  and  the  conceited 
are  thus  excluded  from  philosophy.  Plato  frequently 
emphasizes  knowledge  of  self  as  the  most  important 
object  of  search.  In  his  Phcedros,  Socrates  says  that  he 
has  no  time  to  spend  on  the  interpretation  of  the  myth- 
ologies, and  states  as  the  reason  the  fact  that  he  does 
not  yet  know  himself,  and  so  long  as  he  is  ignorant  of 
self  he  regards  it  ridiculous  to  investigate  other  objects. 
Self-knowledge  is  thus  made  the  object  of  supreme 
importance.  When  he  comes  with  Phsedros  to  a  plan- 
tain-tree, on  the  bank  of  the  Ilissos,  Socrates  breaks 
out  in  rapture  over  the  beauty  of  the  scenery,  which  is 
strange  to  him.  Phaedros  is  surprised  that  the  scenery 
is  not  familiar;  but  Socrates  answers  that  he  is  eager 
to  learn,  but  that  country  and  trees  teach  him  nothing, 
while  he  can  learn  from  men  in  the  city.  Without 
depreciating  other  knowledge,  we  must  emphasize,  with 
Socrates  and  Plato,  the  knowledge  of  self  and  man  in 
general,  as  a  primary  condition  for  the  study  of  phi- 
losophy. 

The  love  of  wisdom  gives  both  the  impulse  and  the 
aim  in  philosophical  inquiries.  Wisdom  can  be  found 
only  in  the  truth.  All  truths  are  not  equally  impor- 
tant, but  whatever  is  not  true  is  worse  than  worthless. 
Philosophy,  viewed  as  a  subjective  state,  is  an  absorbing 
passion  for  the  highest  and  the  final  truth.  With  the 
purity  of  this  passion  no  interest  must  be  permitted  to 
interfere.  However  intense  the  passion  itself,  the  pur- 
suit requires  singular  calmness  and  deliberation.  The 
mind  must  concentrate  its  energies  on  the  subject  under 


856      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

consideration,  losing  itself  in  that,  and  following  it 
unhesitatingly  to  its  legitimate  conclusions.  The  truth 
alone  excepted,  no  results  whatever  are  to  be  considered. 
Philosophy  wants  to  get  at  the  heart  of  things,  so  as  to 
discover  their  source  and  interpret  their  nature  ;  these 
do  not  conform  to  our  views  and  inclinations,  but  we 
must  conform  to  them.  The  philosophic  spirit  is  revo- 
lutionary, and  yet  conservative,  being  ready  to  destroy 
itself  and  all  things  else  if  not  conformed  to  the  truth, 
and  equally  ready  to  sacrifice  all  to  preserve  existing 
truth.  Not  seeking  to  make  the  subjective  objective, 
but  the  reverse,  it  cannot  be  enamoured  with  the  arbi- 
trary, is  not  controlled  by  the  accidental,  and  laughs  at 
the  transient  fashion  in  opinions.  It  seeks  the  eternal, 
and  knows  that  nothing  but  truth  is  eternal.  The 
power  of  truth  is  the  thinker's  power  and  hope.  The 
reception  given  to  the  views  of  Copernicus  made  Gali- 
leo hesitate  to  publish  the  results  of  some  of  his  investi- 
gations. But  Kepler  wrote:  "Have  confidence  and  go 
forward,  Galileo !  If  I  see  aright,  there  will  be  few  of 
Europe's  more  important  mathematicians  who  will  dis- 
sent from  our  view,  so  great  is  the  power  of  truth." 
Every  student  of  philosophy  must  say  with  Locke  :  "  It 
is  truth  alone  I  seek ;  and  that  will  always  be  welcome 
to  me,  when  or  from  whence  soever  it  comes."  It  is 
not  necessary  for  a  man  to  be  a  philosopher ;  but  if  he 
wants  to  be  one  in  reality,  not  merely  in  name,  he  must 
be  true  to  the  truth. 

v  Schopenhauer  declared  that  it  was  not  in  harmony 
with  devotion  to  truth,  for  a  philosopher  to  accept  a 
position  as  professor  of  philosophy.  He  affirmed  that 
in  the  teaching  of  philosophy  in  the  university  the 
disadvantages  were  greater  than  the  advantages;  and 
he  spoke  with  contempt  of  the  philosophy  of  the  cathe- 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY.         357 

dra  (Kathederphilosophie) .  He  thought  it  unworthy 
of  a  philosopher  to  be  dependent  on  the  appointing 
powers,  and  held  that  the  considerations  of  the  state 
and  religion  might  induce  him  to  swerve  from  the 
truth ;  and  to  accept  pay  for  his  instruction  made  it 
seem  as  if  the  teacher  was  more  intent  on  making  the 
truth  minister  to  himself  and  family  than  to  devote 
himself  wholly  and  disinterestedly  to  the  truth.  This 
view  may  be  an  extreme ;  but  it  must  be  admitted  that 
an  official  position  as  teacher  of  philosophy  has  by  no 
means  always  been  promotive  of  an  unbiassed  and  inde- 
pendent relation  to  the  truth.  And  from  Descartes  to 
Hartmann,  some  of  the  most  influential  philosophers 
have  not  been  professors,  —  among  them,  besides  the 
two  just  named,  Spinoza,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume, 
Leibnitz,  and  many  others,  particularly  English  phi- 
losophers. A  discipline  whose  realm  is  the  highest 
truth  can  evidently  be  promoted  by  those  only  who 
unreservedly  consecrate  themselves  to  the  truth,  re- 
gardless of  emoluments  and  of  opprobrium ;  and  a 
philosophy  that  is  not  free  is  not  worthy  of  the  name. 
But  if  the  philosopher  retains  his  freedom,  an  appoint- 
ment as  teacher  of  philosophy  may  be  an  efficient  way 
of  promoting  the  truth. 

For  the  philosophic  thinker,  the  danger  of  prejudice 
consists  in  the  fact  that  its  influence  is  mainly  uncon- 
scious, working  so  insidiously  as  to  make  its  cause  the 
synonyme  of  truth,  arid  then  enlisting  all  the  energies 
in  favor  of  that  cause.  When  once  entertained,  preju- 
dice never  rests  until  it  becomes  universal  and  om- 
nipotent. The  persistence  of  force  applies  fully  to 
the  mind.  A  course  deliberately  chosen  will  in  time 
control  the  intellect  unconsciously ;  it  forms  habits  to 
which  every  thing  is  made  tributary.  A  single  volition 


358      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

may  be  as  a  seed  which  grows  through  life  and  assimi- 
lates to  itself  intellect,  heart,  and  will.  However  diffi- 
cult it  may  be  to  become  conscious  of  the  principles 
which  control  us,  they  must  be  known  if  the  pernicious 
power  of  prejudice  is  to  be  destroyed. 

Views  transmitted  from  generation  to  generation  are 
thoughtlessly  adopted  and,  fortified  by  the  blind  zeal 
of  prejudice,  are  made  norms  of  thought  and  action. 
Where  heredity,  history,  and  the  dominant  factors  of 
an  age,  usurp  the  place  of  reason,  we  find  men  thrust 
into  ruts  from  which  they  can  be  forced  only  with  a 
painful  wrench.  Whoever  has  seized  the  idea  of  phi- 
losophy as  reason  in  the  exercise  of  its  universal  and 
eternal  functions,  can  hardly  understand  the  possibility 
of  making  national  prejudice  a  factor  in  philosophical 
studies.*  Endowed  with  the  universality  of  reason, 
philosophy  is  superior  to  the  peculiarities  of  ages, 
nationalities,  and  schools.  It  is  better  to  call  it  super- 
national  than  international,  since  its  principles  repre- 
sent what  is  above  the  nations,  rather  than  what  is 
interpenetrative  and  common  to  them.  What  difference 
can  it  make  to  him  who  is  absorbed  solely  in  the  search 

*  This  prejudice  is  most  senseless  in  philosophy,  yet  not  uncommon: 
traces  of  it  are,  in  fact,  found  in  every  land.  Speaking  of  the  disciples 
of  Rosmini  and  Gioberti,  Barzellotti  (Philosophy  in  Italy,  Mind,  1878) 
says:  "  The  disciples  clung  to  the  words  of  their  masters,  and  rejected 
all  innovation  and  all  impartial  study  of  foreign  doctrines.  The  senti- 
ment and  the  idea  of '  Italianisin  '  in  philosophy,  which  were  certainly 
exaggerated  by  Gioberti,  but  yet  when  he  wrote  had  some  justification, 
became  in  some  of  his  followers  a  prejudice  and  a  pretext  for  narrow- 
ness of  mind  and  ignorance  of  all  modern  culture."  "The  upholders 
of  Italian  doctrines  erred  in  despising  German  philosophy,  while  they 
did  not  know  it;  the  Hegelians  and  Kantians  erred  in  wishing  to  make 
Italians  think  wholly  in  the  manner  of  Germans."  Professor  Mahaffy 
says,  "  In  reviewing  the  theories  of  past  thinkers,  the  main  objects  with 
Stewart  and  his  school  were  to  magnify  them  if  they  were  Scotch,  and 
to  decry  them  if  they  were  unorthodox."  (Princeton  Eev.,  1878,  July, 
225.)  Similar  instances  might  be  multiplied. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.         359 

for  truth,  whether  a  system  originated  in  Greece,  Ger- 
many, England,  Scotland,  or  America,  if  only  it  is  true? 
The  philosophic  spirit  scorns  every  effort  to  make  truth, 
science,  philosophy,  or  religion,  questions  of  nationality, 
just  because  it  seeks  what  is  deep  and  broad  as  human- 
ity. While  philosophy  thus  transcends  the  temporal 
and  the  local,  it  does  not  ignore  the  abiding  and  uni- 
versal elements  in  them,  but  seeks  their  interpretation 
and  appropriation.  A  system  is  necessarily  largely 
influenced  by  the  age  and  national  peculiarities,  and 
it  cannot  be  true  to  its  author  and  his  surroundings 
unless  it  has  a  flavor  of  both.  If  the  development  of 
philosophy  is  to  be  promoted  among  a  people,  the 
growth  and  present  condition  of  the  nation  must  be 
considered.  The  attainments  made  are  the  starting- 
point  for  all  future  progress,  and  the  soil  into  which 
all  imported  seeds  of  culture  must  be  planted.  Every 
system  of  philosophy  is  racy.  Imported  systems  must 
consequently  be  grafted  on  the  tree  of  knowledge 
already  growing;  they  must  somehow  be  adapted  to 
the  national  life  if  they  are  to  be  assimilated ;  or,  the 
national  life,  if  false,  must  be  so  changed  as  to  bring 
it  into  harmony  with  the  truth.  But  it  is  not  the 
temporal  or  national  peculiarities  which  give  a  philo- 
sophical system  its  rational  excellences.  Truth  is 
cosmopolitan. 

Whatever  the  ideal  of  philosophy  may  be,  every 
actual  system  is,  in  a  measure,  the  product  of  past 
systems  and  of  the  environment.  Even  those  which 
laid  greatest  claim  to  absoluteness  are  no  exception. 
Hegel  held  that  it  is  the  mission  of  philosophy  "to 
seize  the  present  and  the  real."  He  regarded  the  truly 
real  as  the  rational,  and  said,  "  It  is  the  task  of  philoso- 
phy to  comprehend  that  which  is;  for  that  which  is, 


860     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  reason.  As  far  as  the  individual  is  concerned,  he  is, 
of  course,  a  son  of  his  age;  and  philosophy  likewise 
is  the  translation  of  the  age  into  thought.  It  is  as  foolish 
to  imagine  that  any  philosophy  transcends  its  present 
world,  as  that  an  individual  leaps  beyond  his  age."  * 
While  there  is  truth  in  this,  every  system,  to  be 
worthy  of  attention,  must  be  more  than  a  reproduction 
of  past  systems  and  of  its  own  age :  it  must  be  an  inter- 
preter, critic,  and  prophet.  Above  all,  philosophy  must 
not  become  the  imitator  of  the  prevailing  fashion.  The 
philosopher,  seeking  to  get  from  his  age  those  elements 
which  are  eternal,  namely,  the  principles  lying  behind 
phenomena  and  controlling  them,  must  maintain  his 
independence,  and  strive  to  rise  above  the  particular, 
individual,  and  variable,  into  the  realm  of  pure  and 
universal  reason.  A  philosophic  system  is  the  product 
of  a  free,  rational  thinker,  under  the  influence  of  past 
systems  and  his  own  age.  Especially  to  philosophers 
does  the  saying  of  the  historian  Ranke  apply :  "  Great 
men  do  not  make  their  age,  but  neither  are  they  made 
by  it.  They  are  original  minds,  who  independently 
participate  in  the  conflict  of  ideas,  concentrate  the 
mightiest  of  them,  those  on  which  the  future  depends, 
develop  them,  and  are  developed  by  them." 

A  philosopher  cannot  divest  himself  of  his  peculiari- 
ties and  individuality :  how  should  they  affect  his  phi- 
losophy? No  one  can  deny  or  transcend  his  nature, 
but  he  can  cultivate  it  into  the  truth.  The  principal 
point  to  be  decided  is,  whether  the  individual  should 
be  made  the  test  of  truth,  or  whether  the  universal  is 
the  law  to  which  all  that  is  individual  must  conform. 
Individuality  is  the  standpoint  of  the  ego,  universality 
that  of  reason.  Philosophy  seeks  the  truth,  not  my 

*  Preface  to  Philosophic  des  Rechts. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.         361 

truth.  History  deals  largely  with  opinions,  with  the 
exceptional  and  the  individual ;  philosophy,  with  what 
is  universally  the  eternally  rational. 

Philosophy  is  destructive  of  credulity  as  well  as  of 
prejudice.  Whatever  of  Kant's  system  may  be  rejected 
in  the  progress  of  thought,  the  critical  spirit  he  intro- 
duced will  remain.  The  philosopher  takes  for  granted 
nothing  which  is  subject  to  demonstration ;  and  if  any 
thing  accepted  cannot  be  demonstrated,  he  must  give 
the  reason  for  this  inability,  and  the  reason  for  the 
acceptance.  In  this  respect  he  is  no  less  rigid  than 
the  mathematician.  Indeed,  he  is  in  some  respects 
more  rigid.  While  the  mathematician  assumes  axioms, 
the  philosopher  makes  axioms  themselves  objects  of 
rational  inquiry.  Errors  long  cultivated  are  with  great- 
est difficulty  rooted  from  the  mind,  and  even  after  the 
most  critical  investigation  the  truth  may  escape  our 
grasp.  It  is  particularly  in  adopting  a  system  or  prin- 
ciples, that  the  student  should  be  on  his  guard.* 

*  Whoever  would  learn  with  what  caution  philosophical  works 
should  be  read,  need  but  examine  any  thorough  criticism  of  eminent 
authors.  The  student  who  is  in  danger  of  undue  influence  from  a 
favorite  author  or  teacher  would  do  well  to  consider  that  ages  of  careful 
testing  may  be  required  to  determine  a  correct  estimate  of  a  system. 
Thinkers  are  still  intent  on  sifting  the  systems  of  Kant  and  Hegel,  and 
even  the  relative  merits  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  have  not  been  finally 
settled.  With  all  their  excellences,  H.  Spencer's  works,  as  a  system 
of  philosophy,  cannot  stand  the  tests  of  the  criticism  of  the  age  in  which 
they  appeared.  On  this  subject  the  student  will  find  the  articles,  begun 
in  the  Contemp.  Rev.,  December,  1877,  by  the  late  T.  H.  Green,  valuable. 
In  the  same  journal,  January,  1878,  Jevons  gives  an  instance  of  the 
difficulty  of  discovering  the  errors  of  a  subtle  philosophical  writer. 
He  states  that,  according  to  the  traditional  requirements  of  the  London 
University,  he  was  obliged  to  use  part  of  J.  S.  Mill's  works  as  text- 
books. For  twenty  years,  he  says,  he  made  these  works  a  study,  and  for 
fourteen  he  used  them  as  text-books.  "  Some  ten  years  of  study  passed 
before  I  began  to  detect  their  fundamental  unsoundness.  During  the 
last  ten  years,  the  conviction  has  gradually  grown  upon  my  mind  that 
Mill's  authority  is  doing  immense  injury  to  the  cause  of  philosophy  and 


362      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  the  deepest  sense  the  philosopher  seeks  reality, 
aiming  constantly  to  get  at  the  essence  of  things.  Not 
that  he  despises  phenomena  or  form,  but  he  seeks  to 
value  them  at  their  worth.  The  steady  aim  at  intel- 
lectual realities  is  especially  demanded  in  an  age  when 
so  many  delight  in  visions.  Truth  has  not  set  its  seal 
on  the  soul  which  requires  rhetoric,  poetry,  or  fictitious 
adornments  to  make  the  truth  acceptable.  It  may 
require  considerable  philosophic  depth  to  distinguish 
between  the  truth  and  its  trappings,  between  the  sub- 
stance and  the  style. 

Few  things  are  more  intolerable  than  the  scholastic 
boor,  who  wears  his  logic  on  his  sleeve,  demands  a  dem- 
onstration for  what  belongs  to  natural  impulse,  and 
who  deadens  thought,  emotion,  and  inspiration,  by  tor- 
turing them  into  the  Procrustean  bed  of  his  syllogisms. 
Philosophy  is  not  to  pervert  nature,  but  to  aid  it  in 
realizing  its  ideal.  The  era  of  Wolff,  when  men  wanted 
every  thing  in  lectures,  sermons,  books,  and  conversa- 
tion, to  conform  to  mathematical  rules,  is  past;  the 
mechanical  and  artificial  character  of  his  philosophy  is 
riot  adapted  to  an  age  of  vigorous  and  healthy  thought. 
Rousseau  was  right :  education  is  a  naturalization  of 
men,  not  their  transformation  into  machines. 

It  would  be  a  wrong  to  the  student  to  leave  on  his 
mind  the  impression  that  in  the  study  of  philosophy 
any  thing  can  take  the  place  of  the  severest  toil.  Men- 
tal power  is  essential,  but  not  enough ;  it  must  be  con- 
verted into  energy.  The  mind  must  put  itself  wholly 

good  intellectual  training  in  England"  He  even  declares:  "  I  under- 
take to  show  that  there  is  hardly  one  of  his  more  important  and  peculiar 
doctrines  which  he  has  not  himself  amply  refuted."  Many  other 
equally  severe  charges  are  made  against  him.  Numerous  other 
examples  might  be  given,  all  of  which  are  warnings,  especially  to  the 
beginner,  to  be  extremely  slow  and  critical  in  adopting  a  system. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.         363 

into  the  subject.  Whatever  genius  may  do  in  art,  he 
who  depends  on  it  in  philosophy  will  fail.  All  philoso- 
phers have  been  toilers.  The  student  of  philosophy, 
as  well  as  of  science,  may  learn  a  lesson  from  the 
patient,  steady  labors  of  Newton.  He  would  admit  no 
difference  between  himself  and  others,  except  in  perse- 
verance and  vigilance.  "  When  he  was  asked  how  he 
made  his  discoveries,  he  answered, '  By  always  thinking 
about  them ; '  and  at  another  time  he  declared  that  if 
he  had  done  any  thing,  it  was  due  to  nothing  but  indus- 
try and  patient  thought :  '  I  keep  the  subject  of  my 
inquiry  constantly  before  me,  and  wait  till  the  first 
dawning  opens  gradually,  by  little  and  little,  into  a  full 
and  clear  light.'"* 

It  should  not  be  the  first  aim  of  the  student  to  learn 
many  things,  or  to  adopt  or  form  a  system;  but  to 
think,  to  think  correctly  and  profoundly.  If  this  is 
well  learned,  it  makes  him  the  master  of  systems ;  and 
if  nothing  else  is  gained,  it  will  pay  him  for  the  effort 
to  penetrate  the  most  abstruse  subjects,  and  to  solve 
the  most  intricate  problems.  If  in  other  studies  the 
attention  is  directed  mainly  to  the  acquisition  of  knowl- 
edge, in  philosophy  the  aim  is  depth,  —  the  pursuit  of  a 
thought  to  its  ultimate  source,  and  the  reduction  of  the 
multiplicity  of  phenomena  to  their  underlying  princi- 
ples ;  so  that,  instead  of  gathering  new  materials  of 
knowledge,  the  aim  is  rather  to  find  the  absolute  expla- 
nation of  what  is  already  found.  But  by  this  thorough 
appropriation  of  what  we  have,  the  deepest  and  best 
new  possessions  are  gained.  The  delving  process 
reveals  treasures  of  wisdom  never  to  be  found  on  the 
surface.  Just  as  in  the  chemical  substances,  so  in  intel- 
lect, much  that  was  thought  to  be  simple  is  found  to 

*  Wbewell,  II.  192. 


364     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

be  compound;  what  was  viewed  as  isolated,  is  seen 
to  be  intimately  connected  with  other  thoughts  and  to 
lead  to  them ;  what  was  pronounced  exhausted  is,  by 
renewed  study,  made  to  yield  fresh  seed-thoughts; 
hidden  recesses,  new  principles,  and  undiscovered  terri- 
tories are  thus  revealed,  and  new  applications  are  made 
possible.*  The  mind,  thus  disciplined,  in  the  course 
of  time  forms  the  habit  of  looking  at  things  from  the 
rational  point  of  view,  and  the  deep,  exhaustive  study 
of  subjects  becomes  the  natural  bent  of  the  intellect. 
The  spirit  endowed  with  energy  of  thought,  with  a 
comprehensive  grasp,  with  a  disposition  to  go  to  the 
depths,  and  with  the  ability  to  descend  through  the  in- 
finite variety  to  the  fundamental  unity,  has  the  elements 
of  a  philosopher.  The  one  advice  to  be  given  to  the 
student,  and  always  to  be  repeated  and  emphasized,  is 
—  Think.f 

The  requirements  are  such  that,  if  fully  appreciated, 
they  may  deter  many,  who  are  eager  to  learn,  from 
devoting  themselves  to  philosophy.  Without  comply- 
ing with  these  hard  conditions,  much  may  be  learned 
from  the  reading  of  philosophic  works ;  but  they  must 
be  fully  complied  with  if  the  subject  itself  is  to  be 
truly  entered  and  the  philosophic  spirit  cultivated.  The 

*  Herbart  (Einleitung,  192)  says,  "  Every  system  which  does  not 
wholly  separate  its  theoretical  from  its  practical  part,  has  hidden 
sources,  which  the  author  himself  does  not  fully  understand,  hut  which 
must  be  exposed  in  the  course  of  the  examination." 

t  Schaarschmidt  (Phil.  Monatsh.  1877, 5),  speaking  of  what  is  required 
of  him  who  would  become  a  philosopher,  says,  "  It  is  the  activity  of 
the  polymathist,  one  might  almost  say  of  the  panmathist,  which  is 
required  as  a  preliminary.  And  yet  the  positive,  so-called  exact  knowl- 
edge is  still  the  least  of  the  requirements;  for  it  is  not  knowledge  which 
constitutes  the  philosopher,  but  thinking,  concentrated,  thorough, 
methodically  trained  thinking,  to  which  the  sum  total  of  scientific  at- 
tainment is  but  a  premise  with  which  it  starts  in  its  search  for  the  last 
abstractions  and  highest  ideas." 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.         365 

numerous  efforts  to  popularize  systems  may  have  a 
measure  of  success,  but  what  is  deepest  in  philosophy 
cannot  be  made  popular.  There  is  no  hope  of  success 
for  those  who  do  not  think  in  the  best  sense,  except 
that  they  may  get  a  smattering  of  what  others  have 
thought ;  but  their  minds  can  more  easily  be  filled  from 
other  sources  than  philosophy.  The  study  is  not  for 
those  who  want  to  taste  many  things  and  digest  noth- 
ing, or  who  neglect  solid  food  in  order  to  live  on 
desserts,  a  process  which  promotes  mental  dyspepsia. 
Those  who  want  to  receive  their  truths  as  happy  intui- 
tions, or  imagine  themselves  philosophers  by  instinct, 
should  be  sent  to  learn  a  lesson  from  the  instinct  of  the 
ant  and  the  bee.  Philosophy  may  be  dreamt  of,  but  is 
never  dreamt.  But  for  the  slow,  patient  plodder,  there 
is  every  encouragement :  for  that  brilliancy,  however, 
which  wants  to  scintillate  its  philosophy,  there  is  none. 
Where  independent  thought  is  wedded  with  a  genius 
for  toil,  the  best  results  may  be  expected.  A  man  may 
be  an  orator,  a  poet,  or  an  artist,  who  cannot  be  a  phi- 
losopher ;  he  may  be  a  philosopher,  and  lack  the  quali- 
ties which  shine  before  men.  Philosophy  does  not  go 
by  leaps.  Every  foot  of  ground  must  be  conquered  and 
earned  before  it  can  be  possessed ;  nothing  is  inherited, 
nothing  comes  by  lot  or  chance,  nothing  is  bestowed  as 
a  gift.  The  student  of  philosophy  may  learn  a  valua- 
ble lesson  from  the  slowness  and  accuracy  of  scientific 
investigation.  Herbart  said:  "Instruction  in  philos- 
ophy, without  exactness,  makes  only  fantasts  and  fools." 
Enthusiasm  may  be  a  help,  but  it  creates  no  truth ;  it  is 
valuable  if  it  leads  to  depth,  but  an  injury  if  it  encour- 
ages flights  from  solid  ground  into  regions  of  revery  and 
mythology.  Philosophy  has  no  oracles,  and  no  miracles 
of  speculation.  It  is  the  most  prosaic  prose,  whose  sole 


366      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

apology  for  existence  is  the  fact  that  the  mind  cannot  do 
without  it. 

When  beheld  from  the  street,  the  painted  windows  of 
a  cathedral  are  all  blurred ;  in  order  to  see  the  figures 
distinctly,  and  to  learn  what  sacred  scenes  are  repre- 
sented, one  must  enter  the  temple,  and  view  them  from 
the  sanctuary  itself.  So  it  is  with  philosophy :  to  see 
and  appreciate  it,  the  temple  itself  must  be  entered. 
Many  come  to  the  door,  few  pass  through  the  vestibule ; 
perhaps  the  momentary  opening  of  the  door  gives  a  faint 
and  fleeting  impression  of  the  grandeur,  and  affords  a 
hasty  glance  at  significant  but  uninterpreted  symbols. 
However  others  may  hesitate,  let  the  true  student  enter 
boldly;  it  is  his  sanctuary.  For  the  earnest  thinker, 
there  is  every  encouragement  to  study  philosophy.  If 
little  has  as  yet  been  done  that  can  be  regarded  as  final, 
so  much  the  more  remains  to  be  accomplished.  Her- 
bart's  words  apply  to  our  day  as  well  as  to  his  own : 
"  The  truth  lies  before,  not  behind  us ;  and  let  him  who 
seeks  it  look  forward,  not  backward.  In  his  reflections, 
let  him  advance  as  impelled  by  the  problems  presented."  * 
He  will  find  limitations,  but  even  their  discovery  is  of 
great  value ;  and  within  the  limits  of  the  mind  he  will 
find  more  than  enough  to  enlist  his  best  energies  in 
philosophic  pursuits.  Should  it  be  discovered  at  last 
that  the  ultimate  problems  of  being  are  unsolvable,  he 
will  find  even  in  metaphysics  vast  regions  which  the 
mind  can  explore  and  in  which  new  discoveries  are  pos- 
sible ;  while  the  theories  of  knowledge,  of  feeling,  and 
of  volition  are  practically  inexhaustible.  There  may  be 
subjects  which  are  not  worthy  of  great  energy ;  but 
worthy  of  greater  effort  than  we  can  exert  are  those 
problems  which  underlie  all  others,  involve  our  deepest 
interests,  and  constitute  the  domain  of  philosophy. 

*  Einleitung,  212. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.         367 

Having  considered  the  SPIRIT,  we  now  turn  to  the 
METHOD  in  the  study  of  philosophy. 

This  method  must  not  be  confounded  with  any  sup- 
posed absolute  method  of  philosophy  itself,  nor  with 
the  method  adopted  by  a  particular  system,  as  eclecti- 
cism, idealism,  or  the  Hegelian  dialectic  process.  It  is 
not  our  purpose  here  to  determine  how  philosophy 
itself  must  proceed,  but  how  the  mind  ought  to  proceed 
in  order  to  study  philosophy.  The  subjective  method 
of  study,  not  the  objective  method  of  philosophy,  is 
under  consideration. 

The  pedagogical  training  for  philosophy  is  one  thing, 
the  mastering  of  a  philosophical  system  another,  and 
different  from  both  is  the  formation  of  the  system  itself. 
While  the  first  is  the  chief  aim  of  this  volume,  it  can 
accomplish  its  purpose  only  by  keeping  the  other  two 
continually  in  view  as  the  goal  of  the  mental  discipline. 
In  the  process  through  which  the  student  himself  must 
pass,  he  wants  not  merely  to  learn  philosophy,  but  also 
to  become  a  philosopher.  Out  of  his  present  self  and 
his  surroundings,  he  seeks  to  develop  himself  to  the  ideal, 
so  that  the  highest  prophecy  embodied  in  his  intellectual 
being  may  be  fulfilled.  According  to  Hegel,  what  the 
mind  is  implicitly  (an  sick),  potentially,  or  in  idea,  that 
it  should  strive  to  become  really.  The  thinker  knows 
that  reason  as  attributed  to  the  human  mind  is  an 
abstraction,  not  a  concrete  reality.  Reason,  like  phi- 
losophy itself,  is  in  a  process  of  becoming;  but  it  is 
not  yet.  When  the  student  objectifies  philosophy, 
abstracting  it  as  something  wholly  apart  from  mind, 
he  recognizes  it  as  still  requiring  a  certain  process  of 
development  toward  perfection.  That  process  which 
he  ascribes  to  objective  philosophy,  must  be  performed 
by  his  own  mind  in  the  study  and  the  development  of 


368     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy.  This  subjective  process  is  long  and  labo- 
rious, and  his  habitual  methods  of  intellect  may  have  to 
be  changed.  Instead  of  thinking  around  and  about 
things,  he  must  try  to  enter  their  heart,  so  that  he  may 
get  their  essence.  Not  by  magic  does  he  pass  from  the 
surface  to  the  interior;  he  must  slowly  drill  his  way 
into  the  innermost  part,  in  order  there  to  get  a  stand- 
point so  as  to  view  the  whole  circumference  from  the 
centre.  Every  description  of  an  object  from  the  surface, 
or  from  a  point  between  the  surface  and  the  centre,  is 
partial :  it  misses  the  centre,  and  all  that  lies  between 
the  point  of  view  and  the  centre.  These  descriptions 
may  be  true  so  far  as  they  go  ;  but  their  mistake  begins 
when  they  proclaim  themselves  as  an  exhaustion  of  the 
subject.  Thus  there  are  works  on  noetics,  metaphysics, 
aesthetics,  and  ethics,  which  are  rich  in  excellent  sugges- 
tions ;  but  the  inquiries  move  along  the  shell,  and  there- 
fore fail  to  reach  the  kernel,  the  seat  and  source  of  all  life. 
The  ultimate  philosophic  aim  is  always  the  idea, — 
the  perfect  idea,  not  isolated,  but  in  a  completed  system. 
In  its  idea  an  object  is  comprehended ;  in  that,  and  in  that 
only,  we  see  what  it  is.  In  its  most  compressed  form 
the  idea  is  a  word,  as  "  philosophy,"  "  metaphysics  ; "  or 
it  is  a  definition.  But  a  word  is  a  mere  point,  a  defini- 
tion is  a  mere  outline ;  the  developed  idea  is  the  whole 
system  in  its  completeness.  Thus  "philosophy"  is  a 
word,  of  which  we  give  a  definition,  and  which  stands  for 
a  perfect  system.  This  process  from  the  empty  to  the 
full,  from  poverty  to  wealth,  from  the  compressed  to 
the  expanded,  is  common  to  all  ideas.  We  can  say  that 
the  term  "  philosophy  "  contains  the  definition  and  sys- 
tem ;  this  is  true,  but  they  are  contained  in  a  latent  form, 
and  the  problem  is  how  to  make  all  the  implied  content 
a  real  possession  of  the  mind ;  just  as  the  word  "  spirit " 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD   IN   THE   STUDY.          369 

contains  in  nuce  all  that  conscious  personality  involves, 
but  just  what  this  really  means  has  been  the  deepest 
problem  of  philosophy  in  all  ages.  Indeed,  there  has 
been  much  discussion  whether  this  spirit  exists  in  all 
possible  fulness  as  conscious  personality,  or  is  still  toil- 
ing its  way  up  to  the  real  of  its  ideal. 

From  this  it  is  clear  what  the  aim  of  the  student 
of  philosophy  must  be:  not  to  think  at  objects  or  of 
them,  but  to  think  the  objects  themselves,  that  is,  to 
apprehend  them  intellectually.  This  he  does  by  getting 
into  the  centre,  by  grasping  the  idea.  But  this  idea  is 
not  to  be  seized  merely  as  a  word  or  definition,  but  as  a 
system  with  all  its  wealth  of  thought.  In  this  way  he 
is  to  master  philosophy  by  comprehending  its  idea,  not 
as  a  mere  point  or  outline,  but  in  its  fullest  develop- 
ment and  with  the  richest  content. 

This  aim  of  philosophy  is  again  emphasized  here 
because  its  clear  apprehension  is  the  condition  for  secur- 
ing the  method  that  leads  to  the  desired  goal. 

The  appreciation  and  rational  elaboration  of  the  pro- 
found problems  of  philosophy  require  preparatory  disci- 
pline as  well  as  mental  maturity.  The  subject  naturally 
belongs  to  the  higher  classes  in  college  or  to  a  post- 
graduate course.  In  Germany,  the  university  is  re- 
garded as  the  proper  place  for  its  study.  All  rational 
inquiry,  the  study  of  principles,  generalizations,  abstrac- 
tions, and  profound  investigation  of  any  kind,  may  serve 
as  a  preparation  ;  but  the  best  discipline  for  the  mind 
properly  prepared  is  philosophy  itself.  In  the  prepara- 
tory training,  all  is  valuable  in  proportion  as  it  teaches 
the  pupil  to  think  for  himself,  to  be  critical,  exact, 
thorough  and  discriminating,  and  to  distinguish  between 
subject  and  object,  and  between  the  object  before  the 
mind  and  what  it  represents. 


870      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  best  work  in  philosophy  requires  the  union  of  the 
scholar  and  the  thinker.  The  supreme  aim  is  to  philos- 
ophize on  the  deepest  and  broadest  basis.  Malta  for  the 
sake  of  multum,  is  the  motto  of  the  philosophic  student ; 
and  no  department  of  thought,  no  interest  of  humanity, 
is  to  him  a  matter  of  indifference.  The  larger  the  field 
in  which  he  gathers  his  materials,  and  the  more  compre- 
hensive his  view,  the  more  complete  will  be  his  gener- 
alizations, and  the  more  reliable  his  inductions  and 
deductions.  While  going  back  to  the  beginning,  and 
taking  for  granted  nothing  that  needs  proof,  the  pro- 
gressive philosophic  thinker  makes  what  has  already 
been  accomplished  the  starting-point  for  what  remains 
to  be  done ;  in  the  known  he  seeks  the  thread  to  the 
unknown.  While  philosophy  is  not  to  be  studied  ex- 
clusively in  its  history,  that  history  must  nevertheless 
be  mastered  for  the  sake  of  penetrating  the  various  sys- 
tems of  the  past,  and  understanding  the  philosophical 
tendencies  and  needs  of  the  present,  thus  securing  the 
basis  on  which  thinkers  must  build.  In  that  history 
the  weightiest  problems  of  reason  are  presented,  as  well 
as  the  efforts  of  the  greatest  minds  to  solve  them. 
The  genesis  of  problems  in  history  corresponds  largely 
with  that  in  the  mind  of  the  individual ;  and  the  genetic 
study  of  philosophic  thought  not  merely  develops  the 
mind,  and  both  reveals  and  solves  difficulties,  but  it  also 
develops  philosophic  thought.  Memory  is  valuable  as 
an  aid  in  philosophizing,  but  a  hinderance  if  it  becomes 
the  substitute.  The  philosopher  is  not  made  by  learn- 
ing, but  by  critically  mastering  systems ;  not  by  com- 
mitting, but  by  thinking  and  perhaps  transcending  the 
thoughts  of  other  thinkers. 

Original  thinking,  so  strongly  emphasized  as  essential 
for  the  true  study  of  philosophy,  is  often  but  little 


SPIRIT  AND   METHOD  IN   THE   STUDY.          371 

understood  by  those  expected  to  engage  in  it.  Perhaps 
they  think  it  implies  that  even  the  basis  and  the  con- 
tent of  the  thought  are  to  be  originated.  They  forget 
that  the  mind  does  not  create  its  objects  of  philosophic 
contemplation  out  of  nothing,  and  also  that  reason  acts 
according  to  established  and  unvarying  laws.  Not  a 
few  make  fancy  the  most  active  agent  in  what  they  call 
thinking,  regarding  it  a  merit  to  be  able  to  begin  any- 
where and  end  nowhere.  Not  a  few  systems  would  be 
less  brilliant,  but  more  substantial,  if  their  fictions  were 
banished,  and  only  their  rational  thought  were  permitted 
to  stand. 

Being  subject  to  the  most  rigorous  laws,  original 
thinking  rejects  every  thing  that  is  merely  subjective. 
Thinking  is  not  original  because  peculiar  to  him  who 
performs  it,  but  because  he  does  what  all  who  truly 
think  must  do  in  the  same  way  if  they  take  up  the 
same  course  of  thought.*  The  original  thinker  is  one 
who  does  independently  a  work  which  is  really  as  uni- 
versal as  mind.  If  his  work  lacks  that  universal  char- 
acter (or  objectivity),  it  may  have  a  psychological 
interest  as  a  peculiarity,  an  eccentricity,  or  as  a  mon- 
strosity ;  but  it  has  no  claim  to  philosophic  thought. 

The  thought  we  pronounce  original  must  be  about 
something.  Whence  this  material  of  thought?  We 
have  already  seen  that  the  mind  does  not  absolutely 
create  it;  the  material  must  somehow  be  given  to  us, 
or  be  the  product  of  something  thus  given.  In  an 
absolute  sense,  that  is,  without  a  posteriori  conditions, 

*  There  is  no  private  property  in  thought.  If  a  man  can  originate 
any  thing  intellectually,  which  has  significance  for  himself  only,  and 
which  cannot  be  communicated,  he  is  welcome  to  hoard  it.  He  has 
found  something  which  everybody  else  would  have  thrown  away  as 
worthless.  My  feelings  may  be  my  own,  but  my  thought  must  be 
universal  if  it  is  to  be  rational. 


372      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

no  thought  is  a  priori;  just  as  in  an  absolute  sense 
none  is  a  posteriori.  The  object  of  original  thought 
is  either  found  in  consciousness  (so  full  of  materials 
before  philosophic  reflection  begins),  or  is  given  through 
the  senses,  or  is  obtained  from  the  thinking  or  investi- 
gation or  observation  of  others.  The  subjects  thus 
obtained,  or  found  by  reflecting  on  these  materials, 
are  elaborated  by  thought,  worked  over  mentally,  so 
that  the  mind  may  discover  what  is  in  them,  or  may 
be  inferred  from  them.  If  the  mind  adds  any  foreign 
matter  to  them,  it  is  not  done  by  original  thinking,  but 
contrary  to  all  thought.  What  is  original  in  the  sense 
of  adding  unwarranted  elements,  should  be  sedulously 
avoided  as  the  root  of  error.  Real  objects,  and  valid 
thought  on  these  objects,  are  the  conditions  of  original 
thinking  in  the  true  sense.  Such  thinking  is  solid, 
fruitful,  and  abiding;  and  its  value  consists  in  the 
very  things  which  distinguish  it  from  the  processes 
which  are  arbitrary,  vague,  unsubstantial,  and  wild. 

It  is  thus  evident  that  any  real  subject  may  be  the 
occasion  of  original  thinking.  The  mind  can  take  it 
up  in  order  to  fathom  it,  so  as  to  discover  all  it  is, 
intellectually  considered.  Original  thought  consists  in 
all  those  efforts  of  thinking  which  lead  to  the  discovery 
of  what  was  before  unknown  to  the  thinker  himself, 
though  it  may  have  been  known  to  others.  A  discov- 
ery to  the  individual  may  be  old  in  history ;  we  may 
learn  much  that  is  new  to  us,  without  producing  any 
thing  new. 

Ordinarily  the  mind  is  left  to  its  spontaneous  oper- 
ations, without  an  effort  to  give  its  thought  special 
energy  or  a  particular  direction,  much  less  to  make 
the  thinking  itself  an  object  of  rational  inquiry.  Phi- 
losophy checks  this  vagrant  course,  in  order  to  throw 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD   IN   THE   STUDY.          373 

thought  back  on  itself,  and  oblige  it  to  give  a  full 
account  of  itself.  Even  when  the  object  is  not  the 
thinking,  but  the  content  of  thought  (the  thing  thought 
of),  the  question  which  philosophy  considers  is :  What 
must  I  think  of  this  ?  Thus  in  metaphysics,  although 
real  existence  is  the  object  of  thought,  the  question 
to  be  answered  is:  What  must  I  think  of  existence? 
What  do  the  laws  of  thought  require  respecting  it? 
If  in  the  experimental  sciences  (psychology,  of  course, 
excepted),  the  mental  processes  are  largely  or  wholly 
ignored,  while  the  attention  is  absorbed  by  the  object ; 
in  philosophy,  whatever  the  object,  the  claims  of  the 
thinking  subject  are  fully  recognized.  The  mind  knows 
that  the  object  is  its  own,  and  that  the  treatment  to 
which  that  object  is  subjected  depends  wholly  on  the 
mental  laws. 

There  is  thus  good  ground  for  the  view  that  philoso- 
phy is  intimately  connected  with  psychology.  For  all 
the  purposes  of  philosophy,  a  knowledge  of  psychology 
is  of  fundamental  importance.  Although  philosophy  is 
not  psychological,  but  rational  in  its  method,  —  consid- 
ering what  must  be,  not  giving  descriptions  of  what 
occurs  and  an  account  of  the  laws  uniting  phenomena 
into  a  system,  —  psychology  helps  us  to  find  the  philo- 
sophical problems.  The  concepts  given  in  conscious- 
ness, but  not  fully  elaborated  by  ps}rchological  study, 
give  the  materials  with  which  philosophy  begins,  as 
well  as  the  divisions  of  philosophy.  What  must  be 
left  by  psychology  as  problems,  is  taken  up  by  phi- 
losophy for  rational  solution.  All  other  subjects  also 
furnish  such  problems,  but  it  is  by  the  study  of  the 
mind  itself  that  we  become  most  fully  conscious  of 
them. 

After  the  processes  of  cognition  have  been  consid- 


374      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

ered  psychologically,  we  take  up  for  philosophical  con- 
templation, first  of  all,  the  theory  of  knowledge.  It 
occupies  the  first  place  in  the  study  of  philosophy 
proper,  because  on  it,  as  a  foundation,  the  entire  super- 
structure rests.  Men  may,  indeed,  think  correctly  with- 
out understanding  the  laws  of  thought ;  but  philosophy 
is  only  possible  when  thought  is  self-conscious.  This 
self-consciousness  is  particularly  demanded  when  the 
prevalent  scepticism  can  only  be  met  by  an  appeal  to 
the  criteria  of  thought.  Taking  into  account  the  con- 
dition of  philosophy  and  the  spirit  of  the  age,  it  is  not 
strange  that  so  many  emphasize  this  theory  as  the  main, 
if  not  the  sole,  problem  of  philosophy.  To  its  solution 
we  must  look  for  a  firm  basis  and  reliable  method.  The 
stress  placed,  since  Aristotle's  day,  on  logic  as  propae- 
deutic to  all  other  studies,  must  be  extended  to  the 
whole  theory  of  knowledge.  The  student  who  prizes 
philosophy  as  rational  knowledge  will  proceed  ration- 
ally only  if  he,  first  of  all,  inquires  into  the  nature, 
the  origin,  the  validity,  the  method,  and  the  limits  of 
this  knowledge. 

It  is,  of  course,  not  meant  that  no  other  part  of  phi- 
losophy should  be  taken  up  until  all  that  pertains  to 
this  theory  has  been  finally  settled.  In  that  case  we 
should  never  get  beyond  the  theory.  As  all  the  other 
parts  of  philosophy  learn  from  this  theory,  so  it  may 
learn  from  all  of  them.  Only  by  developing  all  depart- 
ments and  elements  of  knowledge,  can  the  theory  itself 
be  made  complete.  It  is  no  evidence  of  vigorous, 
healthy  thinking,  to  regard  knowledge  itself  impossible 
until  the  details  of  the  theory  are  settled,  or  to  spend 
all  the  time  on  the  theory  and  miss  the  knowledge  for 
whose  sake  it  exists. 

After  the  theory  of  knowledge,  it  seems  most  logical 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY.          375 

to  take  up  metaphysics,  both  on  account  of  the  funda- 
mental character  of  the  thought  of  being,  and  because 
this  thought  is  involved  in  aesthetics  and  ethics.  But 
the  inherent  difficulty  of  the  subject,  and  the  present 
unsettled  state  of  metaphysical  inquiry,  may  make  it 
expedient  to  leave  it  to  the  last.  All  the  other  philo- 
sophical studies  will  then  be  a  preparation  for  it,  and 
the  mind  will  come  to  it  after  that  thorough  discipline 
which  is  required  in  order  to  apprehend  its  problems. 
This  course  is  the  more  practicable  now,  because  the 
other  departments  of  philosophy  avoid,  as  much  as 
possible,  the  introduction  of  metaphysical  questions. 
Still  the  ideal  course  makes  ethics  the  crown  of  the 
whole ;  but  even  if  placed  before  metaphysics  in  the 
course  of  study,  it  may  be  made  the  goal  of  all.  Its 
study  before  metaphysics  does  not  determine  its  place 
in  the  system,  nor  does  it  imply  that  ethics  is  to  be 
finished  then ;  it  can  afterwards  be  made  a  specialty,  and 
all  other  investigations  tributary  to  its  development. 
The  whole  course  of  study  in  college  or  university  is, 
after  all,  only  preparatory  for  later  philosophizing. 
From  the  seed  then  planted,  the  whole  life  is  to 
develop  and  reap  the  fruit. 

The  scheme  then  is :  Psychology,  Theory  of  Knowl- 
edge, ^Esthetics,  Ethics,  Metaphysics.  The  applications 
of  philosophy  are  almost  endless,  and  this  is  not  the 
place  to  discuss  them ;  their  consideration  must  be  left 
to  those  who  take  up  the  specialties  to  which  they  see 
fit  to  apply  philosophy.  Thus  the  jurist  will  prefer 
the  philosophy  of  law,  the  statesman  the  philosophy 
of  politics,  the  linguist  the  philosophy  of  language, 
and  the  theologian  the  philosophy  of  religion.  Just  as 
with  the  application  of  philosophy,  so  with  the  study 
of  its  own  departments ;  one  may  choose  this,  another 


376      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  department,  as  a  specialty,  each  according  to  his 
peculiar  needs.  But  for  completeness  all  are  neces- 
sary. 

If  antiquated  subjects  live  only  in  history,  others 
live  both  in  history  and  in  the  present.  Among  the 
latter  we  class  philosophy.  For  this  reason  we  cannot 
agree  with  those  who  treat  it  as  worthy  of  study  in 
its  history,  but  not  according  to  what  it  is  in  itself. 
Only  what  is  finished  can  be  found  in  perfection  in 
history. 

In  the  study  of  philosophy,  what  place  shall,  then, 
be  assigned  to  its  history  ?  *  Were  there  a  history  of 
philosophy  itself,  —  of  the  connected  and  progressive 
development  of  philosophic  thinking,  of  the  growth  of 
the  organism  of  rational  thought,  —  not  merely  of  the 
various  philosophic  systems,  it  might  serve  as  a  most 
valuable  introduction  to  the  study  of  philosophy. 
Even  when  the  history  of  philosophy  means  the  history 
of  the  successive  systems,  as  is  now  the  case,  there  are 
advantages  in  placing  it  at  the  beginning  of  the  course 
as  an  introduction  to  philosophy  itself.  The  thoughtful 
student  finds  this  history  fascinating,  and  full  of  inspira- 
tion; and  the  effort  to  master  the  various  systems  is 
a  fine  discipline  for  philosophizing.  But  there  are  also 
serious  disadvantages  in  putting  it  first.  The  student 
is  not  yet  prepared  to  comprehend  the  leading  problems, 
much  less  the  systems  themselves ;  for  this,  the  study 
of  philosophy  proper  is  the  only  adequate  preparation. 
The  mind  unprepared  for  this  history  is  confused  by 
the  numerous  perplexing  themes,  and  lost  in  the  laby- 

*  The  impulse  given  by  Hegel  has  led  to  the  production  of  many 
valuable  histories  of  philosophy,  and  the  most  eminent  living  writers 
on  the  subject  have  come  from  his  school  ;  as  Erduianii  of  Halle,  Zeller 
of  Berlin,  and  KUDO  Fischer  of  Heidelberg. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE   STUDY.          877 

rinths  of  speculation.*  Instead  of  clear  conceptions, 
a  medley  of  indistinct  notions  is  usually  the  result. 
Some  imagine  that  in  this  history  they  study  philosophy 
itself,  and  perhaps  claim  to  understand  philosophy  after 
learning  a  few  ideas  from  different  systems.  Many 
current  views  of  philosophy  have  their  source  in  the 
reading  of  the  philosophic  thoughts  of  others,  rather 
than  in  the  study  of  philosophy  itself. 

A  method  to  be  highly  recommended  is  the  simulta- 
neous study  of  every  department  of  philosophy,  both 
according  to  its  essence  and  in  the  light  of  its  history. 
In  this  way  the  history  of  philosophy  will  be  studied  by 
subjects.  Where  this  is  done,  there  is  hope  of  clearness 
and  definiteness,  and  results  both  fruitful  and  lasting 
may  be  expected.  Thus  in  connection  with  the  study 
of  logic  its  history  might  be  considered,  especially  the 
views  of  Aristotle  and  Kant,  and  those  prevalent  during 
this  century.  Besides  the  general  history  of  the  sub- 
ject, the  views  of  eminent  philosophers  on  particular 
points  should  be  studied  when  these  points  are  under 
consideration.  By  this  method  the  history  will  bring 
the  subject  itself  into  clearer  light,  and  the  study  of  the 
subject  will  promote  the  understanding  of  the  history. 
Thus  the  theory  of  knowledge  cannot  be  properly 
studied  unless  the  views  of  Locke,  Hume,  Reid,  Kant, 
and  others  are  taken  into  account.  The  same  is  true 
of  metaphysics,  aesthetics,  and  ethics ;  a  knowledge  of 
their  genesis  and  development  essentially  promotes  their 
comprehension.  After  the  various  parts  of  philosophy 
have  thus  been  studied  in  connection  with  their  history, 

*  Hegel  was  certainly  not  inclined  to  make  philosophy  easy  for  stu- 
dents;  but  he  pronounced  the  history  of  philosophy,  which  Herhart  and 
Schelling  recommended  as  propaedeutics  to  philosophy,  too  difficult  for 
that  purpose.  —  Philosophische  Propaedeutik,  XVIII. 


378      INTRODUCTION   TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  student  will  be  prepared  for  the  study  of  the  entire 
history  of  philosophy,  which  can  then  be  taken  up.  To 
master  a  subject  at  the  same  time  in  the  light  of  its 
history,  and  rationally,  is  the  true  philosophical  method; 
and  with  every  branch  of  philosophy,  the  essential  ele- 
ments of  its  history  should  be  connected. 

Besides  the  study  of  the  history  of  philosophy  by 
subjects,  as  a  preparation  for  its  study  as  a  whole,  the 
reading  of  the  principal  works  of  eminent  philosophers 
is  to  be  commended.  Among  the  ancients,  selections 
may  be  made  from  Plato  (Symposium,  Phcedros,  Repub- 
lic) and  Aristotle  (particularly  those  on  Dialectics  and 
Ethics)  ;  among  the  moderns,  Locke,  Spinoza  (Ethics), 
Hume  (Treatise,  first  part,  or  Inquiry),  Kant  (Prolego- 
mena, Kritik  of  Pure  Reason,  and  Kritik  of  Practical 
Reason),  Hegel  (Philosophy  of  History,  Phenomenology, 
and  Logic),  and  Lotze  are  worthy  of  special  mention 
for  this  purpose.  If  only  a  few  works  can  be  read,  let 
them  be  taken  from  Plato,  Aristotle,  Locke,  and  Kant, 
with  selections  from  philosophers  in  the  present  century. 

Hardly  less  important  than  its  history  is  the  study  of 
the  present  status  of  philosophic  thought.  In  it  will 
be  found  many  of  the  conditions  and  demands  with 
which  the  philosopher  must  reckon.  The  exact  status 
of  philosophy  is,  however,  an  exceedingly  difficult  prob- 
lem, particularly  at  a  time  when  there  is  a  multitude 
of  philosophical  thinkers,  but  no  dominant  system  of 
philosophy.  Isolated  problems,  conflicting  tendencies, 
a  search  for  a  reliable  basis  for  system,  criticism,  eclec- 
ticism, and  all  the  uncertainty  and  mere  tentativeness, 
so  common  in  crises,  are  characteristics  of  philosophic 
thought  in  this  age.  The  present  neglect  of  philosophy 
is  not  so  significant  when  it  is  remembered  that  Kant 
and  Hegel  also  complained  of  this  neglect  in  their  day. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY.         379 

The  lack  of  unity  and  continuity  in  the  philosophic 
literature  of  the  day  is  cause  for  greater  regret. 

The  status  of  philosophy  can  be  learned  from  the  phil- 
osophic literature  of  the  day,  particularly  from  the  vari- 
ous philosophical  journals.*  While  the  problems  of 
philosophy  are  always  the  same,  peculiar  circumstances 
may  make  special  demands  for  the  solution  of  particu- 
lar ones.  The  very  uncertainty  prevailing  at  present, 
respecting  the  criteria  and  the  limits  of  knowledge, 
makes  noetics  especially  valuable.  The  importance  of 
metaphysic,  and  the  suspicion  with  which  it  is  viewed, 
attach  peculiar  interest  to  the  question  whether  we  can 
really  get  behind  phenomena  to  the  underlying  reality. 
Theism  and  atheism,  spiritualism  and  materialism,  are 
of  as  momentous  significance  now  as  ever.  The  prob- 
lems of  realism  and  idealism,  of  empiricism  and  ration- 
alism, also  press  for  solution.  Perhaps  the  exclusivism 
in  past  tendencies  has  made  it  evident  that  systems  are 
apt  to  err  rather  in  what  they  deny  than  in  what  they 
affirm,  and  that  now  the  time  has  come  for  the  union 
and  harmonious  co-operation  of  tendencies  formerly 
regarded  as  hostile.  Thus  the  a  priori  and  the  a  poste- 
riori elements  in  knowledge  are  both  essential  factors ; 
realism  and  idealism,  empiricism  and  rationalism,  really 
seem  to  be  complements  to  each  other,  rather  than 
antagonistic.  The  philosophic  movements  within  a  cen- 
tury have  at  least  proved  that  systems  supposed  to  be 
opposite  may  both  have  elements  of  truth.  In  Germany 
there  is  a  tendency  toward  English  empiricism ;  in  Eng- 
land and  America  there  is  a  tendency  toward  German 
speculation,  —  certainly  a  hint  that  each  by  itself  is  not 

*  The  philosophical  tendencies  in  Germany,  since  the  death  of  Hegel, 
are  given  in  a  work  just  published:  Die  Philosophie  der  Geyemoart,  by 
Dr.  Moritz  Brasch. 


380      INTRODUCTION   TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

sufficient.  A  narrow  and  exclusive  method  cannot 
meet  the  demands  of  the  day.  The  one-sided  tenden- 
cies of  particular  systems  in  the  past  may  have  served 
to  produce  a  greater  development  of  certain  phases  of 
thought  than  would  otherwise  have  been  possible ;  but 
the  development  of  a  principle  to  the  utmost  may  also 
serve  to  prove  that  it  is  not  comprehensive  enough  to 
include  and  explain  what  was  expected  of  it.  Thus  a 
one-sided  course,  by  exhausting  itself,  may  prepare  the 
way  for  a  synthesis  of  what  was  before  repellant. 

The  synthesis  necessary  for  that  comprehensiveness 
and  unity  which  are  so  urgent  a  demand  on  philosophic 
thought,  may  require  a  much  more  thorough  elabora- 
tion of  particular  concepts,  as  a  preparatory  stage. 
The  exhaustive  treatment  of  particular  thoughts  is  as 
fruitful  now  as  ever,  and  may  be  more  impartially  per- 
formed than  when  a  reigning  system  demands  solutions 
according  to  its  own  peculiar  principles. 

Among  the  multitude  of  problems  demanding  solu- 
tion, those  suggested  by  natural  science  are  made  espe- 
cially prominent.  Aside  from  materialism  and  evolution, 
the  question  of  design  demands  attention,  also  the  lim- 
its of  scientific  accuracy,  and  the  reliability  of  thought 
transcending  the  domain  of  science.  The  very  tend- 
ency to  specialization  in  science  also  suggests  the  need 
of  the  unity  of  the  various  sciences,  as  well  as  the 
ultimate  unity  of  all  thought.  Pessimism,  agnosticism, 
and  the  great  interests  of  faith  and  hope,  also  present 
numerous  important  problems.  From  all  that  has  been 
said  in  the  various  chapters,  it  is  evident  that  the  criti- 
cal demands  of  the  age  are  such  as  to  place  the  empha- 
sis in  philosophic  thought  on  laying  the  basis  rather 
than  on  rearing  superstructures. 

The  philosophical  problems  have  become  so  numerous 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.          381 

in  our  day  as  actually  to  be  bewildering,  and  the  stu- 
dent may  be  puzzled  to  decide  which  to  take  up  for 
study.  Where  so  many  seem  to  be  urgent,  the  tempta- 
tion may  be  strong  to  make  the  study  comprehensive 
rather  than  thorough.  The  two  methods  do  not  ex- 
clude each  other,  however ;  there  may  be  a  comprehen- 
siveness which  is  a  preparation  for  thoroughness,  and 
thoroughness  in  a  limited  sphere  may  be  the  road  to 
comprehensiveness  that  is  thorough  throughout. 

Those  who  make  a  specialty  of  philosophy  will  of 
course  regard  their  studies  at  college  or  in  the  univer- 
sity as  merely  laying  the  foundation  on  which  they 
hope  to  build  in  after-life.  Even  they  may  find  it 
advisable  to  concentrate  their  efforts  on  a  particular 
department  after  completing  the  general  study  of  phi- 
losophy. Others,  who  cannot  make  a  specialty  of  it, 
may  yet  want  to  master  some  one  of  its  divisions. 
Which  to  choose  will  depend  mainly  on  capacity,  taste, 
aim,  and  calling.  Psychology,  as  an  introduction  to 
the  whole,  cannot  be  omitted,  whatever  part  may  be 
selected  for  special  investigation.  Of  philosophy  proper, 
the  theory  of  knowledge  and  ethics  are  the  most  essen- 
tial. Were  the  theory  of  the  emotions  fully  developed, 
it  might  take  its  place  beside  (or  between)  these,  as 
almost  or  quite  as  important.  The  subject  of  aesthetics 
has  special  significance  for  artists,  critics,  literary  men, 
and  public  speakers.  The  theologian,  besides  ethics, 
will  find  metaphysics  indispensable. 

Thus  far  the  attention  has  been  directed  chiefly  to 
the  study  of  philosophical  systems,  and  to  the  training 
of  the  mind  in  philosophizing.  A  philosopher  may  add 
no  new  contributions  to  the  stock  of  knowledge,  but 
he  must,  as  we  have  seen,  be  an  independent  thinker. 
With  the  laws  of  thought  as  his  sole  guide,  he  cannot 


882     INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

be  the  slave  of  any  system,  not  even  of  his  own,  except 
so  far  as  slavery  means  absolute  subjection  to  the  truth. 

The  exalted  aim  of  the  student  to  become  an  inde- 
pendent thinker  is  worthy  of  highest  commendation. 
He  does  not  merely  want  to  learn  what  has  been  said 
about  a  subject,  but  what  is  actually  in  it.  For  the 
method  necessary  to  realize  this  aim  of  the  original, 
independent  thinker,  we  must  refer  to  the  full  discus- 
sion of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  but  preliminary  hints 
may  here  be  given. 

The  notion  that  philosophy  has  a  method  peculiar  to 
itself,  is  false.  The  laws  of  the  mind  are  always  the 
same,  but  the  objects  to  which  they  apply  differ.  Thus 
there  are  objects  of  sense,  and  objects  of  pure  thinking. 
Our  reasoning  respecting  objects  is  of  course  condi- 
tioned by  their  nature.  Thus  mathematical  reasoning 
is  valid  only  for  mathematical  objects.  But  we  are 
tempted  to  postulate  in  the  mind  itself  such  divisions 
as  pertain  only  to  the  nature  of  the  objects  contem- 
plated. The  same  laws  of  thought  are  seen  in  differ- 
ent lights,  according  to  the  difference  of  the  objects. 
The  process  of  reasoning  in  all  thinking  is  that  of 
induction  and  deduction,  the  one  never  wholly  separated 
from  the  other.  While  in  its  reasoning,  in  its  analyti- 
cal and  synthetic  judgments,  philosophy  does  not  differ 
from  science,  the  aim  and  objects  (phenomena)  of  sci- 
ence attach  it  more  closely  to  observation,  and  the 
results  of  its  reasoning  can  consequently  be  more 
readily  tested  by  experience.  Science  thus  has  means 
of  verification  which  philosophy  cannot  have. 

The  fact  that  its  conclusions  cannot  be  verified  by 
experience,  makes  it  the  more  necessary  that  the  reason- 
ing in  philosophy  should  be  infallible.  Its  method  is 
absolutely  reliable ;  if,  then,  its  start  is  equally  so,  there 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY. 


383 


is  no  reason  for  questioning  the  results  legitimately 
obtained.  The  result  of  scientific  investigation  would 
require  no  verification  if  it  were  not  for  the  liability  to 
error  in  the  process  itself.  The  same  is  true  of  philoso- 
phy. With  a  firm  basis  and  a  reliable  method,  there 
is  a  possibility  of  error  only  when  the  method  itself  is 
not  strictly  followed. 

In  philosophizing,  the  first  aim  should  consequently 
be  to  secure  a  starting-point  which  is  absolutely  reliable. 
Without  such  a  foundation,  the  validity  of  the  entire 
superstructure  will  be  doubtful ;  or,  if  the  basis  is  false, 
the  system  which  rests  upon  it  must  be  so  likewise. 
Therefore  both  in  examining  other  systems,  and  in 
independent  philosophizing  and  constructing  new  ones, 
the  beginning  or  seed  of  all  must  be  subjected  to  the 
most  thorough  scrutiny. 

Modern  philosophy  began  with  an  effort  to  find  a 
basis  whose  validity  cannot  be  questioned.  If  here 
scepticism  is  not  rooted  out,  it  can  never  be  done. 
Without  stopping  to  consider  the  value  of  the  results 
of  Descartes'  investigations  on  this  point,  it  is  enough 
for  our  purpose  that  the  one  thing  which  cannot  be 
questioned,  even  if  all  others  may,  is  the  fact  given  in 
consciousness.  That  there  are  such  facts ;  that  I  am 
conscious  of  something,  or  that  there  is  a  consciousness 
of  something,  —  is  beyond  all  doubt.  What  these  facts 
mean,  is  of  course  a  different  question. 

With  this  consciousness  we  start  in  philosophy,  as 
well  as  in  science.  But  while  the  latter  asks,  How  am 
I  to  explain  the  thing  experienced?  philosophy  asks, 
The  experience  being  given,  what  do  the  laws  of  mind 
(reason)  require  ?  Science  attends  more  to  the  external 
conditions  of  experience,  philosophy  more  to  the  inter- 
nal ;  science  attempts  to  explain  phenomena  by  discov- 


384     INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

ering  their  laws,  philosophy  seeks  to  get  at  their  essence 
by  finding  what  the  laws  of  mind  must  infer  from  the 
phenomena.  To  science  the  phenomena  themselves  are 
the  principal  subject  of  consideration,  being  the  centre 
around  which  all  the  investigation  moves ;  to  philosophy 
they  are  but  the  occasion  for  deeper  inquiry,  the  start 
for  the  speculative  work  of  reason. 

Philosophy  thus,  like  science,  beginning  with  experi- 
ence, with  the  given  and  the  real,  which  it  seeks  to 
interpret,  has  a  perfectly  reliable  basis.  Its  proper 
sphere  is  the  real ;  only  so  far  as  related  to  the  real 
does  it  consider  the  imaginary  and  the  possible.  Begin- 
ning with  what  is  given,  philosophy  carries  its  induc- 
tions as  far  as  thought  can  go.  The  phenomena  given 
to  philosophy  are  of  course  not  those  pertaining  merely 
to  the  external  world ;  they  include  also  the  subjective 
elements  in  thought,  feeling,  and  volition,  all  of  which 
are  made  objects  of  rational  inquiry.  Any  germinal 
thought  legitimately  obtained  may  be  made  the  nucleus 
of  a  system  ;  but  the  comprehensiveness  of  the  germinal 
power  is  also  the  limit  of  the  system. 

A  critical  study  of  philosophical  systems  proves  that 
many  of  them  rest  on  mere  assumptions.  Their  char- 
acter as  assumptions  is  not  changed  by  the  fact  that 
their  authors  regarded  them  as  intuitions  or  self-evident 
truths.  Particularly  respecting  what  is  deepest,  most 
mysterious,  and  of  greatest  concern,  has  an  effort  been 
made  to  secure  axioms  or  some  kind  of  intellectual 
vision.  The  repeated  failure  of  attempts  to  found  phi- 
losophy on  such  a  basis  has  made  thinkers  suspicious  of 
all  systems  constructed  on  a  priori  principles.  No  one 
doubts  that  truths  are  more  valuable  isolated  than  when 
spuriously  connected  so  as  to  form  a  false  system. 
There  is,  however,  great  fascination  in  the  idea  of 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD   IN   THE  STUDY.         385 

developing  all  philosophy  from  a  single  principle  ;  and, 
indeed,  it  is  the  only  ideal  method  for  completeness  of 
system.  The  aim  in  such  cases  is  to  make  philosophy  as 
much  as  possible  like  mathematics.  Having  adopted  its 
principle,  it  calls  in  the  aid  of  axioms  and  definitions  to 
evolve  the  system.  The  most  perfect  example  is  found 
in  Spinoza's  Ethics.  A  system  thus  constructed  is,  of 
course,  valid  for  those  only  who  accept  the  premises  and 
definitions ;  and  by  successfully  attacking  these,  the 
whole  superstructure  falls.  In  view  of  the  imperfections 
and  limitations  of  philosophy,  the  application  of  this 
ideal  method  has  thus  far  been  found  more  valuable  for 
attaining  unity,  or  at  least  system,  than  absolutely 
reliable  conclusions.* 

After  the  principles  have  been  found,  this  method  is 
comparatively  easy.  Thus  the  germinal  notion  may  be 
that  of  substance,  monads,  the  ego,  the  subject-object,  the 
unity  of  thought  and  being,  the  unconscious,  or  some- 
thing else ;  all  that  is  required  being  the  unfolding  of 
the  seed-thought.  Any  fruitful  thought,  if  comprehen- 
sive enough,  can  be  made  the  basis  of  a  system ;  great 
ingenuity  may  be  displayed  in  developing  the  principle 
adopted,  and  the  logic  can  be  rigid  as  in  mathematics : 

*  Instead  of  banishing  the  a  priori  method  from  philosophy,  as  Kant 
aimed  to  do,  it  flourished  most  vigorously  among  his  immediate  suc- 
cessors. Thus  Reinhold  laid  stress  on  the  establishment  of  one  supreme 
principle  from  which  the  whole  of  philosophy  is  to  be  evolved.  Fichte 
eagerly  seized  this  idea,  and  wrote  to  him  that  he  looked  on  him  (Rein- 
hold)  as  having  introduced  among  men  the  conviction  that  all  inquiry 
must  proceed  from  a  single  fundamental  principle.  And  then  the  search 
for  this  principle  began.  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  sought  to  find 
the  idea  which  contains  the  explanation  of  the  universe.  Absolute 
knowledge,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  absolute,  have  an  irresistible 
attraction  for  the  eager  student;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  prom- 
ises made  by  these  men,  especially  the  last,  aroused  great  hopes  and 
enthusiasm.  The  culmination  of  all  philosophy  was  supposed  to  have 
been  reached,  and  the  key  which  unlocks  the  mysteries  of  the  universe 
to  have  been  found. 


386      INTRODUCTION    TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

yet  as  an  interpretation  of  reality  the  whole  may  be 
worthless,  explaining  not  what  is,  but  only  what  would 
be  if  the  assumptions  were  true.  The  essential  ques- 
tions in  determining  the  beginning  are  not  sufficiently 
weighed :  Is  the  basis  true  ?  Is  it  adequate  ?  Is  it 
fruitful  ?  Systems  depending  on  definitions  are  in  dan- 
ger of  being  purely  verbal,  explanatory  of  words  but  of 
nothing  real,  thus  defeating  the  very  aim  of  philosophy. 
The  starting-point  of  a  system  being  assumed,  instead 
of  being  found  as  something  given,  or  instead  of  being 
demonstrated,  it  may  become  necessary  to  construct  the 
system  for  the  sake  of  proving  the  assumptions.  Thus 
if  an  unconscious  something  is  assumed  as  the  reality 
behind  phenomena,  it  may  require  the  philosophy  of 
the  unconscious  to  justify  the  assumption  of  the  uncon- 
scious, or  to  prove  that  the  assumption  is  inadequate. 
It  must  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  in  philosophy 
any  more  than  in  science  we  can  dispense  with  hypoth- 
eses and  theories.  Much  as  philosophy  may  accomplish, 
it  never  can,  by  any  induction,  reach  the  absolute  begin- 
ning of  all  things.  Thus  far  all  efforts  have  failed  to 
ascend,  step  by  step,  from  the  infinite  variety  of  phe- 
nomena to  the  ultimate  unity  of  all  being.  In  our 
efforts  to  do  so,  we  soon  become  painfully  conscious  of 
our  limitations.  Not  satisfied  with  isolated  truths,  we 
seek  completed  systems ;  in  order  to  construct  these, 
we  need  principles  which  cannot  be  discovered  by 
induction.  But  if  theories  become  a  necessity,  there 
must  be  some  valid  basis  for  them,  depending  on  reality 
and  reason,  not  on  imagination.  The  mind  finds  in  the 
phenomena  themselves  hints  of  what  must  be  behind 
them ;  but  they  are  mere  hints.  All  the  suggestions 
and  hints  given  must  be  weighed  in  forming  the  theo- 
ries ;  and  after  being  formed,  every  possible  test  must 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY. 


387 


be  applied  to  them.  Thus,  a  theory  must  be  consistent ; 
it  must  accomplish  all  that  is  required  of  it ;  and  it 
must  not  come  in  conflict  with  any  known  truth.  And 
after  all  these  conditions  are  complied  with,  it  must  be 
regarded  as  what  it  really  is ;  namely,  a  mere  theory. 
Other  theories  may  also  comply  with  these  conditions, 
and  yet  they  cannot  all  be  true. 

By  claiming  for  its  statements  only  what  they  are 
worth,  philosophy  will  gain  in  modesty,  but  also  in 
reliability.  Whatever  is  demonstrated  must  be  held 
as  immovably  fixed;  many  things  may  be  true  which 
cannot  be  mathematically  demonstrated,  but  we  must 
not  hesitate  to  treat  assumptions  and  theories  according 
to  what  they  really  are.  It  may  require  some  sacrifice 
to  take  this  position  with  reference  to  a  pet  theory, 
but  it  is  the  only  safe  and  honest  course.  Theories  are 
to  be  held  as  continually  subject  to  verification ;  but 
whether  or  not  held  as  such  by  their  advocates,  suc- 
ceeding systems  will  not  fail  to  test  them  according  to 
their  worth.  If  under  these  severe  conditions  a  final 
system  is  impossible,  philosophy  has  the  consolation  at 
least  of  sharing  the  same  fate  with  all  subjects  of  human 
inquiry:  there  will  always  be  a  contrast  between  the 
real  and  the  ideal. 

It  is  respecting  the  ultimate  of  all  thought,  that  the- 
ories are  most  prevalent.  This  x  unknown  to  philoso- 
phy, however  apprehended  by  faith,  is  too  far  removed 
to  be  an  object  of  observation ;  nor  can  we  ever  hope 
to  extend  the  chain  of  our  logic  to  that  x.  Hence  the 
resort  to  theory.  The  theories  proposed  can,  perhaps, 
neither  be  demonstrated  as  true,  nor  proved  false ;  yet 
their  origin  and  grounds,  their  consistency  with  them- 
selves, and  their  application  to  reality,  are  valuable 
tests;  and  the  history  of  philosophy  consists  largely 


388      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  critical  tests  to  which  the  various  theories  have 
been  subjected  in  the  progress  of  thought. 

The  mind  cannot  rest  in  a  void.  If  unable  to  pene- 
trate to  the  essence  of  the  reality  behind  phenomena, 
and  to  the  ultimate  basis  and  source  of  the  universe, 
it  may  be  obliged  to  resort  to  postulates  or  hypotheses 
as  a  practical  rest  for  thought.  Plato's  realm,  in  which 
ideas  have  a  metaphysical  existence,  may  be  fiction  ; 
but  even  fiction  may  contain  truth,  and  even  a  myth 
may  be  but  the  clothing  of  a  precious  philosophic 
thought.  The  various  functions  attributed  by  theistic 
thinkers  to  God  may  not  be  mathematically  demonstra- 
ble as  realities ;  but  there  must  be  a  First  Cause  of  that 
which  reveals  itself  as  not  primitive  but  derived ;  and 
is  there  not  a  deep  philosophy,  to  say  nothing  of  theol- 
ogy, in  the  very  effort  of  the  mind  to  find  a  Being  in 
whom  all  truth  and  beauty  and  goodness  inhere,  and 
from  whom  finite  minds  derive  their  fragmentary  con- 
ceptions of  them?  Less,  perhaps,  in  the  final  results 
attained  does  the  mind  reveal  its  true  character,  than 
in  its  strivings  and  tendencies ;  and  even  in  its  aspira- 
tions and  postulates  the  philosopher  beholds  reflections 
of  the  otherwise  hidden  depths  of  the  soul. 

These  considerations  justify  the  conclusion  that  phi- 
losophy is  ideal,  and  that  the  real  systems  must  be 
viewed  as  aspirations  and  essays,  not  as  realizations. 
Nevertheless,  systems  which  are  not  final  may  have 
valuable  truths  and  needed  aspects  of  truth ;  and  the 
fundamental  principle  adopted  may  be  true,  even  if 
not  demonstrable.  The  value  of  philosophic  thought 
by  no  means  consists  solely,  or  even  chiefly,  in  the 
completed  systems  produced ;  it  may  do  the  best  ser- 
vice in  removing  existing  errors,  and  in  establishing 
individual  truths  and  principles.  Even  the  fragments 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY.         389 

of  philosophy  may  be  very  precious,  though  the  master- 
builder  is  not  found  to  form  of  them  a  symmetrical 
structure.  In  philosophy  the  preconceived  plan  of  the 
system  does  not  determine  how  the  materials  must  be 
shaped  and  fitted  into  it,  but  the  character  of  the 
system  is  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  materials. 
If  heretofore  the  architect  has  come  first  with  his  plan, 
and  has  made  that  the  law  for  the  selection  and  adapta- 
tion of  the  building  material,  we  may  henceforth  be 
obliged  to  reverse  the  process,  and  make  the  careful 
gathering  and  shaping  of  the  stones  for  the  building 
the  condition  for  the  plan  and  structure  of  the  edifice 
itself.  The  philosophic  builder  must  be  a  quarrier  and 
a  stone-cutter  before  he  becomes  an  architect. 

It  is  frequently  found  that  the  principles  adopted  by 
philosophers  are  true,  but  that  there  is  a  mistake  in 
their  application ;  they  are  taken  as  absolute  and  final, 
when  they  are  relative  and  limited.  May  not  spiritual- 
ism and  materialism  both  have  spheres  in  which  they 
are  true,  while  their  application  outside  of  these  is 
false  ?  There  is  no  doubt  a  harmony  and  unity  under- 
lying the  differences  between  matter  and  spirit ;  but  so 
long  as  the  unity  in  the  duality  is  not  discovered,  we 
must  apply  each  to  its  sphere  and  limit  it  strictly  to 
that.  However  stringently  the  mind  may  demand  mon- 
ism, no  monism  brought  about  by  violence  can  receive 
philosophical  sanction.  According  to  an  innate  impulse 
of  our  minds,  we  must  aim  at  the  final  explanation  of 
all  things  by  discovering  the  ultimate  principles ;  but 
we  must  distinguish  between  the  aim  and  the  actual 
attainments.  That  this  distinction  must  never  be  lost 
sight  of,  is  a  lesson  taught  both  by  the  present  status 
and  by  the  whole  history  of  philosophy. 

Another  evil  to  be  deprecated  results  from  a  desire 


390      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  propose  something  new,  and  to  develop  original 
systems.  Such  a  spirit  may  become  a  passion,  in  which 
case  it  is  the  philosopher's  evil  genius.  The  sole  aim 
in  philosophy  is  truth,  no  matter  who  its  author,  or 
whether  it  be  old  or  new ;  and  whoever  cannot  sacrifice 
the  itching  for  novelty,  and  the  vanity  of  ambition,  to 
this  aim,  lacks  the  requisites  of  a  philosopher.  Lotze 
justly  remarks  that  in  our  day  philosophy  is  less  in 
need  of  originality  than  of  exactness.  A  signal  advan- 
tage in  the  natural  sciences  has  been  their  continuous 
development.  The  results  of  past  investigations  have 
been  made  the  beginning  of  new  progressive  move- 
ments. Scientists  have  worked  with  and  for  one  an- 
other, and  have  thus  co-operated  in  promoting  organic 
growth  in  science.  But  in  philosophy  the  spirit  of 
individualism  has  largely  prevailed.  Instead  of  seek- 
ing to  promote  continuous  development,  philosophers 
seem  rather  to  have  been  intent  on  the  destruction  of 
the  labors  of  their  predecessors,  and  on  the  construction 
of  a  peculiar  system  of  their  own.  The  destruction  of 
systems  was  the  more  easy,  because  their  foundation 
was  not  solid,  or  because  they  were  badly  constructed. 
Healthy  growth  and  lasting  results  cannot  be  expected 
unless  the  conservation  of  old  truth  is  regarded  as 
sacred  a  duty  as  the  discovery  of  new  truth.* 

*  The  evil  here  deprecated  has  been  deeply  felt  by  philosophers,  and 
repeated  efforts  have  been  made  to  secure  more  co-operation  among 
them,  and  more  regular  and  steady  progress  in  philosophy.  Trendelen- 
burg,  preface  to  Logische  Untersuchunyen,  says,  "  Philosophy  cannot  re- 
gain its  former  power  until  it  acquires  permanence;  and  it  cannot  gain 
permanence  until  it  grows  in  the  same  way  as  the  other  sciences, 
namely,  until  it  develops  continuously,  not  beginning  and  ending  in 
every  head,  but  historically  taking  up  the  problems  and  unfolding 
them."  Various  methods  have  been  proposed  to  secure  this  continuity, 
such  as  conventions  of  philosophers  to  discuss  philosophical  questions, 
and  philosophical  associations.  But  the  end  can  only  be  attained  if 
philosophic  minds  themselves  resolve  to  do  this  work.  A  philosopher 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN   THE  STUDY. 


391 


The  student  is,  however,  in  greater  danger  of  an  evil 
the  opposite  of  this ;  namely,  the  hasty  adoption  of  the 
system  of  another  as  the  embodiment  of  all  truth.  The 
authority  which  in  philosophy  belongs  only  to  the  truth 
is  frequently  transferred  to  an  able  and  admired  teacher. 
Intellectual  receptivity  and  independent  thinking,  deep 
appreciation  and  a  critical  spirit,  should  be  united  in 
healthy  proportion.  The  true  teacher  always  makes 
his  system  and  instruction  subordinate  to  the  truth. 
The  very  vigor  and  independence  of  a  philosopher  may 
serve  to  make  mere  disciples,  as  well  as  profound  and 
original  thinkers.  The  schools  of  Kant  and  Hegel  have 
shown  that  the  disciples  of  eminent  philosophers  may 
be  blind  in  proportion  to  their  enthusiasm,  and  that  a 
philosopher's  cloak  may  conceal  an  imitator  and  a  fana- 
tic. Although  in  his  lectures  Kant  continually  warned 
his  hearers  against  this  spirit,  he  could  not  suppress  it. 
The  wise  student  regards  all  books  and  instructions  as 
means  of  mental  discipline,  as  well  as  for  the  communi- 
cation of  truth ;  and  he  will  find  it  consistent  with  the 
deepest  respect  for  teachers,  to  subject  all  that  is  taught 
to  the  severest  tests  of  reason.  Absolute  dependence 
on  the  truth  is  the  only  true  independence. 

The  numerous  conflicting  systems,  which  have  arisen 
from  the  fact  that  there  was  no  continuous  develop- 
ment, have  added  to  the  suspicion  that  philosophy  is 
caprice  rather  than  reason.  If  the  scepticism  of  the 
day  is  not  as  deep  as  that  of  Greece,  it  at  least  doubts 
the  ability  of  philosophy  to  discover  the  highest  truth. 
The  consequent  criticism  to  which  the  systems  have 
been  subjected  is  cause  for  congratulation  on  the  part 

need  not  produce  a  new  system,  but  he  must  make  truth  the  sole  aim 
of  his  search,  aud  recognize  it  according  to  its  real  worth  wherever 
found. 


392      INTRODUCTION  TO   STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  those  who  have  confidence  in  the  power  of  truth  to 
maintain  itself.  The  most  thorough  diagnosis  may  be 
required  for  the  transition  from  disease  to  health.  The 
sceptical  spirit  and  critical  method,  connected  with  a 
conservative  tendency,  have  given  rise  to  eclecticism. 
This  refuses  to  accept  any  system  of  the  past,  but  claims 
that  there  is  truth  in  all,  and  hence  selects  from  all.* 
But  if  eclecticism  is  to  be  of  philosophical  value,  it  must 
have  fixed  principles  to  determine  the  method  of  its 
selections ;  in  other  words,  there  must  be  a  philosophy 
behind  eclecticism,  if  it  is  to  lay  claim  to  rational  pro- 
cedure. The  ability  to  select  the  truth  presupposes  a 
standard  by  which  it  can  be  tested ;  this  standard,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  is  itself  the  nucleus  of  a  philosophical 
system.  How  far  eclecticism  is  from  being  final,  is 
evident  from  the  fact  that  it  may  be  based  on  either 
rationalism  or  empiricism.  A  man's  philosophy  is  not 
determined  by  his  eclecticism,  but  his  eclecticism  by 
his  philosophy.  Nevertheless,  it  has  an  important  mis- 
sion. It  proceeds  on  the  supposition  that  all  systems 
have  truth,  but  that  none  has  it  all ;  and  it  is  an  admis- 

*  It  has  flourished  most  in  France,  under  the  leadership  of  Victor 
Cousin.  It  naturally  promoted  the  study  of  the  history  of  philosophy. 
Bigot  (Eclecticism  in  France,  Mind,  1877,  367)  says,  "  Its  fundamental 
principle  was  this:  In  philosophy  every  thing  has  been  said;  the  age 
of  systems  is  past;  all  we  have  to  do  is  to  question  history,  to  take  what 
is  true  out  of  each  system,  and  from  all  these  elements  to  form  apcreti- 
nis philosophia.  ...  It  was  a  doctrine  without  originality,  and  standing 
absolutely  aloof  from  the  discoveries  of  science."  Cousin's  eclecticism 
is  brilliant  rather  than  deep,  eloquent  rather  than  definite  or  conse- 
quent, inspiring  rather  than  convincing,  and  rhetorical  rather  than 
philosophical.  Instead  of  seeking  an  immovable  basis,  it  skips  from 
one  system  to  another,  taking  what  pleases  its  fancy,  but  ignoring  the 
rest. 

In  all  countries,  eclecticism  as  a  method  rather  than  a  system  plays 
a  prominent  part.  The  prominence  given  to  the  history  of  philosophy 
is  evidence  of  this.  Even  if  no  system  is  regarded  satisfactory,  scholars 
want  to  get  what  they  can  from  the  various  systems. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY. 


393 


sion  that  we  are  not  yet  prepared  to  construct  the  final 
system.  It  is  a  characteristic  of  the  philosophic  spirit, 
that  it  critically  examines  the  various  systems  to  dis- 
cover their  truths  and  reject  their  errors.  But  this  is 
only  a  preparatory  process ;  it  trains  the  mind,  and  fur- 
nishes it  with  materials  for  reflection.  The  mind  goes 
beyond  eclecticism  as  soon  as  it  inquires  why  it  seeks, 
and  how  it  knows,  the  truth.  This  inquiry  leads  to  the 
root,  while  eclecticism  is  but  the  fruit. 

The  criticism  so  much  insisted  on  here  is  by  no  means 
the  end  in  philosophical  training ;  it  is  but  a  method 
for  attaining  something  better.  Mere  criticism  is  not 
production ;  and  it  has  been  observed  that  critical 
minds  are  not  usually  productive  ones.  Filing  is  not 
a  process  of  growing.  When  the  critical  habit  is  intent 
only  on  the  discovery  of  error,  what  wonder  if  the 
truth  itself  is  missed?  The  discernment  of  error  is 
important  on  account  of  the  hidden  truth  discovered  in 
the  process.  The  value  of  the  scavenger  consists  in  the 
cleanliness  he  promotes.  Criticism  for  the  truth's  sake, 
and  as  promotiva  of  productiveness,  is  therefore  the 
aim.  But  even  if  criticism  is  only  a  handmaid,  its  work 
in  a  philosophic  Babel  may  be  of  supreme  importance 
when  under  the  guidance  of  a  wise  mistress. 

As  the  start  in  philosophy  is  most  difficult,  the  stu- 
dent may  need  something  more  specific  respecting  the 
beginning.  It  has  been  stated  that  we  are  to  rise  from 
psychology,  science,  and  other  departments,  to  philoso- 
phy; but  how?  Take  any  supposed  knowledge,  and 
test  it  to  the  utmost ;  the  tests  applied  to  it  will  involve 
the  theory  of  knowledge.  Get  what  these  tests  imply, 
or  the  ultimate  basis  on  which  they  rest,  and  you  will 
have  the  theory  itself.  Each  division  of  philosophy  is 
like  the  side  of  a  pyramid:  thus,  if  we  begin  with 


394      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

any  concept  of  knowledge,  and  trace  it  far  enough,  we 
come  to  the  apex,  the  principles  of  knowledge.  The 
same  is  true  of  being.  All  that  is,  must  contain  all 
the  principles  of  being;  and  these  are  the  objects  of 
search  in  metaphysics.  Concrete  objects  are  infinite; 
but  follow  the  concept  gained  by  studying  any  one  to 
its  utmost  limits,  and  it  will  be  found  at  every  step 
to  tend  toward  these  principles.  We  find  that  this  is 
also  the  law  for  aesthetics  and  ethics.  The  endless 
variety  is  unified  in  the  principles.  Thus  every  object 
termed  eesthetical  must  contain  all  that  is  required  to 
constitute  aesthetic  quality ;  and  it  is  this  element,  and 
the  system  founded  on  it,  which  constitute  aesthetics. 
Neither  can  any  moral  act  be  traced  to  its  ultimate 
principle  without  attaining  the  primary  thought  of 
ethics.  By  thus  taking  any  concept,  and  tracing  it  back 
far  enough,  we  arrive  at  the  principles  of  that  division 
of  philosophy  to  which  it  belongs.  This  shows  how  any 
thought  pursued  far  enough  must  lead  to  philosophy. 
Indeed,  we  shall  not  go  astray  if  we  view  philosophy  as 
an  exhaustive  elaboration  of  concepts ;  the  aim  being 
to  discover  principles  which  cannot  be  exhausted  any 
more,  but  which  embrace,  principiantly,  the  universe  of 
thought,  of  being,  of  feeling,  and  of  conduct. 

Since  the  rational  laws,  like  reason  itself,  are  unvary- 
ing, the  method  pursued  in  philosophy  must  always  be 
the  same  in  principle ;  but  there  is  abundant  room  for 
variety  in  details.  There  may  be  various  processes  in 
elaborating  the  concepts,  but  their  ultimate  results  must 
harmonize.  The  details  in  the  method  may  be  left  to 
each  one  who  has  the  qualification  for  philosophical 
studies ;  they  may  be  largely  determined  by  the  pecu- 
liarity of  the  subject  under  consideration,  and  by  the 
specific  aim.  While  numerous  avenues  may  be  chosen, 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  IN  THE  STUDY.          395 

they  must  all  lead  to  principiant  truth.  After  the  right 
beginning,  the  intellect  is  probably  in  greatest  danger 
of  taking  as  exhausted  what  is  not  exhausted,  and  in 
accepting  as  certain  what  has  not  been  demonstrated. 
Not  that  the  demonstrable  is  the  limit  of  the  true,  nor 
philosophy  the  only  sphere  of  human  interest  and 
human  confidence ;  but  we  must  distinguish  between 
knowledge  and  faith,  between  hypothesis  and  theory  on 
the  one  hand,  and  demonstration  on  the  other.  The 
true  method  in  philosophy  is  that  in  which  reason 
beholds  itself. 

For  training  the  mind  into  this  harmony  with  the 
truth,  or  to  be  true  to  itself,  which  is  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal aims  of  this  Introduction,  the  following  summary 
may  be  helpful :  — 

1.  Exert  the  mind  to  the  utmost  limit  of  its  powers. 
In  order  to  get  the  full  length  of  a  cable,  it  must  be 
stretched  as  far  as  possible  without  breaking.     Constant 
mental  strain  tends  to  weakness  and  final  destruction ; 
but  frequently  to  tax  the  healthy  mind  severely,  but 
without  overstraining,  is  a  condition  for  promoting  vig- 
orous health.     For  this  discipline  the  deepest  problems 
should  be  selected.     Continuous  exercise  of  the  mind  on 
them  will  train  it  for  the  most  successful  philosophical 
effort.     Only  in  dealing  profoundly  with  deep  problems 
can  the  mind  itself  become  profound. 

2.  Learn  by  practice  to  rivet  the  attention  on  a  sub- 
ject until  you  are  through  with  it,  or  voluntarily  aban- 
don it.     Nothing  is  more  destructive  of  philosophical 
thinking  than  to  skip  from  subject  to  subject,  touching 
each  one  tenderly.     In  such  a  course  it  is  a  lawless 
fancy,  not  reason,  which  holds  the  reins.     The  object 
chosen  for  reflection  should  be  held  up  in  every  light, 
and  viewed  from  every  standpoint,  by  itself  and  in  its 


396      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

relations,  and  all  pertinent  questions  respecting  it  should 
be  asked.  A  twofold  power  of  abstraction  is  necessary  ; 
namely,  the  subject  must  be  abstracted  (distinguished) 
from  all  others,  and  the  mind  must  abstract  its  atten- 
tion from  every  thing  else.  This  twofold  power  of 
abstraction  is  the  condition  for  greatness  of  mind. 
Mental  superiority  consists  largely  in  power  of  concen- 
tration. The  mind  must  be  its  own  lord  ;  it  must  be 
master  of  its  thoughts,  and  must  rigorously  resist  the 
inclinations  and  whims  which  make  them  wander. 
Distraction  is  the  deadly  foe  of  profundity. 

3.  The  most  important  subjects  should  be  chosen,  — 
subjects  whose  interest  is  such  as  to  enlist  all  the  ener- 
gies.    Among  profound  themes,  the  mind  should  choose 
the  most  valuable,  so  that  it  may  become  supremely 
strong,  and  supremely  fruitful  in  its  strength. 

4.  Get  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  —  clear,  because  what 
they  are  in  themselves  is  apprehended ;  and  distinct, 
because  they  stand  out  boldly,  sharply  marked  off  from 
all  their  surroundings.     Explain  the  compound  by  its 
simple  elements,  and  relations  by  denning  the  related. 
Distinguish  the  word  from  the  thought,  the  thought 
from  the  object  for  which  it  stands.     Whatever  severity 
it  may  require,  the  mind  must  give  a  strict  account  of 
itself.     It  will  attain  philosophic  clearness  in  proportion 
as  it  heeds  the  ancient  maxim :  Know  thyself. 

5.  Fathom  what  is  given,  and,  by  fathoming,  develop 
it.     Then  classify  and   systematize.     Avoid   heteroge- 
neity by  discovering  the  unity  in  multiplicity.     Philoso- 
phizing consists  in  unravelling  the  thought  involved  in 
thoughts.     Not  in  the  exclusivism  of  scepticism  or  dog- 
matism or  criticism  or  eclecticism  or  intuitionalism  or 
empiricism,  but  in  the  rational  element  in  all  of  them, 
is  the  true  method  of  philosophy  formed. 


SPIRIT  AND  METHOD   IN   THE  STUDY.          397 

6.  Many  of  the  problems  of  philosophy  are  thrust 
upon  it  by  science.  In  the  co-operation  of  philosophy 
and  science,  not  in  their  antagonism,  is  there  hope  for 
depth,  comprehensiveness,  exactness,  and  completeness. 
Between  the  facts  of  nature  and  of  psychology,  and 
the  speculations  of  philosophy,  there  must  be  the  rela- 
tion of  foundation  and  superstructure.  Phenomena  are 
materials  from  which  concepts  are  formed,  but  phe- 
nomena are  not  the  law  of  philosophy.  It  speculates, 
in  the  etymological  sense  of  looking  about,  beholding 
and  investigating ;  but  the  speculation  of  philosophy  is 
the  work  of  reason,  not  the  play  of  fancy.  Owing  to 
the  objects  of  philosophic  contemplation,  it  may  be 
misleading  to  speak  of  scientific  exactness  in  philo- 
sophic thought ;  but  the  method  which  leads  to  the 
philosophical  investigation  of  what  is,  as  in  metaphys- 
ics, and  of  what  ought  to  be,  as  in  noetics,  aesthetics, 
and  ethics,  is  as  rigid  as  in  science.  The  reason,  and 
the  general  laws  of  thinking,  with  which  the  scientist 
operates,  are  also  those  of  the  philosopher.  Not  its 
method,  but  its  principiant  aim,  namely  to  unify  all 
thought  in  the  ultimate  principle  or  principles,  and  to 
form  of  all  thought  a  system  which,  like  an  organism, 
consists  of  articulated  members, — a  system  as  rich  in 
variety  as  it  is  perfect  in  unity,  —  constitutes  the  diffi- 
culty of  philosophic  inquiry. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Importance  of  the  right  Spirit  in  a  study.  Why 
study  Philosophy  ?  Theoretical  value.  Practical  value. 
Intellectual  craving.  Love  of  Truth.  Enthusiasm  in 
its  pursuit.  Power  of  prejudice.  Mental  power  and 
energy.  Penetrative,  exhaustive  thought.  Abstraction. 
How  does  Philosophy  begin?  Why  do  all  thoughts 


398      INTRODUCTION  TO  STUDY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

ultimately  lead  to  Philosophy  ?  How  does  Philosophy 
unify  Knowledge?  Principiant  Knowledge.  How  do 
Psychology,  Science,  and  History  furnish  the  problems 
of  Philosophy  ?  Order  in  the  study  of  the  divisions  of 
Philosophy.  How  study  the  History  of  Philosophy  ? 
Philosophical  works  and  systems  worthy  of  special  atten- 
tion. Relation  of  the  student  to  teachers  and  systems. 
Original  thought.  Independent  thinking.  Relation  of 
the  Philosopher  to  his  age  and  nation.  What  is  neces- 
sary thought,  and  why  is  it  final?  Truth  and  error  in 
eclecticism.  Define  Speculation.  Healthy  Philosophy 
and  baseless  speculation.  The  learner,  the  scholar,  and 
the  thinker.  Continuity  of  philosophical  thought. 
Division  of  labor  in  Philosophy.  Fruitful  and  empty 
concepts.  Depth  and  narrowness,  breadth  and  shallow- 
ness.  Union  of  breadth  and  depth  in  philosophy. 
Concentration  of  thought.  Scientific  and  philosophic 
definiteness  and  exactness.  Summary  of  requirements 
necessary  for  attaining  the  right  Spirit  and  proper 
Method  in  the  study  of  Philosophy. 


APPENDIX. 


1.  IN  an  article  on  Philosophy  at  Cambridge,  in  Mind, 
1876,  Mr.  Sedgwick  says,  "  The  use  of  the  general  terra 
4  philosophy '  to  mean  physics,  which  Continental  writers 
have  noticed  as  an  English  peculiarity,  has  been  especially 
at  home  in  Cambridge  since  the  time  of  Newton.  .  .  .  Phi- 
losophy without  qualification  was  generally  understood  to 
mean  'natural  philosophy.'  That  which  is  now  usually  un- 
derstood by  philosophy  was,  therefore,  not  at  all  included. 
In  1779  Dr.  Jebb  speaks  of  the  transition  (in  the  examina- 
tion in  the  university)  '  from  the  elements  of  mathematics  to 
the  four  branches  of  philosophy,  viz.,  mechanics,  hydro- 
statics, apparent  astronomy,  and  optics.  .  .  .  The  modera- 
tor, having  closed  the  philosophical  examination,  sometimes 
asks  questions  in  Locke's  Essay  on  the  Human  Understand- 
ing, Butler's  Analogy,  or  Clarke's  Attributes.'  " 

In  the  introduction  to  the  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences, 
Whewell  frequently  uses  ''philosophical"  for  "  scientific." 
He  also  speaks  of  the  "experimental  philosophy  of  the 
Arabians."  Yet  the  title  of  his  work  on  the  Philosophy 
of  the  Inductive  Sciences  implies  that  he  wants  to  distin- 
guish between  the  two  terms.  Other  writers  also  desire  to 
make  a  distinction  ;  but  in  spite  of  their  efforts,  the  old 
habit  of  confounding  the  terms  gets  the  better  of  them. 
Thus  Sir  Alexander  Grant,  in  the  article  "Aristotle,"  in 
the  Ency.  Brit,  (ninth  edition) ,  refers  to  the  different  ele- 
ments of  Greek  thought,  and  pronounces  "  the  one  purely 

399 


400  APPENDIX. 

philosophical,  the  other  scientific."  Other  expressions  also 
indicate  that  he  recognizes  the  difference.  But,  in  the  same 
article,  he  takes  "  natural  philosophy  "  in  the  usual  English 
sense,  and  speaks  of  "a  modern  physical  philosopher." 
The  English  literature  of  the  day  abounds  in  similar  exam- 
ples. 

Hegel  ridiculed  the  looseness  with  which  the  English 
employ  the  words  "  philosophy  "  and  "  philosophical.  "He 
says  that  they  term  thermometers,  barometers,  and  simi- 
lar instruments  philosophical,  whereas  nothing  but  thinking 
should  be  regarded  as  the  instrument  of  philosophy.  He 
also  quotes  the  title  of  a  pamphlet,  "  The  Art  of  Preserving 
the  Hair  on  Philosophical  Principles."  That  confusion  of 
the  terms  which  Hegel  regarded  as  a  peculiarity  of  the  p]ng- 
lish  was,  however,  formerly  common  on  the  Continent  as  well 
as  in  England. 

2.  The  prevalent  view  of  philosophy  in  the  leading  sys- 
tems of  Germany  emphasizes  the  rational  in  distinction  from 
the  empirical.  As  purely  rational,  philosophy  is  theoretical 
as  distinct  from  the  practical,  and  speculative  (the  reason 
beholding  all  objects  in  its  own  light)  as  distinct  from 
observation.  As  transcending  experience,  it  is  transcen- 
dental. It  consequently  deals  with  concepts  (ideas,  no- 
tions), not  with  percepts.  Kant  defines  philosophy  as 
rational  knowledge  b\T  means  of  concepts  ( Vernunfterkennt- 
nisse  aus  Begriffen),  and  regards  the  following  as  its  primary 
problems  :  What  can  I  know  ?  What  ought  I  to  do  ?  What 
dare  I  hope?  What  is  man?  Hegel  pronounces  philosophy 
the  science  of  reason  comprehending  itself  (die  Wissenschaft 
der  sich  selbst  begreifenden  Vernunft).  Herbart  views  it  as 
an  elaboration  of  the  concepts  (die  Bearbeitung  der  Begrijfe) . 
Struempell :  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,  19-22.  Fichte 
wanted  the  whole  of  philosophy  to  be  a  rational  develop- 
ment of  a  single  idea,  and  Schelling  claimed  that  philosophy 
must  construct  even  the  real  world  according  to  concepts  or 
ideas  of  reason.  In  a  recent  work  on  Philosophic  als  Be- 


APPENDIX.  401 

griffswissenschaft,  GL  Biedermann  says,  "  Philosophy  is,  and 
always  was,  a  science  of  concepts." 

3.  However  much  we  may  dissent  from  the  contents  of 
this  book,  we  must  admit  that  in  it  Kant  gives  valuable  hints 
respecting  the  province  of  reason  in  religion.     The  purely 
rational  elements  are,  of  course,  legitimate  subjects  for  phil- 
osophical inquiry.     If  the  elements  are  only  partly  rational, 
then  they  belong  to  philosophy  only  so  far  as  rational.     If 
a  philosophical  system  claims  that  all  the  contents  of  religion 
must  be  rational,  it  fails  to  distinguish  between  knowledge 
and  faith,  between  speculation  and  history,  and  between  the 
facts  of  experience  and  rational  inferences.     Much  of  the 
confusion   of  philosophical  speculation   respecting   religion 
arises  from  the   failure  to  distinguish   between   the   exact 
sphere  of  each.     I  cannot  believe  what  is  in  direct  conflict 
with  reason  ;  but  I  can,  and  may  even  be  obliged  to,  believe 
much  which  I  cannot  raise  from  faith  into  knowledge,  and 
which,  consequently,  I  cannot  subject  to  purely  philosophical 
or  rational  tests.     In  religion  the  emotions  have  a  right  to 
be  heard ;  and  it  is  important  for  philosophy,  as  well  as  for 
religion,  to  determine  the  significance  of  their  voice.     Emer- 
son truly  sa}rs,  "  The  affections  are  the  wings  by  which  the 
intellect  launches  on  the  void  and  is  borne  across  it.     Great 
love  is  the  inventor  and  expander  of  the  frozen  powers,  the 
feathers  frozen  to  our  sides.     It  was  the  conviction  of  Plato, 
of  Van  Helmont,  of  Pascal,  of  Swedenborg,  that  piety  is  an 
essential  condition  of  science,  that  great  thoughts  come  from 
the  heart." 

4.  Those  who  treat  religion  with  levity  are  justly  chargea- 
ble with  a  crime  against  human  nature  itself,  to  say  nothing 
of  a  higher  Being.    A  system  which  ignores  what  has  affected 
humanity  most  deeply,  and  involves  man's  highest  interests, 
cannot  even  be  regarded  as  a  serious  inquiry  into  man's 
nature,  and  is  surely  neither  a  deep  nor  a  broad  philosoph}-. 
To  treat  God,  the  soul,  sin,  and  immortality,  as  if  they  were 


402  APPENDIX. 

trifles  and  unworthy  of  regard,  proves  a  man  wholly  unfit  for 
philosophic  thought.  We  must  not,  however,  confound  with 
the  trifler  the  man  who  has  thought  profoundly  on  these  sub- 
jects, and  come  to  conclusions  different  from  ours.  Ear- 
nest thought  is  always  worthy  of  respect,  regardless  of  its 
consequences,  and  may  demand  the  deepest  research  to  con- 
firm or  refute  its  conclusions.  But  the  frivolous  spirit  should 
be  as  mercilessly  expelled  from  the  fraternity  of  philosophers, 
as  a  traitor  from  the  assembly  of  patriots. 

5.  "The  hypothesis  that  there  is  a  Creator,  at  once  all- 
powerful  and  all-benevolent,  is  pressed,  as  it  must  seem  to 
every  candid   investigator,  with  difficulties  verging  closely 
upon  logical  contradiction.     The  existence  of  the  smallest 
amount  of  sin  and  evil  would  seem  to  show  that  he  is  either 
not  perfectly  benevolent,  or  not  all-powerful.     No  one  can 
have  lived  long  without  experiencing   sorrowful  events  of 
which  the  significance  is  inexplicable.     But  if  we  cannot 
succeed  in  avoiding  contradiction  in  our  notions  of  element- 
ary geometry,  can  we  expect  that  the  ultimate  purposes  of 
existence  shall  present  themselves  to  us  with  perfect  clear- 
ness?    I  can  see  nothing  to  forbid  the  notion  that  in  a  higher 
state  of  intelligence  much  that  is  now  obscure  may  become 
clear.     We  perpetually  find  ourselves  in  the  position  of  finite 
minds  attempting  infinite  problems  ;  and  can  we  be  sure  that 
where  we  see  contradiction,  an  infinite  intelligence  might  not 
discover  perfect  logical  harmony?"  —  JEVONS,  Principles  of 
Science,  3d  ed.  736. 

6.  With  his   merciless   criticism,  Kant,  just  because   so 
rigid,  denied  the  ability  of  philosophy  to  determine  a  priori 
that  revelation   and  miracles  are  impossible.     If   any  one 
claimed  that   they  were   impossible,  he   himself   offered  to 
show  the  fallacy  of  his  reasoning.     He  wanted  the  rational, 
therefore  he  opposed  the  narrow  dogmatism  of  philosophy 
as  well  as  of   religion.     See   his  book  on   Religion   within 
the  Limits  of  Pare  Reason.     The  dogmatic  spirit  is  gener- 


APPENDIX.  403 

ally  found  to  rest  on  assumptions  which  are  the  very  points 
in  dispute.  If  we  despise  bigotry  in  religion,  let  us  not 
deem  it  less  despicable  when  it  is  dubbed  "philosophical  "  or 
"scientific."  Jevons  (Principles  of  Science,  736)  says, 
"There  are  scientific  men  who  assert  that  the  interposition 
of  Providence  is  impossible,  and  prayer  an  absurdity,  be- 
cause the  laws  of  nature  are  proved  to  be  invariable.  Infer- 
ences are  drawn,  not  so  much  from  particular  sciences  as 
from  the  logical  nature  of  science  itself,  to  negative  the 
impulses  and  hopes  of  men.  Now,  I  may  state  that  my  own 
studies  in  logic  lead  me  to  call  in  question  such  negative 
inferences.  Laws  of  nature  are  uniformities  observed  to 
exist  in  the  action  of  certain  material  agents ;  but  it  is  logic- 
ally impossible  to  show  that  all  other  agents  must  behave 
as  they  do."  Men  are  apt  to  take  their  prepossessions  for 
demonstrations.  In  speaking  of  God  as  acting  on  nature, 
W.  B.  Carpenter  (Contemp.  Rev.,  vol.  27,  281)  says,  "I 
deem  it  presumptuous  to  deny  that  there  might  be  occasions 
which  in  His  wisdom  may  require  such  departure.  I  am  not 
conscious  of  any  such  scientific  c  prepossession '  against 
miracles  as  would  prevent  me  from  accepting  them  as  facts 
if  trustworthy  evidence  of  their  reality  could  be  adduced." 
See  also  Lotze,  Grundziige  der  Religionsphilosophie,  60-63. 

7.  At  the  close  of  his  volume  on  the  Principles  of  Science, 
Jevons  says,  "  Now,  among  the  most  unquestionable  rules 
of  scientific  method  is  that  first  law  that  whatever  phenom- 
enon is,  is.  We  must  ignore  no  existence  whatever;  we 
may  variously  interpret  or  explain  its  meaning  and  origin, 
but,  if  a  phenomenon  does  exist,  it  demands  some  kind  of 
explanation.  If,  then,  there  is  to  be  competition  for  sci- 
entific recognition,  the  world  without  us  must  yield  to  the 
undoubted  existence  of  the  spirit  within.  Our  own  hopes 
and  wishes  and  determinations  are  the  most  undoubted  phe- 
nomena within  the  sphere  of  consciousness.  If  men  do  act, 
feel,  and  live  as  if  they  were  not  merely  the  brief  products 
of  a  casual  conjunction  of  atoms,  but  the  instruments  of  a 


404  APPENDIX. 

far-reaching  purpose,  are  we  to  record  all  other  phenomena 
and  pass  over  these?  We  investigate  the  instincts  of  the 
ant  and  the  bee  and  the  beaver,  and  discover  that  they  are 
led  by  an  inscrutable  agency  to  work  towards  a  distant  pur- 
pose. Let  us  be  faithful  to  our  scientific  method,  and  inves- 
tigate also  those  instincts  of  the  human  mind  by  which  man 
is  led  to  work  as  if  the  approval  of  a  higher  Being  were  the 
aim  of  life." 

8.  That  Bacon  was  far  from  giving  a  specific  and  com- 
plete scientific  method,  is  admitted  in  England  as  well  as  in 
Germany.  Thus  we  read  in  Jevons's  Principles  of  Sci- 
ence, 506,  "Bacon's  method,  so  far  as  we  can  gather  the 
meaning  of  the  main  portions  of  his  writings,  would  corre- 
spond to  the  process  of  empirically  collecting  facts,  and  ex- 
haustively classifying  them.  .  .  .  The  value  of  this  method 
may  be  estimated  historically  by  the  fact  that  it  has  not  been 
followed  by  any  of  the  great  masters  of  science.  Whether 
we  look  at  Calileo  who  preceded  Bacon,  to  Gilbert  his  con- 
temporary, or  to  Newton  and  Descartes,  Leibnitz  and  Huy- 
ghens,  his  successors,  we  find  that  discovery  was  achieved  by 
the  opposite  method  to  that  advocated  by  Bacon.  Through- 
out Newton's  works,  as  I  shall  show,  we  find  deductive  rea- 
soning wholly  predominant ;  and  experiments  are  employed, 
as  they  should  be,  to  confirm  or  refute  hypothetical  anticipa- 
tions of  nature." 

The  right  beginning  is  so  important  to  students,  that  the 
principles  here  advocated  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized, 
particularly  at  a  time  when  so  many  expect  success  by  ignor- 
ing them.  The  mere  collector  and  classifier  of  facts  must 
be  content  with  the  position  of  a  journeyman  to  the  thinker, 
instead  of  attaining  the  heights  of  science.  The  leaders  in 
science  are,  and  ever  must  be,  the  thinkers,  —  those  who 
esteem  facts  sufficiently  to  regard  them  worth}'  of  pro- 
foundest  thought.  I  add  another  quotation  from  Whewell : 
"  Invention,  acuteness,  and  connection  of  thought  are  ne- 
cessary, on  the  one  hand,  for  the  progress  of  philosophic 


APPENDIX.  405 

knowledge  ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  precise  and  steady  appli- 
cation of  these  faculties  to  facts  well  known  and  clearly  con- 
ceived. .  .  .  The  facts,  the  impressions  on  the  senses  on 
which  the  first  successful  attempts  at  physical  knowledge  pro- 
ceeded, were  as  well  known  long  before  the  time  when  they 
were  thus  turned  to  account,  as  at  that  period.  The  motions 
of  the  stars,  and  the  effects  of  weights,  were  familiar  to  man 
before  the  rise  of  the  Greek  astronomy  and  mechanics  :  but 
the  '  divine  mind '  was  still  absent ;  the  act  of  thought  had 
not  been  exerted,  by  which  these  facts  were  bound  together 
under  the  form  of  laws  and  principles.  And  even  at  this 
day,  the  tribes  of  uncivilized  and  half-civilized  man  over  the 
whole  face  of  the  earth,  have  before  their  eyes  a  vast  body 
of  facts,  of  exactly  the  same  nature  as  those  with  which 
Europe  has  built  the  stately  fabric  of  her  physical  philoso- 
phy ;  but,  in  almost  every  other  part  of  the  earth,  the  pro- 
cess of  the  intellect  by  which  these  facts  become  science,  is 
unknown.  The  scientific  faculty  does  not  work.  The  scat- 
tered stones  are  there,  but  the  builder's  hand  is  wanting. " 

9.  Those  who  imagine  that  reason  is  liable  to  err,  but  that 
knowledge  obtained  through  sensation  is  absolutely  reliable, 
agree  neither  with  philosophers  nor  with  the  leading  scien- 
tists.    The   history   of   science   shows   that    observation   is 
very  apt  to  make  mistakes ;  and  what  is  termed  the  scien- 
tific method  is  intended  to  prevent  these  mistakes,  as  well  as 
to  make  the  observation  as  full  as  possible.     Reason   and 
sense  must  co-operate,  but  the  supremacy  of  the  former  is 
unquestioned  ;  "  reason  acting  as  interpreter  as  well  as  judge, 
while  the  senses  are  merely  the  witnesses,  who  may  be  more 
or  less  untrustworthy  and  incompetent,  but  are  nevertheless 
of  inconceivable  value  to  us,    because   they   are    our    only 
available  ones."  —  TAIT,  347. 

10.  Whewell    says,    "  Man   is   not  a   practical    creature 
merely ;  he  has  within  him  a  speculative  tendency,  a  pleasure 
in  the  contemplation  of  ideal  relations,  a  love  of  knowledge 


406  APPENDIX. 

as  knowledge.  It  is  the  speculative  tendency  which  brings 
to  light  the  difference  of  common  notions  and  scientific  ideas. 
.  .  .  The  mind  analyzes  such  notions,  reasons  upon  them, 
combines  and  connects  them  ;  for  it  feels  assured  that  intel- 
lectual things  ought  to  be  able  to  bear  such  handling.  Even 
practical  knowledge,  we  see  clearly,  is  not  possible  without 
the  use  of  reason ;  and  the  speculative  reason  is  only  the 
reason  satisfying  itself  of  its  own  consistency." 

Zoellner,  in  the  strange  volume  Ueber  die  Natur  des 
Cometen,  51,  says,  "  In  the  present  state  of  natural  science, 
the  need  of  speculation  is  so  deeply  felt  that  the  English,  a 
people  now  almost  exclusively  devoted  to  induction,  cannot 
resist  the  temptation  to  speculate  even  on  mathematico- 
physical  hypotheses."  Sometimes  in  reading  certain  scien- 
tific works  we  wonder  whether  the  fancy  is  not  aroused  to 
assert  itself  by  the  very  rigors  of  science,  so  luxuriantly 
does  it  flourish  in  those  works.  There  is  no  end  to  inter- 
esting illustrations  of  this,  but  they  are  too  evident  to  the 
thoughtful  reader  to  require  special  notice. 

11.  Helmholtz,  363,  says,  "During  the  first  half  of  the 
present  century  we  had  an  Alexander  von  Humboldt,  who 
was  able  to  scan  the  scientific  knowledge  of  his  time  in  its 
details,  and  to  bring  it  within  one  vast  generalization.  At 
the  present  juncture,  it  is  obviously  very  doubtful  whether 
this  task  could  be  accomplished  in  a  similar  way,  even  by  a 
mind  with  gifts  so  peculiarly  suited  for  the  purpose  as 
Humboldt's  was,  and  if  all  his  time  and  work  were  devoted 
to  the  purpose." 

Professor  Roscoe  (address  before  the  British  Association, 
1884)  pronounces  the  progress  of  organic  chemistry  in  the 
last  twenty  years  "  so  vast,  that  it  is  already  impossible  for 
one  individual,  even  though  he  devote  his  whole  time  and 
energies  to  the  task,  to  master  all  the  details,  or  make  him- 
self at  home  with  the  increasing  mass  of  new  facts  which 
the  busy  workers  in  this  field  are  daily  bringing  forth." 
The  president,  Lord  Rayleigh,  at  the  same  meeting  referred 


APPENDIX.  407 

to  mechanics,  electricity,  heat,  optics,  acoustics,  astronomy, 
and  meteorology,  and  said,  "Any  one  of  these  may  well 
occupy  the  lifelong  attention  of  a  man  of  science  ;  and  to  be 
thoroughly  conversant  with  all  of  them  is  more  than  can  be 
expected  of  any  one  individual,  and  is  probably  incompati- 
ble with  the  devotion  of  much  time  and  energy  to  the  actual 
advancement  of  knowledge." 

12.  Professor  Zoellner  (p.  ix.)  declares  that  he  has  come 
to  the  conclusion  "  that  the  majority  of  the  representatives 
of  the  exact  sciences  in  our  day  lack  a  clear  knowledge  of 
the  first  principles  of  the  theory  of  knowledge."     It  became 
the  habit  to  gather  mere  facts,  and  those  who  gathered  them 
were  unable  to  use  them  in  drawing  conclusions  from  them. 
"  Yes,  it  even  came  to  this,  that  the  most  modest  effort  to 
raise  a  part  of  the  gathered  facts,   by  means  of  inductive 
generalization,   to  a   law  or   a   principle,  was    branded   by 
specialists  as  savoring  of   philosophical   speculation."     He 
holds,  that,  with  all  the  mass  of  materials  gathered  by  obser- 
vation, our  age  is  behind  that  of  Newton  in  the  conscious 
application  of  logical  inductive  principles.     These  facts  have 
been   so   keenly  felt  by  eminent  scientists,  that  they  have 
found  it  incumbent  on  them  to  connect  with  their  scientific 
lectures,  instruction  on  the  laws  of  reasoning,  and  hints  on 
the  theory  of  knowledge.     In  1874  Wundt  said,  "How  one 
would  have  been  astonished  twenty  years  ago,  to  have  dis- 
covered, in  a  work  purely  physical,  an  excursus  on  the  prob- 
lem of  knowledge !     Or  how  would   it   have  been   thought 
possible  for  a  teacher  of  physics  to  have  felt  the  need  of 
giving  his  pupils  a  special  lecture  on  the  logical  principles 
of  his  science?"     ( WUNDT,  Aufgabe  der  Philosophic  in  der 
Gegemuart,  5.)     The  fact  that  attention  is  now  paid  to  these 
problems  is  regarded  by  Wundt  as  evidence  that  scientists 
are  beginning  to  appreciate  the  need  of  a  nearer  approach 
to  philosophy. 

13.  Wundt,  Aufgabe,  19,  says,  "The  science  of  our  day 
strives  to  obtain  an  harmonious  view  of  the  world,  and  has 


408  APPENDIX. 

already  gathered  many  stones  for  the  structure.  But  the 
requirements  of  the  special  sciences  are  not  met  by  any 
of  the  existing  systems,  for  they  lack  that  circumspect  use  of 
scientific  experience  which  the  special  sciences,  and  particu- 
larly the  natural  sciences,  have  a  right  to  demand  according 
to  their  present  degree  of  development."  That  which  the 
special  sciences  demand  but  cannot  do^  he  regards  as  lying 
within  the  province  of  philosophy.  Everywhere  in  the  nat- 
ural sciences  he  sees  philosophical  problems  proposed,  which 
accounts  for  the  revival  of  interest  in  philosophy  on  the 
part  of  scientists.  "  The  interest  in  philosophy  has  again 
been  revived  in  the  more  general  spheres  of  the  scientific 
world,  in  which  for  a  considerable  time  it  was  almost  wholly 
neglected."  Paulsen  says,  "  The  impulse  to  seek  ultimate 
knowledge  is  the  soul  of  all  inquiry,  even  in  the  special 
sciences." 

14.  My  study  of  Comte  left  the  impression  of  breadth 
without  depth  and  thoroughness  and  earnestness.  There  is 
a  lack  of  sharp  distinctions,  of  critical  acumen,  and  of  pene- 
tration to  the  ultimate  consequences  of  the  processes  of 
thought.  The  most  essential  points  are  often  treated  super- 
ficially, and  the  disposition  made  of  them  shows  that  the  real 
problems  involved  are  not  appreciated.  Instead  of  regard- 
ing Comte  as  one  of  the  main  pillars  of  science,  he  has  more 
properly  been  classed  with  the  ancient  sophists.  All  this 
can  be  admitted  without  depreciating  his  merits,  especially 
in  sociology  ;  his  works  have  been  valuable  as  a  ferment.  I 
find  my  view  of  Comte  confirmed  by  Huxley  (Lay  Sermons, 
"  The  Scientific  Aspect  of  Positivism").  Comte's  works 
had  been  recommended  to  him  as  a  mine  of  wisdom ;  but  he 
says,  "I  found  the  veins  of  ore  few  and  far  between,  and 
the  rock  so  apt  to  run  to  mud,  that  one  incurred  the  risk  of 
being  intellectually  smothered  in  the  working.  .  .  .  That 
part  of  M.  Comte's  writings  which  deals  with  the  philosophy 
of  physical  science  appeared  to  me  to  possess  singularly 
little  value,  and  to  show  that  he  had  but  the  most  superficial 


APPENDIX.  409 

and  merely  second-hand  knowledge  of  most  branches  of  what 
is  usually  understood  by  science." 

15.  Reuschle,    Philosophic    und    Naturwissenschaft,    28, 
gives  some   interesting   illustrations   how   the   extremes   of 
speculation  fifty  years  ago  promoted  the  opposite  extreme 
of  empiricism.     The  journals  on  natural  science,  as  a  rule, 
published   only   empirical    articles.      Thus   J.    R.    Mayer's 
article   on    The   Powers  of  Inanimate  Nature  was  rejected 
by  one  of  the  most  prominent  of  these  journals,  because  of 
its  speculation.     Yet  that  paper,  which  afterwards  appeared 
in   Liebig's   Annals  of  Chemistry,  contained  the  first  pub- 
lished information  of  the  mechanical  theory  of  heat,  one  of 
the  greatest  discoveries  of  the  nineteenth  century.     "  Mayer 
was  led  to  his  discovery  of  the  mechanical  equivalent   of 
heat,  by  means  of   speculative   considerations. '•'     Reuschle 
mentions  as  particularly  prominent  in  connecting  philosophy 
with   natural   science,  the   names   of    Helmholtz,    Zoellner, 
Du    Bois-Reymond,    Hering,    Darwin,    Wallace,    Faraday, 
Fechner,  Liebig,  and  Haeckel.     The  list   might  be  greatly 
increased  by  eminent  names  from  America,  England,  France, 
and  Germany. 

16.  The   quotation    is   from   Mind,  1876,  5.     How  little 
agreement  there  is  among  scientists,  is  evident,  among  other 
things,  from  the  controversies  occasioned  by  the  address  of 
Du  Bois-Re}'moud  on   The  Limits  of  Natural  Science.     The 
disputes   connected  with   evolution   and   Darwinism   are  so 
well  known  that  they  need  no  special  mention.     When  we 
come  to  questions  pertaining  to  experience  and   necessary  . 
truth,  there  is  any  thing  but   agreement   among   scientists. 
The  fact  is,  few  of  them  are  at  home  in  philosophical  ques- 
tions.    Some    agree    with    Wundt,    who    says    (Aufgabe), 
"  However  high  the  natural  science  of  the  day  places  experi- 
ence, not  a  few  physicists  agree  that  in  our  knowledge  of 
nature   certain   a  priori   elements    are   actively  concerned, 
among  which  is  found  especially  the  principle  of  causality." 


410  APPENDIX. 

Others  agree  with  Jevons  (738):  "I  demur  to  the  assump- 
tion that  there  is  any  necessary  truth  even  in  such  funda- 
mental laws  of  nature  as  the  indestructibility  of  matter,  the 
conservation  of  energy,  or  the  laws  of  motion."  Can  agree- 
ment be  expected  among  scientists  so  long  as  there  is  no 
agreement  on  the  principles  ?  And  if  scientists  cannot  agree 
respecting  the  philosophical  principles  on  which  all  their  in- 
vestigations depend,  can  they  blame  philosophers  for  their 
disagreement  ? 

17.  The  fundamental  problems  in  Hume's  philosophy 
were  discussed  by  the  author  in  an  address  on  Grundprobleme 
in  Hume,  before  the  Philosophical  Society  of  Berlin,  and 
published  by  that  society  (Philosophische  vortraege:  R. 
Strieker,  Halle) . 

Professor  Adamson,  mEncy.  Brit.,  article  "  Hume,"  refer- 
ring to  the  influence  of  Locke  and  Hume  in  determining  the 
course  of  English  philosophy,  says,  "  It  was  left  for  Hume 
to  approach  the  theory  of  knowledge  with  full  consciousness 
from  the  psychological  point  of  view,  and  to  work  out  the 
final  consequences  of  that  view,  so  far  as  cognition  is  con- 
cerned. The  terms  which  he  employs  are  not  those  which 
we  should  now  employ ;  but  the  declaration,  in  the  introduc- 
tion to  the  Treatise,  that  the  science  of  human  nature  must 
"be  treated  according  to  the  experimental  method,  is,  in  fact, 
equivalent  to  the  statement  of  the  principle  implied  in 
Locke's  Essay,  that  the  problems  of  psychology  and  of  the 
theory  of  knowledge  are  identical.  And  this  view  is  the 
characteristic  of  what  we  may  call  the  English  school  of 
philosophy."  Mr.  Sedgwick  (Mind,  1876,  228)  also  holds 
that  English  thinkers,  with  few  exceptions  (Berkeley  and 
Coleridge) ,  are  psychologists,  not  philosophers.  They  take 
it  for  granted  that  there  is  a  world  external  to  the  mind, 
hence  they  do  not  enter  into  a  critical  examination  of  the 
existence  of  an  external  world.  "  All  our  philosophical  writ- 
ers are  dominated  by  the  notion  of  a  separation  betweer 
consciousness  and  its  objects,  and  approach  philosophic^ 


APPENDIX.  411 

questions  with  the  notion  of  settling  what  we  can  know  of 
objects,  with  what  certainty  we  can  know  it,  and  what  our 
wisest  course  of  action  is  in  consequence.  But  this  is  to 
adopt  the  distinction  between  the  mind  and  its  organism,  and 
the  world  external  to  the  mind,  as  an  ultimate  one.  Our 
English  writers  are  thus  psychologists  in  the  above-explained 
sense  of  the  term,  and  not  philosophers  in  the  strict  sense." 

18.  Although  there  is  no  agreement  among  thinkers 
respecting  the  exact  nature  of  psycholog}?,  it  is  generally 
admitted  that  it  should  be  taken  wholly  out  of  metaphysics. 
Hansel  holds  that  psychology  inquires,  "  what  are  the  acutal 
phenomena  of  the  several  acts  and  states  of  the  human  mind, 
and  the  actual  laws  or  conditions  on  which  they  depend." 
Sedgwick  (Mind,  1876,  223)  claims  that  u  the  main  purpose 
of  psychology  is  to  investigate  the  laws  by  which  different 
states  of  consciousness  either  co-exist  or  follow  one 
another."  A  clear  distinction  between  consciousness  and 
its  contents  is  made  by  Hodgson  (Mind,  1884,  70)  :  ''Psy- 
chology has  nothing  to  do  with  consciousness  qud  content, 
or  with  the  relations  of  its  parts  as  content,  in  which  aspect 
it  is  the  mirror  or  subjective  side  of  the  universe  of  things. 
That  is  the  domain  of  philosophy.  The  business  of  psychol- 
ogy is  with  sentient  beings,  with  the  classification  and  exam- 
ination of  their  faculties,  the  genesis  of  the  various  modes 
of  their  sentience  and  intelligence,  and  generally  the  real 
actions  and  relations  between  them  and  their  environment." 
Similar  views  prevail  to  some  extent  in  Germany.  Steinthal 
declares,  "  Psychology  is  altogether  an  experimental  science, 
and  its  aim  cannot  extend  further  than  to  determine  the 
conditions  under  which  by  experience  a  certain  result  may 
be  expected.  Further  than  this  natural  science  also  does 
not  extend,  and  every  step  farther  in  the  direction  of  causa- 
tion or  teleology  belongs  to  metaphysics  and  the  philosophy 
of  religion."  Benno  Erdmann  says,  "  The  general,  formal 
science  of  mind,  that  is,  the  science  of  the  laws  of  the 
psychical  processes  of  development,  is  psychology." 


412  APPENDIX. 

Other  views  of  psychology  also  prevail.  Thus  Ueberweg 
defines  it  as  "  the  science  of  the  nature  and  natural  laws  of 
the  human  mind."  Spencer  makes  his  psychology  in  part 
what  others  have  termed  a  theory  of  knowledge ;  that  is,  a 
theory  of  the  relation  existing  between  sensation  and  the 
object  producing  it,  or  between  thought  and  its  external  ob- 
ject. (Psychology,  I.  132,  133.)  Volkmann  (Grundriss  der 
Psychologie,  3)  defines  psychology  as  "  aiming  to  describe  the 
several  activities  of  the  soul,  to  interpret  their  laws,  and  to 
throw  light  on  the  nature  of  the  soul."  Without  making  psy- 
chology itself  metaphysical,  it  is  but  natural  that  its  results 
should  be  used  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  soul  itself. 
Hoffding,  the  Danish  psychologist,  pronounces  psychology 
the  doctrine  of  the  soul,  or  the  doctrine  of  that  which  thinks, 
feels,  and  wills,  in  distinction  from  physics,  which  treats  of 
what  moves  in  and  fills  space.  Just  as  in  physics  the  begin- 
ning is  not  made  with  determining  the  essence  of  matter,  so 
in  psychology  the  nature  of  the  soul  is  not  the  starting-point. 
He  treats  the  subject  as  purely  empirical,  and  wants  facts  to 
be  carefully  distinguished  from  theories.  Bain  declares  that 
"  the  only  account  of  mind  strictly  admissible  in  scientific 
psychology  consists  in  specifying  three  properties  or  func- 
tions, —  feeling,  will  or  volition,  and  thought  or  intellect,  — 
through  which  all  our  experience,  as  well  objective  as 
subjective,  is  built  up.  This  positive  enumeration  is  what 
must  stand  for  a  definition."  (Mental  and  Moral  Science,  2.) 
Sully  (Outlines  of  Psychology,  1)  says,  "What  mind  is  in 
itself  as  a  substance,  is  a  question  that  lies  outside  psychol- 
ogy, and  belongs  to  philosophy.  As  a  science,  psychology 
is  concerned  only  with  the  phenomena  of  mind,  with  mental 
states,  psychical  facts,  or  whatever  else  we  choose  to  call 
them.  Bowne  (Introduction  to  Psychological  Theory,  1) 
says,  "  Psychology  deals  with  mental  facts  and  processes. 
It  aims  to  describe  and  classify  those  facts  and  processes,  to 
discover  and  state  their  laws,  and  to  form  some  theory 
concerning  their  origin  and  cause." 


J 


APPENDIX.  413 

19.  Utterances  similar  to  those  given  in  the  text  might  be 
quoted  from  numerous  scientific  authorities.     In  his  address 
before  the  British  Association,  the  president,  Professor  All- 
mann,  said,  "Between  thought  and  the  physical  phenomena 
of  matter  there  is  not  only  no  analogy,  but  no  conceivable 
analogy.  .  .  .  The    chasm    between   unconscious   life   and 
thought  is  deep  and  impassable,  and  no  transitional  phe- 
nomena can  be  found  by  which,  as  a  bridge,  we  may  span 
it  over."     I  shall  add  a  quotation  from  Romanes,  a  Darwin- 
ist:  "  And  here  I  may  as  well  at  once  give  it  as  my  opinion 
that,  of   however  much  service  the  theoiy  of  materialism 
may  be  made  up  to  a  certain  point,  it  can  never  be  accepted 
by  any  competent  mind  as  a  final  explanation  of  the  facts 
with  which  it  has  to  deal.     Unquestionable  as  its  use  may 
be  as  a  fundamental  hypothesis  in  physiology  and  medicine, 
it  is  wholly  inadequate  as  an  hypothesis  in  philosophy."     In 
an  address  on  Descartes,  Professor  Huxley  also  admits  the 
inadequacy  of  materialism  to  account  for  mental  phenomena. 
In  Germany,  popular  scientists  like  Buechner  have  popular- 
ized  materialism;   but   among   the    deeper   scientists    they 
have  no  standing,  and  they  cannot  claim  to  speak  in  the 
name   of   science.      The   leading   physiologists   admit   that 
matter  does  not  explain  the  facts  of  mind. 

20.  T.  M.  Lindsay  (Mind,  1877,  481)  says  that  the  phi- 
losopher loses  much  if  "  he  attempts  to  confine  his  philo- 
sophical observations  either  to  the  working  of  his  own  mind, 
or  to  an  examination  of  the  writings  of  previous  or  contem- 
porary thinkers.     It  is  his  duty  to  measure  the  pulse   of 
human  thought,  to  note  its  movements,  its  expressions,  to 
understand    its   nature,    and   to   describe   it.     His   task   is 
to  reduce  thought  and  its  movements  to  scientific  formulae. 
But  if  he  isolates  the  problem,  if  he  examines  mind  only  by 
the  introspective  method,  if  he  measures  its  movements  in 
some  narrow  technical  fashion,  if  he  overlooks  the  upheav- 
als of  mind  in  art,  poetry,  and  science,  or  its  crystallization 
in  political  and  ecclesiastical  institutions,  he  has  wantonly 


414  APPENDIX. 

and  arbitrarily  limited  the  sphere  of  his  observation,  and  his 
attempt  must  be  abortive.  .  .  .  The  professional  metaphysi- 
cian who  keeps  within  merely  technical  limits  is  liable  to 
make  a  caricature,  not  the  living  reproduction  of  thought." 
This  applies  especially  to  the  psychologist,  whose  views 
should  be  broad  as  well  as  deep,  comprehensive  as  well  as 
thorough.  He  must  aim  to  give  an  account  of  the  operations 
of  mind,  not  merely  of  a  mind. 

21.  "  Even  if  it  explains  the  form  of  thought,  logic  leaves 
unanswered  another  fundamental  question  of  rational  self- 
criticism,  namely,  whether  and  how  far  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness corresponds  with  reality ;    that   is,  the   question 
respecting  the  possibility  and  validity  of  knowledge.     For 
this   another  subject  is  necessary,  namely,  the   Theory  of 
Knowledge.  ...  It  is  the  first  task  of  this  theory  to  explain 
how  we  happen  to  refer  the  content  of  our  consciousness, 
which  is  produced  by  us,  and  which  we  therefore  recognize 
as  ours,  to  something  which  we  are  not,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
speak  of  knowing  and  comprehending  a  reality  different  from 
ourselves."     (SCHAARSCHMIDT  in  Philos.  Monatsh.,  1878,  7.) 
Benno  Erdmann  holds  that  it  is  the  aim  of  this  theory  to 
determine  the  relation  of  the  object  to  our  knowledge  of  it ; 
"  to  give  the  laws  of  the  relation  of  knowledge  to  things." 
Ulrici  held  that  the  theory  is  to  determine  whether  by  cor- 
rect  thinking   we   attain   a   knowledge   of   reality.      There 
might  be  correct  thinking,  even  if  there  were  no  external 
world. 

22.  Intuitionalism  has  been  used  in  various  senses ;  but 
the  disputes  respecting  it  are  on  the  ground  and  validity 
rather  than  on  the  fact  of   intuitions.     On  the  use  of   the 
word,  H.  Calderwood  (Mind,  1876,  201)  says,  "Intuition  is 
a  direct  beholding  of  an  object  or  a  truth.     It  is  immedi- 
ate knowledge  of  the  thing  itself.     It  stands  in  contrast  with 
knowledge  of  one  thing  through  means  of  another,   as  in 
reasoning ;    and   also   in   contrast   with   admission   of  real 


APPENDIX.  415 

existence  without  personal  observation  of  the  thing,  as  in 
belief.  It  is  direct  vision.  .  .  .  Intuition,  then,  is  percep- 
tion in  contrast  with  comparison  or  judgment,  though  the 
term  has  been  applied  to  the  notion  obtained  by  simple  com- 
parison. It  is  a  single  and  direct  act  in  contrast  with  a  men- 
tal process."  Applying  the  doctrine  of  intuitions  to  morals, 
he  says,  "Let  me  begin  with  a  concise  statement  of  the 
intuitional  theory  of  moral  distinctions.  Self-evident  laws 
of  conduct  afford  the  only  rational  basis  for  distinguishing 
the  moral  qualities  of  actions ;  and  self-evident  moral  laws 
are  intuitively  known  by  men,  that  is,  directly  recognized  by 
the  reason.  Or,  to  throw  it  into  another  form,  moral  laws 
are  applied  by  all  men,  and  are  recognized  as  essentially 
true  and  authoritative,  though  their  validity  has  not  been 
determined  by  personal  induction,  nor  established  by  expe- 
rience of  past  ages,  nor  by  the  consensus  of  opinion  among 
the  more  intelligent  and  civilized  nations,  but  is  self-evident 
to  the  reason."  Dr.  M'Cosh  (Princeton  Review,  Novem- 
ber, 1878,  895)  says  of  the  "  marks  and  tests  of  our  intui- 
tions:"  "Their  primary  and  essential  character  is  not 
necessity,  as  Leibnitz  held,  nor  necessity  and  universality, 
as  Kant  maintained  ;  but  self-evidence.  They  look  immedi- 
ately on  things,  and  contain  their  evidence  within  them- 
selves. Being  so,  they  become  necessary,  that  is,  have  a 
necessity  of  conviction,  which  is  the  secondary  test ;  and 
universal,  that  is,  entertained  by  all  men,  which  is  their  terti- 
ary corroboration."  The  essential  points  are  the  reality,  the 
reason,  and  consequent  authority,  of  their  "  self-evidence." 
One  man  ma}'  reject  what  another  pronounces  "  self-evident 
to  the  reason."  How,  then,  shall  the  dispute  be  decided? 

23.  Whately  sa}*s,  "  Logic  is  entirely  conversant  about 
language,"  which  is  true  so  far  as  language  is  the  instrument 
used  in  reasoning.  De  Morgan  says,  u  Formal  logic  deals 
with  names,  and  not  with  either  the  ideas  or  things  to  which 
these  names  belong."  "  Names  are  exclusively  the  objects 
of  formal  logic."  Mill  claims  that  logic  has  to  do  with 


416  APPENDIX. 

facts  or  things  themselves,  rather  than  with  our  ideas  about 
them.  Jevons  says,  "We  may  therefore  say  that  logic 
treats  ultimately  of  thoughts  and  things,  and  immediately  of 
the  signs  which  stand  for  them."  Venn  says,  "  Every  one, 
it  is  to  be  presumed,  will  admit  that  a  proposition  is  a  state- 
ment in  words  of  a  judgment  about  things."  I  should  say, 
no  proposition ;  thus  making  the  sense  the  very  opposite. 
A  proposition  is  always  a  statement  in  words  of  a  judgment 
about  concepts.  Herbert  Spencer's  peculiar  view  of  logic, 
as  distinct  from  the  process  of  reasoning,  is  found  in  his 
Psychology,  II.  87.  These  conflicting  views  respecting  the 
very  nature  of  logic  and  its  subject-matter  will  show  the 
student  how  much  is  yet  required  to  bring  harmony  and  unity 
into  this  study.  In  spite  of  the  great  attention  devoted  to 
the  subject,  its  sphere  and  fundamental  principles  are  not 
even  agreed  upon. 

24.  In  Mind,  1883,  18,  the  editor  states  that  the  sense 
of  metaphysics  best  justified  historically  is  "  ontology  or 
theory  of  being."  While  physics  is  concerned  with  "the 
being  of  things  as  they  appear,"  "  metaphysic,  as  going 
beyond  physic,  has  then  to  do  with  the  being  of  things  as 
they  are,  or  with  their  being  as  the  ground  of  their  appear- 
ing." Speaking  of  transcendental  metaphysics,  J.  S.  Mill 
(Logic,  first  edit.  I.  9)  says,  "To  this  science  appertain 
the  great  and  much-debated  questions  of  the  existence  of 
matter ;  of  the  existence  of  spirit,  and  the  distinction  between 
it  and  matter ;  of  the  reality  of  time  and  space,  as  things 
without  the  mind,  and  distinguishable  from  the  objects  which 
are  said  to  exist  in  them."  Unfortunately,  later  English 
writers  have  used  the  term  so  vaguely,  or  have  made  it  so 
general,  that  it  can  hardly  be  claimed  to  represent  a  definite 
sphere  of  inquiry.  There  are  definitions  in  which  scarce  a 
trace  of  the  historic  use  of  the  word  is  found.  Professor 
Bain  (Cont.  Rev.,  29,  928)  says,  "  By  metaphysical  study, 
or  metaphysics,  I  mean  —  what  seems  intended  by  the  desig- 
nation in  its  current  employment  at  present  —  the  circle  of 


APPENDIX.  417 

the  mental  or  subjective  sciences.  The  central  department 
of  the  field  is  PSYCHOLOGY  ;  and  the  adjunct  to  psychology  is 
logic,  which  has  its  foundation  partly  in  psychology,  but  still 
more  in  the  sciences  altogether,  whose  procedure  it  gathers 
up  and  formulates.  The  outlying  and  dependent  branches 
are,  the  narrow  metaphysics  or  ontology,  ethics,  sociology, 
together  with  art  or  aesthetics.  There  are  other  applied 
sciences  of  the  department,  as  education  and  philology." 
Another  writer  (C.  E.  Appleton,  Cont.  Rev.,  vol.  28,  925) 
makes  the  ''collective  ego "  the  subject  of  metaphysics. 
"  This  collective  ego,  this  best  self,  this  element  of  common 
consciousness  in  man  as  a  member  of  society,  standing 
behind  and  operating  through  the  ordinary  individual  con- 
sciousness, is  precisely,  and  from  first  to  last,  and  nothing 
else  than,  the  subject-matter  of  metaphysic  as  it  has  been 
understood  since  Kant.  Metaphysic  is  the  science  conver- 
sant with  the  collective  consciousness  of  man  as  a  member 
of  society." 

25.  This  view,  particularly  prominent  in  Vischer's  Aes- 
thetik,  is  by  no  means  confined  to  the  Germans,  but  is  gen- 
erally accepted  by  those  who  make  beauty  more  than  the 
agreeable  and  mere  sentience.  Thus  Cousin  in  his  Lectures 
on  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good  (Wight's  transla- 
tion, 149),  says,  "  Form  cannot  be  simply  a  form  :  it  must  be 
the  form  of  something.  Physical  beauty  is,  then,  the  sign 
of  an  internal  beauty,  which  is  spiritual  and  moral  beauty ; 
and  this  is  the  foundation,  the  principle,  the  unity  of  the 
beautiful."  He  quotes  Reid's  Essay  on  Taste,  in  which 
the  Scotch  philosopher  also  argues  "that  sensible  beauty  is 
only  the  image  of  moral  beauty."  Cousin  repeatedly  states 
the  same  thought.  Thus  he  says,  "The  foundation  of  the 
beautiful  is  the  idea ;  what  makes  art  is  before  all  the  reali- 
zation of  the  idea,  and  not  the  imitation  of  such  or  such  a 
particular  form"  (158).  "  Every  work  of  art  that  does  not 
express  an  idea,  signifies  nothing ;  in  addressing  itself  to 
such  or  such  a  sense,  it  must  penetrate  to  the  mind,  to  the 


418  APPENDIX. 

soul,  and  bear  thither  a  thought,  a  sentiment,  capable  of 
touching  or  elevating  it"  (171).  "  Genius  is  a  ready  and 
sure  perception  of  the  right  proportion  in  which  the  ideal 
and  the  natural  form  and  thought  ought  to  be  united.  This 
union  is  the  perfection  of  art."  He  also  says,  "that  all 
arts  are  such  only  so  far  as  they  express  the  idea  concealed 
under  the  form,  and  are  addressed  to  the  soul  through  the 
senses"  (178).  The  idea  or  ideal,  as  the  essential  element 
in  beauty,  dates  back  to  the  philosophy  of  Plato. 

26.  Ideals,  as  we  have  seen,  are  purely  mental  products, 
though  in  their  formation  the  mind  receives  important  help 
from  existing  objects.  They  do  not  inhere  in  things,  nor 
can  they  be  produced  by  any  energy  in  things.  Of  much 
that  is,  I  declare  that  it  ought  not  to  be  ;  and  of  much  which 
is  not,  that  it  ought  to  be.  Experience  is  necessary  to 
form  these  ideals,  but  they  are  not  given  by  the  experience 
of  what  is.  We  meet  real,  not  ideal  men  ;  from  the  past  and 
present  we  learn  what  governments  have  been  and  are,  not 
what  they  should  be.  We  place  the  ideal  against  the  real, 
and  condemn  the  latter  in  the  interest  of  the  former.  Nor 
are  these  ideals  a  composition,  a  conglomeration  formed  by 
choosing  the  most  perfect  elements  from  what  exists.  The 
perfections  in  ideals  are  not  scattered  about  in  that  way, 
they  do  not  at  all  exist  externally.  But  even  if  they  existed, 
how  could  the  mind  discover  and  select  them,  and  form  them 
into  unity,  unless  it  had  in  itself  a  standard  of  perfection? 
All  such  eclecticism  implies  a  principle  of  selection  and  uni- 
fication. How  could  a  compound  be  recognized  as  the  ideal 
unless  the  mind  had  a  standard  with  which  to  compare  it? 
Pushing  our  inquiries  back  into  matter  itself,'  we  cannot  find 
in  that  the  explanation  of  morality.  Combine  the  chemical 
elements  as  we  please,  we  can  never  get  any  thing  from  them 
except  what  is  really  (though  perhaps  only  in  embryo)  in 
them.  By  multiplying  these  elements,  or  by  subjecting  them 
to  any  known  laws  of  physics,  we  never  rise  above  what 
is  to  what  ought  to  be.  Nor  is  the  ideal  even  an  inference 


APPENDIX. 


419 


drawn  from  things.  If  a  certain  thing  is,  I  may  infer  that 
something  else  must  be  ;  but,  that  something  else  ought  to  be, 
is  not  a  logical  deduction  from  things,  simply  because  it  is 
not  in  things.  We  may  call  it  the  logic  of  the  entire  per- 
sonality, but  not  merely  of  the  intellect.  If  so  absurd  a 
notion  as  this  were  advocated,  that  the  ideal  is  inherited, 
it  would  not  meet  the  case  at  all.  It  is  not  merely  the  trans- 
mission of  the  ideal  which  is  to  be  accounted  for,  but  also  its 
first  origin.  If  only  an  inheritance,  I  may  reject  it ;  only  if 
it  is  rational,  am  I  bound  by  it.  Does  inheritance  make  it 
rational  ?  Does  environment,  or  history,  or  training  ?  These 
things  become  clear  as  soon  as  the  question  is  answered : 
What  ultimately  determines  the  ideal  of  morality  ? 


INDEX. 


ABSTRACTION,  227,  228. 

Abstract  and  Concrete,  190. 

^Esthetics,  268. 

^Esthetics  — Definition,  271. 

^Esthetic  Appreciation,  301. 

^Esthetic  Emotion,  its  Sphere,  296. 

^Esthetics  and  Ethics,  294. 

Agnosticism,  70. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis,  238. 

Art,    287;    Characteristic   in,    290, 

292. 

Arts,  Division  of,  293;  Fine,  289. 
Atoms,  123. 

Beauty,  273. 

Beauty  and  the  Agreeable,  276, 280. 
Beauty  as  Form  and  Substance,  282. 
Beauty  in  Objects,  284. 

Categorical  Imperative,  323. 
Causation,  211. 
Character,  330. 
Communism,  321. 
Conscience,  321. 
Consciousness,  145, 149. 
Criticism,  285. 

Eclecticism,  392. 

Eleatics  School,  27,  29,  44. 

Emotion,  268,  275. 

Epicureans,  30. 

Equality,  Law  of,  215,  226. 

Ethics:  Aim,  310;  Conditions  of, 
311,  315;  Philosophical  and  Theo- 
logical, 314;  Principles  of,  316. 


Experience,  203. 

Experience  and  General  Laws,  211. 

Faith,  Rational,  58,  83. 
Feeling,  Religious,  63,  74. 
Feeling  and  the  Will,  334. 
First  Cause,  70. 
Force,  124. 

Freedom  of  the  Will,  340. 
Freedom,    Philosophical,    90;    Re- 
straints of,  80. 

Hedonism,  327,  333. 
Heredity,  212. 
History,  231. 
Hypotheses,  263. 

Ideals,  214. 

Imagination,  299. 

Inferences,  236. 

Innate  Aptitudes  and  Ideas,  196. 

Intuition,  199. 

Intuitionalism,  246,  317. 

Knowledge,  Completion  of,  229; 
Definition,  183;  Development  -of, 
230;  Limits  of,  193;  Origin  of,  195, 
219;  and  the  Real  World,  206, 219; 
Unity  of,  159. 

Laws,  Mental,  213. 
Logic,  181,  224. 


Materialism,  72,  141. 
Materialists,  202. 


421 


422 


INDEX. 


Memory,  145, 147. 

Mental  Faculties,  170. 

Mental  States,  152. 

Metaphysics,  29,  30,  34,  242;  Basis 
of,  261;  Definition,  247;  Divisions, 
252;  Growth  in,  263;  Importance 
of,  253,  259;  Necessity  of,  254; 
Needs  of,  257;  and  Noetics,  244; 
Problems  of,  250. 

Mind,  130,  135. 

Mind  as  Entity,  264. 

Monism,  139. 

Morality,  Evolution  of,  323. 

Morality  and  Religion,  342. 

Mysterious  Mental  Phenomena, 
136. 

Mysticism,  199. 

Noetics,  173. 

Notions,  General,  191,  215. 

Opera,  The,  293. 

Pantheism,  72. 

Penetrative  Method,  233. 

Peripatetics,  30. 

Philosophize,  24. 

Philosophy,  Definition,  13,  45;  Di- 
vision of,  159,  165;  Etymology,  21; 
in  the  Catholic  Church,  78;  His- 
tory of  the  Term,  20;  How  regard- 
ed in  Greece,  23;  How  regarded 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  30;  How  re- 
garded in  England,  31;  How  re- 
garded in  America,  Scotland, 
Germany,  and  other  lands,  37; 
Method  of  Study,  367;  National- 
ity in,  358;  in  the  Protestant 
Church,  80;  Popular  View  of,  12; 
Problems  leading  to,  7;  reduced 
to  Psychology,  134;  Scientific,  93; 
its  Sphere,  12;  Spirit  in  its  Study, 
349;  Subjects  included,  42;  Vague- 
ness of  the  Term,  16. 

Physics  among  the  Ancients,  162. 

Positivism,  3,  111,  255. 

Principles,  46. 


Psychology,  Abstract  Terms  in,  150; 
Applications  of,  154;  Definition, 
129;  Experimental,  188;  and  Nat- 
ural Science,  138;  Metaphysical, 
133,  139;  Propaedeutics  to  Philoso- 
phy, 156;  its  Sources,  146;  Spe- 
cialists in,  148,  153;  Value  of,  155. 

Psycho-Physics,  154,  168. 

Rational,  47. 

Reason,  Limits  of,  69,  83. 

Reasoning,  Analogical,  141. 

Religion,  60, 63;  Conflicts  with  Phi-' 
losophy,  83;  its  Origin,  61;  Rela- 
tion to  Philosophy,  57. 

Right,  331. 

Rightness,  339. 

Sacrifice,  330. 

Scepticism,  Philosophical,  69,  178. 

Sceptics,  30. 

Science,  Definition  of,  94;  Limits  of, 

105,  120;  and  Philosophy,  96, 112; 

and  Religion,  73. 
Sensation,  208. 
Sensationalism,  210. 
Socialism,  4. 
Socratic  School,  28. 
Sophists,  23,  28,  41,  44. 
Soul,  132;  its  Activity,  144. 
Specialization,  228,  232. 
Stoics,  30. 
Sublimity,  287. 
Substance,  233. 
System,  47,  237. 

Taste,  302. 

Tendencies,  Empirical  and  Ideal,  2. 
Theory  of  Knowledge,  175;  its  Re- 
lation to  Logic,  180. 
Tilings  per  se,  222. 
Thinking,  Pure,  233. 
Thought,  225;  Energy  of,  231. 

Utilitarianism,  317. 
Wisdom,  25,  28,  30,  44. 


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